file:tecson vs comelec 161434 march 3, 2004 j_ puno en banc.htm

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

Why bastard?  Wherefore

When my dimensions are well compact,

My mind as generous, and my shape as
true

As honest madam’s issue?

Why brand they us

With base?  With baseness

Bastardy?  Base, base? 

Who, in the lusty stealth of nature
take

More composition and fierce quality

Than doth, within a dull stale, tired
bed,

Got ‘tween sleep and wake?

– well then,

Legitimate Edgar, I must have your
land:

Our father’s love is to the bastard
Edmund.

As to the legitimate:  fine word – legitimate!

Well my legitimate, if this letter
speed,

And my invention thrive, Edmund the
base

Shall top the legitimate.  I grow; I prosper –

Now, gods, stand up for bastards!

(Edmund,
Bastard Son to Gloster,

King Lear, Act I, Scene
II)

I.

PROLOGUE

The petitions at bar seek the disqualification of respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. from running for the Presidency in the May 2004 national
elections.  But the issues posed by the
petitions at bar transcend the person of respondent Poe.  These issues affect some of our most deeply
held values in democracy – – – the protection of the exercise of political
rights, such as the right to run for public office against irrelevant
impediments, the levelling of the political playing field, the disapprobation
of political loyalty in our temples of justice, elimination of all invidious
discrimination against non-marital children, and the continued enthronement of
the sovereignty of the people in the election of our leaders.  The petitions at bar concern all these
democratic values.  It is the people on
the line.  It is us.

II.

THE FACTS AND THE PROCEEDINGS

Let us first look at the facts for they are staring at us. On
December 31, 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. filed with the Commission on Elections his Certificate of Candidacy
for President in the May 10, 2004 elections. 
He made the following declarations under oath in his certificate of
candidacy:

CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY

FOR PRESIDENT

I hereby announce my candidacy for the position of PRESIDENT,
Republic of the Philippines, in the May 10, 2004 elections; and after having
been sworn in accordance with law, hereby state the following:

1.            FULL
NAME: POE, FERNANDO, JR./RONALD ALLAN KELLEY

2.            ONE
NICKNAME OR STAGE NAME (by which I am generally or popularly known): FPJ

3.            OFFICIALLY
NOMINATED BY: KNP

4.            DATE
OF BIRTH: 20 August 1939 PLACE OF BIRTH: MANILA SEX: MALE

5.            CIVIL
STATUS: M IF MARRIED, FULL NAME OF SPOUSE: JESUSA SONORA

6.            I
AM A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN

7.            PROFESSION
OR OCCUPATION: MOVIE PRODUCER/ACTOR

8.            RESIDENCE:
23 LINCOLN ST., GREENHILLS, SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA

9.            RESIDENCE
IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 10, 2004: 64 Years and 8 Months

10.          I
AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 227 A, BARANGAY GREENHILLS
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, PROVINCE OF METRO MANILA

11.          I
AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR MIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12.          I
AM ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.  I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines, and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I
will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion, I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct
of my own personal knowledge.

31 December 2003

(thumbmarked)                                   (sgd) RONALD ALLAN K. POE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31^st day of Dec.
2003 at Manila, affiant exhibiting to me his/her Community Tax Certificate No.
11835585 issued on 8 Jan. 2003 at San Juan, M. Mla.

Doc. No. 92              (sgd) ATTY. KEVIN NARCE B. VIVERO

Page No. 20                          NOTARY PUBLIC

Book No. III                            until December 31, 2003

Series of 2003          PTR NO. 881104, JAN. 09, 2003, MANILA

On January 9, 2004, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, Victorino X.
Fornier, filed with the COMELEC a “Petition for Disqualification of
Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr.” Fornier alleged that respondent Poe is not a citizen of the Philippines,
much less a natural-born citizen, and as such, lacks one of the essential
qualifications for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines.  Fornier presented a
photocopy of the marriage contract of Allan Fernando Poe, respondent Poe’s
father, and a certain Paulita Gomez which appears to have been executed on July
5, 1936.[1]
Said marriage contract indicates that Allan Fernando Poe’s nationality was “Español”,
and that his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes, were both Spanish
citizens.  The copy presented by Fornier
was certified by Ricardo Manapat, Chief of the Records Management and Archives Office.[2]
Based on said document, Fornier alleged that respondent Poe could not have
acquired Filipino citizenship from his father. 
Fornier added that even if respondent Poe’s father were a Filipino
citizen, he still could not have validly acquired Filipino citizenship from the
former because the prior marriage of Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez
renders the marriage of his parents, Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley,
void, thus making him an illegitimate child. 
He contended that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the
legally known parent which is the mother. 
Respondent Poe’s mother, Bessie Kelley, was admittedly an American citizen.[3]
In addition to the copy of the marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe and
Paulita Gomez, petitioner Fornier also presented a photocopy of the affidavit
of Paulita Gomez stating that she filed a bigamy case against Allan Fernando Poe.[4]
Petitioner prayed that respondent Poe be disqualified from running for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be denied due course or cancelled.

In his Answer, respondent Poe asserted that he is a Filipino
citizen and denied Fornier’s allegation that his father and his grandparents
were Spanish subjects.  He likewise
denied the alleged prior marriage between Allan Fernando Poe and one Paulita
Gomez.  He maintained that his father,
Allan Fernando Poe, and grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, were Filipino citizens.  He alleged that since the Constitution
provides that “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” are
Filipinos, he is therefore a Filipino citizen. 
Respondent presented a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan stating the contents of page 32 of
Book 4 of the Register of Death of San Carlos City which show, among others,
that Lorenzo Pou died a Filipino citizen.[5] Respondent alleged
that Lorenzo Pou was born a Spanish subject; he was an inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands when Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States
by virtue of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898; and he became a citizen
of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law.  Respondent further averred
that in his lifetime, Lorenzo Pou comported himself a Philippine citizen – – –
he voted in elections; he did not register as an alien; and he owned real properties.[6]
Respondent Poe also presented the death certificate of his father, Allan
Fernando Poe, which states that he died as Filipino.[7] Respondent further
alleged that his father was born in the Philippines in 1916, before the 1935
Constitution took effect, hence, a Filipino by reason of his birthplace. He
stated that Allan Fernando Poe acted as a Filipino during his lifetime.  He was called to active duty to serve in the
Philippine Army; he was inducted into the USAFFE; he fought in Bulacan and was
in the “Death March”; and after the war, he reverted to inactive status with
the rank of Captain;[8] he was awarded the
Gold Cross[9]
and served the guerilla movement during the Japanese occupation.  Respondent Poe also presented his own
Certificate of Birth[10] which indicates
that he is a Filipino citizen and that his father, Allan F. Poe, was
Filipino.  Like his father and
grandfather, respondent Poe represented and conducted himself as Filipino from
birth.  He is a registered voter and has
voted in every election; he holds a Philippine passport;[11]
he owns real properties which only citizens of this country may do;[12]
he represented himself as a citizen of the Philippines in all contracts or
transactions.  Respondent dismissed as a
“worthless piece of paper” the alleged marriage contract between Allan Fernando
Poe and Paulita Gomez for the following reasons:  (1) it is only a xerox copy which is not even
represented to be a xerox copy of an original document; (2) no averment is
made  whether an original exists and
where it is located; (3) assuming an original exists, its genuineness and due
execution may not be assumed and no proof is offered; and (4) it is not
evidence, much less persuasive evidence of the citizenship of the parties.  Respondent further presented the sworn
statement of Ms. Ruby Kelley Mangahas, a surviving sister of Bessie Kelley
belying, among others, petitioner’s claim of the prior marriage between Allan
Fenando Poe and Paulita Gomez.[13]

Meanwhile, Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
as well as Zoilo Antonio Velez, filed their separate petitions with this Court,
also seeking the disqualification of respondent Poe from the presidential
elections on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.  Petitioners Tecson and Desiderio[14]
contended that respondent Poe is an illegitimate child and therefore follows
the citizenship of his mother. 
Petitioners cite the marriage certificate of Poe’s parents which shows
that they were married in 1940, while Poe was born in 1939.  They contend that it does not appear that Poe
has been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents as he had not
been acknowledged by his father.  The
same arguments were advanced by petitioner Velez.[15]

The Senate also conducted two public hearings on January 21, 2004
and February 2, 2004 on the authenticity of the following documents submitted
by petitioner Fornier to the COMELEC: 
(1) the alleged birth certificate of Allan Fernando Poe; (2) the alleged
marriage certificate between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez; and (3) the
alleged bigamy charge filed by Paulita Gomez against Allan Fernando Poe.  The Senate issued subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum to compel the appearance of witnesses and the
production of documents, equipment and other materials relevant to the
investigation.  Witnesses from the
Records Management and Archives Office came forward and testified that they
have been unwitting instruments in the fabrication of the documents in
question.  The Senate Committee Report
No. 517, signed by Senators Edgardo Angara, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, Rodolfo
Biazon, Loren Legarda, Aquilino Pimentel, Sergio Osmeña, Juan Flavier and
Vicente C. Sotto III, recommended the criminal prosecution of Director Ricardo
Manapat for falsification of public documents, perjury, incriminatory
machination, theft, infidelity in the custody of document, violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and obstruction of justice.  The Report was submitted by the respondent to
the COMELEC en banc.

After hearing the parties, the First Division of the COMELEC, on
January 23, 2004, issued a Resolution dismissing Fornier’s petition for
disqualification for lack of merit.  The
First Division stated that its jurisdiction is limited to all contests relating
to elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial
and city officials.  It, however, has
authority to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials in
actions under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, in Petitions to
Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that any
material representation contained therein is false.  Thus, the First Division of the COMELEC
proceeded to assess the evidence presented by the parties to resolve the issue
of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen.  The COMELEC First Division concluded:
“(c)onsidering that the evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial,
we declare that the respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation
when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.”

Petitioner Fornier moved to reconsider the Resolution of the
First Division.

On February 6, 2004, the Commission En Banc affirmed the
Resolution of the First Division.

Thus, petitioner Fornier filed a Petition for Certiorari with
this Court assailing the Resolution of the Commission En Banc.  He cited the following grounds for the
petition:

1.    Respondent Comelec committed grave and
reversible error of law and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it arbitrarily and
whimsically ruled, in violation of the Constitution, existing laws,
jurisprudence and its own rules and issuance, that it had no jurisdiction over
the disqualification case below grounded on the lack of essential qualification
of respondent FPJ and on his disqualification to be elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines.

2.    Respondent Comelec committed grave and
reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that under the law
Lorenzo Pou became a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

3.    Respondent Comelec committed grave and
reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that, under law and
Constitution, Allan F. Poe/Allan Fernando Poe/Allan R. Pou/Fernando R. Pou
became a citizen of the Philippine Islands or of the Philippines.

4.    Respondent Comelec committed grave and
reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that, under the
1935 Constitution, respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen despite
his illegitimacy.

5.    Assuming arguendo that respondent Comelec’s
jurisdiction is limited to denying due course or cancelling certificate of
candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation, respondent Comelec
committed grave and reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that
respondent FPJ’s certificate of candidacy does not contain a material
misrepresentation or falsity as to his being a natural-born Filipino citizen.

6.    Respondent Comelec committed grave and
reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that respondent FPJ
should not be declared as disqualified to run for President in the May 2004
elections, and in consequently dismissing the petition of petitioner Fornier.

7.    In any event, regardless of whether or not
respondent Comelec has jurisdiction to rule on the disqualification case below
which is grounded on the fact that respondent FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen and thus lacks an essential qualification, the Honorable Court
can take cognizance of said issue and rule on the qualifications of respondent
FPJ to run for the position of President for the Republic of the Philippines.

III.

THE ISSUES

On February 23, 2004, the Court held a session to discuss the
cases at bar.  The issues discussed were
the following:  (1) Whether the Court has
jurisdiction over the Tecson and Valdez petitions and the Fornier petition; (2)
Assuming the Court has jurisdiction, whether the COMELEC en banc gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the Fornier petition on the ground that
Fornier failed to prove that respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented himself
as a natural-born Filipino; (3) Assuming there is no grave abuse of discretion,
whether the issue of the citizenship of respondent Poe should now be resolved;
and (4) Assuming the issue will now be resolved, whether the Court should
resolve it on the basis of the evidence on record or whether it should be
remanded to the COMELEC to enable the parties to adduce further evidence on the
acknowledgment made by Allan F. Poe of respondent Poe as his son.

These issues shall be discussed in seriatim.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A.

JURISDICTION

The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction.  It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and
Valdez petitions.  Petitioners cannot
invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The word “contest” in the provision means
that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of a President or Vice President. 
There can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed.

On the other hand, the Court is also unanimous in its view that
it has jurisdiction over the Fornier petition. 
The COMELEC treated the Fornier petition as a petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of B.P. Blg.
881 which provides:

B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78.  Petition
to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false.  The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election.

Article IX (C), Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution provides:

Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The Fornier petition is before this Court
on review under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.  The jurisdiction of this Court is therefore
unassailable.

B.

THE
COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE CHARGE THAT RESPONDENT POE
DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTED THAT HE IS A NATURAL- BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IN HIS
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

Certiorari power of this Court to

review COMELEC decisions is a

limited
power.

We start with the elementary proposition that the certiorari
power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC is a limited one.  This Court can only reverse or change the
COMELEC decision on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.  Grave abuse of discretion
has a well defined meaning in our jurisprudence.  It means despotic, arbitrary or capricious.  A decision supported by substantial evidence
is not despotic, arbitrary or capricious. 
Neither is a decision interpreting a novel or difficult question of law
with logical reasons.  A mere
disagreement with COMELEC on the weight it gave to certain evidence or on its
interpretation of some difficult provisions of law is no basis to strike down
the COMELEC decision as despotic, arbitrary or whimsical.  More so when the case involves election law
where the expertise of COMELEC ought to be conceded.

The ruling of the COMELEC

denying the petition to disqualify

respondent Poe is based on

substantial evidence, hence is not

despotic,
whimsical or capricious.

To stress again, the petition of Fornier was treated by the
COMELEC as a petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of respondent Poe on the ground of material misrepresentation under B.P. Blg.
881, Section 78.  Allegedly, respondent
Poe misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.  In Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC[16]
we held that the misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate
and willfull.

Petitioner, therefore, has the burden to prove by substantial
evidence the following facts:  (1) that
respondent Poe made a misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy; (2)
that the misrepresentation is material to the position of which he is a
candidate; and (3) that the material misrepresentation was made deliberately
and willfully.  Let us now examine the
evidence presented by petitioner Fornier to determine whether he was able to
discharge the burden of evidence.

Analysis of Petitioner’s

Evidence

The first evidence of
petitioner is Exhibit “A” which is the Certificate of Birth of respondent
Poe.  This evidence proved the date of
birth of respondent Poe, i.e., August 20, 1939.  It is no proof that he is not a natural-born
citizen.  Nor is it proof that respondent
Poe knew that he was not a natural-born citizen and deliberately represented
himself as such in his Certificate of Candidacy.

The second evidence of
petitioner are Exhibits “B”, “B-1” and “B-2”.  Exhibits “B” and “B-1” is the Sworn Statement
of Paulita Gomez charging Allan F. Poe with bigamy.  Exhibit “B-2” is the alleged marriage
contract between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez.  Exhibits “B”, “B-1” and “B-2” were presented
thru Director Manapat.  These exhibits do
not prove anything.  They are out and out
fabrications.  The sworn statements of
Mr. Remmel G. Talabis, Mr. Emman A. Llamora, Ms. Vicelyn G. Tarin, all
employees of the Records Management and Archives Office, as well as the sworn
statements of Mr. William Duff and Mr. Victorino Floro III of Florofoto proved
the fabrications of Director Manapat.

The sworn statement of Remmel
Talabis states:

REPUBLIKA NG
PILIPINAS)

SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA    ) s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako Si Remmel G. Talabis,
nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 149 P. Gomez St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

1.    Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa
Pambansang Sinupan bilang Store Keeper I sa Supplies Section.  Inilipat ako ni Dir. Ricardo Manapat sa aming
Computer Section dahil sa ako ay nagtapos ng Computer Technology.

2.    Noong magkakatapusan ng buwan ng Nobyembre
2003 ay ipinatawag ako ni Dir. Manapat sa kanyang tanggapan at ako ay inutusang
mag-scan ng mga birth record sa Archives, Paco. 
Nakahanda na raw ang mga ito at ii-scan na lang.  Ang mga birth record na ito ay mula sa mga
taong 1936 hanggang 1941.

       Matapos kong i-scan ang mga birth record
at makabalik sa opisina ay inutusan naman niya ako na linisin ang mga ito at
alisin ang mga datos na nakalagay dito at pagkatapos ay gawan ko raw ito ng
black and white copy.  Ginawa ko ito sa
Adobe Photoshop.  Nagpa-print din siya ng
mga kopya nito.

3.    Muli na naman akong ipinatawag ni Dir.
Manapat noong kaagahan ng buwan ng Disyembre 2003 at ako ay inutusan na naman
niya na mag-scan ng birth record sa Archives, Paco.  Ayon sa kanya ang kailangan niya raw na
record ay para sa taon ng 1915 o 1916 pero ang pinakamaagang kopya lang ng
birth record na nasa Archives, Paco ay para sa taon ng 1928 lang.  Kaya yun na lang ang ipina-scan niya sa akin.

3.1    Nang matapos kong i-scan ang birth record ay
inutusan niya ako uli na linisin ang birth record, alisin ang mga datos nito at
gawing black and white copy.  Inutusan
din niya ako na dagdagan ng entrada ang black and white na kopya ng 1928 birth
record ng in-scan ko, para sa “province” at “municipality.” Pina-alis din niya
ang numero “2” sa lahat ng “192_” na entrada. 
Nagpa-print siya ng kopya nito.

3.2    Pinahanap din ako ni Dir. Manapat ng katulad
na font na ginamit sa 1928 birth record na in-scan ko pero hindi ako makakita
kaya “nag-cut and paste” na lang ako ng mga letra mula din sa nasabing
dokumento at ipinagdugtong-dugtong ko na lang para mabuo ang mga salitang
isisingit.

4.    Bago mag-pasko ay ipinatawag niya akong muli
sa kanyang tanggapan.  Inutusan niya ako
na kopyahin ang isang faxed copy ng marriage certificate at gawan ito ng
“form.” Naumpisahan kong gawin ang porma ngunit hindi ko natapos dahil sumapit
na ang takdang araw ng aking forced leave na na-file.  Nang mga panahon ding iyon ay inuutusan na
rin niya ako na mag scan ng mga pirma mula sa iba’t-ibang documento at linisin
ang nga iyon.

4.1    Tinawagan ko si Emman Llamera upang
pakiusapan na siya na lang ang tumapos duon sa iniuutos sa akin ni Dir.
Manapat.  Pumayag naman siya dahil wala
ng ibang gagawa noon.

5.    Nakaraan ang ilang araw ay nakatanggap naman
ako ng tawag mula kay Dir. Manapat na nagtatanong kung paano lilinisin ang
pirma na ilalagay sa MS Word document. 
Sinabi ko na sa Adobe Photoshop ang gamitin para malinis ang mga dumi.

6.    Matapos iyon ay wala na kaming komunikasyon
hanggang sa ako’y pumasok ng Enero 5, 2004. Ipinatawag niya ako muli sa kanyang
tanggapan at inutusan na i-print ang isang Marriage Contract.  Ito yung “form” ng Marriage Contract na
pinagawa niya sa akin noong Disyembre.

6.1    Nang aking suriin ang documento, nakita ko
na meron nang mga entrada tulad ng pangalan, pirma, selyo, atbp.  Pero gusto ni Dir. Manapat na paliitin
ito.  Sinabi ko sa kanya na mahirap gawin
yun sa isang Word Document.

6.2    Iminungkahi ko sa kanya na kung gusto nyang
paliitin ang marriage contract ay mas maigi na i-print ito ng actual size at
pagkatapos ay i-scan muli at pagkatapos ay i-paste sa MS Word para madali tong
i-resize.  Pumayag naman siya at ito nga
ang aming ginawa.  Ayon sa kanya ay gawin
namin itong katulad lamang ng laki ng isang lumang litrato sa Archives Library.

6.3    Pinalagyan din niya ng parang wavy line na
border ang ipina-print nyang marriage contract sa akin.  Pagkatapos ay pinadagdagan na naman niya ito
ng isa pang border para raw magmukhang naka ipit.  Pina-print niya ito ulit sa akin gamit ang
isang newsprint na papel.

7.    Ang sumunod naman nyang ipinagawa sa akin ay
ang paglalagay naman ng pirma ng isang Paulita Gomez sa gilid ng isang
dokumento at pirma ng isang nagngangalang Cordero sa ikalawang pahina ng
pareho ring dokumento na nakasaad sa wikang espanyol.  Dati ng may nakalagay na pirma ni Paulita
Gomez sa ibabaw ng pangalan nito sa ikalawang pahina ng documento.  Nang matapos ko ang pinagagawa niya,
ipina-print niya sa akin ang nasabing dokumento gamit ang isang newsprint na
papel.

8.    Makaraan pa ng ilang araw, pinatawag akong
muli ni Dir. Manapat upang ipa-scan naman ang isang birth record na may
pangalan ng isang Allan Fernando Poe. 
Inutusan po ako na mag-print ng isang negative copy at isang positive
copy.

8.1    Nang makita ko ang Xerox copy ng minarkahang
“Exhibit C” sa kasong disqualification sa COMELEC ay katulad ito ng ipina scan
at ipinalinis na birth record sa akin ni Dir. Manapat noong Disyembre 2003.

9.    Nito nga pong nakaraang lingo ay inutusan na
naman ako ni Dir. Manapat na i-scan uli yung mga dokumento na ipina print nya
sa akin noon (marriage contract at dokumento ni Paulita Gomez).  Napansin ko na sinunog ang mga gilid ng
dokumento.  Nagpa print po siya uli ng
isang negative copy at isang positive copy ng mga nabanggit na dokumento.

10.  Sa lahat po ng mga iniutos at ipinagawa ni
Dir. Manapat sa akin ay hindi po niya ni minsan binanggit kung ano at para saan
gagamitin ang mga ipinagagawa niya sa akin.

(sgd) Remmel Talabis

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me, at Quezon City this 21^st
day of January, 2004, Affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 15325884,
issued on January 21, 2004 at Valenzuela City.

NOTARY
PUBLIC

(sgd) ATTY. KENNETH
S. TAMPAL

Notary Public

Until Dec. 31, 2005

PTR No. 50648646

Quezon
City

Doc.
No. 673;

Page No. 135;

Book No. XIII;

Series of 2004.

The sworn statement of Emman
A. Llamera states:

REPUBLIKA NG
PILIPINAS)

SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA    )s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako si Emman A. Llamera,
nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 825 Rosarito Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

1.    Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa
Pambansang Sinupan bilang isang contractual, na may alam sa lahat ng gawain
pang computer, at direktang nagrereport sa opisina ni Dir. Ricardo
Manapat.  Ako po nagtatapos ng computer
science at isinabay ang kursong computer technician, at nagpatuloy sa pag-aral
bilang computer engineer hanggang sa ikaapat na taon.

2.    Noong bago magkatapusan ng Disyembre ng
taong nagdaan, may ipinasa si Remmel Talabis sa akin na trabaho na ipinapagawa
sa kanya ni Dir. Manapat.  Nakisuyo si
Remmel sa akin na ipagpatuloy ko yong naumpisahan niyang trabaho at ibigay na
lang kay Mr. Manapat pag natapos ko.

3.    Nang humarap ako sa computer ni Dir.
Manapat, nakita ko sa unang pagkakataon ang isang blankong porma ng Marriage
Contract.  Pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay
kinausap ako ni Dir. Manapat at may pinakita at ibinigay sa akin na kopya ng
Marriage Contract na may lamang datos at entrada na gawa sa sulat kamay
niya.  Ang sabi niya, kopyahin ko daw ang
mga datos at entrada at ilipat ang mga ito sa blankong porma ng Marriage
Certificate na nakasalang sa computer.

3.1    Inumpisahan ko na ipinil-up sa blankong
porma ng Marriage Contract na nasa computer ang mga pangalan nina Allan
Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez at iba pang impormasyon na nakalagay sa papel na
binigay ni Dir. Manapat.

3.2    Nang matapos na naming makompleto ang mga
datos at entrada sa Marriage Contract ay dahan-dahan ko namang in-insert ang
tatlong pirma na ang natatandaan ko po lamang ay ang pirma ng isang
nagngangalang Mata, na nakalagay sa gitna sa bandang baba ng dokumento.  Nang matapos kong mailagay lahat ang tatlong
pirma ay ipinapaprint na ni Dir. Mata. 
Di nagtagal, pinauwi na niya ako dakong mag-aalas singko na.

3.3    Wala pang nakalagay na pirma sa pangalan
nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez.

3.4    Nakabantay sa tabi ko si Dir. Manapat habang
nagtratrabaho ako, mula umpisa hanggang matapos ko ang pinagawa niya.

4.    Sa lahat po ng mga iniutos at pinagawa ni
Dir. Manapat sa akin ay hindi po niya ni minsan binanggit kung ano at para saan
gagamitin ang mga ipinagagawa niya sa akin.

(sgd)
Emman A. Llamera

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 21^st
day of January, 2004, Affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 01477379,
issued on April 10, 2003 at City of Manila.

NOTARY
PUBLIC

(sgd) KENNETH S.
TAMPAL

Notary Public

Doc.
No. 672;

Page No. 135;

Book No. XIII;

Series of 2004.

The sworn statement of Vicelyn
G. Tarin states:

REPUBLIKA NG
PILIPINAS)

SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA    )s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako si Vicelyn G. Tarin,
nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 3150 Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela City, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

1.    Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa
Pambansang Sinupan bilang isang Records Management Analyst I.  Bahagi ng aking katungkulan ay ang wastong
paggamit at pagsusuri ng mga iba’t-ibang anyo ng mga dokumento at kasulatan.
Ako ay pansamantalang inilipat noong Agosto, 2002 sa computer section ng aming
tanggapan.  Naging bahagi ng aking
panibagong tungkulin ang humawak ng anumang gawain hinggil sa computer.

2.    Noong Disyembre 30, 2003 ng gawing hapon,
inutusan ako ni G. Ricardo L. Manapat na mag-scan ng mga dokumento.

2.1    Iniabot ni G. Manapat sa akin ang dalawang
piraso ng papel para i-scan. Iyung isang papel ay naglalaman ng maraming
pirmang “Allan Poe”; at iyung isa naman ay naglalaman ng maraming
pirmang “Paulita Gomez”. Iniutos ni G. Manapat na mamili kami ni Leizl
Punongbayan ng pinakamaayos na pirma.

2.2    Pagkatapos kong i-scan ang buong papel,
krinap (crop) ko iyong pinakamaayos na pirma nina “Allan Poe” at “Paulita
Gomez”, at nilinis sa pamamagitan ng software na Adobe Photoshop.  Pagkatapos noon, “Ininsert” ko yung dalawang
napili kong lagda sa MS Word at I-save sa diskette.

2.3    Nang matapos kong I-save sa diskette ang
lahat ng aking mga nagawa ay iniwan ko na lang ito kay Leizl para ibigay kay G.
Manapat sa kadahilanang may kausap si G. Manapat sa kaniyang opisina noong mga
oras na iyon.

3.    Matapos ang ilang araw, pinatawag ako muli
ni G. Manapat para baguhin ang pirma ni Paulita Gomez dahil masyado daw malaki
ang tipo at sukat.  Nang pumunta ako sa
computer niya, doon ko na muling nakita na iyong ini-scan kong mga pirma ay
nakapaloob na sa isang file o “softcopy” ng isang dokumento na may titulo na
“Marriage Contract”.

3.1    Inedit ko yung pirma ni Paulita Gomez sa
pamamagitan ng Adobe Photoshop. Nang matapos kong baguhin ito ayon sa
kagustuhan ni G. Manapat, I-ninsert ko muli sa MS Word at si-nave ko ito sa
isang diskette.  Binigay ko ang diskette
na naglalaman ng edited version ng pirma ni Paulita Gomez kay G. Manapat mismo.

4.    Makaraan ang isang linggo nakita ko muli sa
ikalawang pagkakataon yung dokumento na may titulong “Marriage Contract” kung
saan nakapaloob na ang mga pirma nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez na
ini-scan at trinabaho ko sa mismong loob ng kuwarto namin ni Remmel
Talabis.  Napagalaman ko kay Remmel na
inutusan siya ni G. Manapat na I-print na yung kopya ng “Marriage Contract”.

5.    Ginawa ko ang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng buong
kusa at laya upang patotohanan ang lahat ng mga nakasaad dito.

(sgd)
VICELYN G. TARIN

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 21^st
day of January, 2004, Affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 15325883 ,
issued on January 21, 2004 at Valenzuela City.

NOTARY
PUBLIC

(Sgd.) KENNETH S.
TAMPAL

Notary Public

Until Dec. 31, 2005

PTR No. 50648641

Doc.
No. 674;

Page No. 135;

Book No. XIII;

Series of 2004.

This is not all.  Equally
damaging to the credibility of Director Manapat are the sworn statements of Mr.
William Duff and Mr. Victorino A.
Floro III of Florofoto.  The sworn statement of Mr. Duff states:

REPUBLIKA NG
PILIPINAS)

SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA    )s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako si William Bautista Duff,
may sapat na gulang, may asawa, kasalukuyang namamasukan sa Florofoto na may
address sa No. 502, C. Palanca St., Quiapo, Manila, pagkatapos manumpa ay
nagsasabing:

1.    Ako po ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan bilang
isang service supervisor sa naturang tanggapan.

2.    Noong ika-sampu ng Enero ngayong taong
kasalukuyan, sabado ng umaga, sinabihan ako ni Mr. Floro na i-setup ang aming
kamera dahil may ipapamicrofilm si Director Manapat na “confidential in
nature”.

3.    Dumating si Director Manapat mga dakong
alas-onse ng umaga.  Mahigit mga 30 to 50
dokumento ang iniwan niya na minicrofilm ko. 
Mga deed of sale na nakasaad sa espanyol ang mga naturang documento.

3.1    Tinanong ako ni Mr. Manapat kung ilang oras
ko magagawa ito?  Ang sabi ko, sandali
lang mga 30 minutes to 1 hour. Iiwanan ko na lang kay Emy, sekretarya ni Mr.
Floro ang mga dokumento para doon na lang niya kunin.

3.2    Kinuha ni Director Manapat ang mga naturang
documento bandang hapon kay Emy.

4.    Noong ika-labindalawa ng Enero, tinawagan
ako ng processor ng film at sinabihan na hindi daw malinaw at mabasa ang
microfilm na ginawa ko.

4.1    Agad-agad kong tinawag si Director Manapat
sa kanyang opisina at pinakiusapang ibalik ang mga dokumento na minicrofilm ko
dahil hindi ito mabasa at kukunan ko ulit.

4.2    Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na hintayin
ako noong oras ding iyon. Dumating siya mga dakong alas-onse na ng umaga at may
dalang dalawang bundle ng mga dokumento. 
Ang tantiya ko, iyong isang bundle naglalaman ng humigit kumulang
tatlong daang dokumento, at iyong isa naman ay may humigit kumulang limang
daang dokumento.

4.3    Sinabihan ko si Direktor Manapat na gagawin
ko agad at balikan na lang niya. 
Napagalaman ko na mga birth certificate ang laman ng isang folder at mga
deed of sale naman ang laman noong isang folder.

5.    Bumalik si Director Manapat mga dakong 12:30
ng hapon habang kasalukuyang akong nag-mimicrofilm ako ng mga deed of
sale.  Nang tinanong ako ang kalagayan ng
trabaho, sinabi ko na tapos na yong mga birth certificates at pwede na niyang
kunin.  Iyong mga deed of sale, balikan
na lang niya at matatagalan pa.  Iwanan
ko na lang uli sa sekretarya ni Mr. Floro at doon niya kunin ang mga dokumento.

5.1    Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na
magdagdag ng isa pang kopya para sa mga deed of sale.

6.    Pagkatapos ko pong magawa ang mga microfilm,
pinadala ko sa planta namin para sa developing. Sinabihan ko ang supervisor ng
aming planta na kabilin-bilinan ni Director Manapat kay Mr. Floro na “highly
confidential” ang laman ng microfilms.

7.    Noon ika-labingpito ng Enero, bumalik si
Director Manapat para kunin ang mga rolyo ng developed film.  Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na
mag-print ng mga kopya ng microfilms.

7.1    Sinita ako dahil nag-iisa ang kopya ng
microfilm na naglalaman ng mga deed of sale.

7.2    Agad akong tumawag sa planta namin para
magpakopya pa ng isa.  Sinabi ni Director
Manapat na siya lang ang magdadala ng film sa isang planta.  Ito ay pinaalam ko kay Mr. Floro.

8.    Gusto ni Director Manapat ng print copies
kaya pina-basa ko sa makina ang rolyo ng birth certificate.  Habang ginagawa ko ito, pinatigil ako sa
isang image. Nakita ko ang birth certificate ng isang Allan Fernando Poe.  Nag-print ako ng kopya sa utos ni Director
Manapat.  Malabo po ang lumabas na
printout.  Lahat na ng paraan ginawa
namin para gumanda ang printout ngunit di namin magawa.

8.1    Iyong isang rolyo na naglalaman ng mga deed
of sale naman ang isinunud naming ipabasa sa makina.  Pinatigil ako ni Director Manapat sa isang
image.  Nakita ko ang marriage contract
ni Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez. 
Nakita ko rin ang isang image na nakasulat sa espanyol na may pangalang
Paulita Gomez. Sa utos niya, nag-print ako ng isang kopya ngunit katulad ng
dati malabo ang printout.

9.    Para luminaw ang mga printout, pinalaki ko
ang mga microfilms gamit ang isang enlarger. 
Doon lumabas ng maganda ang mga imahen sa loob ng dalawang
microfilm.  Nagprint ako ng kopya ng
marriage contract, birth certificate at ang dalawang pahinang documento na
nakasulat sa espanyol na may pangalang Paulita Gomez.  Natapos ko lahat ng mga ito dakong alas-4 na
ng hapon.  Kinuha mismo ni Director
Manapat ang mga microfilms at mga printouts sa akin.

10.  Gusto akong ihatid ni Director Manapat sa
bahay ko ngunit sinabihan kong madami pa akong gagawin.

11.  Ang lahat po ng mga iniutos at ipinagawa ni
Director Manapat sa akin ay bahagi lamang ng aking katungkulan.  Ni minsan po ay hindi nabanggit kung ano at
para saan gagamitin ang mga trabahong ipinagagawa sa akin.

12.  Ginawa ko ang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng buong
kusa at laya upang patotohanan ang lahat ng mga nakasaad dito.

(sgd)
WILLIAM B. DUFF

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 2^nd
day of February, 2004, Affiant exhibiting to me his Information Tax No.
109-998-007, issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

NOTARY
PUBLIC

(sgd) KENNETH S.
TAMPAL

Notary Public

Until Dec. 31, 2005

PTR No. 50648641

Doc.
No. 696;

Page No. 135;

Book No. XIII;

Series of 2004.

The sworn statement of Mr.
Floro is as follows:

REPUBLIKA NG
PILIPINAS)

SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA    )s.s.

A F F I D A V I T

I, VICTORINO A. FLORO III,
of legal age, married, with business address at No. 502 Carlos Palanca St.,
Quiapo, Manila, under oath, states:

1.    I am the Vice-President of Florofoto;

2.    Floro International, a sister company of
Florofoto has a standing business agreement with the Records and Management and
Archives Office (RMAO) for the supply of microfilms;

3.    Sometime in the first week of January, 2004,
Mr. Ricardo L. Manapat, Director of the RMAO, called me up, asking if Florofoto
could microfilm some confidential documents;

4.    On January 10, 2004, Mr. Manapat brought to
my office a set of documents, numbering about 20 to 30 pages, and requested
that the same be microfilmed;

5.    On January 12, 2004, our technician, Mr.
William Duff informed me that the microfilm was unreadable;

6.    On January 17, 2004, Mr. Manapat came to
pick up the microfilm rolls;

7.    Mr. Duff, with whom Mr. Manapat communicated
directly on the matter of the production of the microfilms will be most willing
to give details in the transactions he had with Mr. Manapat;

8.    Florofoto had absolutely no knowledge of the
intention of Mr. Manapat on what he intended to do with the microfilms he asked
our company to produce;

9.    I am executing this affidavit for the
purpose of the Senate hearing.

Affiant further
sayeth naught.

(sgd)
VICTORINO A. FLORO III

Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 2^nd
day of February, 2004, Affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax No. 12356783,
issued on January 6, 2004 at Manila.

NOTARY
PUBLIC

(sgd) KENNETH S.
TAMPAL

Notary Public

Until Dec. 31, 2005

PTR No. 50648641

Doc.
No. 695;

Page No. 140;

Book No. XIII;

Series of 2004.

These sworn statements were submitted to the COMELEC en banc
by the respondent Poe.  Instead of
traversing them, petitioner merely contended that they should not be considered
on the technical grounds that they were not formally offered in evidence before
the COMELEC and that they cannot be the subject of judicial notice.  Petitioner, however, overlooks that the
COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and hence is not bound by the technical rules
of evidence. It can accept evidence which cannot be admitted in a judicial
proceeding where the rules of court on evidence are strictly observed. It can
accord weight to such evidence depending on its trustworthiness.  In any event, petitioner cannot complain they
are hearsay for he was given an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who executed the foregoing sworn statements.

The third evidence of
petitioner is Exhibit “C” which is the birth certificate of Allan F.
Poe.  This is part of the Manapat
fabricated evidence with a zero value. But even assuming it has a value, it
merely proves the fact of birth of Allan F. Poe as all birth certificates
merely do.  It does not prove that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born citizen. 
Neither does it prove that respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen.

The fourth evidence of
petitioner is Exhibit “D”, the certification of Director Manapat that the
National Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the
Philippines before 1907.  Again, this is
part of the Manapat manufactured evidence which can only be given the value of
a cypher.  But even if it is admissible,
it has little weight for there is no evidence that the National Archives has a
complete record of all persons who lived in the Philippines during the Spanish
and American occupation of our country. 
Needless to state, petitioner again failed to prove that Lorenzo Pou,
grandfather of respondent Poe, was a Spanish subject.

The fifth and last
evidence of the petitioner is Exhibit “E” (also Exhibit “1” of respondent
Poe).  It is a certification of Estrella
M. Domingo, OIC, Archives Division that the Register of Births for the
municipality of San Carlos, Pangasinan in the year 1916 is not on file with the
National Archives, hence, there is no available information about the birth of
Allan Poe to the spouses Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes in San Carlos
Pangasinan.  This lack of information is
not proof that respondent Poe deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen.  Law and logic bar that non sequitur conclusion.

These are all the evidence presented by the petitioner.  Even a sweep eye contact both with these
evidence will show that petitioner failed
to discharge the burden of proving that respondent Poe is not a
natural-born citizen.  Petitioner was
more dismal in trying to prove that respondent Poe willfully and deliberately misrepresented himself as a natural-born
citizen.  For one, the Manapat evidence
appears to have been manufactured evidence. For another, these and the other
evidence are irrelevant evidence and there is no proof that they ever crossed the
attention of respondent Poe.  On the
other hand, the evidence unerringly show that respondent Poe, from the time of
his involuntary birth here, has always conducted himself as a Filipino.  He is a registered voter, he owns land, he is
married to a Filipina, he carries a Filipino passport – – – he has always lived
the life of a Filipino (Exhibits “16”, “17” to “19”).  Thus, there is no iota of doubt that
petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving that respondent
Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen.  For
failure of petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, respondent Poe is
entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition.  Respondent Poe need not present any contrary
evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to him.  Prescinding from these premises, this Court
cannot hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that no substantial evidence was offered by petitioner to disqualify respondent
Poe.

C.

ASSUMING
THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JURISDICTION AND THE ISSUE OF WHETHER RESPONDENT
POE IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO SHOULD NOW BE RESOLVED, THE FORNIER PETITION
NEED NOT BE REMANDED TO THE COMELEC FOR FURTHER RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE.

Remand to the COMELEC to give

the petitioner a second opportunity

to
prove his case is a palpable error.

As aforediscussed, petitioner has the following burden of proof
in the COMELEC:  (1) prove that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born citizen, and (2) prove that knowing he is
not a natural-born citizen, he willfully and deliberately misrepresented that
fact in his Certificate of Candidacy.

The COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition of Fornier for
failure to prove these operative facts by substantial evidence.  After the 12-hour marathon hearing of the
case at bar before this Court, the hope of petitioner to disqualify respondent
Poe became dimmer.  Petitioner’s
principal thesis that respondent Poe is an illegitimate child and therefore
follows the American citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, was completely
smothered by the learned opinions of the amici curiae.  They opined that respondent Poe’s illegitimacy is immaterial in resolving
the issue of whether he is a natural-born citizen and whether he has a political
right to run for President.  They further
submitted the view that all that is required is clear proof of his filiation –
– – i.e., that his father is Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen.  Mr. Justice Mendoza left it to the Court to
determine the standard of proof that should be imposed to prove this filiation.

In light of these erudite
opinions of our amici curiae, it is daylight clear that petitioner
Fornier is not only wrong with his facts but also wrong with his law.  Considering that petitioner is wrong both
with his facts and the law, the Court has no option but to dismiss the petition
at bar which espouses nothing but errors. This Court will be compounding the
wrongs committed by petitioner Fornier with another wrong if it remands the
petition at bar to the COMELEC. A remand means
a new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings have long been
closed and terminated.  Remand means the petitioner will be gifted
with another chance to prove facts which he has failed to prove before.  Remand means the petitioner will be given the
extra-ordinary privilege of correcting his erroneous understanding of the law
on who are natural-born Filipino citizens. 
These are favors which cannot be
extended to a litigant without shattering the Court’s stance of political
neutrality.  The Court must be above
politics for in the temples of justice, we do not follow any political god.

Remand will change the nature of a

Section 78 proceeding by judicial

legislation,
hence, unconstitutional.

The Fornier petition was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under B.P. Blg. 881,
Section 78.  The principal issue on a
Section 78 petition is whether the respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate
of Candidacy.  In the particular petition
at bar, the issue is whether respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.  The issue of whether respondent
Poe is in truth a natural-born citizen is considered only because it is
necessary to determine the deliberateness and the willfulness of the material
misrepresentation.  The proceedings are
summary in character for the central issue to be resolved is the deliberateness
of the material misrepresentation, as the issue of natural-born citizenship is
a mere incident.  In fine, the complex
issue of natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be
raised in an appropriate proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding
after election.  The citizenship issue in
a quo warranto proceeding will be determined in full length proceedings.

The remand of the case to the COMELEC will change the character
of a Section 78 proceeding.  The
citizenship of respondent Poe will no longer be inquired into as a mere
incident necessary to determine whether he deliberately made a material
misrepresentation that he is a natural-born citizen.  It will now be determined as if it is the
main issue in a Section 78 proceeding. 
This Court cannot change the nature of a Section 78 proceeding without
usurping legislative power.  It is
Congress by law that defined the nature of a Section 78 proceeding and it is
only Congress that can change it by another law.  We cannot engage in judicial legislation.

Remand will violate respondent

Poe’s right to due process, hence,

unconstitutional.

There is a more compelling reason why the petition at bar should
not be remanded to the COMELEC for re-litigation.  The COMELEC that will resolve the issue of
whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino has ceased to be an impartial
tribunal.  Three of its members,
Commissioners Tuazon, Barcelona and Garcellano, submitted separate Comments to
this Court expressing the firm view that respondent Poe is not a natural-born
Filipino.  Their views are contrary to
the decision of the COMELEC under review by this Court.  It is improper enough for individual
commissioners to assail the decision of the COMELEC of which they are members.  It is worse in the case of Commissioners
Barcelona and Garcellano, who are not even sitting commissioners when the
COMELEC promulgated its decision under review. 
This is plain and simple
prejudgment and it is not even disguised prejudgment that needs to be unmasked.  The COMELEC is composed of seven
commissioners all of whom must be independent and unbiased.  The right to due process of respondent Poe is
the right to be heard by seven unbiased
COMELEC commissioners – – – not 1, not 2, not 3, not 4, but by 7 unbiased members. 
We do not have such a COMELEC.

Remand will delay the resolution

of the issue of whether respondent Poe

is qualified. Delay will also

prejudice his candidacy and will

favor
his political opponents.

Remand of the petition at bar to the COMELEC will inevitably
delay the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.  The issue will not be
finally resolved by the COMELEC.  The
decision of the COMELEC can still be appealed to this Court.  Given the temperature of the present
presidential contest, such an appeal can be assumed.

It cannot be gainsaid that any doubt on the qualification of
respondent Poe to run as President is prejudicial to his presidential bid and
favorable to his political opponents.  The right to run for a public office
includes the right to equal chance to compete. 
The right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished or denied a
candidate.  This chance to win may amount
to a mere chimera if the disqualification of respondent Poe will be left
hanging in the air for a long time. 
It is the solemn duty of this Court to equalize the chances of winning
of all candidates to a public office. 
Any failure to equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure the
defeat of the disfavored.

D.

TO
AVOID DELAY, THE COURT SHOULD ITSELF DECIDE THE ISSUE AND DECLARE RESPONDENT
POE AS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE THE
COMELEC.

Whether respondent Poe is

illegitimate is irrelevant in

determining his status as natural-

born
citizen – – –  that is the law.

Petitioner has always submitted the legal thesis that: (1)
respondent Poe is an illegitimate child as he was born out of wedlock, i.e.,
he was born before the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly; (2) as an
illegitimate child, he follows the American citizenship of his mother, Bessie
Kelly; therefore, (3) he is not a natural-born citizen.  Petitioner contends that evidence of
respondent Poe himself, Exhibits “3” and “21”, prove these facts.

This interpretation of the law by the petitioner is
erroneous.  The amici curiae have
opined that the illegitimacy of respondent Poe is immaterial in determining his
status as natural-born citizen.  I quote
the learned opinion of Father Joaquin
Bernas:

AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF A FILIPINO FATHER

IS BORN A FILIPINO AND IS THEREFORE A

NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN. PUT DIFFERENTLY,

THE PRINCIPLE OF JUS SANGUINIS APPLIES EVEN
TO

ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN

I now come to the question whether jus sanguinis applies
to illegitimate children.  We have many
decisions which say that jus sanguinis applies to the illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers because the mother is the only known or
acknowledged parent.  But does the law
make a distinction and say that jus sanguinis does not apply to the
illegitimate children of Filipino fathers even if paternity is clearly
established?

No law or constitutional provision supports this
distinction.  On the contrary, the
Constitution clearly says without distinction that among those who are citizens
of the Philippines are those whose father is a Filipino citizen.  Hence, what is needed for the application of jus
sanguinis according to the clear letter of the law is not legitimacy of the
child but proof of paternity.

Having said that, however, we must contend with four cases
promulgated by the Supreme Court which contain the statement that illegitimate
children do not follow the Filipino citizenship of the father.  These cases are:  Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562 (1967), which in
turn cites Chiongbian v. De Leon, 46 O.G. 3652 and Serra v. Republic, L-4223,
May 12, 1952, and finally Paa v. Chan, 21 SCRA 753 (1967).

We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was
in each of them.  If the pronouncement of
the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis.  But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to
the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. 
I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

First, Morano v. Vivo. 
This case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father.  It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a
stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father.  The issue was whether the stepson followed
the naturalization of the stepfather. 
Nothing about jus sanguinis there.  The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian v. de Leon.  This case was not about the illegitimate son
of a Filipino father.  It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office
before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution.  No one was illegitimate
here.

Third, Serra v. Republic. 
The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.  Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother.  The issue
was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized.  There is
nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa v. Chan. 
This is a more complicated case. 
The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan.  Quintin Chan claimed that
his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother.  Quintin therefore argued that he
got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. 
But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio
was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. 
The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino.  If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his
son Quintin.  Quintin therefore was not
only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with
an obiter dictum.  The Court said
obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin’s father, were Filipino, Quintin would not
be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin,
based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the
case.  Quintin was already on the floor
and the Court still kicked him.  It was obiter
dictum pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano
v. Vivo.  I submit that the
petitioners in this case as well as three Comelec Commissioners including the
two new ones and also the Solicitor General have merely been repeating without
any semblance of analysis the obiter dicta in these four cases.

The clear conclusion from all these four cases is that their
statements to the effect that jus sanguinis applies only to legitimate
children were all obiter dicta which decided nothing.  The Court had purported to offer a solution
to a non-existent problem.  Obiter
dicta do not establish constitutional doctrine even if repeated
endlessly.  Obiter dicta are not
decisions and therefore they do not constitute stare decisis.  They therefore cannot be used to resolve
constitutional issues today.

Now to Fernando Poe, Jr. 
If indeed he is an illegitimate son of a Filipino father, should the
Court now pronounce a new doctrine that an illegitimate son of a Filipino
father is not born a Filipino citizen even if paternity is established?  There is compelling constitutional reason why
the Court should not do so. Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice.  First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second it
would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was
established long ago by People v. Cayat. 
I would grant that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children rests on real differences even if the differences are not as
pleasurable as the differences between male and female.  But real differences alone do not justify
invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.

Among the four requirements of allowable distinction is that the
distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law.  Thus, the distinction between male and female
is real, and we thank God for that. But such distinction would not be relevant
for purposes of, for instance, improving the standards of the legal profession.
Such distinction cannot be made the basis for disqualifying women from the
practice of law or sitting in the Supreme Court.

It is the same thing with respect to the exercise of political
rights. What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service?  What possible state interest
can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public
officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault
of his own?  To disqualify an
illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for
the indiscretion of his parents.  There
is neither justice nor rationality in that. 
And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.

The delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention, honorable
men that they were, must have been aware of the injustice of punishing the
child politically for the indiscretion of his or her parents. I invite the
honorable Court to peruse the debates of the 1935 Constitutional Convention.
When the delegates were debating jus sanguinis, there was not the
slightest suggestion to make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children. For them sanguis, or blood, whether injected legitimately or
illegimately was the same blood and had the same political effect – citizenship
of the offspring.

The only time the Convention distinguished between legitimate and
illegitimate children was in relation to the right of children born of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
majority.  But it was an unnecessary
distinction.  When Delegate Rafols raised
the question whether the right to elect belonged to both legitimate and
illegitimate children, Delegate Cuaderno answered that only legitimate children
could elect because only legitimate children needed to elect.  Illegitimate children already had the
Filipino citizenship of their mother flowing in their veins.

What then should be done with the obiter dicta in the four
cases cited by the petitioners?  I answer
this question with what the Court said when it declared in Tan Chong v.
Secretary of Labor that Roa v. Collector of Customs was wrong in
holding that jus soli was put in effect in the Philippines.  The Court said: “The duty of this Court is to
forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in
force.” Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947).

The four cases cited by petitioners are not even decisions.  They do not come under stare decisis.  They are obiter dicta more easily
repudiated and should be repudiated.

In conclusion, therefore, when the Constitution says: “The
following are citizens of the Philippines … ‘Those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines’”, the Constitution means just that without invidious
distinction.  Ubi lex non distinguit
ne nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual
foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an
injustice on an innocent child.  What
flow from legitimacy are civil rights; citizenship is a political right which
flows not from legitimacy but from paternity. And paternity begins when the
ovum is fertilized nine months before birth and not upon marriage or
legitimation.

As to Fernando Poe, Jr., therefore, if it is established by
competent proof that he is the son of a Filipino father, legitimate or
illegitimate, he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The former Dean of the UP College of Law Merlin Magallona espoused the same scholarly view.  I quote him:

4.  Transmissive Essence of Citizenship

4.1           It is an
essential feature of citizenship that it is transmissible. The key issue
is:  What principle governs its
transmissibility?  The Philippine Bill of
1902 as well the Jones Law defines the conditions by which persons similarly
situated as Lorenzo Pou as a Spanish subject “shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands.” Over and above that, these laws provide
for the means by which Lorenzo Pou’s Philippine citizenship would be
transmitted when they declare that their or his “children born subsequent” to
the date of exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Paris as “citizens of
the Philippine Islands” as well.

4.2           While the text
of the law speaks of children of Spanish subjects who are deemed
to be “citizens of the Philippine Islands,” it is at that same time an
embodiment of a core principle of blood relationship or jus sanguinis.  The word children becomes merely a
reflection of the transmissive essence of citizenship which lies in blood
relationship.  In this sense, the
transmissibility of citizenship, such as that of Lorenzo Pou, is not limited to
the immediate generation to which Allan R. Pou belonged; it continues to run
through all children across generations, barring naturalization and other
methods of extradition.

4.3           The operation
of the core principle of transmissibility in blood relation finds affirmation
and, more significantly, continuity in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions in
which blood relationship becomes a principal derivation and transmissibility of
citizenship.  All Constitutions embody
this transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship.  In the determination as to who are citizens of
the Philippines, they have a common provision that those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines are citizens.

4.4           The
interconnection between the Philippine citizenship of children born to Spanish
subjects under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law and the said
provision common to the three Philippine Constitutions becomes a long line of
generations that illustrates the transmissive essence of citizenship.

4.5           Under the
circumstances defined by the Treaty of Paris in correlation with the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, the Philippine citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and
his son Allan R. Pou were further affirmed by the application of subsection
(1), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, by which citizenship is
defined on the part of:

Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.

4.6           On his own
account, having become citizen of the Philippine Islands as a child of Lorenzo
Pou born subsequent to the date of exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of
Paris under Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Section 2 of the Jones
Law, Allan R. Pou has the benefit of subsection (1), Section 1, Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, quoted above.

4.7           As thus
defined, Philippine citizenship on the part of Allan R. Pou is not limited to
his person; his citizenship is transmissible by its nature.  The principle governing the transmissibility
of his citizenship to his children is provided by subsection 3, Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines –

Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4.8           The
transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core principle of blood
relationship or jus sanguinis.  On
this account, the derivation of citizenship from a person or the transmission
of citizenship to his child, springs from a person or the transmission of
citizenship to his child, springs from the fact that he is the father.  Thus, paternity as manifestation of blood
relationship is all that is needed to be established.  To introduce a distinction between legitimacy
or illegitimacy in the status of the child vis-à-vis the derivation of his
citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in
blood relationship.  The text of the law
which reads “Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” becomes an
embodiment of the kernel principle of blood relationship, which provides no
room for the notion of citizenship by legitimacy or legitimation.

4.9           The
transmissive essence of citizenship as outlined above may receive further
clarification in the 1987 Constitution, in which it is provided in subsection
2, Section 1 of Article IV that Philippine citizenship is derived as follows:

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.  (Emphasis added.)

A woman becomes a derivation of citizenship not because of the
illegitimate status of her child but for the reason that she is a mother and as
mother she is the medium of blood relationship. 
In this provision of law, the father and the mother stand in
equality.  Both are derivative of
citizenship on the same principle of blood relationship.

4.10         The approach to
the problem of citizenship from the angle of transmissive essence of
citizenship receives authoritative support from Chief Justice Manuel Moran
speaking for this Honorable Court in Chiongbian v. De Leon (82 Phil. 771
[1949]).  In question was the
interpretation of the provision in the 1935 Constitution declaring that “Those
born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office.” (Art. IV, Section 1,
subsection 2). It was contended that citizenship thus acquired is personal and
cannot be transmitted to the children. 
In response, Chief Justice Moran emphasized the “transmissive essence of
citizenship,” saying that this provision does not stand alone and requires its
application together with the provision that “Those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines”, thus bringing in the transmissibility of citizenship on
the principle of blood relationship.

Associate Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, a former member of this Court and an expert in Constitutional
Law, similarly opined:

The cases, in interpreting Art. IV, Section 1 (3), do not exclude
illegitimate children of Filipino fathers from this class of citizens of the
Philippines.  They do not say that only
legitimate children or natural children, who are legitimated as a result of the
subsequent marriage of their parents and their acknowledgment before or after
the marriage, belong to this class of citizens of the Philippines (“those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines”). 
Nor, on the other hand, by holding that illegitimate children follow the
citizenship of their Filipino mothers as the “only legally recognized parents,”
do some of the cases exclude instances in which an illegitimate child may have
been acknowledged by his Filipino father.

Indeed, cases holding that illegitimate children follow the
citizenship of their Filipino mothers involve situations in which the fathers
are not Filipinos.  (United States v. Ong
Tianse, supra; Serra v. Republic, supra; Santos Co v. Government
of the Philippine Islands, 52 Phil. 543 [1928]; Ratunil Sy Quimsuan v.
Republic, 92 Phil. 675 [1953]).  To hold that the illegitimate child follows
the citizenship of his Filipino mother but that an illegitimate child does not
follow the citizenship of his Filipino father would be to make an invidious
discrimination.  To be sure this Court
has not ruled thus.

What is only needed is that the illegitimate child must be
acknowledged by the father to establish his filiation to the latter.  The acknowledgment and establishment of
filiation of such child may not be sufficient to entitle him to support,
successional rights, and other benefits under Civil Law, but, for purposes of
determining his political status as a citizen of the Philippines, such proof of
acknowledgment and filiation is all that is required.

A ruling by this Court that the constitutional provision (that
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are citizens of the
Philippines themselves) will require no overruling of prior decisions.  After all, none of the prior decisions of this
Court deal with a situation in which the Filipino parent of the illegitimate
child is the father.

If this Court interprets the constitutional provision as
including in the class of citizens illegitimate children whose filiation to
their Filipino fathers is established, the Court will simply be adding a third
category of citizens.  In 1949, Chiongbian
v. De Leon, supra, this Court held that “a legitimate minor child follows
the citizenship of his Filipino father.” This is the first category.  In 1967, in Paa v. Chan, supra, it was
held that a legitimated natural child, whose father is a Filipino, is also
Filipino.  This is the second category of
citizens whose fathers are Filipinos.

By holding that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of
his Filipino father provided he is acknowledged or his filiation to him is duly
proven, this Court will be creating a third category of Filipino citizens
“whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” For there is really no
difference in principle between, on the one hand, the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother and an alien father, and, on the other hand, the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother.  As long as the child’s filiation to his
supposed father is established, it does not matter whether he is a legitimate
or an illegitimate child.

These opinions of the amici curiae support the ruling of
the First Division of the COMELEC that:

x x x

Note that Section 3 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does
not have a qualifying term “legitimate”
after the words “those whose fathers” and before the phrase “are citizens of
the Philippines.” Legitimacy therefore
is beside the point. As long as the father is a Filipino, the child will always
be a Filipino.  As we have discussed early on, since Allan
Fernando Poe is a Filipino, his son Ronald Allan Poe, the respondent herein, is
a natural-born Filipino.

This
ruling was unanimously affirmed by the COMELEC en banc.

If petitioner Fornier is wrong
in his understanding of the law on who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, how can he+ be right in
assailing the status of respondent Poe?

To establish that respondent Poe

is a natural-born citizen, all that is

needed is proof of his filiation to his

father Allan R. Poe, a Filipino

citizen
– – – that is the critical fact.

The critical fact in
the determination of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen is his filiation with Allan F. Poe, a citizen
of the Philippines. The fact that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe is not disputed.  It is an admitted
fact.  Petitioner Fornier from Day 1
proceeded from the premise that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe.

The records of the case at bar speak for themselves.  Let us first examine the Petition filed by Fornier in SPA No. 04-003 before the First
Division of the COMELEC.  The Petition
never questioned the fact that Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr.  What it questioned is
the alleged Filipino citizenship of Allan F. Poe.  I quote the Petition in extenso:

x x x

3.  Under Section 2, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, the qualifications of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines are enumerated as follows:

Section 2.  No person may be
elected president unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

4.  Respondent Poe, however,
is not even a citizen of the Philippines, much more a natural-born citizen, and
as such lacks the essential qualifications for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines since both of his parents are not Filipino
citizens.

5.  Based on respondent
Poe’s alleged Certificate of Birth, he was born on 20 August 1939.  A copy of the said Certificate of Birth is
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex
“B”.

5.1.    Respondent Poe’s
alleged Certificate of Birth indicated that his parents are Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley.

5.2.    Respondent Poe’s
alleged Certificate of Birth indicated that his mother, Bessie Kelley, is an
American citizen.

5.3.    However, the alleged
Certificate of Birth of respondent Poe falsely or incorrectly indicated the
real citizenship of his father Allan
F. Poe, since he is legally not a Filipino citizen, as shown below.

6.  Contrary to what was
falsely indicated in the alleged Certificate of Birth of respondent Poe, the latter’s father, Allan F. Poe, is not a
Filipino, but an alien, specifically, a citizen of Spain.

6.1.    On 05 July 1936, Allan
F. Poe expressly and categorically declared in a public instrument that he was
a Spanish citizen.  A copy of the
Marriage Contract executed by Allan F. Poe, and one Paulita Gomez at the
Convento de Santo Domingo at Intramuros, Manila is attached and made an
integral part hereof as Annex “C”.

6.2.    Moreover, in said
Marriage Contract, Allan F. Poe likewise categorically and expressly admitted
that both of his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes are also citizens of
Spain.

6.3.    Clearly respondent Poe’s father is a Spanish
citizen whose parents are both Spanish citizens.

7.  Thus, respondent Poe
could not have possibly acquired Filipino citizenship from his father, Allan F. Poe since the latter is a Spanish
citizen.

8.  But even assuming arguendo
that respondent Poe’s father, Allan
F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, as indicated in respondent Poe’s Certificate of
Birth (Annex “B” hereof), still respondent Poe could not have validly acquired
Filipino citizenship from his father
due to the fact that the purported marriage of his parents, Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, is void.

8.1.    Under Philippine
jurisprudence, an illegitimate child, i.e., a child conceived and born
outside a valid marriage, follows the citizenship of his mother.  (United States vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332
[1915])

8.2.    As previously stated, respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Poe,
married Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936, which marriage was subsisting at the
time of the purported marriage of respondent Poe’s father to his mother, Bessie Kelley. (cf. Annex “C”
hereof)

8.3.    Moreover, it appears
that Allan F. Poe’s first wife, Paulita Gomez, even filed a case of bigamy and
concubinage against him after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie
Kelley.  A copy of the Affidavit dated 13
July 1939 executed by Paulita Gomez in Spanish attesting to the foregoing
facts, together with an English translation thereof, are attached and made an
integral parts hereof as Annexes “D” and
“D-1”, respectively.

9.  Verily,
having been born out of void marriage, respondent Poe is an illegitimate child of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley.  Consequently, the citizenship of
respondent Poe follows that of his mother, Bessie Kelley, who is undeniably an
American citizen.

10.           Under the 1935
Constitution, which was then applicable at the time of respondent Poe’s birth,
only the following are considered Filipino citizens:

Section 1.  The following are
citizens of the Philippines:

1)      Those who are citizens
of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

2)      Those born in the
Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines Islands;

3)      Those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines;

4)      Those whose mothers
are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship; and

5)      Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law.

11.           Clearly,
respondent Poe is not a citizen of the Philippines, much more a natural-born
Filipino citizen, considering that both of his parents are aliens.  Also, even assuming arguendo that respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Poe,
is a Filipino citizen, as indicated in his Certificate of Birth (Annex “B”
hereof), since respondent Poe is an
illegitimate child of his father with Bessie Kelley, an American, he
acquired the citizenship of the latter. 
(United States vs. Ong Tianse,
supra)

12.           Hence,
respondent Poe, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, lacks an
essential qualification and corollarily possesses a disqualification to be
elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, as expressly required
under the 1987 Constitution.

13.           In view of the
foregoing, respondent Poe should be disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the coming 10 May
2004 elections.

The Answer of
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. did not touch on the fact that his father is Allan
F. Poe as that is a non-issue.  Rather, it discussed the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, the grandfather of respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr., the citizenship of Allan
F. Poe, the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., and the Philippine
citizenship of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. himself.

After the evidence of the parties were received by the First
Division of the COMELEC, petitioner offered
the following evidence as narrated in his Memorandum, viz:

x x x

1.8.          In support of
the petition, the petitioner presented and offered in evidence the following
documentary evidence showing that FPJ is not
a natural-born Filipino citizen and is, therefore, disqualified to run for
President of the Republic of the Philippines, and that he made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy as to his true and real citizenship.

1.8.1.       As Exhibit “A”
– A copy of FPJ’s Certificate of Birth, indicating that respondent Poe was born
on 20 August 1939 and that his parents
are Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan F. Poe, allegedly a Filipino citizen.

1.8.2.       As Exhibits “B”
and “B-1” – A certified photocopy of an Affidavit executed on 13 July 1939 by
Paulita Poe y Gomez in Spanish, attesting to the fact that she filed a case of
bigamy and concubinage against
respondent’s father, Allan F. Poe, after discovering the latter’s bigamous
relationship with respondent’s mother, Bessie Kelley.

1.8.3.       As Exhibit
“B-2” – A certified photocopy of the Marriage Contract entered into on 5 July
1936 by and between respondent’s father,
Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez, showing that respondent’s father is “Español;”
and that his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes, were “Español” and “Mestiza
Española,” respectively.

1.8.4.       As Exhibit
“B-3” – An English translation of the Affidavit dated 13 July 1939 executed by
Paulita Poe y Gomez.

1.8.5.       As Exhibit “C”
– A certified photocopy of the Certificate of Birth of Allan Fernando Poe
showing that he was born on May 17, 1915, and that his father, Lorenzo Poe, is
“Español” and his mother, Marta Reyes, is “Mestiza Española,”

1.8.6.       As Exhibit “D”
– A certification dated 16 January 2004 issued by Ricardo L. Manapat, Director
of the Records Management and Archives Office, certifying that the National
Archives does not possess any record of a certain Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou
residing or entering the Philippines before 1907.

1.8.7.       As Exhibit “E”
(also respondent’s Exhibit “1”) – Certification dated 12 January 2004 issued by
Estrella M. Domingo, OIC of  the Archives
Division of the National Archives, certifying that there is no available information
in the files of the National Archives, regarding the birth of “Allan R. Pou”,
alleged to have been born on November 27, 1916.

Again,
it is plain to see that petitioner offered no evidence to impugn the fact that
Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.  Indeed, petitioner’s Exhibits “A”, “B”, “B-1”
and “B-2” recognized that Allan F. Poe is the father of the respondent.

Consequently, the First
Division of the COMELEC in its Resolution
of January 23, 2004 treated the fact that Allan F. Poe is the father of
respondent Poe as an admitted fact.  Page
7 of the Resolution states:

x x x

To assail respondent’s claim of eligibility, petitioner asserts
that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.  According to him, Exhibit “B-2” (alleged Marriage
Contract between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez) shows that the
nationality of the father of Allan Fernando Poe, Lorenzo Poe is Español.  Allan
Fernando Poe is admittedly the father of the respondent.  In the same Exhibit “B-2” appears an entry
that the nationality of Allan Fernando Poe is also Español.  Petitioner’s line of argument is that
respondent could not have acquired Filipino citizenship from his father since
the latter is Español.

Page 8 of the Resolution reiterated:

x x x

Parenthetically,
petitioner and respondent agreed on the fact that Allan Fernando Poe is the
father of Ronald Allan Poe.  Hence,
if Allan Fernando Poe is Filipino, necessarily, Ronald Allan Poe, his son is
likewise a Filipino.

Page 11 of the Resolution is similarly emphatic
that respondent Poe, is the son of Allan F. Poe, viz:

x x x

Note that Section 3 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does
not have a qualifying term “legitimate”
after the words “those whose fathers” and before the phrase “are citizens of
the Philippines.” Legitimacy therefore is beside the point.  As long as the father is a Filipino, the
child will always be a Filipino.  As we have discussed early on, since Allan
Fernando Poe is a Filipino, his son Ronald Allan Poe, the respondent herein, is
a natural-born Filipino.

Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated January 26, 2004. 
In this Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner always conceded that
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., is the son of Allan F. Poe.[17]
Petitioner simply continued to allege that the evidence does not show that the
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou (grandfather of respondent Poe) and Allan F. Poe
(father of respondent Poe) is Filipino.  Petitioner
insisted in the conclusion that respondent Poe is not a Filipino, let alone a
natural-born Filipino.  Again, this is
evident from the grounds invoked by petitioner in his Motion for
Reconsideration, viz:

x x x

Grounds

I.

The Honorable First Division committed a
serious and reversible error in holding that it is not the proper forum to
finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

II.

The Honorable First Division committed a
serious and reversible error in not appreciating all the evidence presented by
the parties in determining whether or not respondent made a material
misrepresentation or false material representation regarding his real citizenship in his certificate of
candidacy.

III.

The Honorable First Division committed a
serious and reversible error in holding that the evidence presented do not
controvert the declaration of the respondent in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

IV.

The Honorable First Division committed a
serious and reversible error in holding that legitimacy is beside the point in
determining the citizenship of the
respondent.

On February 4, 2004, petitioner filed his Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner’s Motion For Reconsideration.  As to be expected, petitioner did not again
assail the fact that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe.[18]

In its February 6, 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto, the resolution of
its First Division that respondent Poe, “x x x did not commit any material
misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.” Significantly, it did not waste any word on
whether Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.  The paternity of respondent Fernando Poe,
Jr., is conceded, a non-issue.

In the Petition for
Certiorari dated February 9, 2004 and filed with this Court, petitioner
again proceeded from the premise that Allan Poe is the father of respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr.  The pertinent portion
of the Petition states:

x x x

The Relevant Facts

8.  Briefly stated, the
pertinent facts concern the circumstances of Lorenzo Pou – respondent FPJ’s
grandfather, of Allan F. Poe/Allan Fernando Poe/Allan R. Pou/Fernando R. Poe –
respondent FPJ’s father, of Bessie Kelley – respondent FPJ’s mother, and accordingly of respondent FPJ himself.

The fact that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe is a
judicial admission.  It does not require proof.[19]

Aside from these admissions, the filiation of respondent Poe is
also proved by the declaration of Mrs. Ruby Kelley Mangahas, Exhibit “20” of
the respondent.  Mrs. Mangahas is the
sister of Bessie Kelly, mother of the respondent. Her sworn statement states:

DECLARATION OF

RUBY KELLEY
MANGAHAS

I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently
residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with
law, do hereby declare that:

1.  I am the sister of the
late BESSIE KELLEY POE.

2.  Bessie Kelley Poe was
the wife of FERNANDO POE, SR.

3.  Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by name of RONALD ALLAN POE, more
popularly known in the Philippines as “Fernando Poe, Jr.”, or “FPJ”.

4.  Ronald Allan Poe “FPJ”
was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital, Magdalena St., Manila.

5.  At the time of Ronald Allan Poe’s birth, his father, Fernando Poe,
Sr., was a Filipino citizen and his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American
citizen.

6.  Considering the existing
citizenship law at that time, Ronald Allan Poe automatically assumed the
citizenship of his father, a Filipino, and has always identified himself as
such.

7.  Fernando Poe, Sr. and my
sister, Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936.  I
was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr. by my sister that same year.

8.  Fernando Poe, Sr. and my
sister, Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9.  Fernando Poe, Sr., my
sister Bessie, and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald Allan, and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s house on
Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10.           Fernando Poe,
Sr. and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.

11.           From the very
first time I met Fernando Poe, Sr., in 1936, until his death in 1951, I never
heard my sister mention anything about her husband having had a marital
relationship prior to their marriage.

12.           During the
entire life of Fernando Poe, Sr., as my brother-in-law, I never heard of a case
filed against him by a woman purporting to be his wife.

13.           Considering
the status of Fernando Poe, Sr., as a leading movie personality during that
time, a case of this nature could not have escaped publicity.

14.           Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the case was never published in any newspaper or
magazine, but was in fact filed in court, I would have known about it because
my sister would have been an indispensable party to the case, and she could not
have kept an emotionally serious matter from me.

15.           This is the
first time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard Fernando Poe, Sr., being
maliciously accused of being a married man prior to his marriage to my sister.

16.           This is the
first time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard the name Paulita Poe y
Gomez as being the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

17.           There was no
Paulita Poe y Gomez, or any complainant for that matter, in or out of court,
when my sister gave birth to six (6) children, all fathered by Fernando Poe,
Sr.

18.           I am executing
this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural-born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in the City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12^th
day of January 2004.

(Sgd.)
RUBY KELLEY MANGAHAS

Declarant

The allegation of Mrs. Mangahas that
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is the son of Allan F. Poe stands unchallenged.

We follow the principle of jus
sanguinis, the rule of blood relationship. 
Proof that Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is the father of respondent
Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in the veins of respondent
Poe.  No other proof is required for the
principle of jus sanguinis to
apply.  There is no need for other proofs
such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used in civil law
for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children. Our
Constitutions from 1935 merely state – “those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.”  The ineluctable conclusion
is that the only proof required for
the principle of jus sanguinis to
operate is filiation, i.e., that
one’s father is a citizen of the Philippines. 
No other kind of proof is required. 
In fine, the quantity and quality
of proof or the standard of proof is provided by the Constitution itself.  We cannot alter this standard by suggesting
either a strict or liberal approach.

In any event, if further poof of acknowledgment is required,
Exhibit “8-a” of the respondent Poe, should be considered.  It is entitled “Affidavit for Philippine Army
Personnel,” executed by Allan F. Poe.  In
this Affidavit, Allan F. Poe declared and acknowledged his children to be
Elizabeth, 6 years old, Ronnie, 5 years old and Fernando II, 3 years old.  This Affidavit is not refuted.

Filipino citizenship of Allan F. Poe,

respondent’s
father is well established.

The Filipino citizenship of respondent Poe’s father, Allan F.
Poe, is well established by evidence. 
Allan F. Poe’s father is Lorenzo Pou. 
Lorenzo Pou was a Spanish subject. 
He was an inhabitant of the Philippines on December 10, 1898 when Spain
ceded the Philippines to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris.  Said Treaty pertinently provides:

x x x

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or
dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right
to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in
respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners.  In
case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date
of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they
shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality to the
territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.

In relation to this Treaty, the Philippine Bill of 1902, provided
as follows:

SEC. 4.  That all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April eighteen hundred ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

while the Jones Law provided as follows:

SEC. 2.  That all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens
of some other country:  Provided, That
the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the Untied
States residing therein.

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, Exhibit “S” shows he died
at age 84 in San Carlos, Pangasinan.  By
the Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Lorenzo Pou
was a citizen of the Philippines. Allan F. Poe followed the citizenship of his
father (Lorenzo) as a Filipino.  Allan F.
Poe can also be considered as a Filipino by birth.  He was born in the Philippines on November
27, 1916, before the 1935 Constitution. He studied, worked, lived and died in
the Philippines.[20]
His Filipino citizenship is transmitted to his son, respondent Poe.  The attempt of petitioner to cast doubt on
the Filipino citizenship of Allan F. Poe is an exercise in futility.

E.

TO DISQUALIFY
RESPONDENT POE BECAUSE HE

IS ILLEGITIMATE
WILL VIOLATE OUR TREATY

OBLIGATION.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1989.  The Philippines was the 31^st state
to ratify the Convention in July 1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution 109.  The Convention entered into force on
September 2, 1990.  A milestone treaty, it abolished all discriminations against children
including discriminations on account of “birth or other status.”  Part 1, Article 2 (1) of the Convention
explicitly provides:

Article 2

1.  State Parties shall
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race colour, sex, language
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property, disability, birth or other
status.

The Convention protects in the most
comprehensive way all rights of children: 
political rights, civil rights, social rights, economic rights and
cultural rights.  It adopted the principle
of interdependence and indivisibility of children’s rights.  A violation of one right is considered a
violation of the other rights.  It also
embraced the rule that all actions of a State concerning the child should
consider the “best interests” of the child.

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution,
this Convention on the Rights of the child became valid and effective on us in
July 1990 upon concurrence by the Senate. 
We shall be violating the Convention if we disqualify respondent Poe
just because he happened to be an illegitimate child.  It is our bounden duty to comply with our
treaty obligation pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda.  As we held in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,[21]
viz:

x x x

For a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be
enforced or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a Ministry.  It creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties founded on the generally accepted principle of international law of
pacta sunct servanda which has been
adopted as part of the law of our land. (Constitution, Article II, Section 3)

Indeed there is no reason to refuse compliance with the
Convention for it is in perfect accord 
with our Constitution and with our laws.

Moreover to disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy is
against the trend in civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an
illegitimate child with that of a legitimate child.  Called originally as nullius filius or
no one’s child, an illegitimate child started without any birthright of
significance. The passage of time, however, brought about the enlightenment
that an illegitimate should not be punished for the illicit liaison of his
parents of which he played no part.  No
less than our Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., then a Commissioner of the Constitutional Commission, proposed
the adoption of the following radical provision in the 1987 Constitution, viz:
“All children regardless of filiations
shall enjoy the same social protection.” In an exchange with Commissioner
Nolledo, he explained its rationale as follows: [22]

x x x

Mr. Nolledo.  Would it be appropriate to say that social
protection is earned and should not be imposed by legal mandate?

Mr. Davide:  Mr. Presiding Officer, it is not, it may not
be imposed but we are framing a Constitution to provide for a directive policy
or directive principles of state policy, there is no harm in making it as a
directive principle or a state policy especially
if it would affect the lives of citizens who, I would like to state again, are
not responsible for a misfortune in life.

Following the undeniable injustice committed to illegitimate
children due alone to the accident of their birth, the universal trend of laws
today is to abolish all invidious discriminations against their rights.  Slowly, they were granted more rights until
their civil rights are now equal to the rights of legitimate children.  The Philippines has joined the civilized
treatment of illegitimate children. 
Hence, under Article 178 of our New Family Code, a child born out of
wedlock of parents without any impediment to marry (like the parents of
respondent Poe) can be legitimated.  If
legitimated, Article 179 of the same Code provides that the child shall enjoy
the same civil rights as a legitimate child. 
In Ilano vs. Court of Appeals,[23]
this Court expressed the enlightened policy that illegitimate children “were
born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.” The march
towards equality of rights between legitimate and illegitimate children is irreversible.  We will be medieval in our outlook if we
refuse to be in cadence with this world wide movement.

V.

EPILOGUE

Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President
involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less
dominant.  The Court is split down the
middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made
more difficult by the interplay of national and international law.  Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the
members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide
who will be the next President.  For on
political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To
be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court
the right to elect in behalf of the people.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.