YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CELSO AVELINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XIII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND SPOUSES FELIX C. LIM AND …

This special civil action for certiorari
raises the question of whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death
or injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies
available under the Civil Code.

It appears that on December 22, 1971, Rolando G. Lim, single, a
licensed second mate, was on board the vessel M/S Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation, when the same ran aground and
sank near Sabtan Island, Batanes.
Rolando perished as a result of that incident.

Claiming that Rolando’s untimely death at the age of twenty-five
was due to the negligence of petitioner, his parents, respondents Felix Lim and
Consorcia Geveia, sued
petitioner in the Court of First Instance on January 28, 1972 for damages
[Civil Case No. R-12861].

In its answer, petitioner-defendant alleged by way of affirmative
defenses [1] that the complaint stated no cause of action; [2] that
respondent-plaintiffs had received P4,160 from petitioner and had signed
release papers discharging petitioner from any liability arising from the death
of their son, and [3] that most significantly, the respondents had already been
compensated by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission [WCC] for the same
incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies
against the same employer under the Civil Code.

A protracted legal battle over procedural points ensued. Finally,
on July 30, 1975, the case
was set for pre-trial. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.

In his order of December
29, 1975, respondent Judge Avelino upheld
respondents’ vigorous opposition and denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss for
being unmeritorious. Its motion for reconsideration having met the same fate on
February 3, 1976, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction, contending that respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he refused to dismiss the complaint for damages on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. This Court subsequently granted a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the trial court from proceeding with the hearing
of the case.

At issue is the exclusory provision of Section 5 of the Women’s
Compensation Act reiterated in Article 173 of the Labor Code:

“Sec. 5. Exclusive right
to compensation. -The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest
of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of
said injury.

“Art. 173. Exclusive of
liability.-Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities
of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to
receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided
for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended, Republic Act No. 610, as amended, Republic Act No. 4864, as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System, during
the period of such payment for the
same disability or death, and conversely.”

Petitioner invokes the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing,
L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 267, to support its contention that
all claims for death or injuries by employees against employers are exclusively
cognizable by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission regardless of the causes of
said death or injuries. That case no longer controls.

In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA
141, involving a complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a
cave-in on June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three divergent
opinions on the exclusivity .rule as presented by several amici
curiae. One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death,
may initiate an action to recover damages [not compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act] with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the
employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles
case, is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident
is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the
action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing
themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his
negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs
are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee
cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. This latter view was adopted by the
majority in the Floresca case, reiterating as main
authority its earlier decision in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, L-25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442.
In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights, and
remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case. Three justices
dissented.

It is readily apparent from the succession of cases dealing with
the matter at issue*
that this Court has vacillated from one school of thought to the other. Even
now, the concepts pertaining thereto have remained fluid. But unless and until
the Floresca ruling is modified or superseded, and We
are not so inclined, it is deemed to be the controlling jurisprudence yice the Robles case.

As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot
be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages
against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent Consorcia Geveia admitted that
they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had
received the compensation payable to them under the WCA [Rollo, pp. 22-23, 29-30]. It is
therefore clear that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act
but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would
demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election
and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise
the second option. “Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy,
[he] is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior
claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.” [See Separate Opinion
by Justice Teehankee in Robles vs. Yap Wing, supra on
pp. 281-282].

In the light of this Court’s recent pronouncement in the Floresca case, respondent Judge Avelino’s denial order of petitioner’s motion to dismiss is
adjudged to be improper.

WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Avelino’s orders dated December 29, 1975 and
February 3, 1976 are reversed and set aside. Civil Case No. 12861, entitled
“The Spouses Felix C. Lim, and Consorcia Geveia vs. Ysmael Maritime
Corp.” is hereby ordered dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued
by this Court on May 5, 1978 enjoining respondent Judge Avelino
from conducting further proceedings in said case is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, C.J., files a brief concurrence.

Melencio-Herrera, J., maintains her view in Floresca pursuant to the clear exclusory provision of
Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result, reiterates his dissent in the Floresca
case.

Sarmiento, J., no part, for having the
general counsel of all Ysmael interests and this was
one of them.

*
Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 98 Phil. 856; Vda. de Mallari vs. National
Development Company, G.R. No. L-17914, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 538; Valencia
vs. Manila Yacht Club, Inc., G.R. No. 27346, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 724; Hudencial vs. S.P. Marcelo and Co., Inc, G.R. No. L-23969,
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 707

6 pt
6 pt
0
3