VICENTE GARCIA, BENJAMIN GARCIA, ANATALIA GARCIA, FABIAN GARCIA, TRANQUILINO GARCIA AND RAYMUNDO MERIS-MORALES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS, JOSE FENOY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the case without costs on
motion of defendant Jose Fenoy.

It is alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs Vicente Garcia,
Benjamin Garcia and Anatalia Garcia are, also, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 13847 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in which a
notice of lis pendens was filed with the office of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that Pedro de Guzman, the defendant in
said Case No. 13847, was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 8425 of the
same court, in which he obtained judgment for the sum of P55,754.26,
plus interest, as compensation for part of the land involved in Case
No. 13847 which had been taken by th Government for the Agno River
Control Project in the Barrio of Mabalbalino, Municipality of San
Carlos, Province of Pangasinan; that Pedro de Guzman had some
difficulty in securing payment of the amount of said judgment, owing
seemingly to the notice of lis pendens annotated on Original
Certificate of Title No. 25381 of Pangasinan in his name, covering the
property involved in said Civil Case No. 13847, which included the land
taken by the Government for said Agno River Control Project, to which
said Civil Case No. 8425 refers; that defendant Jose Fenoy, was counsel
for said Pedro de Guzman, as plaintiff in said Case No. 8425; that on
April 28, 1960, defendant Fenoy, as such counsel for de Guzman, urged
plaintiff Meris-Morales, as counsel for the plaintiffs in said Civil
Case No. 13847, to sign a communication addressed to the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan asking the latter to take note of the fact that the
aforementioned notice of lis pendens refers only to so much
of the land covered by said Original Certificate of Title No. 25381 as
is left after excluding the portion acquired by the Government as above
stated; that, in order to induce plaintiff Meris-Morales to sign the
aforementioned communication, defendant Fenoy promised in writing to
give him and his clients one-fourth (1/4) of the amount to be collected
from the Government as compensation for the property expropriated from
De Guzman; that, with the consent of his clients, plaintiff
Meris-Mocales accepted said promise of defendant Fenoy and signed the
aforementioned communication addressed to the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan; that after the filing of said communication with the
latter’s office, or on May 12, 1960, De Guzman collected from the
Government the aforementioned sum of P55,754.26; that on June 7, 1960,
plaintiffs demanded compliance with the aforementioned promise of
Fenoy, who then informed the plaintiffs that his client, De Guzman, was
not agreeable to pay the promised amount until the final determination
of said Civil Case No. 13847; that Fenoy is personally bound to complyi
with the aforementioned promise, he having been guilty of deceit and
fraud in securing the signature of plaintiff Meris-Morales on the
communication above referred to, thereby causing damages to plaintiffs
herein, who, accordingly, prayed that Fenoy be sentenced to pay them
one-fourth (1/4) of said sum of P55/754.26, in addition to attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation.

Upon being summoned, defendant Fenoy filed a motion for the
production of the actionable document, in pursuance of Section 7 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, and the suspension, in the meanwhile, of
the period within which to answer the complaint. This motion having
been granted, plaintiffs submitted a statement from which it appears
that said document reads as follows:

“Segun al resultado del asunto en la Corte Suprema,
dare una cuarta (1/4) parte del dinero que se saque del dique,
al-abogado-Meris-para el y su clientes.

Dagupan, Enero 31, 1960.

Alleging that the words “segun el resultado del asunto en la Corte
Suprema” were crossed out, without any signature or initial of the
person who did it, and that said deletion, did not exist when he signed
the instrument, defendant Fenoy moved, soon thereafter, to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that it states no cause of action, and that
the plaintiffs’ cause of action has not accrued against him. Plaintiffs
objected to this motion, but, this notwithstanding, the lower court
issued an order dated August 6, 1960, granting said motion, upon the
theory that defendant does not appear to have been authorized by his
client to promise to give a sum of money belonging to the latter and
that, until a final decision shall have been rendered in said Civil
Case No. 13847—which was then pending on appeal in the Supreme Court as
G. R. No. L-15988—in favor of plaintiffs herein, the latter could have
no possible cause of action against defendant herein. Hence this appeal
by plaintiffs herein.

Plaintiffs-appellants maintain that the lower court erred in not
holding that defendant-appellee is in estoppel to deny his authority to
make the promise relied upon by tile plaintiffs; but we do not deem it
necessary to pass upon this question for the reasons presently to be
stated.

It should be noted, that, in said Civil Case No. 13847, plaintiffs
herein, as plaintiffs therein, sought to cancel Original Certificate of
Title No. 25381, in the name of Pedro de Guzman, and/or to compel the
latter to convey to them the land covered by said title, upon the
ground that the same had been fraudulently secured by De Guzman.
However, the latter moved for the dismissal of the complaint therein
for the reason that the cause of action of plaintiffs therein is barred
by a prior judgment, as well as by the statute of limitations. The
lower court having granted this motion, plaintiffs moved for a
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, plaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court, which, in a decision promulgated on August 30, 1962 (G.
R. No. L-15988), affirmed the order appealed from it appearing that the
property covered by said Original Certificate of Title No. 25381 was
claimed by the plaintiffs as heirs of its original owner, their father,
Juan Garcia; that on June 1, 1918, the latter executed a deed of
donation—which plaintiffs brand as fraudulent—in favor of Pedro de
Guzman, who, on October 18, 1918, applied for the registration of said
land and, on January 30,1923, obtained judgment for the registration of
said land in his name; that, accordingly, Original Certificate of Title
No. 25381 was issued on July 18, 1923, in the name of De Guzman; and
that, consequently, plaintiffs’ claim in that case was barred, no only
by said decree of registration, but, also, by the statute of
limitations, plaintiffs’ complaint having been filed on March 24, 1959.

It is now incontestable, therefore, that plaintiffs herein have no
right whatsoever to the land involved in said Civil Cases Nos. 8425 and
13847, so that the partial cancellation of their notice of lis pendens
in the latter was—independently of the circumstances under which such
partial cancellation had been secured by defendant Fenoy—caused them no
damage whatsoever and they have no cause of action therefor against him.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.