IN THE MATTER FOR THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, JR. AND AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, SR., AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, JR. AND AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, SR., PETITIONERS…

In this habeas corpus proceeding, the pivotal issue is whether a
widow may be considered an offended party within the meaning of the applicable
Rules of Court provision, entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her
deceased husband?^[1]
The question raised is thus novel and significant.  The Court of First Instance of La Union, the
Hon. Jose P. Flores presiding, answered in the negative, hold­ing that such a
complaint was “void for not having been signed by the offended
party.”^[2]
Hence this appeal to us.  For reasons to
be here­after made explicit, we reverse. 
It is our view that the widow possesses the right to file such a
complaint as an offended party.

The petition for habeas corpus was filed on July 29, 1965,
petitioners being Aquilino del Rosario, Sr. and Aquilino del Rosario, Jr.,
father and son.  It was alleged therein
that the latter was confined as of July 11, 1965 and on the date of the filing
of such petition still under confinement in the municipal jail of Aringay, La
Union, by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the municipal court of the
same municipality, based on a criminal complaint for murder filed by the
widow.  Then came the assertion of the
nullity of such complaint based on the contention that the widow was not
authorized to file the same, she being merely the heir of the offended party
but not the offended party herself within the meaning of the above-cited
provision of the Rules of Court. 
Consequently, with the alleged nullity of the above complaint, the
warrant of arrest was alleged to be void resulting, in the opinion of the
petitioners, in the confinement of Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. being arbitrary
and unlawful.  Hence his right to be
released by virtue of this petition for habeas corpus.  There was a motion to intervene as well as an
opposition to the petition, dated July 31, 1965, filed on behalf of the widow,
Juanita Olidar, maintaining her right to file the complaint and praying that
the petition for habeas corpus be denied.

The decision on the habeas corpus proceeding was rendered on
October 29, 1965, sustaining the right of petitioners to such a writ.  Why the lower court arrived at such a
decision was explained by it thus: “The most reasonable interpretation
that can be given to the term, offended party, is that it refers
to the person, actually injured and whose feeling is offended, to the exclusion
of the surviving spouse or other forced heirs. 
In the present case, where the offended party is physically incapable of
filing a complaint in person, the prosecuting officers are the only ones who
can present the complaint against the defendant.  Juanita Olidar could not validly file the
criminal complaint for murder as she is not one of those authorized by law to
sign the same.  The complaint in the
present case should be filed by the chief of police of Aringay or any peace
officer or employee of the government charged with the enforcement and
execution of the law.  As a consequence,
the complaint signed by Juanita Olidar is void, and the warrant of arrest
issued by virtue thereof is, likewise, void, so that the subsequent arrest and
detention of Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. became illegal.”^[3]

It was likewise stated in the decision: “Under these circum­stances,
the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is proper because
when the Court issued the warrant of arrest it had not acquired any
jurisdiction over the defendant, for the complaint is void for not having been
signed by the offended party or government official or employee charged with
the enforcement of the law violated. 
Hence, the necessity of another verified complaint to be signed by any
peace officer authorized by law.”^[4]

The matter, as above-noted, was then taken on appeal to us, the
widow, as appellant, assailing the holding that the criminal complaint filed by
her resulting in the issuance of the warrant of arrest should be considered
void, the contention being pressed that under the circumstances the surviving
spouse should be considered as an offended party within the meaning of the
appropri­ate Rules of Court provision. 
To repeat what was stated at the outset, such a contention finds favor
with us, and we sustain her right to file such a complaint as an offended
party.

1. It may well be that the indivisibility that was once thought
to be an inherent attribute in a marital union is now subject to
qualifications.  As human beings, husband
and wife, individually, have rights, in certain cases even as against each
other.  However much we may postulate
their separate identities, we cannot go so far as to hold that the death of
either does not vitally affect the interest of the survivor, sufficient in law
if such death arose from a criminal offense to give her the character of an offended
party.  To view it otherwise would be an
affront to reason.  That is precisely one
instance where the unity that marks the relationship of husband and wife calls
for the most emphatic affirmation.

More specifically, in the case before us, the injury to the widow
cannot be disputed.  Her right to
consortium was definitely put an end to. 
The loss of the material support to which she was entitled was equally
evident.  The suffering she had to endure
then as the survivor of the tragedy was unavoidable even if time could
thereafter be trusted to assuage the pain. 
It would show less than full regard then for the realities of the
situation not to consider her an offended party within the meaning of the Rules
of Court provision.  Certainly, it is not
to be interpreted in a manner that defies both logic and common sense, not to
mention the deeply felt sentiment associated with the relationship of such a
close intimacy that unity rather than divisiveness is its distinctive
characteristic.

2. A contrary holding, perhaps with due obeisance to what
literalness may appear to require, is likely to be attended with deplorable
consequences, where, as in this case, the accused is a member of the police
force.  Under such circumstance, reliance
on that portion of the rule empowering any peace officer or any employee of the
government or governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or
execution of the law violated to file the complaint might in not a few
instances prove futile.  For one thing, a
false sense of camaraderie may paralyze the hand of such officials.  Equally, there may be other causes even more
in­defensible to ward off the filing of the complaint.

Nor is this to indulge in empty theorizing.  Reference is made to this allegation in the
motion to intervene and the opposition to the petition filed by the widow:
“On July 11, 1965 in the afternoon, the petitioner being a member of the
municipal police force of Aringay, La Union, critically shot Orencio Mercado
within the said municipality, allegedly with his service pistol which was
turned over to the P.C., La Union Command by the Chief of Police of
Aringay.  That same afternoon the
petitioner Aquilino del Rosario, voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as
evidenced by a true copy of the entries made in the Municipal Police Blotter
for July 11, 1965 * * *.  On July 13,
1965, the victim died.  No criminal
complaint was ever filed before or after his death, either by the P. C. or the
Chief of Police.  On July 14, 1965, a
criminal complaint for Murder, bearing Criminal Case No. 901, was subscribed
and filed by Juanita Olidar, surviving spouse of the victim, before the
Municipal Court of Aringay.”^[5]

Such a conspicuous failure on the part of the peace officers to
start a criminal prosecution could very well be repeated in the hundreds of
municipalities where the alleged assailant is a comrade.  At the very least, if not a failure, there is
likely to be a delay in meting out justice to transgressors of the law.  There is thus an equally cogent consideration
based on the primacy of the principle that public interest demands that a crime
should not go unpunished.  That bolsters
and fortifies the interpretation adopted by us concerning the right of a widow
to file a complaint as an offended party.

3. The lower court decision apparently could not ignore the
emphasis placed in the memorandum of petitioners, reiterated in their brief as
appellees, on what for them is the principle announced in Guevarra v. Del
Rosario.^[6]
According to the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Padilla: “The
right of the petitioners to file a complaint charging the commission of a crime
is personal.  It is so, because as
required in section 2, Rule 106, a complaint charging a person with an offense
must be subscribed by the offended party.  The right being personal, the complaint filed
by the petitioners with the respondent court abated upon their death.”
Petitioner would likewise invoke what for them is an even more explicit
declaration found in the concurring opinion of Justice Feria in the same
case.  Thus: “The Rules of Court do
not directly define the meaning of offended party, but from the provision of
section 11, Rule 106, of the said Rules, it may clearly be inferred that
offended party is the person against whom or against whose property the crime
was committed.”^[7]

For one thing, the Guevarra decision may be distinguished, deal­ing
as it did with the question of whether or not a prosecution for the crime of
falsification of public documents could be continued by a son and a brother of petitioners,
who apparently died in the meanwhile. 
The facts are therefore different. 
Whatever statement, general in character, found expression in the
opinion of the Court as well as in the concurrence of Justice Feria should be
thus limited to the particular situation that called for such
pronouncement.  We can even go
further.  There should be no doubt that
our present holding renders untenable the implication apparently yielded by the
Guevarra decision that a widow may not be considered an offended party within
the meaning of the applicable Rules of Court provision.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the decision of the lower court
of October 29, 1965, granting the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, is
reversed and the case ordered remanded to the municipal court of Aringay, La
Union, for further proceedings in accordance with law.  With costs against petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro,
Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., on official
leave.

^[1]
Rule 110, Section 2 reads as follows: “Complaint is a sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense, sub­scribed by the offended party,
any peace officer or other employee of the govern­ment or governmental institution
in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law violated.”

^[2]
Decision, Special Proceeding No. 787 of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Record on Appeal, p. 57.

^[3]
Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 56-57.

^[4]
Ibid, p. 57. Petitioner Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. was not however
released as shown by this last paragraph of the decision of the lower court: “Because the defendant,
Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. has surrendered to the police authorities of Aringay
before the complaint of Juanita Olidar was filed, the said accused shall remain
in custody of the chief of police, who is ordered to immediately file, upon the
receipt of this decision, the necessary and appropriate criminal charges
against Aquilino del Rosario, Jr. as a more tho­rough investigation shall
warrant.” Ibid, p. 57.

^[5]
Record on Appeal, pp. 7-8.

^[6]
77 Phil. 615, 617 (1946).

^[7]
Ibid, p. 621.