file:rep of the phil vs sandiganbayan 152154 november 18, 2003.htm

Forfeiture Proceeding under
RA 1379: An action in rem, against the thing itself hence civil in
character

 

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152154.  November 18, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
ESTATE/HEIRS:  IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA
IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE
MARCOS-ARANETA), AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

Before us are motions dated August 1, 2003, August 2, 2003 and
August 25, 2003 of respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Ma.
Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., respectively, seeking
reconsideration of our decision dated July 15, 2003 which ordered the
forfeiture in favor of the Republic of the Philippines of the Swiss deposits in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the estimated aggregate amount
of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.

Respondent Imelda Marcos, in her motion for reconsideration, asks
this Court to set aside the aforesaid decision dated July 15, 2003, premised on
the following grounds:

I

THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF HER CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENSHRINED RIGHT  TO  DUE PROCESS ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

A.  FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
UNDER R.A. 1379, IN RELATION TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE CRIMINAL/PENAL IN
NATURE, HENCE, RESPONDENT HAS ALL THE RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED UNDER  THE CONSTITUTION;  AND THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
RESPONDENT’S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

B. CONSIDERING THE
CRIMINAL/PENAL NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, THE DENIALS RAISED BY RESPONDENT IN
HER ANSWER WERE SUFFICIENT TO TRAVERSE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION FOR
FORFEITURE.

C. THE PROSECUTION HAD FAILED
TO ESTABLISH EVEN A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT, MUCH LESS PROVEN ITS
CASE FOR FORFEITURE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE, A SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT
BE RENDERED IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO OVERTHROW THE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION.

E. THE FACTUAL FINDING THAT
THE FOUNDATIONS INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS ARE CONSIDERED
BUSINESSES, AND WERE MANAGED BY RESPONDENT TOGETHER WITH HER LATE HUSBAND, WILL
PERNICIOUSLY AFFECT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FILED BY THE REPUBLIC AGAINST
RESPONDENT.

II

THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT, WHICH IMPROPERLY CONVERTED THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION INTO A
REGULAR APPEAL, DIVESTED RESPONDENT OF HER RIGHT TO APPEAL THE CASE ON THE
MERITS, THEREBY DEPRIVING HER OF DUE PROCESS.

A.  THE RESOLUTION DATED 31
JANUARY 2002 RAISED BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT ON A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
WAS OBVIOUSLY A MERE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE  COURT 
SHOULD  NOT HAVE DELVED ON THE
MERITS OF THE CASE, IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO APPEAL, WHICH
IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED BY THE RULES.

Respondent Imelda Marcos further alleges that our July 15, 2003
decision will prejudice the criminal cases filed against her.

Respondents Ferdinand, Jr. and Imee Marcos also pray that the
said decision be set aside and the case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan to
give petitioner Republic the opportunity to present witnesses and documents and
to afford respondent Marcoses the chance to present controverting evidence, based
on the following:

I

THE LETTER AND INTENT
OF RA 1379 FORBID/PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THE PROCESS TO DECIDE FORFEITURE
UNDER RA 1379.  THUS, IT PROVIDES FOR
SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION AND MANDATES A WELL-DEFINED
PROCEDURE TO BE STRICTLY OBSERVED BEFORE FORFEITURE JUDGMENT MAY BE RENDERED.

II

SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN THE DECISION UNDER RECONSIDERATION DIMINISHES/MODIFIES OR REPEALS
VIA JUDICIAL LEGISLATION SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS GRANTED AND
GUARANTEED BY RA 1379 AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

III

THE
DECISION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID FOR FAILURE TO EXPRESS CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE TRUE/GENUINE STATEMENT OF FACTS (ADDUCED AFTER TRIAL/
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE) ON WHICH IT IS BASED.

IV

THE
LAW(S) ON WHICH THE DECISION IS BASED IS/ARE NOT APPLICABLE/PROPER  AND/OR 
ARE FORCEFULLY STRAINED TO JUSTIFY THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSIONS REACHED,
VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS.

V

THERE
BEING A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS, THE COURT AXIOMATICALLY OUSTED ITSELF OF
JURISDICTION. HENCE, THE DECISION IS VOID.

VI

ASSUMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE AND PROPER, IT IS NOT
WARRANTED UNDER THE PREMISES.

VII

ASSUMING THAT A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THE AVERMENTS OF THE PETITION FORFEITURE ARE
INCOMPLETE AND INCONCLUSIVE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUISITE IMPERATIVES.  JUDGMENT VIOLATES THE CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON
TO BE OBSERVED TO RENDER A VALID DECISION OF FORFEITURE UNDER RA 1379.

VIII

THE STATEMENT OF
OPERATIVE FACTS/FACTUAL NARRATION AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE
DECISION ARE CONTRADICTED OR REFUTED BY THE PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES, THE
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF PETITIONER, THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE
ORDERS ISSUED.

Respondent Irene Araneta, in her motion for reconsideration,
merely reiterates the arguments previously raised in the pleadings she filed in
this Court and prays that the Court’s decision dated July 15, 2003 be set
aside.

In its consolidated comment dated September 29, 2003, the Office
of the Solicitor General argues that:

I

THE MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION DO NOT RAISE ANY NEW MATTER AND WERE FILED MANIFESTLY TO DELAY
THE EXECUTION OF THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003.

II

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS
APPLICABLE TO A PETITION FOR FORFEITURE, AS LONG AS THERE IS NO GENUINE FACTUAL
ISSUE WHICH WOULD CALL FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

III

THE DECISION DATED
JULY 15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CLEARLY EXPRESSED THE FACTS ON WHICH IT
IS BASED, MOST OF WHICH WERE ADMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS
SUBMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

IV

CERTIORARI IS THE
APPROPRIATE AND SPEEDY REMEDY OF PETITIONER REPUBLIC, GIVEN THE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN TOTALLY REVERSING ITS OWN
DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 AND IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION DATED
JANUARY 31, 2002, AND CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE IS IMBUED WITH IMMENSE PUBLIC
INTEREST, PUBLIC POLICY AND DEEP HISTORICAL REPERCUSSIONS.

V

A FORFEITURE PROCEEDING UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379 IS CIVIL AND
NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE.

VI

THE DECISION DATED
JULY 15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
FILED AGAINST RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

On October 6, 2003, respondents Marcos, Jr. and Imee Marcos filed
a motion for leave to file a reply to petitioner Republic’s consolidated
comment, which this Court granted. On October 22, 2003, they filed their reply
to the consolidated comment.

As the aforequoted issues are interwoven, the Court shall discuss
them together.

At the outset, we note that respondents, in their motions for
reconsideration, do not raise any new matters for the Court to resolve.
The arguments in their motions for reconsideration are mere reiterations of
their contentions fully articulated in their previous pleadings, and
exhaustively probed and passed upon by the Court.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS

Respondent Marcoses argue that the letter and intent of RA 1379 forbid
and preclude summary judgment as the process to decide forfeiture cases under
the law. It provides for specific jurisdictional allegations in the petition
and mandates a well-defined procedure to be strictly observed before a judgment
of forfeiture may be rendered.

According to respondents, Section 5 of RA 1379 requires the court
to set a date for hearing during which respondents shall be given ample
opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how they acquired the
property. They contend that the proceedings under RA 1379 are criminal in
character, thus they have all the rights of an accused under the Constitution
such as the right to adduce evidence and the right to a hearing. They claim
that it is petitioner which has the burden of proving respondents’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that forfeiture of property should depend not on the
weakness of their evidence but on the strength of petitioner’s. Accordingly,
respondents maintain that, due to the criminal nature of forfeiture proceedings,
the denials raised by them were sufficient to traverse all the allegations in
the petition for forfeiture.

The issue of the propriety of summary judgment was painstakingly
discussed and settled in our July 15, 2003 decision:

A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or
issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that
the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid
of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.   It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of
Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no
serious controversy. Summary judgment is a procedural devise for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a
genuine issue as to any material fact.[1]

IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE

PROCEEDINGS
A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?

The principal contention now of respondent Marcoses is limited to
their argument that our aforementioned decision effectively deprived them of
their constitutionally enshrined right to due process.

According to respondents, RA 1379 is penal in substance and
effect, hence, they are entitled to the constitutional safeguards enjoyed by an
accused. Respondents further argue that the reinstatement of the decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated September 19, 2000, which ordered the forfeiture of the
properties subject of the instant case by summary judgment, diminished or
repealed, by judicial legislation, respondents’ rights guaranteed by RA 1379 for
failure to set a date for hearing to benefit respondents.

We disagree.

Due process of law has two aspects:  substantive and procedural due process.  In order that a particular act may not be
impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with
both substantive and the procedural requirements thereof.[2]

In the present context, substantive due process refers to the
intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his
property.[3]
On the other hand, procedural due process means compliance with the procedures
or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are
called upon to administer it.[4]

Insofar as substantive due process is concerned, there is no
showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or unjust.  In other words, respondent Marcoses are not
being deprived of their property through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons or on
flimsy grounds.  As meticulously explained
in the July 15, 2003 decision of the Court, EO No. 1[5]
created the PCGG primarily to assist then President Corazon Aquino in the
recovery, pursuant to RA 1379, of vast government resources amassed and stolen
by former President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, close
associates and other cronies.  These
assets were stashed away  here and
abroad.

A careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses
that the forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did not violate the
substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. 
These proceedings are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the
Marcoses that it is penal in character.

In Almeda Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al.,[6]
we suggested a test to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil
or criminal:

“ . . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in
nature, and may be in rem or in personam. 
If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they are criminal in nature,
although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the
statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be
considered as civil.  If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the
proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so
provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not
also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil
action.”  (37 CJS, Forfeiture, Sec. 5,
pp. 15-16)

In the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario Asistio,
Jr.,[7]
this Court categorically declared that:

The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in
rem and therefore civil in nature.

The proceedings under RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition
of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired
in favor of the State.  Section 6 of said
law provides:

x x x If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of
the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by
virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State
x x x

The procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that
provided for in a civil action:

x x x                x x x                      x x x

Sec. 3. The petition – The petition shall contain the following
information:

(a)          The name and address of the
respondent.

(b)          The public office or employment he
holds and such other public offices or employments which he has previously
held.

(c)          The approximate amount of property he
has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and
employments.

(d)          A description of said property, or
such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e)          The total amount of his government
salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired
property, and

(f)           Such other information as may enable
the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired
property during his incumbency.

x x x                   x x x                     x x x

Sec. 4. Period for the answer. – The respondent shall have a period
of fifteen days within which to present his answer.

In short, there is a petition, then an answer and lastly, a
hearing. The preliminary investigation required prior to the filing of the
petition, in accordance with Section 2 of the Act, is expressly provided to be
similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. The similarity,
however, ends there for, if the investigation were akin to that in a criminal
case but all the other succeeding steps were those for a civil proceeding, then
the process as a whole is definitely not criminal. Were it a criminal
proceeding, there would be, after preliminary investigation, a reading of the
information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, a trial and a reading of judgment
in the presence of respondents. But these steps, as above set forth, are
clearly not provided for in the law.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary
judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.[8]

The proceedings in RA 1379 and EO No. 14 were observed in the
prosecution of the petition for forfeiture. Section 1 of EO No.14-A, dated
August 18, 1986, amending Section 3 of EO No.14, provides that civil suits to
recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by
preponderance of evidence. Under RA 1379 and EO Nos. 1 and 2, the Government is
required only to state the known lawful income of respondents for the prima
facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. As we fully explained in our
July 15, 2003 decision, petitioner Republic was able to establish this prima
facie presumption. Thus, the burden of proof shifted, by law, to the
respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits
were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income.
This, respondent Marcoses did not do. They failed ― or rather, refused ― to
raise any genuine issue of fact warranting a trial for the reception of
evidence therefor. For this reason and pursuant to the State policy to expedite
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment
which the Sandiganbayan appropriately acted on.

Respondents also claim that summary judgment denies them their
right to a hearing and to present evidence purposely granted under Section 5 of
RA 1379.

Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present
their case, their defenses and their pleadings.   Not only did they obstinately refuse to do
so.  Respondents time and again tried to
confuse the issues and the Court itself, and to delay the disposition of the
case.

Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:

The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open to the
public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to
explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in
question.

And pursuant to Section 6 of the said
law, if the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that
he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare
such property forfeited in favor of the State.

Respondent Marcoses erroneously understood “hearing” to be
synonymous with “trial.”  The words
“hearing” and “trial” have different meanings and connotations. Trial may refer
to the reception of evidence and other processes.  It embraces the period for the introduction
of evidence by both parties.  Hearing, as
known in law, is not confined to trial but embraces the several stages of
litigation, including the pre-trial stage. 
A hearing does not necessarily mean presentation of evidence.  It does not necessarily imply the
presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open court but that the parties
are afforded the opportunity to be heard.

A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that
the word “hearing” does not always require the formal introduction of evidence
in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to participate and
explain how they acquired the property in question.  If they are unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that they lawfully acquired the property in question,
then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.[9]  There is no provision in the law that a full
blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the forfeiture of
the subject property.  Thus, even if the
forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court is not precluded from
determining the nature of the acquisition of the property in question even in a
summary proceeding.

Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due
process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s
evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the
absence of previous notice but the absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard.[10]
This opportunity was made completely available to respondents who participated
in all stages of the litigation.

When the petition for forfeiture was filed at the Sandiganbayan,
respondent Marcoses argued their case and engaged in all of the lengthy
discussions, argumentation, deliberations and conferences, and submitted their
pleadings, documents and other papers. 
When petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment, respondent Marcoses
filed their demurrer to evidence.  They
agreed to submit the case for decision with their opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. They moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan
resolution dated September 19, 2000 which granted petitioner Republic’s motion
for summary judgment (which was in fact subsequently reversed in its January
31, 2002 resolution.) And when the case finally reached this Court, respondent
Marcoses were given, on every occasion, the chance to file and submit all the
pleadings necessary to defend their case. And even now that the matter has been
finally settled and adjudicated, their motion for reconsideration is being
heard by this Court.

For twelve long years, respondent Marcoses tried to stave off
this case with nothing but empty claims of “lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief,” or “they were not privy to the transactions,” or
“they could not remember (because the transactions) happened a long time ago”
or that the assets “were lawfully acquired.” And they now allege deprivation of
their right to be heard and present evidence in their defense?

It would be repulsive to our basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow respondents to further delay the adjudication of this case
and defeat the judgment of this Court which was promulgated only after all the
facts, issues and other considerations essential to a fair and just
determination had been judiciously evaluated.

Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this
case. It would readily be apparent to a reasonable mind that respondent
Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every procedural device to delay
the resolution hereof. There is justice waiting to be done.  The people and the State are entitled to
favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the
salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the
rightful owner, the Republic of the Philippines, within the shortest possible
time.

The respondent Marcoses cannot deny that the delays in this
case have all been made at their instance. The records can testify to this
incontrovertible fact. It will be a mockery of justice to allow them to
benefit from it.  By their own deliberate
acts ― not those of the Republic or anybody else ― they are deemed to have
altogether waived or abandoned their right to proceed to trial.

Respondent Imelda R. Marcos likewise asserts that the factual
finding that the foundations involved in the instant forfeiture proceedings
were businesses managed by her and her late husband, will adversely affect the
criminal proceedings filed by the Republic against her.  The contention is bereft of merit.  The criminal cases referred to by said
respondent are actions in personam, directed against her on the basis of
her personal liability.  In criminal
cases, the law imposes the burden of proving guilt on the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, and the trial judge in evaluating the evidence must find that
all the elements of the crime charged have been established by sufficient proof
to convict. 

But a forfeiture proceeding is an action in rem, against
the thing itself instead of against the person. 
Being civil in character, it requires no more than a preponderance of evidence.[11]  And by preponderance of evidence is meant
that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the
other.[12]  Hence, the factual findings of this Court in
its decision dated July 15, 2003 will, as a consequence, neither affect nor do
away with the requirement of having to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt
in the criminal cases against her.

One final note.  We take
judicial notice of newspaper accounts that a certain Judge Manuel Real of the
US District Court of Hawaii issued a “global freeze order” on the Marcos
assets, including the Swiss deposits.  We
reject this order outrightly because it is a transgression not only of the
principle of territoriality  in  public  
international  law  but 
also  of the jurisdiction of this
Court recognized by the parties-in-interest and the Swiss government itself.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby
DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Carpio, J., no part.