UNIVERSAL INSURANCE INDEMNITY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF?APPELLANT, VS. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY AND ITS SUBSIDIARY MANILA PORT SERVICE, DEFENDANTS?APPELLEES.

This is a direct appeal from the portion of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dis­missing the plaintiff’s first cause of
action for the recovery of the sum of P3,935.00.

From the stipulation of facts on the first cause of action, it
appears that on August 30, 1960
the vessel “SS FERNSTATE” arrived at the Port
of Ma­nila carrying a shipment of
twenty-one (21) bales of cotton piece-goods consigned to Cinderella Dresses of Caloocan, Rizal.  On September
2, 1960 the said shipment was completely discharged in good order
from the carry­ing vessel and into the custody of the Manila Port Ser­vice, the
arrastre operator acting as a subsidiary of the
Manila Railroad Company (now Philippine National Railways).  When the consignee’s customs broker withdrew
the shipment from the Manila Port Service on September 9, 1960, eight (8) bales were found to be in bad
order and the contents thereof short by eight hundred thirty-two pounds (832
lbs.).  On October 31, 1960 the consignee filed with the Manila Port
Service a formal claim for the value of the shortage.  However, the said formal claim was preceded
by a provisional Claim dated August
26, 1960, which was received by the arrastre
operator from the consignee’s customs broker on September 1,1960, a day prior to the discharge of the
aforementioned shipment from the carrying vessel.

The Universal Insurance and Indemnity Company, as insurer of the
goods, upon demand made by the consignee, paid the value of the shortage in the
sum of P3,935.00 and was thereby subrogated to the consignee’s rights.  Having been refused payment of its claim, the
insurer, on August 30, 1961,
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Manila
Railroad Com­pany and the Manila Port Service.

On April 15, 1965
the lower court rendered the decision appealed from.  After its motion for reconsidera­tion was
denied for lack of merit, the plaintiff insti­tuted this appeal alleging that
the lower court commit­ted the following errors, among others, namely: (1) in
failing to hold that its provisional claim under the first cause of action was
sufficient compliance with Paragraph 15 of the Management Contract; and (2) in
de­claring that its claim under said cause of action was time-barred.

The pertinent portion of Paragraph 15 of the Ma­nagement Contract
reads as follows:

“x x x; in
any event, the Con­tractor shall be relieved and re­leased of any and all
responsibility or liability for loss, dam­age, misdelivery
and non-delivery of goods, unless suit in the court of proper jurisdiction is
brought within a period of one (1) year from the date when the claim for the
value of such goods have been rejected or denied by the Contractor, provided
that such claim shall have been filed with 
the Contractor within fifteen (15) days from the date of  discharge of the last package  from the carrying vessel.”
(Underscoring supplied)

Under the above-quoted provision of the Manage­ment Contract, it
is clear that the claim must be filed “within fifteen (15) days from the
date of dis­charge of the last package from the carrying vessel.”  In the instant case, considering that the
provisional claim was filed one (1) day before the discharge of the shipment;
and considering further that there is no showing that at the time of the filing
of said claim the consignee or its customs broker had knowledge of any shortage
in the shipment, as in fact there was none because said shipment was admittedly
discharged in good order on the following day, the appellant’s provisional
claim was undoubtedly premature and specu­lative and cannot be legally
considered as a substan­tial compliance with the requirement of paragraph 15 of
the Management Contract.^[1]

The appellant now contends that even granting that it failed to
file a claim within the 15-day period prescribed in paragraph 15 of the
Management Contract, it is not barred from filing the claim in court since the
same was commenced within one (1) year from the date of discharge of the
cargo.  In disposing of a similar
contention, this Court in the case of Insurance Company of North
America vs. Manila Port Service, et al.,^[2]
said:

“It is true that the present action was instituted by appellee within the period of one year from the date of the
arrival of the shipment in view of the failure of appel­lant to pay the value
of the miss­ing article, but such step is not sufficient it appearing that appellee has failed to file a claim therefor
with appellant within the 15-day period from the carrying vessel as provided in
section 15 of the management con­tract; and it is preposterous to contend, as appellee now claims, that such provisional claim is not
necessary because the appel­lee has already filed an
action in court within the one-year pe­riod not only because the provi­sions of
the management contract on the point seem to be clear but also because of the
interpretation already placed thereon by this Court in another similar case in­volving
a similar issue.  We refer to the case of
David Consunji, et al. v. The Manila
Port Service, et al., G. R. No.
L-15551, November 29, 1960,
wherein this Court made the following comment:

‘We do not think this interpretation may be sustain­ed.  Carriers or deposita­ries sometimes require
pre­sentation of claims within a short time after delivery as a condition
precedent to their liability for losses. 
Such requirement is not emp­ty formalism.  It has a de­finite purpose i. e. to afford the carrier or depo­sitary a reasonable
opportu­nity and facilities to check the validity of the claims while the facts
are still fresh in the minds of the persons who took part in the transaction
and documents are still available.  x x x.’

In view of the foregoing, and considering that the other errors
assigned depend upon those herein resolved, we hold that the lower court ruled
correctly in dismissing the first cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar,
Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., did not take part.

^[1]
Shell Co. of the Phil. Ltd. vs. Compañia
General de Tabacos de Filipinas, L-20230, July 30,
1965; New Hamp­shire Fire Ins. Co. vs. Manila Port Service, et al,
L-20938, Aug. 9, 1966; Rizal Surety & Ins. Co.,
Inc. vs. Manila Railroad & Manila Port Service, L-22409, April 27,
1967; Domestic Ins. Co. of the Phil. vs. Ma­nila Railroad Co., L-24066,
Aug. 30, 1967.

^[2]
G. R. No. L-17331, Nov. 29, 1961.