FRANCISCA GATCHALIAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GORGONIO PAVILIN, JOSE DE VERA, EUGENIO DE VERA, JOSE ORTIZ, ALFONSO ORTIZ, AND CONRADO CABUYADAO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal on points of law from a summary judgment rendered on 1
December 1959 by the Court of First Insstance of Isabela, Branch II
(Judge Pedro C. Quinto presiding), in its case No. 385, declaring
plaintiff-appellee Francisca Gatchalian owner of the disputed property
andordering defendants-appellants to vacate the same; as well as from
the supplementary decision of 23 August 1960 awarding damages against
the defendants and m favor of plaintiff.

In substance, the complaint, which was filed on 9 August 1958,
alleged that plaintiff-appellee Gatchalian is the owner of a tract of
land consisting of three lots with a total area of about 143 hectares
as evidenced by one Original Certificate of Title No. P-31 (Sales
Patent No. V-33) of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Isabela;
that Lot No. 2 thereof consists of about 88 hectares, portions of which
were “by means of force, strategy and/or stealth, unlawfully entered”
by herein defendants-appellants during the planting season of 1953,
“ejecting the plaintiff and/or her representative or representatives,
thereby illegally depriving said plaintiff of the possession of said
portions” which have an aggregate area of 36 hectares; and that the
extent or area in Lot No. 2 respectively entered by the defendants are,
more or less, as follows:

and prayed for recovery and damages.

In their joint answer, appellants not only denied all the material
facts and allegations of the complaint but also made ”Affirmative and
Alternative Defenses” with “Counterclaim”, with special emphasis on the
fact that said Certificate of Title No. P-31 is null and void ab initio,
the same being a forest land at the time it was allegedly bought in
1947 by plaintiff-appellee. Further more, appellants claim in their
answer that “the alleged landholding and title of the plaintiff could
not have covered defendant’s landholding” (paragraph 2, Affirmative an
Alternative Defenses); that their predecessors-in-interest, in good
faith, took possession, made clearings, cultivations, and improvements
thereon for several years long before 1953, openly, continuously,
exclusively, publicly and peacefully, on concept of owners thereof,
with intention of acquiring later on their respective land titles over
the same from the Bureau of Lands, in the manner provided by law, as
soon as it is released by the Bureau of Forestry. In attempting to
perfect their claim over their landholdings, appellants claim in their
answer and submitted affidavits that they had filed and paid for their
homestead entry applications, entered and numbered as H. A. Nos.
V-68296; V-68301; V-68382; and V-68298 (Exhibits S and 4, pp. 57-68 and
63-65, Record on Appeal), after the said land was actually released by
the Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of Lands on 17 May 1954, several
years before plaintiff’s patent was issued by that Bureau.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, and overruling the objections of the
defendants, the court below declared that there was no genuine issue of
fact in so far as the title to the property was concerned, and granted
summary judgment in her favor, ordering defendants to vacate the lands.
In a suplementary decision, plaintiff was awarded damages to be paid by
defendants.

Their motions for reconsideration having been rejected, defendants appealed to this Court.

The theory of plaintiff-appellee, accepted by the Court a quo, is that the defendants-appellants’ pleadings raised no genuine issue of fact. We find this contention unwarranted.

Our examination of the pleadings and affidavits submitted for the
defendants reveals that while inartistically drawn, they interpose two
main defenses: (1) that their landholdings lay outside the title of the
plaintiff; and (2) that if her title did cover their landholdings, the
title was acquired illegally, because at the time the plaintiff’s sales
patent was issued, the land covered was still part of a forest reserve.
While such defenses are to a certain extent incompatible inter se,
it can not be said that they raise no genuine issue of fact. It must be
remembered that section 9 of Rule 15 specifically authorizes the
pleading of alternative or hypothetical de-defenses, and the decisions
of this Court hold that such defenses may be inconsistent with each
other provided each is consistent in itself (Castle Bros. vs. Go Juno, 7 Phil. 144; Heirs of Marquez vs. Valencia, 99 Phil., 740; 52 Off. Gaz., 63.76; I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., pp. 234-235).

In view of the circumstances, the following notes that former Chief
Justice Moran (of. cit.) has made on the rendition of summary judgments
under the Federal Rules are apposite and fully applicable to the case
now before us:

“A summary judgment should not be granted unless the
facts are clear and undisputed, and if there is a controversy upon any
question of fact, there should be a trial of the action upon its
merits. (Kissick Construction Co. vs. First National Bank of
Wahoo, Nebraska, 6 Fed. Rules Service, 56c. 41, Dec. 3, 1940).”
(Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, p. 600. 2nd Ed.)

“Authority of Court to enter summary judgment.—Rule
56 (in this jurisdiction Rule 36, sec. 3) does not vest in the court
jurisdiction summarily to try the issues on depositions and affidavits,
but gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment only if
it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Upon a motion for summary judgment the Court’s sole function is to
determine, whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all
doubts as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against
the moving party. On a motion for summary judgment, the court is not
authorized to decide an issue of fact, but is to determine whether the
pleadings and record before the court create an issue of fact to be
tried. In other words, the rule (Rule 36, sec. 3) does not invest the
court with jurisdiction summarily to try the factual issues on
affidavits, but authorizes summary judgment only if it clearly appears
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” (Moran, supra, p. 603)

“Movant has burden of showing absence of genuine issue.—A
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to
the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. The
courts are quite critical of the papers presented by the moving party,
but not of the opposing papers. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable
to the party against whom it is directed, giving that party the benefit
of all favorable inferences. That one may surmise from plaintiff’s
showing that defendant is unlikely to prevail upon a trial is not a
sufficient basis to assume that defendant’s allegations are sham,
frivolous or unsubstantial. If the defense relied upon by the defendant
is legally sufficient and does not appear ‘patently sham,’ the motion
for summary judgment should be denied.” (Moran, supra, pp. 601-602)

The conflicting claims of the parties plainly require the exact
delimitation of the area covered by the title of the plaintiff and
those occupied by the defendants in order to find out if they overlap,
To do so, a trial is indispensable.

As to the alleged lack of personality of defendants-appellants to
assail appellee’s land grant and certificate of title for the reason
that said appellants are mere prospective homestead applicants, it is
sufficient to remark that by reason of their prior occupancy and
cultivation, these parties have already acquired possessory rights that
they may vindicate and defend against intruders without better title.
And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue
a patent in favor of appellee Francisca Gatchalian because the land
involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be
plausibly contended that her patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected (Civil Code, Art. 1409, 1421; Vano vs. Insular Gov’t., 41 Phil. 161; Adorable vs.
Dir. of Forestry, 107 Phil., 401). Be that as it may, the questions of
law should be resolved after, and not before, the questions of fact are
properly litigated, since the facts proved may well affect the legal
provisions applicable.

Wherefore, we find that the court a quo erred in rendering
the summary judgment complained of; hence, its decisions in its Civil
Case No. 385 (II Branch), dated 15 December 1959 and 23 August 1960,
are annulled and set aside. The records are ordered remanded to the
court below for trial on the merits in conformity with the Rules and
established practice, and for a new judgment as the facts, law, and
justice may warrant. Costs against appellee Francisca Gatchalian.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredez,Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.