UNITED SEAMEN’S UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. DAVAO SHIPOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ANGTIONG SONS AND/OR RICARDO ANG, OWNER-MANAGER; ANGLIONGTO SONS & COMPANY, GARCIA WATER …

Review
on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.

The material facts are
not disputed.  On August 4, 1959
petitioner United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as
USUP) presented a set of demands to
respondent Davao Shipowners
Association (hereinafter referred to as Shipowners)
representing respondent shipping companies, for union recognition, union security,
standardization of wages and other benefits.  In
its answer, the Shipowners invited USUP’s attention to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement with the Davao Marine Association
(hereinafter referred to as Association), to which all the crewmen of their launches belonged.  Since the Shipowners
were bound by said collective bargaining agreement until the end of that year
(1959), it suggested that USUP first take the necessary steps to be certified
as the collective bargaining agent of the employees before they could negotiate
in connection with its proposals.

However,
even before receiving the Shipowners‘ answer to its
set of demands, USUP had filed with Regional Office No. 8 of the Department
of Labor of Davao City a notice of strike
against all the individual shipowners.  The Chief of the Labor Operations Section of
the Davao Regional Office requested USUP and the Shipowners to a conference with a view to settling the
conflict.  On August 20, 1959 the USUP, the Shipowners
and the Association reached an agreement and executed the following covenant:

“A.  We, the undersigned representatives of the
United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (USUP) hereby withdraw the notice to
strike against any and all members of the group known as the Davao Shipowners Association that
we filed on or about August 6, 1959;

“B.  We, the USUP, further under­take to preserve
and observe the status quo with reference to the normal and original operation
practices of loading, unloading, departures, manning and the performance of any
and/or all jobs in­cident to the businesses of the members of the said Shipowners‘ Association here in Davao
City and in the outports of Davao
province which are their ports of call or may travel to and conduct their
businesses;

“C. We, the Davao Marine Association, hereby undertake to cooperate
with the Davao Shipowners‘
Association and the USUP in the observation and preservation of such practices
and conduct of the Shipowners‘ businesses, and in
view of this covenant will withdraw our complaint against the USUP, its
officers, agents and other representatives which is now Civil Case No. 3106
before Branch I of the Davao Court of First Instance;

“D. That the USUP
hereby announces and binds itself that it will respect the contract between the
Davao Shipowner’s Association
and the Davao Marine Associa­tion until its expiry
date and will not in any manner cause the same to be impaired or disturbed, but
will file a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations for certifica­tion
election to determine the issue of union representation of the Shipowners‘ workers, and if we, the USUP, will be the one
certified, we will commence to bargain with Shipowner’s
Association after the said contract shall be expired;

“E.  We, the Davao Shipowner’s Association gladly give our conformity to the
agreement of both parties to observe and preserve the status quo on the above
mentioned contract’s opera­tion and the commitment of the USUP to have the CIR
determine the issue of union representation.”

As stipulated, USUP filed
with the Court of Indus­trial Relations a petition for certification election
to determine the sole collective bargaining representative of all the workers and
employees of respondent shipping companies.

Meanwhile, subsequent to
the covenant of August 20, the respondent shipping companies separately served
notices of termination of service upon sixty-four (64) em­ployees, effective December
31, 1959, for
reasons ranging from stoppage of operations due to the death of a partner to
business losses and reversals.

Because of these notices
of termination of service upon USUP members (who, admittedly, were also members
of the Association), USUP reported the matter to Regional Of­fice No. 8 of the
Department of Labor in Davao City and requested at
the same time the assistance of said office. 
The Regional Office thereupon called the parties to a con­ference, but
apparently it did not do much good, for in a letter dated December 29, 1959 USUP formally notified the Regional
Office, Department of Labor, the City Mayor of Davao,
the Chief of Police, the Philippine Constabulary, the Bureau of Customs and the
general public that they would declare a strike on January 1, 1960.

On February 11, 1960 the
respondent shipping companies filed a petition
for a writ of injunction (Case No. 3-INJ-DB) with the court a quo,
alleging that a res­training order was necessary ‘to forestall substantial and
irreparable damage to petitioners’ (now respondents’) properties and public
weal,” citing specific acts of coercion, violence and illegal picketing
being committed by defendants (now petitioners).

On
February 24, 1960 USUP filed an unfair labor practice case against herein
respondents (Case No. 49-ULP-DB), alleging that “while its petition for
certifica­tion election is still pending consideration before this Honorable
Court, respondents herein by their respective officers interfered with and have
been interfering with their employees’ guaranteed right to self-organization
and discriminated and have been discriminating against their respective
employees, who are members of the com­plainant, in regard to hire or tenure of
office or con­dition of employment in order to deter organizational activity
amongst employees, to induce those already organized to drop from the rank,
disrupt union morale and ultimately to break up the complainant union x x x“.  The unfair labor case was apparently
predicated upon the dismissal of the USUP members from employment.  The petition then proceeded to enumerate the
various acts of respondents which were claimed to be violations of section
4(a), sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of Republic Act 875.^[1]

After
the respondent companies had filed their respective answers, the petition for
injunction filed by the Shipowners and the unfair
labor case filed by the USUP were heard and tried jointly.  On October
31, 1960 the court a quo issued the appealed order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the USUP complaint for
unfair labor prac­tice (Case No. 49-ULP-DB) dated February 24, 1960, against
the respondent Ship­owners is hereby DISMISSED, while
on the other hand, respondents’ claim for moral damages are also dismissed for
want of jurisdiction together with other compen­satory reliefs
for lack of sufficient sub­stantial proof thereof.  As the strike declared on December 31, 1959 is held illegal and unjustified, dismissal of all
the active participants thereof is hereby decreed.  And as a consequence
thereof, permanent injunction is hereby granted.  For its implementation, respondent USUP,
Alvaro Trinidad, Vivencio Quilong-Quilong,
Fernando Bantillan, together with their agents and
representatives, are permanently enjoined and restrained from:

(1)  Coercing or causing to be coerced, by means of
violence, force, threat or intimidation any employee or laborer of the peti­tioners
herein, so as to prevent him, her or them from entering Petitioners’ properties
at Sta. Ana Wharf, Davao City, with the view of
operating the vessels of petitioners, to put petitioners’ business in normal
operations;

(2)  Instilling or causing to be instilled fear
into the officials, supervisors, agents, employees, guards and laborers of the
herein petitioners or any person desiring to work for or deal in business with
petitioners;

(3)  Unlawful impeding, obstructing, ham­pering or
interfering with the business of peti­tioners, particularly the loading and
unloading of cargoes from and to their vessels;

(4)  Molesting and harassing or causing to be
molested or harassed the officials of peti­tioners and their agents in
protecting and conducting petitioners’ properties and businesses;

(5)  Barricading or in any way obstructing with
odds and ends the gate and pathway leading to and from the premises where the
properties and vessels of petitioners are docked.

The Chief of Police of Davao City and the
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Constabulary and/or their authorized
representatives are hereby directed to enforce this DECISION upon receipt
thereof without the least delay.”

The
principal question to be determined, reso­lution of which will actually dispose
of the other in­cidental issues presented is: 
Did the Court of Industrial Relations gravely abuse its discretion, as
claimed, in declaring the strike staged by the members of the USUP unjustified
and illegal?

The
lower Court found that the strike staged by the USUP and the subsequent unfair
practice case it filed against the respondent companies were the
culmination of a series of drastic moves designed to compel respondents to recognize USUP as the employees’
collective bargaining agent to the exclusion of the Association with whom the Shipowners had an existing collective bargaining
agreement.  In other words, they were the
direct offshoot of a losing effort to have the USUP recognized as the sole
collective bargaining agent of the employees, an effort which suffered legal
infirmities from its inception.  A number
of circums­tances strongly support this finding:

First,
it must be noted that USUP filed its Notice of Strike even before it received
the Shipowners‘ answer to its set of demands.  It seems that regardless of whether the Shipowners would be willing to negotiate with USUP or not,
USUP was already predisposed to go on with the strike.  There could only be one reason for USUP to
anticipate the Shipowners‘ negative stand:  USUP was aware of the existence of a valid
collective bargaining agreement between the Shipowners
and the Association which would operate as a legal bar for the Shipowners
to entertain USUP’s demands.  Knowing as it did that its demands could not
be entertained by the Shipowners, USUP at that early stage could not have had any legitimate
excuse for seeking recognition as the sole collective bargaining agent of the
employees.

Second,
in open contravention of the August 20 covenant, USUP completely disturbed and
impaired the status quo by going on strike pending resolution of
its petition for certification
election.  That status quo referred expressly “to the normal and original operating
practices of loading, unloading departures, manning, and the performance of any
and/or all jobs incident to the businesses of the members of the said Shipowners Association.” By striking, USUP had
impaired or disturbed the existing collective bargaining agreement between the Shipowners and the Association which recognized “the
right of the Employer to hire, promote and transfer and for legal cause
suspend, lay-off or discharge employees subject to the right of the union
(referring to the Association) to notification and to ask reconsideration of
any action of the Employer in the premises.” It should be remembered in
this connection that those who took part in the strike and picketing were also
members of the Asso­ciation and hence were bound by the collective bargaining
agreement.  In seeking to justify their
action, USUP asserts that the strike it staged was a matter of
“self-defense” and/or “union survival”, claiming that the
respondent ship­ping companies were the first to violate the covenant to
preserve and observe the status quo by a concerted action in
sending out notices of dismissal or separation, all effective December 31, 1959
to the 64 USUP members.

It
is at least doubtful that the Shipowners could have
violated the covenant of August 20 for the simple reason that it was not an active nor a principal party thereto.  As the court a quo observed:

“Perusal of the covenant of August 20, 1959 evidently shows
that the fulfill­ment of all the commitments and faithful observance of all the
terms thereof fall upon the United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (USUP) and
the Davao Marine Association, who are the active and
principal parties thereto x x x
the Davao Shipowners
Association never made any specific and categorical commitment ex­cept to, in
the language of the covenant, ‘gladly give our conformity to the agree­ment of
both parties to observe and pre­serve the status quo on the above-mentioned
contract’s operation and the commitment of the USUP to have the CIR determine
the issue of union representation’.  In
effect, the covenant is bilateral
and not tripar­tite.  It imposes no
definite binding ob­ligation to the Shipowners.  The burden lies heavily upon the USUP x x x“

Even assuming arguendo that the shipping companies were also bound
by the covenant, still the termination of services of the affected employees
could not be considered a violation of the covenant.  Sustained by the court a quo,
in specific cases, was the companies’ contention that the dismissals made were
predicated on legitimate reasons.  After
hearing and receiving the exhaustive testimony and evidence of both sides, the
lower court ruled:

“Re:  ANGTIONG SONS

It is completely
established by the evidence that, with the exception of the crewmen of the
vessel MERCURY who received their termination notices on November 12, 1959 due to sustained losses in the opera­ting of the same, no tying up of the other
vessels nor dismissal of their respective crews were effected by respondent Antiong Sons.  With
respect to the MERCURY, it is very evident from the termination notice that it
was directed to the individual crewmen of the same, as members of the
(Association) and at the bottom thereof, it is noted that copies of the same
have been furnished the president of the Davao Marine
Association and the Department of Labor. 
In fact and in law, therefore the laying off was directed to the crew­men
of MERCURY as members of the Davao Marine Association
and not as unionists of the
(USUP).  As the Association was the one
vitally affected for the mass laying-off of said crewmen with the substantial
reduction of its membership and the respective collection of check-off dues, it should
have been the militant com­plaining party, had it been convinced that the total
laying-off of its members in the MERCURY was anti-union, unreasonable and
unjustified under the circumstances.

x           x            x

The decommissioning of the MERCURY followed by the announcement of
its sale and finally its disposal by purchase, fully negate complainant’s
charge of unfair labor practice against respondent.  It can be cons­trued as a legitimate exercise of its rights and prerogative under the
‘Management of Labor Force’ provision of the collective bargaining agreement
dated December 28, 1957
between the Shipowners and the Association providing
as follows:

‘The operation and direction of working forces and the manage­ment
of the business shall be vested exclusively in the EMPLOYER, including the
right to hire, promote, and transfer and for legal cause, to suspend, lay-off
or discharge employees.  The UNION
shall be notified in case of suspension, lay-off, or discharge of any of its
members.  Should the UNION
consider the suspension, lay-off or discharge un­lawful, it may seek
reconsideration from the EMPLOYER and should the
latter maintain its stand, the matter maybe taken up with the court so vested
with jurisdiction to set­tle the controversy.‘

PREMISES CONSIDERED, complainant’s
particular charges of unfair labor practice against Antiong
Sons are hereby dismissed.”

With
respect to Southern Navigation Company, the court a quo found that the strike declared against it was a
sympathy strike; that the crew and officers of the EMPRESS OF DAVAO and the ANHAI were
given termination notices because the company was dissolved after the death of
one of its principal partners; and that the cessation of the operation of the
two vessels was not motivated by any anti-union feeling.  As in the Angtiong
case, the notice of termination was addressed not to the USUP but to the
Association, by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement with it.

As
to Vicente Yu Water Transportation, the court a quo
observed that “the contents of said termination notices clearly state that the
planned cessation of operation (of the M/L WATSON and M/L RIZAL) x x x are (sic) but temporary in character, aside
from the fact that said notices were addressed to all the crewmen and officers as members of the Association and not
of USUP.” Accordingly, the same conclusion as in the above stated cases was reached.

With
respect to Joyce Enterprises, Anglionto Sons & Co., Garcia Water Transportation
and Garcia Navi­gation, the court a quo correctly analyzed the
situation, thus:

“If it was really true that respondents had any abiding
hostility against the USUP or any intention to bust the same by dismis­sing or
locking-out their respective personnel who joined said union, investiga­tion
should have been done after USUP sent its demand letter on August 4, 1959
manifesting its majority representation and requesting for recognition and
bargaining rights to negotiate for its items of demand contained therein, or
after it filed its Notice of Strike with the Regional Office of the Department
of Labor in Davao on August 6, 1959, or, by natural
reaction the Shipowners should have dismissed all
Association members (who were also USUP members) who refused to work on their
vessels from August 13, 1959, through the instigation of USUP, which was
charged of contempt of court for violating the Injunction order dated August
16, 1959.  That was the most oppor­tune
moment for the Shipowners to rightly charge
Association members of violations violating their contractual duties and
obligations under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of December 28, 1957 and of dismissing them without
notice and without recourse in the exercise of its managerial powers and pre­rogatives
under said contract and under the law.  In spite of such affront and clear
violation of their rights, none such reta­liatory acts were done by any of the
respon­dent Shipowners.  x x x“

We
find no urgent reason to take issue with the conclusions reached by the court a
quo, considering that petitioner does not now
question the veracity of the facts on which the conclusions are based.

Third,
the existence of a collective bargaining agreement should have been sufficient
to deter USUP from acts tending to force the issue of union recogni­tion.  The pertinent provisions of said agreement
read:

“VI – GRIEVANCE AND HEARING COMMITTEE

“A ‘Grievance Committee’ shall be created, composed of three
(3) members of the UNION, one of wham shall be in the service of the EMPLOYER,
the names of whom shall be furnished to the said employer.  All grievance of
UNION members in the ser­vice of the EMPLOYER shall be coursed through the
aforementioned grievance committee, which shall take up the same with a
‘Hearing Committee’ composed of three members to be chosen by the EMPLOYER.

“Any grievance or dispute which can­not be settled by a
conference of both grievance and hearing committees,
shall be referred to the Court of Industrial Rela­tions or any other Court of
competent juris­diction for final determination.  Pending such determination it is agreed by
the par­ties that no strike, slow down of work or lockout shall be declared by
either the UNION or the EMPLOYER.”

Undoubtedly,
the parties adopted a graduated procedure in the settlement of their labor
disputes because of their desire to maintain harmonious relations and pre­vent
as much as possible the declaration of a strike, which in the last analysis
works adversely to both capital and labor.

The
employees concerned who after all were bound by the collective bargaining
agreement, as members of the Association, totally disregarded the procedure
laid down therein by immediately going on strike without coursing their
complaints through the grievance committee for possible settlement.  Having failed to take advantage of a legal
right granted them under the agreement, they are in no
position to demand relief from the consequences of their own impulsive acts.

“The authorities are numerous which hold that strikes held in
violation of the terms contained in a collective bar­gaining agreement are
illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration
clauses.  These agreements must be
strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved.”
(Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can. Co., 91 Phil. 72, 78).

The unlicensed
crew-members contravened the collective bargaining agreement not because
they affiliated with the USUP but because they were remiss in complying with
their obligations and duties as members of the
Association, the employees’ collective bargaining representative.

Fourth, even assuming
again that the purpose for which the strike was staged was valid, still the
fact remains that the means employed were far from legitimate.  In the hearing of the injunction case (Case
No. 3-INJ-DB), the factual findings of the court a quo reveal the
following:

“The USUP struck at about 8:00
in the evening of December 31, 1959.  Led by Alvaro Trinidad and other respondents,
some 300 strikers formed a human cordon along side the Sta. Ana wharf and
blocked all ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of Petitioners.  The loading and unloading of some boats of
the Petitioners, then docked at the Sta. Ana wharf, were obstructed by the
strikers, not only by the employment of human fence but also by acts of
violence and coercion.  At the inception
of the strike, some boats were already loaded with perishable commodities destined
for the gulf and coastal towns of Davao,
which departure was also rendered impossible due to the impregnability of the
human wall placed by the strikers blocking the egress and ingress to the said
vessels.  x x x

“the strikers, thru force and coer­cion,
took possession of the Shipowners‘ vessels on several
occasions.  The ‘lanchita‘
of the M/V ALFONSO, vessel belonging to Angliongto
Sons & Co., was taken by the strikers on January 4, 1960 without the
owner’s consent and used it to ferry themselves to the M/L MA. LUISA, launch of
Joyce Enterpri­ses, at the midstream where they remained and refused to leave in
spite of appeals made by the owner and officers of said vessel.  x x x
Also on January 7, 1960, some of the strikers took possession of the M/L COLUM­BIAN,
launch owned by Joyce Enterprises, that was anchored upstream sans prior permission
from its owner.  x x x Again, on January 18, 1960, thirteen (13) identified
strikers were caught red-handed in posses­sion of the ‘bote‘
of the M/V ISABEL, also of the Joyce Enterprises, without authority from its
owner.  x x x

“Acts of intimidation, coercion and violence punctuated the
conduct of the strike.  On January 2, 1960, when about 19 stevedores led by Celestino Cañete, attempted to
install a 2 by 9 feet gang­plank on the M/V ISABEL to unload its car­goes,
strikers grabbed the gang-plank and pushed it against the bodies of said steve­dores
who fell to the ground and suffered physical injuries, thereby preventing the
unloading of the cargoes.  x x x

“On January 4, 1960,
as the ‘lanchita‘ theft, committed by the strikers,
was being investigated at the wharf by the Captain Mumuñgan,
P.C. in-charge of the strike area, at the instance of William Joyce, one of the
shipowners, Alvaro Trinidad, challenged frontally William
Joyce to a fight in the presence of said peace officer supposedly to settle the
strike.  x x x On January 14, 1960, Blas Nicase and the crew of the M/L MALITA, Garcia Navigation’s
launch, were prevented against their will from performing their duties.  As they were waiting for the ‘bote‘ of that launch to come alongside the pier to take
them and the crew aboard, the men on the ‘bote‘ who
were non-strikers were subjected to scurrilous remarks and were warned that if
they come nearer, they (the strikers) would get hold of the ‘bote‘ and submerge them into the water.  Fearing physical harm the ‘bote‘ withdrew.  Nicase and his co-workers were themselves surrounded and
rendered immobile by the husky and menacing strikers.  The rest of the crew, greatly outnumbered and
intimidated, were blocked by a human wall and were not able to get into the ‘bote‘.  x x x

“Benedicto Erespe,
the patron of the M/L MARIA LUISA corroborated the above testimony of Mr. Joyce
and further testified that when he was about to board that boat on the night of
January 8, 1960, the
respondent union president and his confe­derates, aided by some husky men,
surrounded him and stopped him from going aboard.  He was threatened with bodily harm if he
persisted in going up the boat so that he had to desist from complying with his
job-duties and reported to the police. 
However, the perpetrators of the said illegal acts whom he clearly
identified and who are always in the vicinity of the Sta.
Ana Wharf
have not been apprehended by the po­lice.

“Celso Villodres
and Eliodoro Cervan­tes, Chief mate and marine
engineer, res­pectively, of the motor launch COLUMBIAN were prevented, in the
same manner as Captain Erespe was prevented from perform­ing his work, against
their will.  They were warned by Mr.
Trinidad and his confederates that something evil will befall them if they
insisted on boarding the ves­sels. 
Alvaro Trinidad on that occasion shouted at Captain Erespe
while shaking clenched fists at the latter that he was a bootlicker and that something will surely happen to him if he boarded the
vessel.  As they were encircled by
strikers, they refrained from insisting to do their work and reported these
threats, coercion and intimidation to the police who have done nothing up to
the present time.

“To crown the already mentioned commis­sion of acts of
threats, intimidation, coer­cion and invasion of shipowners‘
property rights, in the evening of January
13, 1960, Pablo Sisa, a non-striker,
employee of the M/V ALFONSO was mauled by six husky strikers upon order of
Alvaro Trinidad.  It appears that Pablo Sisa was ordered by management of the Angliongto
to pull and tie the rope of the M/V APOLLO, Antiong
Sons’ at about 6:30 p.m.  While aboard, he was told by Alvaro Trinidad
in the presence of his husky men, to go down or else something evil will happen
on him.  Angered by Sisa’s stand, Trinidad made a sign with
his head to his men, then around him to
follow Sisa on his way out of the pier.  On
his way home, along Uyanguren St., Sisa was intercepted
by six men.  His hands were pinned, legs were grabbed tight and was socked on the left
side of the nose, left cheek bone, left ear and left collar bone and kicked
while lying prostrate on the pavement. 
His blue shirt and handkerchief were smeared with blood oozing from his
nose.  During the incident no people were
around neither were there peace officers within the vici­nity.  He was hospitalized.  The local public hospital physician
identified the victim in favor of whom the medical certificate was issued.

“Similar acts to the aforementioned continued to be
perpetrated by the strikers, their agents and representatives after the
expiration of the January 31, 1960
temporary injunction, whenever opportunities were afforded them.

“On January 31, 1960, when the M/L MALITA was unloading its cargoes at Talomo Beach, which is around 8
kms. from the heart of the City of Davao, a truck-load of strikers
and their agents led by Trinidad, numbering around
eighty, resumed picketing.  Strikers
wading in the water at waist-line deep, in several groups, took turn in pushing
the ‘bote’ of the M/L MALITA away from the beach in as many times as there were attempts to approach
the beach to unload cargoes.  It was
during this occasion that the strikers untied the launch’s anchor causing the
vessel to drift into the gulf thus successfully prevented the unloading.  This occasion was also the setting of the
incident wherein Manuel Garcia, owner of the above-cited launch, was physically
pushed by the elbows of husky strikers within sight of Alvaro Trinidad and P.C.
Captain Mumuñgan who did nothing to arrest the
culprits.

“On February 3, 1960,
several attempts of Manuel Garcia, owner of petitioner Garcia Water
Transportation and Cañete together with his
stevedores, to install the gangplank from the Sta. Ana pier on M/L MALITA
preparatory to the unloading of its cargoes, were blocked by the respondents and
their agents.  The one hundred fifty
strikers more or less formed one long unbroken line on the edge of the pier,
from bow to stern of the above launch, and a horde of men, three to four men
deep marched to and fro in close formation to insure that no person or object
would ever get to the vessel despite the pleas
of Cañete and his twenty five (25) odd men to
allow them to unload the launch.  The
strikers grabbed the gangplank, carried by some stevedores and pushed this hard
twice against the latter causing injuries to two stevedores, namely, Tecson and Vargas who in
turn were hos­pitalized.  This treatment
by a government phy­sician is evidenced by Exhibits AA and BB,
respectively.  Dr. Renato
Montenegro, after identifying
the documents and the victims, testified that only an exterior force could
possibly cause the physical injuries on the two patients.  x x x

“Aside from these acts, the strikers not only shouted
slanderous and scurrilous words against the owner of the vessels but also
hurled threatening remarks at the non-strikers. 
Fear was instilled in the minds of non-strikers and owners of the
vessels.

“To the above continuously perpetrated illegal acts and
activities of the strikers, their agents and representatives, several witnesses
gave corroborative testimonies including the City Fis­cal, P.C. Captain
in-charge of the strike-bound area and several police officers and men of the
Sta. Ana district.

“Respondents’ witnesses and other evidence available miserably
failed to offset and discre­dit the more credible testimonies of the City
Fiscal and the peace officers called upon by the court to shed light on the
conduct and manner the strike was prosecuted.

x         
x          
x”

The
foregoing findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and
petitioner itself does not question their veracity.  Besides, they are matters which involve the
credibility and weight of the evidence and which are primarily addressed to the
appreciation of the trial court.

“In cases not
falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or illegality of a strike depends first, upon the
purpose for which it is main­tained,
and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on.  Thus, if the purpose which the laborers
intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust
(as in the case of the National Labor Union vs. Philippine Match Co., 70 Phil.
300), or if in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence or
cause injuries to persons or damage to property (as in the case of National
Labor Union Inc., vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 68 Phil. 732), the
strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by the court
illegal, with the adverse consequences to the strikers.” (Luzon Marine Dept. Union vs. Roldan, 86
Phil. 507, 513)

Where, “in carrying
out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violation with physical injuries,
sabotage and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were
committed by the top officials and members of the union in an attempt to
prevent the other willing laborers to go to work,” it was held that
“a strike held under those circumstances cannot be justified in a regime
of law for that would encourage
abuses and terrorism and would subvert the very purpose of the law which
provides for arbitration and peaceful settlement of labor disputes.” (Liberal Labor vs. Phil. Can, supra)

A
labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of promoting the interests of labor without
unnecessary labor disputes.  That is why
it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining
agreements.  But if it is made use of as
a subterfuge, or as a means to
subvert valid commitments, it defeats its own purpose, for it tends to
undermine the harmonious relations between management and labor.  The situation does not deserve any approving
sanction from the Court.

In view of our conclusion that the strike staged by petitioner USUP
was illegal and unjustified and that the permanent injunction issued by the
lower court was proper, we deem it unnecessary to consider the other incidental
issues presented by petitioner.  The
decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
SEC. 4. Unfair Labor Practice.
– (a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:

(1)    To interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section three;

(2)    To require as a condition of
employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or
shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;

x         x          x          x

(4)    To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization:  x x x