RAMCAR, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Ramcar, Inc. operates and maintains an auto repair and
body building shop at No. 1241 (formerly No. 1377) General Luna Street,
Ermita, Manila, while the seven private respondents reside near or
around the shop. Respondents brought an action before the Court of
First Instance of Manila to abate the said establishment as a nuisance.
That Court, after trial, dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied
with the decision, the plaintiffs (respondents now) appealed the case
to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decisions and entered judgment against Ramcar, Inc., as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is
hereby reversed and another one rendered declaring that the operation
and maintenance of the establishment of the defendant corporation at
No, 1241 (formerly No. 1377) General Luna St., Ermita, Manila, is a
public nuisance and violates the provisions of Zonification Ordinance
No. 2830, as amended by Ordinance No. 2906, of the City of Manila;
ordering the defendants-appellees to remove the said establishment and all buildings and structures built therein
with in 30 days from the finality of this judgment; and, condemning
defendant-appellee Ramcar Inc., to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of
P10,000.00 as special damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, without
cost in this instance.”

Whereupon, Ramcar, Inc«, petitioned this Court for a review on certiorari.

Petitioner has been engaged in the auto repair and body building
business since 1938 up to the present, except when it was interrupted
during the Japanese occupation. It transferred its place of business to
its present site from 1049 R. Hidalgo Street, Manila, on December 20,
1951 because the old location was within the 100-meter radius from the
Jose Rizal College, in violation of city ordinances. As found by the
Appeals Court, the nature of the corporation’s activities, actually
engaged in, consists in repairing and building bodies of motor
vehicles, and involves the use of tools and machinery that give rise to
much noise and annoyance during all hours of the day up to nighttime;
and its employees oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays. At the time
of the transfer, respondent Eusebio S. Millar and his family were
already residing on his own land adjacent to that of Ramcar, Inc. He
and his co-respondents repeatedly petitioned the city authorities for
the closure of the shop to no avail, because city authorities were “at
loggerheads as to whether the immediate vicinity where the business of
Ramcar, Inc., is located is a residential or a commercial zone”. The
Court of Appeals, however, found that the place is a commercial zone,
as the business would not be permitted in a residential zone.

It further appears that Ramcar Inc., has been granted a license and
permit to operate a garage; and it claims that such license entitles it
to conduct its body building business, and that Section 5 of Ordinance
No. 2830, as amended by Ordinance No. 2906 of the City of Manila, allow
it to conduct its business at the present site. The said ordinance
restricts the kinds of business, buildings, and establishments that may
be built in commercial zones, and the enumeration of permitted
Activities includes “6. Garage and gasoline service stations.” A body
building shop is riot within the purview of “garage”, which designates
a shop for storing reparing and servicing motor vehicles, being merely
a modern substitute for the ancient livery stable (Legum vs. Carlin, 99 ALR, 536). The Court of Appeals correctly held on this point:

“It is clear that the business of Ramcar, Inc., is
not a mere garage or automobile repair and painting shop, much less, a
gasoline service station, within the contemplation of Section 5 of the
City Ordinances. Besides the usual services of vehicle storage, of
supplying gas, and of making repairs, the shop also assembles and
rebuilds car and truck bodies which require more than ordinary labor
and skill and involves the use of tools and machinery with the
concomitant noise created by the use of those tools and machines. While
repair work may be considered as necessary incident off a garage or a
gasoline service station for purposes of goodwill when they involve
minor repairs, body assembling or rebuilding certainly make such kind
of business more than a more garage and gas service station and, for
zonification purposes; should not be confused with and must be
separated from a garage or gas service business.”

In fact, it has been held in Uy Chao vs. Aguilar, 103
Phil., 219; 54 Off. Gaz. (30) 7225, that to repair pre-supposses decay,
dilapidation, injury, or partial destruction of the repaired elements;
i.e., broken or damaged parts of a structural whole to their original
condition. Clearly, the term can not apply to the building or
remodeling of bodies or structures.

The second assigned error refers to the appreciation of documentary
and testimonial evidence on record, and incorporates certain
testimonials of some neighbors of petitioner attesting to their
non-molestation by the shop in question; and, proceeding therefrom,
petitioner argues that its business is not a nuisance in its present
location. Whether a particular thing is or is not a nuisance is a
question of fact (Iloilo Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal
Council, 24 Phil. 471; 61 C.J.S. 864) and is properly within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, whose findings of fact are
conclusive. Under this same assignment of error, petitioner argues that
it is only the City, under its Charter, that can determine whether a
business, occupation, act, or building is a nuisance or not, and
suggests that the remedy is an action against the City of Manila only
for a determination of whether or not the subject matter thereof is a
nuisance. While Section 18 of Republic Act 409 grants legislative
powers to the municipal board to declare, prevent, and provide for the
abatement of nuisances, inaction by the board does not preclude the
ultimate power of courts to determine the existence of a nuisance in a
particular case tried before them (Rutton vs. City of Camden, 23 Am. Rep. 203, 209; Iloilo Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council, supra).

The decision appealed from condemns the petitioner to pay
P10,000.00, as “special damages”, and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees to
the respondents,

“For the annoyance and discomfort caused by the
constant noise emanating from the corporation’s shop, as well as to
counsel fees where the defendant’s (herein petitioner) acts or
omissions have compelled them to litigate * * *.”

As last assignment of error, petitioner vehemently asserts that the
award of damages has no sanction in law, and because its business was
covered by a valid license, the decision tends to punish a citizen who
acted with diligence and in accordance with law. In disposing of this
assigned error, it is enough to point out that the zoning ordinance
prohibited the body building operations of petitioner. Contrary to
petitioner’s pretense that nowhere in the Civil Code is the award of
damages arising from a nuisance authorized, said Code provides:

“ART. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not
preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its
past existence.”

and, in the general provisions on Damages, the same Code states:

“ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without
prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this
code. * * *”

However, the business of the petitioner is not nuisance per se.
It is only on account of its location that it is a public nuisance. To
abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed decision decrees, to
remove all buildings and structures built in the place where it is
presently located, as these, or parts thereof; may be utilized for
pursuits that are not forbidden by law or ordinance.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified by permanently
enjoining the petitioner only from operating its body building
operations or activities in its present location, without requiring the
demolition of the existing buildings. In all other respects, the
judgment below is affirmed. Costs in this instance against petitioner,
Ramcar, Inc.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.