TANGLAW NG PAGGAWA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & RED V COCONUT PRODUCTS, LTD., RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the dismissal en banc by the
Court of Industrial Relations, for lack of jurisdiction, of a complaint,
docketed as Case No. 3153-ULP, filed by the herein petitioner labor union, Tanglaw Ng Paggawa, against the
respondent company, Red V Coconut Products, Ltd., for unfair labor practice in
having caused a depletion in the membership of the union by refusing to comply
with the provisions of a collective bargaining agree­ment involving, inter
alia vacation leave and night differential
pay.

Sometime in October, 1961, the petitioner union and the
respondent com­pany entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering
many facets of their relationship.  One
of the stipulations in the agreement provides:

“PAYMENT – Mill EMPLOYEES who work 90%
or more of the milling days at their designated jobs shall receive 15 days
vacation leave pay if the mill has, worked 170 or more days between January 1st
and December 31st, otherwise the EMPLOYEE shall receive vacation Pay at the
rate of 1 day’s pay for every 15 days of mill operation.”

“Mill EMPLOYEES who work less than
90% of the milling days at their designated jobs, shall receive 1 day’s pay for
every 20 days they have worked between January 1st and December 31st up to a
maximum of 15 days.” (Par. 15, Vacation Plan, Appendix “B” BENEFITS,
of the Agreement, Annex “H” of the Petition)

The complainant union demanded payment of vocation leave for
employees listed in Annex “A” of the complaint but the company
refused, on the ground that “complainant would like to apply the first
paragraph of the particular pro­vision starting from the otherwise proviso
while respondent was applying to complainants the second paragraph of the aforestated provision” Decision of trial court, Annex
“D”, page 10)

Unable to bring management around to its own interpretation of
the disputed provisions bargaining contract, the union brought charges of
unfair labor practice against the employer company, accusing the latter of
refusing in bad faith to comply with the collective contract on vacation leave
and night differential pay, leading to a wave of resignations from the union
that reduced its membership from 800 to around 700.

While the hearing judge found for the union, the Industrial Court
en banc upon appeal of the employer thereto, found no sufficient
evidence “to show that the non-enforcement of the collective bargaining
agreement was the reason for the resignation of a few members of complainant
Union.”  and “that it is very
apparent in the face of the agreement that the company acted in good faith when
they entered into the said agreement” 
(Resolution, Annex “G”, pages 4-5).  With regard to the night shift differential
claims, the court en banc held that the same had already been
decided by it in Case No. 1642-V, which had been appealed to the Supreme
Court.  Thus, the Court of Industrial
Relations concluded that, there being no unfair labor practice on the part of
the company, the question was reduced to one of interpretation and enforcement
of the bargaining agreement which should be settled by the regular, courts,
and, as previously stated, dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.

Its attempt to have the decision reconsidered being fruitless,
the union appealed to this Court.

It will be seen that the main issue is one of fact:  was the conduct of the employer discriminatory
and intended to prejudice the union by aiming to reduce its membership?  The Industrial Court
answered the question in the negative, and this finding finds substantial
support in the record.  The only direct
evidence on the point is the testimony of the union vice-president, Pedro Barba, which is not only naturally biased but hearsay in
its nature, since the reasons for the resignation of the union members could
only be known to him from what the former revealed.  As the letters of resignation submitted in
support of the union’s allegations did not make any reference to the bargaining
agreement, and were moreover, dated after the unfair practice charges
had been filed in the Court of Industrial Relations, i.e., post litem motam, the
court a quo was justified in refusing to credit Barba’s testimony for lack of corroboration.

It stands to reason that unfair labor practice being in the
nature of a criminal offense, the same must be clearly proved, by direct or
circumstantial evidence and can not be merely presume
from the fact of the members’ resignations. 
Not only this:  the employer must
be shown to have designed its conduct to produce such resignations, and of this
no evidence is produced, or referred to, in the appellant’s own briefs.  Not only did the Court of industrial
Relations declare that there was no evidence of discrimination since the
company enforced its interpretation of the vacation leave and shift
differential ”to all its employees irrespective of union affiliation”
(Resolution, pages 3-4), but it also found that the vacation leave provision
was enforced by the company from January 1, 1961, despite the stipulation that
the contract providing the same was to be effective only as of August 15,
1961.  The Industrial
Court found this retroactive enforcement as negativing the company’s bad faith, and we find no reason
to hold this view to be unjustified or improper.

On the question of night shift differential, the union stresses
that the previous case (No. 1642-V) was for recovery of its money value, while,
in the case at bar, the charge is for unfair labor
practice.  Obviously, even if it is
adjudged that the company is bound to pay such differentials, it is still
questionable whether its refusal to do so was done to prejudice the union.  No clear evidence exists on this point.

The findings of fact made by the Industrial
Court being reasonably supported by the record,
they are binding upon this Court.  In the
absence of an unfair labor practice, the issue becomes reduced to a simple case
of divergence of opinion between labor and management as to how their agreement
on vacation leave should be applied. 
Hence, the proper issue on this matter is the interpretation and
enforcement of the contractual stipulations, which devolves upon the regular
courts, not upon the Industrial Court (Phil. Sugar Institute vs. C.I.R., et
al., L-13098, October 29, 1959, 106 Phil. 401, Elizalde
Paint & Oil Factory Inc., vs. Hon. Jose S. Bautista, et al., L-15904,
November 23, 1960; National Mines & Allied Workers’ Union vs. Phil, Iron
Mines, Inc., et al, L-19372, October 31, 1964; Dee Cho
Lumber Workers Union vs. Dee Cho Lumber Co., L-10080,
April 30, 1957, 101Phil. 417; Nasipit Labor Union
(MFL) vs. C.I.R., et al., L-17838, August 3, 1966), No error, and much Iess abuse of discretion, exists, therefore, in the Court
of Industrial Relations declining jurisdiction.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the resolution under review is
hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.