JESUS DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JAIME HAMOY, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH XV, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, AND WILEADO DE LEON, DOMINGO DE LEON, CRISTINO DE LEON, HENCIANO…

For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of
attorney for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of the
plaintiff, the petitioner in this case, the respondent Judge declared him
non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the plaintiff to
appear for pre-trial conference.”^[1]
We do not agree.  The respondent Judge
manifestly erred.  He acted with indecent
haste.  He could have easily required the
counsel for the plaintiff to buy the required one-peso documentary stamp
outside the court room and affix the same to the special power of attorney and
that respite would not have taken ten minutes.  Had he been less technical and more sensible,
the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court and of
his own would have been avoided.

The respondent trial Judge had three chances to rectify his grave
error but he missed all of them.  He was
adamant.  By such rigidity he denied the
petitioner substantial justice.

(1) He procrastinated when the plaintiff and his counsel
immediately after the hearing on the same morning of July 25, 1986, made oral
representations with him inside his chamber for the reconsideration of his
order declaring the plaintiff non-suited and dismissing the complaint.  The plaintiff, through his counsel, explained
that he was actually inside the court room while his lawyer and the defendants’
counsel, were arguing, but he (plaintiff) was too timorous to interrupt the
proceedings and make known his presence to his counsel or to the court.  Despite the immediacy of the representations and the plausibility
of this explanation considering the plaintiff’s nescience, being merely an
agricultural tenant and can hardly write his name, the respondent Judge still
required him to file a written motion and set it for hearing
“in accordance with the Rules of Court.”

(2) Complying, the plaintiff’s counsel forthwith filed the
written motion,^[2]
duly supported by an Affidavit of Merit of the plaintiff, on the same day, July 25,
1986, and set it for
hearing as ordered by the respondent Judge. 
This motion for reconsideration was denied “for lack of merit”
on August 29, 1986.  The order of denial states in part:^[3]

xxx    xxx       xxx

A judicious appraisal of the facts alleged in the motion for
reconsideration and in the accompanying affidavit of merit fail to convince the
Court to reconsider the
Order.  As admitted by the plaintiff, he
was inside the Court room when the case was called for pre-trial conference and
when his counsel, Atty. Alejandro Saavedra and
defendants’ counsel Atty. Narvaro Belar
Navarro were arguing about the insufficiency of the special power of attorney,
but he never made known his presence to the Court or to his counsel or to the
defendants.  He approached his counsel
and presented himself to him when they were already outside the Courtroom and
after the case was already dismissed.  To
the mind of the Court, the foregoing circumstances detailed by the plaintiff do
not constitute excusable negligence or
mistake.^[4]

xxx    xxx       xxx

(3) Undaunted, seven days later, on September 5, 1986, the petitioner filed a second motion
for reconsidera­tion^[5]
verified by his counsel, setting it for hearing on September 19, 1986, which was promptly denied on
the same day of the hearing.

And, on October
7, 1986, as a coup
de grace, an
over-kill to be sure, the respondent Judge issued a curt order which reads:

xxx    xxx       xxx

The Court having
denied the second motion for reconsideration
for not being allowed by
Section 4 of the Interim Rules as per
Order entered on September 19, 1986, the case at bar is therefore considered
closed and terminated.

SO ORDERED.^[6]

xxx    xxx       xxx

The respondent Judge lost
sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves, fortified by
jurisprudence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings in
order to effect substantial justice.^[7] After all, “[O]verriding
all the foregoing technical considerations is the trend of the rulings of this
Court to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.”^[8]

In a recent case^[9] where the trial court, as in this instance, declared the petitioner
non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, and consequently
dismissed the complaint, this Court reiterated the doctrine of liberality in
the construction of the rules of procedure to be followed by all courts.

While it is true
under Section 1, Rule 20 of the
Rules of Court, it is mandatory for the parties and their counsel to appear at
the pre-trial to consider inter alia
“the possibility of an amicable settlement, the simplification of the issues, the possibility of obtaining stipulations
or admission of facts, totally or partially, and
such other matters as may aid in
the prompt disposition of the
action”; and that a party
who fails to appear at the pre-trial may be non-suited or considered as in
default, this rule was by no means intended as an implacable bludgeon but as a
tool to assist the trial courts in
the orderly and expeditious conduct of trials. 
Time and again We have
emphasized that the rule should be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy, but more
importantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.^[10]

Practically on all fours
with this case is Gabucan vs. Hon. Judge Luis D.
Manta, et al.,^[11] in which the petition for the probate of a notarial will was dismissed on the sole ground that the will did not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp, and, hence, according to
the respondent Judge, it was not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of
the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code, which reads:

xxx    xxx       xxx

‘SEC. 238.  Effect of
failure to stamp taxable
document.  – An instrument, document, or paper
which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued,
accepted, or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded nor shall it or any copy thereof or any
record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled.

‘No notary public or other
officer authorized to administer oaths shall add his jurat
or acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax unless the
proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.’^[12]

In
reversing the interpretation of the provisions of sections 238 and 250 of the
old Tax Codes above copied which
are identical to those of
section 214 of the National Internal Code of 1986, as amended, the law now
obtaining, this Court held:

xxx    xxx       xxx

What the probate court should have done was to require the
petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp
to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is
the taxable portion of that document.

That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238
that the non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite
documentary stamp, subsists only “until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and
cancelled.”

Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the
time the taxable document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena, 49 Phil. 749). 
If the promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the court
should have allowed plaintiff’s tender of a stamp of supply the deficiency. 
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. 67, 71.  Note the
holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that
the lack of the documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate such
document.  See Cia.
General de Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet,
12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar,
16 Phil. 403, 405-6.)^[13]

This is as it
should be because the quality of justice is not strained.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the trial court complained of,
the first dated July 25, 1986 declaring the petitioner non-suited and
dismissing his complaint, and those dated August 29, 1986 and October 7, 1986,
denying the petitioner’s motions for reconsideration are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.  Civil Case No. 3331 is hereby
remanded to the respondent trial court for further proceedings.  No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of
the respondent judge.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 17-18.

^[2]
Id., 15.

^[3]
Id., 13.

^[4]
Id., 19.

^[5]
Id., 10-11.

^[6]
Id., 20.

^[7]
Maturan vs. Araula,
No. L-57392, January 30, 1982,
111 SCRA 615 (1982).

^[8]
De Mesa Abad vs. Court of Appeals, No.
L-42225, July 9, 1985, 137
SCRA 416 (1985); citing Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-37522, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262
(1975); See also, Siguenza vs. Court of
Appeals, No. L-44050, July 16, 1985,
137 SCRA 570 (1985).

^[9]
Tejero vs. Rosete,
No. L-55102, June 19, 1985,
137 SCRA 69 (1985).

^[10]
Tejero vs. Rosete,
supra, 74.

^[11]
No. L-51546, January
28, 1980, 95 SCRA
751 (1980).

^[12]
Supra, 753.

^[13]
Supra, 754.