JOSE IRA AND CONSUELO DE IRA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. MARINA ZAFRA AND ALFREDO LEGASPI, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Originally, a case for forcible entry and detainer instituted by
plaintiffs against the defendants, over a piece of agricultural land,
found its way on appeal to the CFI of Bulacan, after the Justice of the
Peace Court of Bocaue, Bulacan, had dismissed the same, on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, it appearing that the question involved,
according to the inferior court, was tenancy relations in which the
Court of Agrarian Relations has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

The appealed case was heard by the CFI of Bulacan, but after the
defendants had presented one witness, the parties submitted a
“Stipulation of Facts”, to wit:

“1. That the defendants herein will be allowed by
the plaintiff to continue and work on this land in question for the
agricultural year 1956-1957 on the basis of 60-40, that is 60% for the
defendant and 40% for the plaintiff;

2. That after the
harvest on or about March, 1957 the defendants herein obligate
themselves to deliver the land in question to the plaintiff herein and
that they will no longer have any right to work on this land in
question;

3. That the plaintiff in return will allow the
herein defendants to be their tenants on another lot situated in the
barrio of San Juan, Bigaa, Bulacan with an area of approximately one
(1) ha. more or less and with a capacity of seedling of not less than
22 gantas;

4. That in the event that the land in barrio San
Juan, Bigaa, Bulacan is in the possession of another person, the
plaintiff herein obligates himself to take the said possession of the
land and deliver same to the herein defendants;

5. That
in the event that the plaintiff would not be able to the possessioin of
this land in the barrio of San Juan, Bigaa, Bulacan and deliver the
same to the herein defendants, the defendants will continue working on
this lot in question; and

6.
That the parties in this case in entering this agreement or Stipulation
of facts hereby agree and renounce any of their respective rights
provided for by law to appeal against the decision to be rendered by
this Court in this case.”

On April 12, 1956, the court a quo rendered judgment, dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered approving
the aforesaid agreement of the parties and they are hereby ordered to
comply with the terms and conditions therein set forth, without
pronouncement as to costs.”

On May 11, 1957, the lower court directed the issuance in the
stipulation. For refusal of the defendants to of a writ of execution to
enforce the conditions contained comply with the writ of execution, the
plaintiffs presented a petition to cite defendants for contempt. Under
date of June 10, 1957, the court a quo, directed defendants
to vacate the land in question, within 5 days from receipt of said
order, otherwise they would be held in contempt of court. The motion
for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, was denied on
July 15, 1962. On July 19, 1957, due to refusal of the defendants to
vacate the land, plaintiffs reiterated their petition for contempt.
Defendants were thereafter arrested but subsequently released on bail.

Defendants-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
elevated the case to this Court, the issues presented in the appeal
being purely of law. In their brief, appellants contend that the lower
court erred: (1) In assuming authority and jurisdiction over the case,
after the submission of the stipulation, which converted the subject
matter of the controversy to a tenancy agreement, under the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, provided
for in Republic Act No. 1267, as amended; and (2) In issuing the order
of execution over the Case, and subsequently ordering the arrest of the
de fendants for contempt of court.

A cursory reading of the terms and conditions of the stipulation as
embodied in the decision will show, at least, impliedly, that even
before the institution of the forcible entry case, the defendants had
been working on the land subject matter of the case, and a tenancy
relation existed. This relation was reaffirmed when the parties
stipulated that “defendants herein will be allowed by the plaintiff to continue and work on this land in question for agricultural year 1956-57 on the basis of 60-40, that is 60% for the defendant and 40% for the plaintiff”.
This being the case, it is evident that the controversy comes within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The said Republic
Act No. 1267, as amended, provides:

Sec 7. Jurisdiction of the Court.—The Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes
involving all those relationships established by law which
determine the varying rights of parsons in the cultivation and use
agricultural land where one of the parties works the land: * * *

While it is true that in the stipulation the defendants-appellants
obligated themselves to vacate the land in exchange for another, also
belonging to the plaintiffs, situated in another place, the
self-imposed obligation, however, did not change the subject of the
case—tenancy relation. After the plaintiffs had recognized the
relationship and consented to the establishment of the same, the
refusal of the defendants-appellants to vacate the land had placed the
controversy within the purview of Act No. 1199, which defines the
security of the tenure of the pertinent provision of which reads:

Sec. 8. Limitation of Relation.—The relation of landholder and tenant shall be limited to the person who furnishes land, either as owner lessee, usufructary, or legal possessor and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from Within his immediate farm household.”

In other words, by so allowing the defendants to work and share on
the land, the detainer case, if it was ever one, became a tenancy
matter, the termination of which Is not within the authority or
jurisdiction of the CFI.

Under the provisions of section 9 of the same law, the term of
the stipulation having to do with the acceptance of another land for
cultivation by the defendants, did not serve to sever the relationship
of tenant-landlord already existing or created by the voluntary
agreement of the parties. Apart from the fact, that the promise to
exchange the land under cultivation with another, although belonging to
the same landlord, is not one of the means provided for where a tenant
could be ejected.

“Sec. 49.—Ejectment of Tenant.—Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period, in
all cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under
any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his
holdings except for any of the causes herein after enumerated and only
after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession authorized
by the Court.” (Act 1199).

Undoubtedly, the CAR did not authorize the dispossession which is the object of the writ of execution.

From what has heretofore been stated, we hold that the trial court
did not have authority or jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide
the present controversy and we declare the proceedings held before it,
null and void. The case is dismissed, and the orders appealed from are
set aside. Costs taxed against plaintiffs-appellees.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.