G.R. No. L-25135. September 21, 1968
PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS AND JOSE MA. TORRES, RESPONDENTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original action for certiorari and mandamus, against the Board of
Medical Examiners and Jose Ma. Torres, to annul a resolution of the former and
a certificate issued by the same authorizing the latter to practice medicine
in the Philippines
without examination.
The facts are not disputed.
Jose Ma. Torres – hereinafter referred to as respondent – is a Spanish
subject and a member of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart of Mary,
otherwise known as the Claretian Missionaries. Having graduated from the University of
Barcelona, Spain, with the degree of Licentiate Medicine and Surgery, he is
entitled, under the laws of Spain,
to practice medicine and surgery throughout the territory thereof.
On January 21, 1955,
respondent was granted special authority to practice medicine in Lamitan, Basilan
City, where he resides, pursuant to
Section 771(e) of the Revised Administrative Code reading:
“SEC. 771. Persons exempt from registration.- Registration
shall not be required of the following classes of persons: x x x x
“(e) In
cases of epidemics or in municipalities where there is no legally qualified
practicing physician, or when the circumstances require it, in the interest of
the public health, the Director of Health may issue special authorizations, to
all medical students who have completed the first three years of their
studies, or to persons who have qualified in medicine, and to graduate or registered
nurses, who may request it.
“
This
authority was revoked, on November 8, 1960, by the then Secretary of Health,
upon the ground that “the conditions under which it was granted no
longer obtained in Lamitan, Basilan
City, there being enough practising physicians in
that locality.” Said officer restored the authority on December
19, 1960, to be revoked again, on January 22, 1963. It
was renewed once more, on September 1, 1963, and, once again, it was revoked on February
10, 1964, upon the
recommendation of the Board of Medical Examiners – hereinafter referred to as
the Board. On motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent, the Board issued, on April 6, 1965, its Resolution No. 25, series of 1965, which was approved
by the President, granting respondent a certificate to practice medicine in the
Philippines without the examination required in Republic
Act No. 2882, otherwise known as the Medical Act of
1959. The resolution relied therefor upon The Treaty on the Validity of Academic
Degrees and The Exercise of the Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, signed at Manila on March 4, 1949, and ratified on May 19, 1949.[1]
Petitioner herein,
Philippine Medical Association, is a domestic corporation. On June 14, 1965, it addressed the Chairman of the Board a
communication requesting reconsideration of said resolution No. 25, upon the
ground that, pursuant to said Medical Act of 1959, respondent has to take and
pass the examination therein prescribed, before he can be allowed to practice
medicine in the Philippines. This
letter was followed by another, dated October 6, 1965, to which said Chairman replied on October
8, 1965, stating
“that the final decision on the matter will have to come from the
President of the Philippines upon whose authority said resolution has
been finally approved and implemented.
Thereupon, or, on October
18, 1965, petitioner
commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this
decision, upon the theory that the Board had violated. Republic Act No. 2382 in granting
respondent’s certificate for the general practice of medicine in the
Philippines without the examination prescribed in said Act; that the Board had
exceeded its authority in passing said
Resolution, because, of which the same is null and void; that the Board
should therefore, be ordered to cancel the certificate issued in pursuance of
said resolution; and that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In their respective
answers, respondents, admit the basic facts, but not the conclusions drawn therefrom by the petitioner and allege that the resolution
in question is sanctioned by the provisions of the Treaty above referred to;
that petitioner has no cause of action; and that the petition should be
dismissed for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the available
administrative remedies.
Respondents cite the
cases of Costas vs. Aldanese[2] and Almario vs. City Mayor[3] in support of the theory that
petitioner herein has no sufficient interest or “personality” to
maintain the present case. In the first
case, it was held that the president of the Association of Philippine (Marine) Engineers[4] had no particular “individual”
interest, and, hence, no cause of
action for mandamus to compel the Collector of Customs to implement Section
1203(j) of the Administrative Code,
providing that steamers making round trips of more than 48
hours or travelling at night shall carry the complement
of marine engineers therein specified.
In the second case, a citizen of the Philippines, as such, who is not an applicant for any stall or
booth, or the representative of any such applicant, stall-holder or any
association of persons who are deprived of the right to
occupy stalls in said market, “is not the real party in interest who has
the capacity, right or personality” to bring an action for mandamus,
to compel the officers of Pasay City
to comply with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 37, by ejecting, from the public market of said City,
stallholders who are nationals of the Philippines.
Said cases are not in point.
To begin with, both are actions mandamus, whereas the case at bar
is mainly one for certiorari.
Although, petitioner herein, likewise, seeks a writ of mandamus,
directing the Board to cancel the certificate of registration issued the
respondent, this would be a necessary consequence of the writ of
certiorari annulling the disputed resolution. Moreover, said two cases were
commenced by individuals who,
as such, had no special interest in the relief therein prayed for. Indeed, in the Almario
case it was intimated
that the result might have been otherwise had it been brought by an
“association” whose members have an interest in the subject-matter of
the action.
This was confirmed by PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,5 in which
we sustained the right of the
Philippine Constitution Association to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 3836, insofar as it allowed retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick Ieave to members of Congress and to
elective officials thereof. Further authority in favor of petitioner herein is
supplied by Nacionalista Party vs. F. Bautista Angelo6 in which the Nacionalista
Party successfully impugned the validity of the designation of the then
Solicitor General as Acting Member of the Commission on Elections.
It is our considered opinion that the view adopted in the last
three (3) cases should be maintained and that, in line therewith, petitioner
herein has sufficient interest to prosecute the case at bar and a cause of action against
respondents herein.
As regards their objection based upon petitioner’s failure to
appeal to the President, suffice it to say
that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is concededly subject to exceptions,
among which are cases involving only questions of law or when jurisdiction is
in issue7 or the action complained of bears the
approval of a department secretary, as the disputed resolution, which was
approved by the Executive Secretary “by authority of the President or as an alter
ego of the Executive.8 The case
at bar falls under these exceptions to said rule.
The main issue herein hinges on the interpretation of Article I
of the Treaty aforementioned, reading as follows.
“The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained
degrees or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the
Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed
competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the other, subject
to the laws and regulations of the latter. When the degree or diploma of Bachelor,
issued by competent national authorities allows its holder without requiring
further evidence of proficiency to pursue normally higher courses of study, he
shall also be deemed qualified to continue his studies in the territory of
either Party in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations of the
State which recognizes the validity of the title or diploma in question, and
with the rules and regulations of the particular educational institution in
which he intends to pursue his studies.
This Treaty provision was the subject matter of our resolution of
August 15, 1961, in connection with the petition of Arturo Efren
Garcia for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the Bar
examination. After completing, in Spain,
the course prescribed therefor, Garcia had been
graduated from the College of Law of the Universidad Central de Madrid with the
degree of “Licenciado en Derecho“,
which entitled him to practice law in Spain.
Having invoked the provisions of said Treaty in support of his claim of
exemption from the requisite bar examinations, this Court denied his petition
upon the ground, among others ” x x x that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16
thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice
the legal profession in the Philippines
he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; x x x.”
We find no
plausible reason to depart from this view.
On the contrary, we reiterate the same, inasmuch as the theory of respondent
herein cannot be accepted without placing graduates from our own educational
institutions at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Spanish
graduates from Spanish schools, colleges or universities. Indeed, the latter could – under respondent’s
pretense – engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines
without taking the examination prescribed in Republic Act No. 2882, whereas the
former would have to take and pass said examination. Worse still, since – as we ruled in the
Garcia case – the benefits of the aforementioned Treaty cannot be availed of in
the Philippines except by Spanish subjects, the result would be – should
respondent’s contention be sustained – that graduates from Spanish schools of
medicine would be entitled to practice medicine in the
Philippines without examination, if they were Spanish subjects but not
if they are Filipinos.
Surely said Treaty was
not made to discriminate against Philippine schools, colleges or universities,
much less against nationals of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, we hold that said Treaty merely extended to
diplomas issued or degrees conferred by educational institutions of Spain the
same recognition and treatment that we accord to similar diplomas or degrees
from local institutions of learning; that holders of said Spanish diplomas or
degrees must take the examination prescribed by our laws for holders of
similar diplomas or degrees from educational institutions in the Philippines;
that resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent Board is violative
of Republic Act No. 2882 and hence, null
and void; and that, respondent Board of Medical Examiners should be, as it is hereby
ordered to cancel the certificate of registration, for the practice of medicine
in the Philippines, issued in favor of respondent Jose Ma. Torres, without
special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
Effective on January 5, 1951.
[2] 45 Phil. 345.
[3]
L-21565, January 31, 1966.
[4]
Not the association itself.
5
G. R. No. L-23325,
December 18, 1965.
6
85 Phil. 101.
7
Cariño v. ACCFA, L-19808, September 29, 1966; Tapales v. The President and the Board of Regents,
L-17523, March 30, 1963; Danan v. Secretary of Agriculture, L-19547, January 31, 1967.
8
Gonzalez v. Hechanova, L-21897, October 22,
1963; Extensive Enterprise v. Sarbro, L-22383
L- 22386, May 16, 1966; Santos v. Secretary of Public Works, L-16949,
March 18, 1967; Lacson-Magallanes v. Jose Paño, L-27811, November 17, 1967.