DOMINGO SERMONIA, JESUS SEMPER, PASTOR SEMIC, ELIAS FAJAMOLIN, EULOGIO TOLENTINO, GIL SAPALARAN AND AMADO SANTIANES, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. JOSE T. SANTACERA, AMADO SIASAT, …

Sermonia versus Santacera

The Case

This is an appeal by the respondents from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The petitioners, seven policemen of the municipality of San Joaquin in Iloilo, were removed from their positions by the newly elected mayor, Jose T. Santacera, and replaced by persons who were neither civil service eligibles nor war veterans. The petitioners sued for quo warranto and mandamus with damages, claiming that as war veterans they were entitled to preference over the mayor's appointees. The case matters because it fixes the rule that the veteran's preference is not a mere preference in appointment but a preference in retention — a temporary appointee who is a war veteran cannot be replaced by a non-veteran who is not a civil service eligible.

Procedural History

The petitioners first asked Mayor Santacera for reinstatement and payment of their salaries, and he denied the request. They then commenced an action for quo warranto and mandamus with damages before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor: it declared them entitled to their respective positions from which they were removed, except Jesus Semper, who was found not to be a war veteran; ordered Mayor Santacera to reimburse the municipality for whatever amounts it may pay the petitioners; ordered him to pay attorney's fees of 500 pesos; and denied the claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack of evidence. The respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. Jesus Semper did not seek review of the decision and is not involved in the appeal.

Facts

On the dates set out after their respective names — Elias Fajamolin on April 16, 1949; Pastor Semic and Domingo Sermonia on January 1, 1952; Gil Sapalaran on September 8, 1958; Jesus Semper and Eulogio Tolentino on January 1, 1960; and Amado Santianes on February 8, 1960 — the petitioners were extended temporary appointments as members of the police force of San Joaquin, Iloilo. These appointments were attested to by the provincial treasurer of Iloilo and approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service under the Civil Service Act of 1959. The petitioners qualified, assumed their duties, and received the emoluments attached to their positions continuously up to December 31, 1963.

On that date, the newly elected mayor, Jose T. Santacera, gave notice of the termination of their services. He then appointed as their replacements Amado Siasat, Graciano Sandig, Ireneo Salcedo, Quirico Chavez, Eusebio Selibio, Jesus Sardon, Antonio Saquilayan, Eduardo Baylon and Fermin Egalin, who assumed the positions formerly held by the petitioners.

The petitioners admitted that they were not civil service eligibles, but asserted that as war veterans they were entitled to preference over the mayor's appointees, who were neither civil service eligibles nor war veterans. On appeal, the respondents argued that the petitioners were merely temporary employees who could be removed at any time; that the veteran's preference under the law refers only to appointments and promotions, not to retention; and that the preference was good only for three years from the passage of the amendatory law in 1947, so that a separation in 1963 fell beyond its reach.

Issues

• Whether or not the veteran's preference granted by law extends to the retention of the position held, and not merely to appointment and promotion, so that a temporary appointee who is a war veteran cannot be replaced by a person who is not a civil service eligible.
• Whether or not the expiration of the three-year period fixed in the earlier veteran's preference law bars the petitioners from invoking that preference, in view of the later enactment of Republic Act Number 1363.
• Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to back salaries during the period of their separation from service.

Applicable Provisions

Section 8 of Republic Act Number 65, as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act Number 154, provides:

Sec. 8. For a period of three years from the time of the passage of this Act, the persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof shall, all other qualifications being equal: (1) Have preference in appointments and promotions in and to any Government office, agency, or instrumentality, or in and to any Government-owned or subsidized corporation, the provisions of law as to civil service eligibility notwithstanding: Provided, That in examinations where experience is an element of qualification the time spent in the military or naval service of the United States or of the Philippines shall be credited in a veteran's rating where his actual employment in a similar vocation to that for which he is examined was interrupted by such military or naval service.

This is the provision the respondents invoke, and the Court reads its phrase on preference in appointments as embracing the retention of the position to which the veteran was appointed.

Section 1 of Republic Act Number 1363 provides:

Sec. 1. The policy of the Government is to give preference, other considerations being approximately equal, to persons who are veterans under section four of this Act.

This later law supplies the continuing policy of veteran preference that survives the expiration of the three-year term in the earlier statute.

Section 2 of the same Act provides:

Sec. 2. Accordingly, appointing officers shall give preference to veterans when extending appointments to positions in the government, in semi-government corporations, and government-controlled corporations. Appointing officers who knowingly violate the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of one month's pay for the first violation, and dismissal from the service for the second violation.

This makes the preference a duty of the appointing officer, enforced by a penalty for knowing violation.

Section 4 of the same Act provides:

Sec. 4. The term 'veteran' as employed in this Act shall refer to: (1) veterans of the Philippine Revolution as certified to by the Board of Pensions for Revolutionary Veterans; (2) veterans of World War ll as certified to by the Philippine Veterans Board; and (3) honorably discharged soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who have served therein for at least five years.

This defines who may claim the preference, and the six petitioners fall within it as admitted war veterans.

Section 5 of the same Act provides:

Sec. 5. In order to enable a veteran to obtain preference under the provisions of this Act, it must be shown that he has approximately the same qualifications as other applicants. It is not intended that a veteran shall have priority over civil service eligibles unless he himself is of the same or higher civil service eligibility.

This sets the limit of the preference: it does not defeat a civil service eligible, but it does operate against a non-eligible who is not a veteran.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the veteran's preference extends to retention. It is true that temporary employees may be removed at any time in the absence of a legal provision to the contrary, but such a provision is found in Section 8 insofar as war veterans are concerned. Quoting its earlier ruling in Gonzalez versus Aldana, the Court said:

the Act aforementioned speaks of preference in general and our impression is that the preference contemplated by the law is not only an appointment whereby a veteran is accepted in the service of the Government but also his enjoyment of the benefits, rights and emoluments accruing from said appointment. It would certainly be unjust as well as illogical if after appointing a non-veteran to a Government position today, he may be replaced and dismissed tomorrow, when there are non-veterans occupying other and similar positions who could and should be replaced first.

The Court stressed that the positions were neither policy determining, primarily confidential, nor highly technical, and that the petitioners were not asking for promotion or transfer but only to retain their positions.

On the second issue, the Court held that the three-year limitation no longer barred the claim, because Republic Act Number 1363 took effect on June 18, 1955. Three of the petitioners were still in office when that law was approved, and it was already in force when the other three were appointed. All six were therefore entitled to its benefits. Following Sison versus Pajo, the Court held that the replacement of a non-eligible but veteran incumbent by another non-eligible was unlawful, because the former, although appointed in an acting capacity, was entitled by the preference to keep his position until the availability of a civil service eligible was duly certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service. The Court noted that the petitioners' case was even stronger than Sison's, since the replacement there was himself a war veteran, and even the later acquisition of eligibility by the replacement did not cure the invalidity of the removal. The earlier Ribo cases, invoked by the respondents, arose before Republic Act Number 1363 and were deemed modified to that extent.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the award of back salaries, rejecting the respondents' second assignment of error in light of the same reasoning on preference and retention.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the veteran's preference under the civil service laws is a preference not only in appointment but also in retention; a temporary appointee who is a war veteran may not be replaced by a person who is neither a civil service eligible nor a veteran. Second, the preference does not give a veteran priority over a civil service eligible unless he himself holds the same or higher eligibility, as Section 5 of Republic Act Number 1363 states. Third, the expiration of the three-year term in Republic Act Number 65, as amended, does not extinguish the preference, because Republic Act Number 1363 established a continuing policy of preference for veterans. Fourth, the replacement of a non-eligible veteran incumbent by another non-eligible is unlawful until the Commissioner of Civil Service certifies that a civil service eligible is available.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, with costs against the respondents-appellants; the six petitioners who were war veterans won reinstatement and back salaries, while Jesus Semper, who did not appeal, was not reinstated.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the veteran's preference is a preference in appointment and in retention, so a temporary veteran appointee cannot be replaced by a non-veteran non-eligible. Examiners use this case in civil service and administrative law questions on the scope of the veteran's preference and the removal of temporary employees.