file:people vs lacson 149453 october 7, 2003 j_ callejo sr en.htm

Remedial Law: Sec. 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedures; Prospective application of 2-year time bar to refile
criminal cases provisionally dismissed

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149453.  October 7, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY
CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to
wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;[1]
(b) Motion for Reconsideration;[2]
(c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;[3]
(d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.[4]

The Omnibus Motion

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003
Resolution of this Court which granted the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.  The respondent thereafter
prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S.
Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such
inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing
or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration.  The respondent points out that the aforenamed
members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after
the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was submitted
for the decision of the Court.  He
asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC[5]
specifically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the Court, it
should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of
this Court which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the
constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his motion for
reconsideration and its supplement.  As
such, according to the respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by
Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any other member of the Court.

The Court resolves to deny the respondent’s motion for lack of
merit.

The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent
filed an urgent motion for the recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma.
Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they were appointed to the Court
after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the
integral portions of the proceedings. 
Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and
decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition.[6]  On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a
motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on
account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court
of Appeals.

On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the
respondent’s Motion dated March 18, 2003. 
The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the
April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M.
No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court
who had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May
28, 2002 Resolution.  The respondent
likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S.
Azcuna, again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the
oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already been
submitted for decision.

On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the
aforesaid motions of the respondent.[7]  The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is
applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court:

The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is
misplaced.  As admitted by the
respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration
in cases assigned to the Divisions of the Court.  For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had
always been and still is, if the ponente
is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for
reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof.  This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr.
who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the April 1,
2003 Resolution of the Court.[8]

The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest
members to inhibit themselves from participating in the deliberation of the
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration:

Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and
Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of the Court during the February 18, 2002[9]
oral arguments before the Court, nonetheless they were not disqualified to
participate in the deliberations on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion for
reconsideration.  Neither is Justice
Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of the Court on the motion
for reconsideration of the respondent. 
When the Court deliberated on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna
were already members of the Court.

It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken
during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of the parties are
parts of the records of this case.  Said
transcripts are available to the parties or to any member of the Court.  Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix
Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the respondent on February 18,
2002 but by reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are
informed of what transpired during the hearing and oral arguments of the
parties.[10]

It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his
omnibus motion had already been passed upon and resolved by this Court.  The respondent did not make any new
substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the
aforesaid resolutions.

Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices
Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only after they had already concurred
in the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2003. 
Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when
filed after a member of the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of
the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate
upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection of this sort after a
decision has been rendered.[11]

The Motion to Set the Case for

Oral
Arguments

The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have
already extensively discussed the issues involved in the case. The respondent’s
motion for reconsideration consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding
the supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply to the
petitioners’ comment on his motion. 
There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral arguments.

The Issue as to the Application of

the Time-bar under Section 8,

Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure – Whether

Prospective
or Retroactive

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court and thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28,
2002.

He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a
long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively
and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its
being favorable to the accused.  He
asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should
likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law.  The respondent insists that Section 8 was
purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case.  It is primarily a check on the State to
prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right
to prosecute the accused anew.  The
respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure,
there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have retroactive application,
absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively.  Accordingly, prospective application thereof
would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999
within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s
right to due process and equal protection of the law.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in
time to provide relief to the accused. 
In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity
to prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the
cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect
on December 1, 2000.  According to the
respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his
right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid
for the Senate.

In their comment on the respondent’s motions, the petitioners
assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the
rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantial rights.  While
Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not
preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice.  If such right to public justice is taken
away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule.  According to the petitioners, if a procedural
rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be
given a retroactive application.  They
contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the
criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases
already dismissed.  The petitioners
assert that the “refiling of the cases” under Section 8 should be taken to mean
as the filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the
purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of
the criminal complaint or information in court for trial.  Furthermore, according to the petitioners,
the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional
dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly
states.  Thus, if the requisite notices to
the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year
period had not yet even commenced to run.

In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the
respondent asserts that the State is proscribed from refiling a criminal case
if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation of the right of the
accused to due process.  In this case,
there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the
witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the same
witnesses in 2001.  The State had
reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed
to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence.  Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the
respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8
refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial.  The operational act then is the refiling of
the Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly
beyond the two-year bar.

The Court finds the respondent’s contentions to be without merit.

First.  The Court approved
the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of
the Constitution which reads:

(5)     Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.  Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.  Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply
because it is favorable to the accused. 
It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to
reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
the case.  The time-bar under the new
rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and
the accused; not for the accused only. 
The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended
party.  The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code.  However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice
to the State and the accused.  It took
into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process.  The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended
parties.  The time-bar fixed by the Court
must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.[12]

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims,
the Court, in the interest of justice, may make the rule prospective where the
exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective.  The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a
rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on
which the dictate is based.  Each
constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its
own background or precedent, and its own impact on the administration of
justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with
the dictate involved.[13]

Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in
operation as a statute.[14]  To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court
per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits of adherence may
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of
relating forward.[15]

The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article
VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution.  This constitutional grant to promulgate rules
carries with it the power, inter alia,
to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive
effect.  Moreover, under Rule 144 of the
Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it
if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work
injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply.[16]

The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective
application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor
does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and
prospective effect.  If the statutory purpose
is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to
fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the
rule.  It should be construed so as not
to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose.[17]
A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved.  To construe it in a manner that disregards or
defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.[18]
In Cometa v. Court of Appeals,[19]
this Court ruled that “the spirit rather than the letter of the statute
determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent.”[20]  While we may not read into the law a purpose
that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason
for its enactment.  In doing so, we defer
not to the “letter that killeth” but to the “spirit that vivifieth, to give
effect to the lawmaker’s will.”[21]

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the
new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the
intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for
which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice
of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the
accused.  It would be a denial of the
State’s right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply
the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists,
considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge
Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before
the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. 
A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust
and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their
heirs.

Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally
dismissed a criminal case with the express consent of the accused in 1997.  The prosecution had the right to revive the
case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.  On December 1, 2000,
the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to
revive the criminal case before then.

If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied
retroactively, this would mean that the State would be barred from reviving the
case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved
by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case.  In contrast, if the same case was
dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right to revive the
same within the time-bar.  In fine, to so
hold would imply that the State was presumed to foresee and anticipate that
three years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP.  The State would thus be sanctioned for its
failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court.  It must be stressed that the institution and
prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by
rules yet to exist.  It would be the
apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence
before it was approved by the Court.  The
past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.

In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002
within which to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge
Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999
when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the
new rule.  Instead of giving the State
two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably
less than two years to do so.  Thus,
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999.  The new rule took effect
on December 1, 2000.  If the Court
applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and
three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal
cases.  The period is short of the
two-year period fixed under the new rule. 
On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State
would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within
which to revive the cases.  This is in
consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus
prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive,
injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999[22]
should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule
prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be
expected to comply with the time-bar.  It
cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal
cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within
the two-year period under the new rule. 
As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter,
in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12
(1956):

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of
it waived their rights …

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of
both the State and the accused.  It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application
of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused.  For to do so would cause an “injustice of
hardship” to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in
general and of criminal laws in particular.[23]

Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion in Griffin v. People,[24]
he said, “it is much more conducive to law’s self-respect to recognize candidly
the considerations that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of
law.  That this is consonant with the
spirit of our law and justified by those considerations of reason which should
dominate the law has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly
before he came here and in an opinion which he wrote for the Court.”

Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion
for reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to
comply with the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet had to exist:

99.     Respondent submits
that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and
incompletion.  This however is not
strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999,
when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have its
text to guide his actions.  How could the good judge have complied with
the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?[25]

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.  In that sense and to that
extent, procedural laws are retroactive.[26]
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge
Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.  When the petitioners filed the Informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated.  The two-year bar in the new rule should not
be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect.  While it is true that the Court applied
Section 8 of Rule 110[27]
of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated
with finality.

The records show that after the requisite preliminary
investigation conducted by the petitioners in accordance with existing rules,
eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed
with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor.  The respondent cannot argue that his right to
due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the
Constitution had been violated.[28]

The respondent’s plaint that he was being singled out by the
prospective application of the new rule simply because before the Court issued
its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of
the Republic for the 2004 elections has no factual basis whatsoever.[29]
The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of
the retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before
the Court.  The ruling of the Court in
its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless
of who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the Republic or
an ordinary citizen.

The respondent’s contention that the prospective application of
the new rule would deny him due process and would violate the equal protection
of laws is barren of merit.  It proceeds
from an erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely
for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State to due process.  The new rule was approved by the Court to
enhance the right of due process of both the State and the accused.  The State is entitled to due process in
criminal cases as much as the accused.

Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely
defined.  It is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.  The phrase expresses the
requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can be as opaque
as its importance is lofty.[30]  In determining what fundamental fairness
consists of in a particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered
and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the
interests of the government must be assessed. 
In this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive
application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of the
respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be.  The interest of the State in the speedy,
impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise
considered.

The Respondent Failed to Comply

with the Essential Prerequisites of

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised

Rules
of Criminal Procedure

The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of
Appeals is entirely different from the issue involved in the present recourse;
hence, any admissions he made in the court below are not judicial admissions in
this case.  He asserts that the issue
involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he
was charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite
the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the
issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP.  The respondent avers that the proceedings in
the appellate court are different from those in this Court.

The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving
considerable weight to the admissions he made in his pleadings and during the
proceedings in the CA.  He stresses that
judicial admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a)
made in the course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding
a relevant fact, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Evidence.  He contends that
contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial
determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said cases.  His motion carried with it, at the very
least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases.  Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge
Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases.  Moreover, the respondent avers that his
motion included the general prayer “for such other reliefs as may be equitable
in the premises.”  The respondent also
points out that the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as
the latter did not even file any motion for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir,
Jr.’s order dismissing the cases.

The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of
facts.  It has no means to ascertain or
verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a
function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts.  He posits that there is a need for the case
to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not
Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice requirements of Section 8.  Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this
Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of
notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said
rule was not yet in existence at the time he filed his motion for a
determination of probable cause.

The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the
offended parties under Section 8 is a formal and not an essential
requisite.  In criminal cases, the
offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited
to the determination of the civil liability of the accused.  According to the respondent, notice to the
prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to
recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after all,
the prosecution of the offense is under the control and direction of the public
prosecutor.

The contentions of the respondent have no merit.

First.  The issue posed by
the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same.  To recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933,[31]
the respondent[32]
sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting
a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the
petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the
RRCP.[33]
When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his
petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double
jeopardy, praying that:

13.     Inasmuch as the case
subject of the “preliminary investigation” was dismissed for the reasons
mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation
can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the
existence of a “sworn written statement charging a person with an offense” as
basis for the commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule 112.

For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses
over which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly entered before the
Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) before its remand to the QC
RTC.  Hence, to proceed therewith on
similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor
(Article III, §21, Constitution).[34]

The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to
a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted
anew for the same offense without violating his right against double jeopardy.  However, the respondent filed a second
amended petition wherein he invoked for
the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:

(e)     the new criminal
cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other accused
on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and
pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as
they involve exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously
been dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March
29, 1999, hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such dismissal in
accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117.[35]

Indeed, the CA granted the respondent’s petition based on Section
8, Rule 117 of the RRCP.  In this case,
the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution.  Thus, during the oral arguments in this
Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking
Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       You are saying that
Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing
of the 11 in 1995?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       That is my submission,
Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       Let us see your reason
for it?

ATTY. FORTUN:[36]

       First, are you saying
that double jeopardy applies or not?

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:[37]

       Allow me to qualify the
effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my
submission.

ATTY. FORTUN:[38]

       No, no, I am not
talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the
doctrine of double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Your Honor, double
jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       That is right.

ATTY. FORTUN:

       They are two different
claims.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       That is what I am
trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Very well, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       You are not invoking
double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       As I mentioned we are
saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       No, I am not talking of
the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to
apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Because the element of
double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       So, the answer is yes?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       No, Your Honor, we were
saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy
upon the accused who invokes it.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       What you are saying is
the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later.

ATTY. FORTUN:

       They are two different
(interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       Later, I am asking
about doctrines.  Since you are not
invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose,
sink or sail on the application of 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       On the constitutional
right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition
of cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       Are you not resting on
8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       That and the
constitutional provision, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       So, you are resting
on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Not exclusive, Your
Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       The Constitution
which gave life to 8,117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       To speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

       Can a Court, let us see
your theory then – your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of
Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Yes, Your Honor.[39]

Second.  The respondent’s
answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during the hearing
in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express
conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation
to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy,
thus:

JUSTICE SALONGA:

       Do we get it from you
that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       It is my submission,
that it is, Your Honor.  In addition, of
course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on double
jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the
Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

       You are referring to
those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

       And it is your stand
that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       It was in that the
accused did not ask for it.  What they
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for
warrants of arrest issued.  Then Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses,
particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further
conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes
of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to
trial.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

       And it is expressly
provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused.

ATTY. FORTUN:

       That is correct, Your
Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

       And with notice to the
offended party.

ATTY. FORTUN:

       That is correct, Your
Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

       Was there an express
conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       There was none, Your
Honor.  We were not asked to sign any
order, or any statement which would normally be required by the Court on
pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal.  My very limited practice in criminal courts,
Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of
provisional dismissal.  In fact, they ask
the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the
implications of a provisional dismissal.[40]

The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his
plea for equitable relief in his motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the
cases.  The respondent insisted that the
only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his
arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable cause.  He asserted that the judge did not even
require him to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases:

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

       You were present during
the proceedings?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

       You represented the
petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       That is correct,
Your Honor.  And there was nothing of
that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in
criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr.
Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

       Now, you filed a
motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

       Did you make any
alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
should the Court do?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       That the arrest
warrants only be withheld.  That was the
only prayer that we asked.  In fact,
I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the
Court, it said: “Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing
the prosecution to present private complainants and their witnesses at the
scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the
accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution
of this incident.”

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

       There is no general
prayer for any further relief?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       There is but it simply
says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

       Don’t you surmise Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for
just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net
effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       Yes, Your
Honor.  I will not second say (sic)
yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional
dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional
dismissal.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

       If you did not agree to
the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of
the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?

ATTY. FORTUN:

       I did not, Your
Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been
arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned.  So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir
operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition
to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could
prejudice the interest of my client.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

       Continue.[41]

In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the
Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring
the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases.  The records were remanded to the QC RTC.  Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch
91.  Petitioner and the others promptly
filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B).  He asked that warrants for his arrest not be
issued.   He did not move for the
dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s claim.[42]

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions.
– An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.  The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.

A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party
or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. 
It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney
during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a
party.[43]
It may occur at any point during the litigation process.  An admission in open court is a judicial
admission.[44]
A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel.[45]
As declared by this Court:

… [I]n fact, “judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel
or of attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of
his client.  When such admissions are made
… for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, … they bind the
client, whether made during, or even after the trial.”[46]

When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express
consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted
that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.

The respondent’s contention that his admissions made in his
pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case
as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not hold
water.  It should be borne in mind that
the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the
present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate
court.  This is not a new trial, but a
review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed
through the CA.  The respondent is bound
by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him
in the proceedings before this Court.  As
categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark
Equipment Company:[47]

… [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made
by  counsel on behalf of a client during
a trial, are binding “for the purpose of the case  … including appeals.”

While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally
dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable cause, absent the express
consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot
thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof.  Neither may the accused do so simply because
the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial
determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the case.  Even a cursory
reading of the respondent’s motion for a judicial determination of probable
cause will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant for the respondent’s arrest as a prayer for
the dismissal of the cases.  The
respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or not there was
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the
meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of the said warrant.  Case law has it that a prayer for equitable
relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize
the court to grant such relief.[48]
A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings.  Anything that is resolved or decided beyond
them is coram non judice and void.[49]

Third.  There is no need
for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the
respondent to adduce post facto
evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied with by
Judge Agnir, Jr.  The Court has
thoroughly examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC[50]
and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the heirs
of the victims.  The respondent himself
admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, “Judge
Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 because
said rule had yet to exist.”[51]

One final matter.  The
records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were assigned,
through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City,
the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.[52]
In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch 81
of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos.
01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch.  The Court notes, however, that in
Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six branches of the RTC of
Quezon City[53]
as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act
No. 7659.  Since the accused in the said
cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as
a heinous crime, the above cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a
special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M.
Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED.  The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. 
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby
DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to
RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and
decide heinous crimes.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

Puno, J., maintains his dissent.

Vitug, J., maintains his
dissent and reiterate his opinion on the Court’s resolution of 28 May 2002.

Ynares-Santiago,
J., see separate dissenting opinion.

Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., see dissenting opinion.

Carpio, J., no part.

Corona, J., on leave.

Tinga, J., no part.