G.R. No. L-48237. June 30, 1987
MADRIGAL & COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND MADRIGAL CENTRAL OFFICE EMLOYEES UNI…
SARMIENTO, J.:
These are two petitions for certiorari and prohibition
filed by the petitioner, the Madrigal & Co., Inc. The facts are undisputed.
The petitioner was engaged, among several other corporate
objectives, in the management of Rizal Cement Co.,
Inc.[1]
Admittedly, the petitioner and Rizal Cement Co., Inc.
are sister companies.[2] Both are owned by the same or practically
the same stockholders.[3]
On December
28, 1973, the
respondent, the Madrigal Central Office Employees Union, sought for the renewal of its collective bargaining agreement with the petitioner, which was due
to expire on February 28, 1974.[4] Specifically, it proposed a wage increase of P200.00 a month, an allowance of P100.00 a
month, and other economic benefits.[5] The petitioner, however, requested for a
deferment in the negotiations.
On July 29,
1974, by an alleged
resolution of its stockholders, the petitioner reduced its capital stock from
765,000 shares to 267,366 shares.[6] This was effected through the distribution
of the marketable securities owned by the petitioner to its stockholders in exchange for their shares
in an equivalent amount
in the corporation.[7]
On August
22, 1975, by yet
another alleged stockholders’ action, the petitioner reduced its authorized
capitalization from 267,366 shares to 110,085 shares, again, through the same
scheme.[8]
After the petitioner’s
failure to sit down with the respondent union, the latter, on August
28, 1974, commenced
Case No. LR-5415 with the National Labor Relations Commission on a complaint
for unfair labor practice.[9] In due time, the petitioner filed its
position paper,[10] alleging operational losses. Pending the resolution of Case No. LR-5415,
the petitioner, in a letter dated November 17, 1975,[11] informed the Secretary of Labor that Rizal Cement Co., Inc., “from which it derives
income”[12] “as the General
Manager or Agent”[13] had “ceased operating temporarily.”[14] In addition, “because of the desire of
the stockholders to phase out the operations of the Madrigal & Co., Inc.
due to lack of business incentives and prospects, and in order to prevent
further losses,”[15] it had to reduce its capital stock on two
occasions. “As the situation,
therefore, now stands, the Madrigal & Co., Inc. is without substantial
income to speak of, necessitating a reorganization, by way of retrenchment, of
its employees and operations.”[16] The petitioner then requested that it
“be allowed to effect said reorganization gradually considering all the
circumstances, by phasing out in at least three (3) stages, or in a manner the
Company deems just, equitable and convenient to all concerned, about which your
good office will be apprised accordingly.”[17] The letter, however, was not verified
and neither was it accompanied by the proper supporting papers. For this reason, the Department of Labor took
no action on the petitioner’s request.
On January 19, 1976, the labor arbiter rendered a decision[18]
granting, among other things, a general wage increase of P200.00 a month
beginning March 1, 1974 plus a monthly living allowance of P100.00 monthly in
favor of the petitioner’s employees. The
arbiter specifically found that the petitioner “had been making
substantial profits in its operation”[19]
since 1972 through 1975. The petitioner
appealed.
On January 29, 1976,
the petitioner applied for clearance to terminate the services of a number of
employees pursuant supposedly to its retrenchment program. On February
3, 1976, the petitioner applied for clearance to terminate 18
employees more.[20]
On the same date, the respondent union went to the Regional Office (No. IV) of
the Department of Labor (NLRC Case No. R04-2-1432-76) to complain of illegal
lockout against the petitioner.[21]
Acting on this complaint, the Secretary of Labor, in a decision dated December
14, 1976,[22]
found the dismissals “to be contrary to law”[23]
and ordered the petitioner to reinstate some 40 employees, 37 of them with backwages.[24]
The petitioner then moved for reconsideration, which the Acting Labor
Secretary, Amado Inciong,
denied.[25]
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Office of the
President. The respondent, the
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, affirmed with modification the Labor
Department’s decision, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Eliseo Dizon,
Eugenio Evangelista and Benjamin Victorio
are excluded from the order of reinstatement.
2. Rogelio Meneses and Roberto Taladro who appear to have voluntarily retired and paid
their retirement pay, their cases are left to the judgment of the Secretary of
Labor who is in a better position to assess appellant’s allegation as to their
retirement.
3. The rest are hereby reinstated with six (6) months backwages, except Aleli Contreras,
Teresita Eusebio and Norma Parlade who are to be reinstated without backwages.
SO ORDERED.[26]
xxx xxx xxx
On May 15, 1978,
the petitioner came to this court. (G.R.
No. 48237.)
Meanwhile, on May 25,
1977, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a decision
affirming the labor arbiter’s judgment in Case No. LR-5415.[27]
The petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On June
9, 1978, the Secretary of Labor dismissed the appeal.[28]
Following these successive reversals, the petitioner came anew to this
court. (G.R. No. 49023.)
By our resolution dated October
9, 1978, we consolidated G.R.
No. 48237 with G.R. No. 49023.[29]
We likewise issued temporary restraining orders.[30]
In G.R. No. 48237, the petitioner argues, that:
xxx xxx xxx
I. SAID RESPONDENTS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT.
II. SAID RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO LOCKOUT
HERE IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION, MUCH LESS FOR UNION-BUSTING PURPOSES.
III. RESPONDENT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE REST OF AFFECTED MEMBERS OF RESPONDENT UNION
WITH SIX (6) MONTHS BACKWAGES, EXCEPT ALELI CONTRERAS, TERESITA EUSEBIO AND
NORMA PARLADE WHO ARE TO BE REINSTATED WITHOUT BACKWAGES.
IV. RESPONDENT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ERRED IN LEAVING TO THE
JUDGMENT OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY THE CASES OF ROGELIO MENESES AND ROBERTO
TALADRO WHO HAD VOLUNTARILY RETIRED AND PAID THEIR RETIREMENT PAY.[31]
xxx xxx xxx
while in G.R. No. 49023, it submits that:
xxx xxx xxx
1.
RESPONDENT MINISTER ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION EN BANC OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
DESPITE CLEAR INDICATIONS IN THE RECORD THAT THE AWARD WAS PREMATURE IN THE
ABSENCE OF A DEADLOCK IN NEGOTIATION AND THE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE LABOR
ARBITER TO RESOLVE THE MAIN IF NOT ONLY ISSUE OF REFUSAL TO BARGAIN, THEREBY
DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
2.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS A DEADLOCK IN NEGOTIATION, RESPONDENT
MINISTER ERRED NEVERTHELESS IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS GRANTED
IN THE FORM OF SALARY INCREASES ARE UNFAIR AND VIOLATIVE OF THE MANDATORY
GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 525 AND IGNORING THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT, PETITIONER HAD VIRTUALLY CEASED OPERATIONS AFTER HAVING
TWICE DECREASED ITS CAPITAL STOCKS AND, THEREFORE, NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO
ABSORB SUCH AWARD OF BENEFITS.[32]
xxx xxx xxx
There is no merit
in these two (2) petitions.
As a general rule, the findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but even finality.[33]
This is especially true with respect to the Department of Labor, which performs
not only a statutory function but carries out a Constitutional mandate as well.[34] Our
jurisdiction, as a rule, is confined to cases of grave abuse of
discretion.[35] But for certiorari to lie, there must be such
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, or that discretion was
exercised despotically.[36]
In no way can the questioned decisions be seen as arbitrary. The decisions themselves show why.
Anent Case No.
R04-2-1432-76 (G.R. No. 48237), we are satisfied with the correctness
of the respondent Presidential Assistant
for Legal Affairs’ findings. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In urging reversal of the appealed decision, appellant contends
that (1) its letter dated November 17, 1975, constitute “‘substantial
compliance with the clearance requirement to terminate;” and (2)
individual appellees’ dismissal had no relation to
any union activities, but was the result of an honest-to-goodness retrenchment policy occasioned by loss of income due
to cessation of operation.
We find the first contention to be without merit. Aside from the fact that the controversial
letter was unverified, with not even a single document submitted in support
thereof, the same failed to specify the individual employees to be affected by
the intended retrenchment. Not only
this, but the letter is so vague and indefinite regarding the manner of
effecting appellant’s retrenchment plan as to provide the Secretary of (sic)
a reasonable basis on which to determine whether the request for retrenchment
was valid or otherwise, and whether the mechanics in living effect thereto was
just or unjust to the employees concerned.
In fact, to be cleary implied from the letter is that the implementary measures needed to give effect to the intended
retrenchment are yet to be thought of or concretized in the indefinite future,
measures about which the office of the Secretary “will be “apprised
accordingly.” All these, and more, as correctly found by the Acting
Secretary, cannot but show that the letter is insufficient in form and
substance to constitute a valid compliance with the clearance requirement. That being so, it matters little whether or
not complainant union or any of its members failed to interpose any opposition
thereto.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose in requiring a prior
clearance by the Secretary of Labor, in cases of shutdown or dismissal of
employees, is to afford said official ample opportunity to examine and
determine the reasonableness of the request.
This is made imperative in order to give meaning and substance to the
constitutional mandate that the State must “afford protection to
labor,” and guarantee their
“security of tenure.” Indeed, the rules require that the application
for clearance be filed ten (10) days before the intended shutdown or dismissal,
serving a copy thereof to the employees affected in order that the latter may
register their own individual objections against the grant of the
clearance. But how could this
requirement of notice to the employees have been complied with, when, as
observed by the Acting Secretary in his modificatory
decision dated June 30, 1977 “the letter of November 17, 1975 does not even state definitely the ‘employees
involved’ upon whom service
could be made.”
With respect to appellant’s second contention, we agree with the
Acting Secretary’s
findings that individual appellee’s
dismissal was an offshoot of the union’s demand for a renegotiation of the then
validly existing collective bargaining Agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
The pattern of appellant’s acts after the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in Case No. LR-5415 has convinced us that its sole objective was to
render moot and academic the desire of the union to exercise its
right to bargain collectively with management, especially so when it is
considered in the light of the fact that under the said decision the demand by the union for wage increase and
allowances was granted.
What renders appellant’s motive suspect was its haste in terminating the
services of individual appellees, without waiting the
outcome of its appeal in Case No. LR-5415.
The amount involved by its offer to pay double separation could very
well have been used to pay the salaries of those employees whose services were
sought to be terminated, until the resolution of its appeal with the NLRC,
since anyway, if its planned retrenchment is found to be justifiable and done
in good faith, its only liability is to answer for the separation pay provided
by law. By and large, therefore, we
agree with the Acting Secretary that, under the circumstances obtaining in this
case, “respondent’s action [was]
a systematic and deliberate
attempt to get rid of complainants because of their union activities.”
We
now come to the individual cases of Aleli
Contreras, Teresita Eusebio
and Norma Parlade.
It is appellant’s claim that these three (3) should not be reinstated
inasmuch as they have abandoned their work by their continued absences, and
moreover in the case of Contreras, she failed to oppose the application for clearance filed against her on October
24, 1975. However, appellant’s payrolls for December
16-31, 1975, January
1-15, 1976 and January
16-31, 1976, show
that the three (3) were “on leave without pay”. As correctly
appreciated by the Acting Secretary, these “payrolls prove, first that
‘leave’ has been granted to these employees, and, second, that it is a practice
in the company to grant ‘leaves without pay’ without loss of employment status, to those who have exhausted their
authorized leaves.” As regards, Norma Parlade,
the records show that she “truly incurred illness and actually underwent
surgery in Oct., 1975.” As to Aleli Contreras,
there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor or appellant ever acted on the
clearance. If we were to follow the
logic of appellant, Contreras should not have been included in the application
for clearance filed on Feb. 3, 1976. The
fact that she was included shows that up
to that time she was still considered as a regular employee. It was for these reasons, coupled with the
length of service that these employees have rendered appellant, that the Acting
Secretary ordered their reinstatement but without backwages.[37]
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to Case No. LR-5415 (G.R. No. 49023), we are likewise content with
the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant now points that the only issue certified to compulsory
arbitration is “refusal to bargain” and it is, therefore, premature to
dictate the terms of the CBA on the assumption that there was already a
deadlock in negotiation. Appellant
further contends that, assuming there
was deadlock in negotiation, the economic benefits granted are unreasonable and violative of the guideline prescribed
by P.D. 525.
On the other hand, it is
the union’s stance that its economic demands are justified by the
persistent increase in the cost of living and the substantial earnings of the
company from 1971 to 1975.
It bears to stress that although the union’s petition was
precipitated by the company’s refusal to bargain, there are glaring
circumstances pointing out that the parties also submitted “deadlock”
to arbitration.’ The petition itself is couched in general terms, praying for
arbitration of the union’s “dispute” with the respondent concerning
proposed changes in the collective bargaining agreement.” It is supported
with a copy of the proposed changes which just goes to show that the union,
aside from the issue concerning respondent’s refusal to bargain, sought
determination of the merit of its proposals.
On the part of the appellant company, it pleaded financial incapacity to
absorb the proposed economic benefits during the initial stage of the
proceedings below. Even the evidence and
arguments proferred below by both parties are
relevant to deadlock issue. In the face
of these factual environment, it is our view that the Labor Arbiter below did
not commit a reversible error in rendering judgment on the proposed CBA
changes. At any rate, the minimum
requirements of due process was satisfied because as heretofore stated, the
appellant was given opportunity, and had in fact, presented evidence and
argument in avoidance of the proposed CBA changes.
We
do not also subscribe to appellant’s argument that by reducing its
capital, it is made evident that it is phasing out its operations. On the contrary, whatever may be the reason
behind such reductions, it is indicative of an intention to keep the company a
going concern. So much so that until now
almost four (4) years later, it is still very much in existence and operational
as before.
We now come to the question concerning the equitableness of the
economic benefits granted below. It
requires no evidence to show that the employees concerned deserve some degree
of upliftment due to the unabated increase in the
cost of living especially in Metro
Manila. Of course the company
would like us to believe that it is losing and is therefore not financially
capable of improving the present CBA to favor its employees. In support of such assertion, the company
points that the profits reflected in its yearly Statement of Income and
Expenses are dividends from security holdings. We, however, reject as puerile its
suggestion to dissociate the dividends it received from security holdings on
the pretext that they belong exclusively to its stockholders. The dividends received by the company are
corporate earnings arising from corporate investment which no doubt are attended to by the employees
involved in this proceedings. Otherwise,
it would not have been reflected as part of profits in the company’s yearly
financial statements. In determining the
reasonableness of the economic grants below, we have, therefore, scrutinized
the company’s Statement of Income and Expenses from 1972 to 1975 and after
equating the welfare of the employees with the substantial earnings of the
company, we find the award to be predicated on valid justifications.
The salary increase we
herein sanction is also in keeping with the rational that made imperative the
enactment of the Termination Pay Law since in case the respondent company
really closes down, the employees will receive higher separation pay or
retirement benefits to tide them over while seeking another employment.[38]
What clearly emerges from
the recorded facts is that the petitioner, awash with profits from
its business operations but confronted with the demand of the union for
wage increases, decided to evade its responsibility towards the employees by a
devised capital reduction. While the
reduction in capital stock created an apparent need for retrenchment, it was,
by all indications, just a mask for the purge of union members, who, by
then, had agitated for wage increases.
In the face of the petitioner company’s piling profits, the unionists
had the right to demand for such salary adjustments.
That the petitioner made
quite handsome profits is clear from the records. The labor arbiter stated in his decision in
the collective agreement case (Case No. LR-5415):
xxx xxx xxx
A clear scrutiny of the financial reports of the respondent [herein
petitioner] reveals that it had been making substantial profits in its
operation.
In 1972, when it still had 765,000 common shares, of which 305,000
were unissued and 459,000 outstanding, capitalized at
P16,830,000.00, the respondent made a net profit of P2,403,211.58. Its total assets were P70,821,317.81.
In 1973, based on the same capitalization, its profit increased to
P2,724,465.33. Its total assets
increased to P83,240,473.73.
In 1974, although its capitalization was reduced from P16,830,000.00
to P11,230,459.36, its profits were further increased to P2,922,349.70. Its assets were P78,842,175.75.
The reduction in its assets by P4,398,297.98 was due to the fact
that its capital stock was reduced
by the amount of P5,599,540.54.
In 1975, for the period of only six months, the respondent reported
a net profit of P547,414.72,
which when added to the surplus of P5,591,214.19, makes a total surplus of
P6,138,628.91 as of June 30, 1975.[39]
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner would, however, have us believe that it in fact sustained losses. Whatever profits it earned, so it claims, were in the nature of dividends
“declared on its shareholdings in other companies in the earning of which the employees had no participation
whatsoever.”[40] “Cash dividends,” according to it,
“are the absolute property of the stockholders and cannot be made
available for disposition if only to meet the employees’ economic
demands.”[41]
There is no merit in this
contention. We agree with the National
Labor Relations Commission that “[t]he dividends received by the company
are corporate earnings arising from corporate investment.”[42] Indeed, as found by the Commission, the
petitioner had entered such earnings in its financial statements as profits,
which it would not have done if they were not in fact profits.[43]
Moreover, it is incorrect
to say that such profits – in the form of dividends – are beyond the reach of
the petitioner’s creditors since the petitioner had received them as compensation
for its management services in favor of the companies it managed as a shareholder thereof. As such
shareholder, the dividends paid to it were its own money, which may then be
available for wage increments. It is not
a case of a corporation distributing dividends in favor of its stockholders, in
which case, such dividends would be the absolute property of the stockholders
and hence, out of reach by
creditors of the corporation. Here, the
petitioner was acting as stockholder itself, and in that case, the right to a share in such dividends, by way of salary increases, may not be denied
its employees.
Accordingly, this court
is convinced that the petitioner’s capital reduction efforts were, to begin
with, a subterfuge, a deception
as it were, to camouflage the fact that it had been making profits, and
consequently, to justify the mass layoff in its employee ranks, especially of
union members. They were nothing but a
premature and plain distribution of corporate assets to obviate a just sharing
to labor of the vast profits obtained by its joint efforts with capital through
the years. Surely, we can neither
countenance nor condone this. It is an unfair
labor practice.
As we observed in People’s
Bank and Trust Company v. People’s Bank and Trust Co. Employees Union:[44]
xxx xxx xxx
As has been held by this Court in Insular Lumber Company vs. CA, et
al., L-23875, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 371, retrenchment can only be availed of
if the company is losing or meeting financial reverses in its operation, which
certainly is not the case at bar.
Undisputed is the fast, that the Bank “at no time incurred
losses.” As a matter of fact, “the net earnings of the Bank would be
in the average of P2,000,000.00 a year
from 1960 to 1969 and, during this period of nine (9) years, the Bank
continuously declared dividends to its stockholders.” Thus the mass lay-off or dismissal of the 65
employees under the guise of retrenchment
policy of the Bank is a lame excuse and a veritable smoke-screen of its scheme
to bust the Union and thus unduly disturb the employment
tenure of the employees concerned, which act is certainly an unfair labor
practice.[45]
Yet, at the same time,
the petitioner would claim that “the phasing out of its operations which
brought about the retrenchment of the affected employees was mainly dictated be
the necessity of its stockholders in their capacity as
heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal to partition the estate left by him.”[46] It must be noted, however, that the labor cases were tried on the theory of losses the petitioner was supposed to have incurred to justify
retrenchment. The petitioner cannot
change its theory in the Supreme Court.
Moreover, there is nothing in the records that will substantiate this claim. But what is more important is the fact that
it is not impossible to partition the Madrigal estate – assuming that the
estate is up for partition – without the petitioner’s business closing shop and
inevitably, without the petitioner laying off its employees.
As regards the question
whether or not the petitioner’s letter dated November 17, 1975[47] was in substantial compliance with legal
clearance requirements, suffice it to state that apart from the Secretary of
Labor’s valid observation that the same “did not constitute a sufficient
clearance as contemplated by
law, “[48] the factual circumstances show that the
letter in question was itself a part of the “systematic and
deliberate attempt to get rid of [the union members] because of their union
activities.”[49] Hence, whether or not the said letter
complied with the legal formalities is beside the point since under the
circumstances, retrenchment was, in all events, unjustified. Parenthetically, the clearance required under
Presidential Decree No. 850 has been done away with by Batas Blg. 130, approved on August 21, 1981.
During the pendency of these petitions, the petitioner submitted
manifestations to the effect that certain employees have accepted retirement
benefits pursuant to its retrenchment scheme.[50] This is a matter of defense that should be
raised before the National Labor Relations Commission.
To do away with the
protracted process of determining the earnings acquired by the employees as a
result of ad interim employment, and to erase any doubt as to the
amount of backwages due them, this court, in
line with the precedent set in Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations,[51]
affirmed in a long line of decisions that came later,[52]
hereby fixes the amount of backwages at three (3)
years pay reckoned at the increased rates decreed by the labor arbiter in Case
No. LR-5415 without deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Subject to the modification as to the amount
of backwages hereby awarded, the challenged decisions
are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
orders are LIFTED. With costs against
the petitioner.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 48237, 10, 18, 20-21.
[2]
Id., 10.
[3]
Id., 20.
[4]
Id., 21.
[5]
Id., 29.
[6]
Id., 18, 30.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id.
[9] Rollo, G.R.
No. 49023, 4.
[10]
Id., 25-29.
[11]
Id., G.R. No.
48237, 18-20.
[12]
Id., 18.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id., G.R. No.
49023, 32-37.
[19]
Id., 34.
[20]
Id., G.R. No.
48237, 3, 84.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id., 20-28.
[23]
Id., 27.
[24]
Id., 28.
[25]
Id., 29-36.
[26]
Id., 60-61.
[27]
Id., G R. No.
49023, 64-76.
[28]
Id., 78-80.
[29]
Id., 86-A1.
[30]
Id., 85-86; id.,
G.R. No. 48237, 77-78.
[31]
Id., G.R. No.
48237, 6.
[32]
Id., G.R. No. 49023, 8.
[33]
Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union San Miguel Corp.,
Nos. L-51002-06, May 30, 1983,
122 SCRA 557 (1983), citing International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v.
Leogardo, No. L-57429, October 28, 1982, 117 SCRA 967 (1982), Genconsu Free Workers Union v.
Inciong, No. L-48687, July 2, 1979,
91 SCRA 311 (1979), and Dy Keh
Beng v. International Labor, No. L-32245, May 25, 1979, 90 SCRA 161 (1979).
[34]
Int’l. Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the
Phil. v. Leogardo, supra.
[35] Special Events & Central Shipping Office
Workers Union v. San
Miguel Corp., supra, citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, No.
L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469 (1970); Scott
v. Inciong, No. L-38868, December
29, 1975, 68 SCRA
473 (1975), and San Miguel Corp.
v. Secretary of Labor, No. L-39195, May 26, 1975, 64 SCRA 56 (1975).
[36]
Busier v. Leogardo, Jr., No. L-63316, July 31,
1984, 131 SCRA 151 (1984), citing Palma and Ignacio v. Q & S. Inc., No. L-20366, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 97 (1966) and Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration v. Lucero, No. L-32550, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 337 (1983).
[37]
Id., G.R. No. 48237, 55-57, 58-59.
[38]
Id., G.R. No. 49023, 65-67.
[39]
Id., 34-35.
[40]
Id., 53.
[41]
Id.
[42]
Id., 67.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Nos. L-39598 and 39603, January
13, 1976, 69 SCRA 10
(1976).
[45]
Supra, 25-26.
[46]
Id., G.R., No.
48237, 144.
[47]
Id., 18-19.
[48]
Id., 25.
[49]
Id., 26.
[50]
Id., 118-122, 141-145.
[51]
No. L-23557, April 30, 1974,
56 SCRA 694 (1974).
[52]
Manila Hotel Corporation v. NLRC, No. L-53453, January 22, 1986, 141 SCRA 169 (1986); Akay Printing Press v. Minister of
Labor and Employment, No. L-59651, December
6, 1985, 140 SCRA 381 (1985); Magtoto v.
National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-63370, November 18, 1985, 140 SCRA 58 (1985); Panay Railways, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission; No. L-69416, July 11, 1985,
137 SCRA 480 (1985); Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company v. Encarnacion, Nos. L-67002-03, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 256 (1985);
Medical Doctors, Inc. (Makati
Medical Center)
v. NLRC, No. L-56633; April 24,
1985, 136 SCRA 1 (1985); Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v.
NLRC, No. L-49071, April 17, 1985,
135 SCRA 697 (1985); Flexo Manufacturing Corp. v.
NLRC, No. L-55971, February 28, 1985,
135 SCRA 145 (1985); Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, No. L-64809, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 223
(1983); Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation v. Lazaro, No. L-63779, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 463 (1983); Capital Garment
Corporation v. Ople, No. L-53627, September 10, 1982, 117 SCRA 473
(1982); Litex Employees Association v. CIR,
No. L-39154, September 9, 1982,
116 SCRA 459 (1982); Yucoco v. Inciong, No. L-49061, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 245 (1982); People’s Industrial
and Commercial Employees and Workers Org. (FFLU) v. People’s Industrial
and Commercial Corp., No. L-37687, March
15, 1982, 112 SCRA 440 (1982); Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa
Camara Shoes v. Camara
Shoes, No. L-50985, January 30, 1982,
111 SCRA 477 (1982); Pepito v. Secretary of
Labor, No. L-49418, February 29, 1980,
96 SCRA 454 (1980); Citizens’ League of Free-Workers v. CIR, No.
L-38293, February 21, 1980,
96 SCRA 225 (1980); Liberty Cotton
Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills,
Inc., No. L-33987, May 31, 1979,
90 SCRA 391 (1979); Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor, supra; Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, No. L-26136, October 30,
1978, 86 SCRA 27 (1978); L.R. Aguinaldo
& Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-31909, April 3, 1978, 82 SCRA 309 (1978); Danao Development Corporation v. NLRC, Nos. L-40706
& 40700, February 16, 1978,
81 SCRA 487 (1978); Monteverde v. Court of
Industrial Relations, No. L-32975, September
30, 1977, 79 SCRA 259 (1977); Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-Natu v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., No. L-25291, March
10, 1977, 76 SCRA 50 (1977); People’s Bank and Trust Company v.
People’s Bank and Trust Co. Employees Union, supra; Luzon
Stevedoring v. Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-34300, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 154
(1974); Feati
University Faculty Club (Paflu) v. Feati University,
No. L-31503, August 25, 1974,
58 SCRA 395 (1974).