HON. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, AS JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BENITO FERMIN, JESUS S. TENCHAVEZ, TAN BOON SIONG, JOSE TIONG­SON, QUIRINO APACIBLE, MARCOS D. MASA AND TAN TO, PETI…

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

On February 26, 1960, S.G.V.
Chaves, Octaviano Ladeña,
See Kui, Thomas K.C. Uy,
Felipe Juico, Jaime A. Vergara
and Gilberto Neri – hereinafter referred to as Chaves
et al. – commenced Civil Case No. 42650 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in the name of Quezon City Export and Import,
Inc. – hereinafter referred to as the Corporation – against Benito Fermin, Jesus S. Tenchavez, Tan
Boon Siong, Jose O. Tiongson,
Quirino Apacible and Marcos
D. Masa – hereinafter referred to as Fermin et al. – to restrain the latter
from holding meetings, passing resolutions or otherwise acting for the
Corporation, upon the ground that they had ceased to be of­ficers thereof and
that Chaves et al. are now the officers of the Corporation, and, as
such, entitled to manage the same. 
Chaves et al., likewise, prayed that defendant Quirino
Apacible be ordered to surrender to them all papers
of the Corporation in his possession
and that Fermin et al. be sentenced to pay damages. 
Soon later, Fermin et al., Arsenio
Tenchavez and Tan To, instituted Civil Case No. 42704
of the same court, against Chaves et al., for the purpose of securing a judg­ment
declaring that plaintiffs therein, not Chaves et al., are the directors and
officers of the Corporation and order­ing Chaves et al. to refrain from acting
as officers thereof, in addition to sentencing them for damages.

On March
16, 1960, Fermin et al. filed a motion to dis­miss the complaint in
case No. 42650, but, the motion was denied. 
Subsequently, they filed their answer in case No. 42650, which was
substantially identical to the allegations
in the complaint in case No.
42704.  Similarly, Chaves et al. filed
their answer in said case No. 42704, making substan­tially the same averments
contained in their complaint in case No. 42650. 
Later on, the Judge presiding Branch XIV of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, to which case No. 42704 had been assigned, issued an order
transferring the same to Branch VIII of the same court, before which case No. 42650 was pending, upon the ground that the
issues in case No. 42704 were identical to those raised in the earlier case,
No. 42650.

On January
13, 1961, after a
joint trial, Hon. Juan P. Enriquez, who then presided said Branch VIII,
rendered, in both cases, a decision the dispositive
part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 42650 without pronouncement as to costs.  In Civil
Case No. 42704 judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
respondents, declar­ing the former lawfully entitled to the positions claimed
by them in the complaint.  Respondents
are sentenced to pay jointly and severally to complainants moral damages in the
sum of P5,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the sum of
P2,000.00 plus costs, making the preliminary injunction dated September 24, 1960 final against the
respondents.”

Twenty-eight days after
notice of this decision, or on March 21, 1961, Chaves et al. filed a notice of
appeal, a record on appeal and an appeal bond, in case No. 42650.  Fermin et al., in
turn, filed, on March 28, 1961, a motion for execution of said decision, upon
the ground that it had become final, no appeal having been taken therefrom within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof,
which Fermin et al. claimed to be the period applicable,
upon the theory that the two cases are in the nature of quo warranto proceedings.  Chaves et al., in turn, maintained that they
had thirty (30) days within which to appeal from said decision, because case
No. 42650, they argued, is, not a quo warranto proceeding,
but an action for injunction.  Judge
Enriquez overruled this contention and sustained that of Fermin
et al., and, accordingly, refused to give due course to the appeal.

A reconsideration of the order to this effect having been denied
and the motion of Fermin et al. for a writ of
execution having been granted, Chaves et al. instituted the present case
C.A.-G.R. No. 29254-R of the Court of Appeals, for mandamus, against Fermin et al. and Judge Enriquez, to compel the latter to
give due course to said appeal and secure a writ of injunction restraining the
execution of the decision of the trial court. 
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
for Chaves et al.  Hence, Fermin et al. filed the present petition for review by
certiorari.

This case hinges on whether said Civil Case No. 42650 is a quo warranto
proceeding or not, it being conceded that, if the answer were in the
affirmative, the appeal of Chaves et al., from the decision of the trial court,
was taken after the same had become
final and executory. 
The Court of Appeals held:

“We find that the nature of Civil Case No. 42650 as one for
injunction and the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint to
constitute a cause of action, were sustained by the order of the lower court
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and by the very words of its decision
expressly making reference to Civil Case No. 42650 as an action for
injunction.  The case having proceeded,
been tried, decided, and an appeal therefrom
perfected on the theory that it was an action for injunction, it was error for the lower court to reverse things by
abruptly ruling that the action was ‘more in the nature of quo warranto rather
than injunction’, for the purpose of disallowing the appeal.  We therefore, hold that the appeal in Civil
Case No. 42650 for injunction having been perfected within the reglementary period of 30 days,
should have been allowed.”

We can not accept this
view.  To begin with, the Court of
Appeals did not state why it held case No. 42650 as “one for
injunction.” Moreover, it seemingly assumed that said finding negated that
the case was a quo warranto
proceeding.  Such assumption is
unwarranted, for an injunctive relief may, and is often, if not generally, sought
in quo warranto
proceedings.  In fact, the very Court of
Appeals admitted, in its appealed decision, that case No. 42704 “could
have been a combined action for quo warranto and
injunction.”

Secondly, the prayer for injunction in case No. 42650 is
predicated upon the allegation that, despite the election and qualification of
Chaves et al., in 1960, as members of the board of directors and officers of
the Corporation, and “knowing full well that they (Fermin
et al.) are no longer members of the board of directors nor the duly constituted
officers of the corporation,” Fermin et al.
“persist and continue to unlawfully represent themselves not only as
members of the board of directors, but, also, as officers of the corporation,
acting on matters affecting the interests of the corporation and
misrepresenting themselves to the public as individually and collectively
acting for and on behalf of the corporation on corporate matters and
affairs.” Upon the other hand, in their answer to said complaint, Fermin et al. controverted the
legality of the alleged election and qualification of Chaves et al., as members
of the board of directors and officers of the Corporation, and averred that
they (Fermin et al.) – not Chaves et al. – “are
lawfully entitled to the positions they (Fermin et
al.) now occupy in the corporation.”

The main issue in the case was, therefore, whether or not Fermin et al. were board members and officers of the
Corpora­tion.  In other words, the
proceeding was essentially one for quo warranto.^[1]
As pointed out in said answer of Fermin et al., in
case No. 42650, the aforementioned “complaint seeks to have” the
Court “look into” their right “to the offices and/or posi­tions
they occupy in the corporation,” although they questioned the sufficiency
or regularity of the complaint, the same having been filed in the name of the
Corporation, instead of that of Fermin et al., who
claim to be entitled to said offices and/or positions.

Thirdly, the very decision of the Court of Appeals points out the
substantial identity of the allegations, on the one hand, in the complaint of
Chaves et al. in case No. 42650 and their answer in case No. 42704, and, on the other, of the com­plaint of Fermin et al. in case No. 42704 and their answer in case
No. 42650.  Thus, the issues in both
cases are admittedly identical.  Then,
again, it is not disputed that the complaint in case No. 42704 properly states
that it is one for “quo warranto,” as, in
fact, it is, the injunction therein prayed, like the one applied for
by Chaves et al. in case No. 42650, being merely auxiliary to or in aid of the declaration of lack of title of their respective opponents.

The statement made by the Court of Appeals to the effect that
case No. 42650 had been “tried, decided and the appeal thereon perfected
upon the theory that it was an action for injunction,”
is not entirely accurate.  The first
paragraph of the decision of the trial court^[2] adverted to the fact that each
party claimed title to the offices in question and assailed
that of their opponents thereto, and that both sought an injunction as a
means to enforce their respective titles. 
In fact, His Honor the trial
Judge had explicitly declared that case No. 42650 was “more in the
nature of quo warranto x x x than
injunction.”

One other factor must be reckoned with.  The decision in case No. 42704 is now
final and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom.  Hence,
the question as to which of the two groups – Fermin
et al. or Chaves et al. – are the lawful members of the board of directors and
officers of the Corporation, has been definitely
settled in said case in favor of the first group.  This being the case, it may no longer be
litigated in case No. 42650.^[3] The claim of Chaves et al. in such case is now
barred by the decision in case No. 42704.^[4]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed, and the petition for mandamus in the case at bar
should be, as it is hereby, dismissed and the writ denied,
with costs against Chaves, et al.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Angeles,
and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court; Acosta
vs. Flor, 5 Phil., 18; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil., 401; Cesar vs.
Garrido, 53 Phil., 97; Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12; Cuyekeng
vs. Cruz, L-16263, July 26, 1960; Board of Directors of the Phil.
Charity Sweepstakes vs. Alandy, L-15391, Oct. 31, 1960.

^[2]
“Under the complaint in Civil Case No. 42650 for injunction, plaintiff
corporation seeks ouster of
defendants Benito Fermin, Jose C. Tiongson, Jesus Tenchavez, Tan
Boon Siong, Quirino Apacible and Marcos D. Masa from
their offices in the corporation, alleging that J.C.V. Chaves, See Kui, Felipe Juico, Octaviano Ludeña, Thomas K.C. Uy, Jaime C. Vergara and Gilberto Neri were chosen in an election held on February 15, 1960 by its stockholders owning more than 50%
of the total paid-up shares, on the strength of the order issued by this Court (Branch XIX) in Civil Case No.
42385.  Defendants assert ownership of
about 95% of the paid-up shares of the company and rightful possession of
the offices they were then holding. 
This is the same position taken by said defendants and two others,
namely, Arsenio Tenchavez
and Tan To as plain­tiffs in their complaint
for Quo Warranto, Civil Case No. 42704, against
Chaves et als., praying in
turn for injunction against the latter, including damages, attorney’s fees and costs.  Respondents’ answer in the second case is a reaffirmation of the
stand taken by them in the first case, No. 42650.”

^[3]
Kidpalos vs. Baguio
Gold Mining Co., L-19944, Aug. 14, 1965; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-19783, July 30, 1965; Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca,
37 Phil., 921, 942; Ferinion vs. Sta. Romana et al., L-25521, Feb. 28, 1966; Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 39, Sec. 49, Effect of Judgments.

^[4]
Angcao, et al. vs. Punzalan,
et al., L-20521, Dec. 28, 1964; Prieto vs.
Arroyo, et al., L-17885, June 30, 1965; Malabon
Restaurant, et al. vs. Hearing Officer,
et al., L-22199, Jan. 31, 1966; and Republic vs. Planas,
et al., L-21224, Sept. 27, 1966.