G.R. No. L-24687. September 21, 1968
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPINES, FONG CHOY, ALSO KNOWN AS CARLOS YEE, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-AP…
FERNANDO, J.:
The question presented in this appeal from a grant of citizenship is whether an
applicant, who previously pleaded guilty to an indictment for the violation of the
Price Tag Law, had nonetheless successfully hurdled
the barrier rightfully interposed to weed out undesirables and to bestow
citizenship only on the deserving. The
lower court, the Hon. Francisco Geronimo presiding, answered in the
affirmative. As the correct response
ought to have been anything but that, we reverse the lower court.
In the statement of facts in the brief for the Republic as appellant,
there being an acceptance of what was set forth therein in petitioner-appellee’s brief,[1]
it was expressly set forth; “During the hearing, the petitioner admitted that he
was fined P25.00 for violation of the
price tag law, He explained that at that time all the articles he was selling were properly
tagged as to its prices, but it so happened that the tag of a certain article
fell and when the inspector came the tag was not on the article. In order to avoid any more discussion, he
paid the fine. * * *”[2]
The above admission notwithstanding, there being an opposition to
the petition filed by the Republic as to his failure to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner as shown by such violation of the Price Tag
Law, the lower court, on March
24, 1965, rendered a decision to the effect that there was no impediment to
applicant Fong Choy’s naturalization. It
was held that he was possessed of all the qualification required
by law and none of the disqualifications specified
therein, thus entitling him to the grant of Filipino citizenship. The
Republic appealed.
We sustain the appeal and reverse the lower court. Its rather generous frame of mind in
considering this application for citizenship, manifested in the decision
appealed from, finds no support in the law.
The decision was rendered on March 24, 1965. Approximately five months previously, on
October 30, 1964, in Tio Tek
Chai v. Republic,[3]
this Court held, that violation of the Price Tag Law “certainly renders
[petitioner’s] conduct anything but proper and irreproachable.”
What this Court has ruled is binding on inferior tribunals. The lower court, instead of exhibiting
deference and respect for a decision of this Court, would in effect overrule
the same. It did not have such a power. What this Court had decreed
must be obeyed. The lower court’s duty was plain, it failed to
do it. Its decision is tainted with the corrosion of substantial legal
error. It cannot stand.
In the Tio Tek Chai
decision, the opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal,
reference was made to the testimonial evidence
of applicant to the effect that he had
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization. The opinion continues: “One of the facts
disclosed by such evidence, and now relied upon by appellant as the only ground for urging the denial of the petition,
is that sometime in 1956, petitioner was charged with, violation of the Price
Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71) and upon his
plea of guilty was sentenced to
pay a fine of P10.00. Petitioner tried
to minimize the significance of that conviction as follow that he was the owner
of a bakery, from which he was deriving his income; that one day 1956 his
storekeeper cleaned the showcase in his establishment where different kinds of
bread and biscuit were displayed that the storekeeper failed to replace the
price tag pertaining to one of them and a policeman noticed the omission and
that although petitioner was not in the bakery at the time he nevertheless
owned the violation, preferring the fine to the trouble of defending himself in
a litigation.”
It goes on to refer to the “considerable discussion in the
briefs as to whether or not the offense of which petitioner was convicted”
involves moral turpitude. Petitioner was
sustained by the Court below in his view that it does not, but the Solicitor
General maintained the contrary. This
Court, in the Tio Tek Chai decision, ruled that “the point is of no decisive
importance.” It explained why: “Conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude is one of the grounds upon which an alien is absolutely
disqualified from becoming un-naturalized as a Filipino citizen, according to
Section 4 of the Revise Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended). However, it is not enough
that an applicant be not disqualified under said provision; it is also required
that he be possessed of the qualification enumerated in Section 2. And among those qualifications is that he
must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community
in which he is living.”
Moreover, in that case, the explanation that the plea of guilt
was inspired, presumably “for convenience as business men in general
desire to devote all their time to their business rather than to waste [it], in
lawsuits failed to satisfy this Tribunal.
Thus, according to the concluding paragraph of the Tio
Tek Chai opinion
“Republic Act No. 71, as amended by Republic Act No. 1074, provides that
all articles of commerce and trade offered for sale to the public at retail
shall be publicly displayed with
appropriate tags or labels to indicate the price of each article and that said
articles shall be sold uniformly and without discrimination at the stated
prices. The absence of price tags could
obviously serve as a means to facilitate profiteering, and the law was enacted
precisely to protect the buying public there from. Violation of this law by petitioner certainly
renders his conduct anything but proper and, irreproachable. The explanation given by him that he pleaded
guilty simply to avoid a troublesome court proceeding – deserves little
credence; and if true at all betrays a lack of faith in the administration of
justice in this country that is unseemly in one desiring to become a
citizen. So it ought to have been in
this case.
That is all that needs be said concerning this appeal of the
Republic which, as above pointed out, must be given a favorable response.
One other point. The lower court apparently was satisfied with
the explanation that while petitioner saw to it that the articles he was
selling were properly tagged, “it so happened that the tag of a certain
article fell, and when the inspector came, the tag was not on the article.[4]
Off-hand, such an explanation appears to strain the limits of
human credulity, but, of course, some minds are more credulous than
others. Such a version could, without
implausibility, be looked upon as indicative of applicant’s ingenuity,
apparently taxed to the utmost, to explain the inexplicable and excuse the
inexcusable. It could have been inspired
by an awareness that unless he could offer some sort
of a justification, however lame, the obstacle to the grant of citizenship was
insuperable. Hence
such a version.
Truth may be stranger than fiction, but it would not be safe rule
to consider as the test of veracity the improbability of what is asserted. The unbelievable as such, can, more often
than not, hardly claim kinship with the truth.
The lower court apparently was of a different mind. That is no guaranty of the correctness of its
conclusion. Far from
it.
Even if there were no binding Tio Tek Chai ruling therefore, the
lower court ought to have been less generous in its indiscriminate acceptance
of explanations of such character. It
ought to have shown greater awareness of the trend of decisions of this
Tribunal, which is rightfully insistent on the rigorous observance of each and
every requisite indispensable for the acquisition of citizenship. Such should be the case if the boon of
nationality which is the basis of political rights is to be accorded only to those who, by their exemplary behavior
and conduct, have earned the title-deed to membership in our political community.
The applicant in this case failed to live up to such a rigorous
standard. Hence, his petition ought to
have been denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court naturalizing
petitioner Fong Choy also known as
Carlos Yee, is reversed. Costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[1] Brief for Appellant, pp. 2 to 3.
[2] Ibid, pp. 6 to 7.
[3] G.R. No. L-19112, October 30, 1964.
[4]
Brief for Appellant, p. 4.