VICENTE Y. REALIZA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GASPAR DUARTE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. VICENTE Y. REALIZA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. URBANO DEBEVAR, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. VICENTE Y. REALI…

Before Us are separate appeals by the
defendants from three decisions of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte relating to the possession of certain
parcels of land located in the municipality
of New Piñan,
same province.  Since the issues are iden­tical
and as the plaintiff-appellee is the same in all
three cases, the defendants-appellants were allowed to file a single and joint
brief.

In Civil Cases Nos. 932, 951 and 954, which are actions for
forcible entry and detainer filed by Vi­cente Y. Realiza against Jesus Arpa, Gaspar Duarte and Urbano Debevar, respectively, in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Dipolog, Zamboanga del
Norte, after a trial on the merits, the court rendered decisions or­dering the
defendant in each case to vacate the parcel of land occupied by him and to pay
monthly rentals and costs.  Writs of
execution were issued after the deci­sions have become final.  The sheriff made returns of the writs with
the defendants refusing to vacate the land and remaining in possession thereof.

On April 9, 1957, or more than five years, but before ten years,
after the entry of final judgment in each case, Vicente Y. Realiza
again filed three sepa­rate actions, this time in the Justice of the Peace
Court of New Piñan, a newly created municipality
under whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the actions fell, for the
enforcement and revival of the judgments rendered in the aforementioned Civil
Cases Nos. 932, 951 and 954.  After trial
the court decreed the revi­val of the judgments.

On separate appeals interposed by the defendants, the cases were
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte where the parties submitted in each case identical stipulations of
facts, typical of which are the following pertinent clauses:

“3. That Exhibits A and A-1 (de­cisions) was (were) executed May
20, 1952 as per sheriff’s return dated May 24, 1962, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Exhibit B;

“4. That owing to the fact that the defendant did not vacate the
premises the complaint was filed and that after due hearing and consideration
by the justice of the peace court of New Piñan,
judgment was rendered for plain­tiff reviving the judgments of the justice of
the peace court of Dipolog, x x
x .”

It was stipulated likewise that the
defendants Urbano Debevar,
Jesus Arpa and Gaspar
Duarte are “homestead­ers” of the land; and that Duarte’s
application for homestead was approved by the Bureau of Lands on May 31, 1954.  On the basis of the parties’ stipulations,
the court affirmed the decisions of the Justice of the Peace Court of New Piñan.

Appellants contend that the judgments in Civil Cases Nos. 932,
951 and 954 having been satisfied, the same cannot be revived.  The contention is de­void of factual
basis.  “In order to constitute a
full  execution
of a writ, both defendant and his personal property must be removed from the
premises, and the estate  given to
plaintiff, unless the removal of the personal property is waived by
defendant.  Where de­fendant is
decreed to be ejected, he must vacate and 
be ejected from every part of the land included within the area
defined by the court in fixing the boundaries in the description of the property
involved in the action, x x x.”
(36 C. J. S. 1209, underscoring supplied) In the cases at bar, it is admitted
that “the defendants did not vacate the premises” (par. 4, sti­pulation,
supra).  The defendants have
ignored and dis­obeyed the writs of execution and have contemptuously remained
in possession of the land.  Indubitably
there­fore, the writs have not been fully executed.

No error was committed by the court a quo in hold­ing
that the appellee has a right to bring to life the
judgments rendered in the forcible entry and detainer
cases.  Ten years have not passed since
final entry of said judgments was made. 
The right to revive and en­force the judgments by an independent action
is a re­medy granted to the prevailing party by Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides as follows:

“Execution by motion or by inde­pendent action.- A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.  After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action.”

It is contended in the second assignment of error that the
defendants-appellants Urbano Debevar
and Je­sus Arpa are “homesteaders” and as
such are entitled to the possession of the land and cannot be ejected therefrom.  The
contention is untenable.  It was not
shown that these appellants have filed homestead appli­cations for the portions
of the land occupied by them before the governmental agency entrusted with the
ad­ministration and disposition of public lands.  In the absence of proof that such
applications have been filed, much less, approved by competent authority, the
reference to them as “Homesteaders” in the stipula­tion of facts, does not legalize their illegal possess­ion of the
land or convert them from usurpers into law­ful possessors.  Their naked claim of being
homestead­ers cannot set at naught the judgment of ouster rendered against them
by a competent court.

The situation of appellant Gaspar Duarte,
however, is different.  On May 31, 1954, or after the entry of
judgment, his homestead application was approved by the Director of Lands.  In view of this supervening event which
occurred after the entry of judgment, it behooved the court a quo
to have ascertained if the re­lationship between appellee
and Duarte was changed.  In the case of Compañia
General de Tabacos vs. Marti­nez,
et al., 29 Phil. 515, 521, which involved an act­ion for revival of judgment,
this Court, through Just­ice Trent, stated:

“There is by no means any pre­sumption in his (judgment
creditor) favor that he is entitled to no less than the exact relief set forth
in the first judgment.  Dur­ing a period
of five years or more, many events or transactions may have transpired to change
the relations of the parties or the right of the judgment creditor to de­mand
the enforcement of his judgment.  It is
the duty of the court before which the second action is tried to examine any
such defenses presented by the defendant and allow their just effect.”

The foregoing pronouncement was
substantially repeated in the case of Francisco, et al. vs. Borja,
L-7953, February
27, 1956, when this Court, through Justice Montemayor,
stated:

“Aside from the defenses of prescription, in an action for
revival of a judgment, defenses based on facts occurring after the judgment,
such as satisfac­tion thereof by the losing party or counterclaims arising out
of transactions not connected with the former controversy, may be set
off.”

The land on which Duarte
settled may be initially presumed as public land, his homestead application
over it having been approved by the Director of Lands.  It is our considered opinion that the
approval of his homestead application legalized his possession, and such
approval constitutes a justiciable defense against
the action for revival of judgment as it ne­cessarily affects the appellee’s right of possession of the land from which Duarte
was ordered ejected.

In the case of Hernandez, et al. vs. Clapis,
et al., 98 Phil. 684, a judgment in favor of the plain­tiffs in a forcible
entry and detainer case was appealed to this Court which affirmed the same. 
The decision of this Court having become final and execu­tory,
the plaintiffs, in the court below, moved for execution thereof.  The motion was opposed by the de­fendants on
the ground that while the case was on appeal here, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, in a conflict involving the same parcel of land, decided
to reject the sales   application of the
plaintiff and to allow the defendants, as veterans of the last world war, to
possess the land.  The motion for
execution was, nevertheless, granted by the lower court.  In reversing the order of execution, this
Court, through then Chief Justice Paras, ruled:

“x x x
While the decision in the forcible entry and detainer
case is final, it can no longer be executed at least in so far as the
possession of the land in question is concerned, because, under section 4 of
Common­wealth Act No. 141, the Director of Lands has direct executive control
of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions
as to questions of fact are conclusive when approved by the Sec­retary of
Agriculture; and because the latter had already cancelled the right of
plaintiff Maria L. Hernandez to administer the land in question and rejected
both her sales applica­tion and that of her husband, plain­tiff, Antonio
Hernandez, at the same time giving the defendants the pre­ferential right to
apply for said land in virtue of the provisions of Republic Act No. 65.  The correctness of the final decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture is not herein involved, but it is valid and binding until
re­versed in a proper proceeding by the court. 
The situation is not that the judgment in the forcible entry and detainer case has lost its virtuality,
but that the plaintiffs had subse­quently ceased to be entitled to the relief
awarded by said judgment.

“However, the money judgment in favor of the plaintiffs not
being within the scope of the administrative control granted by law to the
Director of Lands with reference to public land, may
still be enforced by execution.”

In conformity with the above ruling, We cannot sus­tain the revival of judgment as against Duarte
in so far as his possession of the land is concerned.  The money judgment, however, may still be
revived or enforced it being a matter which could not be affected by the
approval of defendant’s application for homestead.

WHEREFORE, the decision against Gaspar
Duarte is hereby reversed with respect to his possession of the land but
affirmed as to his monetary lia­bility; judgments as against the other
defendants-appellants are affirmed.  On equitable considerations, no pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J, Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.