THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. FROILAN LAGRIMAS, ACCUSED, HEIRS OF PELAGIO CAGRO, HEIRS-APPELLANTS, MERCEDES AGUIRRE DE LAGRIMAS, MOVANT-APPELLEE.

The Civil Code, under the conditions therein specified,
recognizes the liability of the conjugal partnership for fines and indemnities
imposed upon either husband or wife “after the responsibilities enumerated
in article 161 have been covered,” in the absence of any separate property
of the offending spouse or its insufficiency.^[1]
How such an obligation “may be enforced against the partnership
assets” is the question, one of first impression, raised in this appeal
from a lower court order, based on the assumption of the total exemption of the
conjugal partnership from the liability thus incurred, prior to the stage of
liquidation.  The result was to set aside
the preliminary attachment and thereafter the writ of execution in favor of the
heirs of the murdered victim, appellants before us, the judgment against the
accused imposing not only the penalty of reclusion perpetua but also the indemnification to such heirs having attained the
status of finality.  In view of the
failure, apparent on the face of the appealed order, to respect what the Civil
Code ordains, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

The brief of appellants, the heirs of Pelagio
Cagro, the murdered victim, discloses that on February 19, 1960 an information was
filed against the accused, Froilan Lagrimas, for the above murder committed on February 15, 1960 in Pambujan, Samar.  Thereafter, appellants as such heirs, filed
on February 27, 1960 a
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of
the accused, such motion being granted in an order of March 5, 1960. 
After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as such
heirs in the sum of P6, 000. 00 plus the additional sum of P10, 000.00 in the
concept of damages, attorney’s fees and burial expenses.  An appeal from the judgment was elevated to
this Court by the accused but thereafter withdrawn, the judgment, therefore,
becoming final on October 11, 1962.

A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was issued by
the lower court upon motion of appellants. 
A levy was had on eleven parcels of land in the province declared for
tax purposes in the name of the accused. 
The sale thereof at public auction was scheduled on January 5, 1965 but
on December 29, 1964 the wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment as
well as the writ of execution with the allegation that the property levied upon
belonged to the conjugal partnership and therefore could not be held liable for
the pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.  The then judge of the lower court granted
such motion declaring null and void the order of attachment and the writ of
execution, in accordance with Article 161 of the, new Civil Code.  Another judge of the same lower court set
aside the above order, sustaining the legality of the preliminary attachment as
well as the writ of execution. 
Thereafter, upon appellee filing a motion for
the reconsideration of the above order giving due course to the writ of
execution, a third judge, then presiding over such court, the Hon. Ignacio Mangosing, revived the original order of March 5, 1960,
declaring such attachment and the writ of execution thereafter issued as null
and void.

This order of August 7, 1965, now on appeal, was premised on the
following considerations: “It can be readily seen from the above quoted
provisions of law that only debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
the marriage, and those of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the charges enumerated in article
161 have been covered.  So that, as long
as the obligations mentioned in said article 161 have not been paid, the assets
of the partnership cannot be made to answer for indemnities like the one being
sought to be enforced in the instant case. 
And, before the obligations enumerated in said article 161 can be paid,
the conjugal partnership properties should first, by necessity, be liquidated,
and liquidation can take place only after the dissolution of the partnership
thru the occurrence of any of the
causes mentioned in article 175 of the same Code, one of which is death
of one of the spouses.  Since both are
still living there can not be any dissolution, imprison­ment for life of the
husband notwithstanding, in the absence of, a judicial separation of property
properly decreed in accordance with the provisions of article 191 thereof.  Moreover, the fines and indemnities sought to
be charged against the financial properties of the accused and his wife are not
such debts and obligations contracted by said accused for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.”^[2]

The conclusion arrived at by Judge Mangosing
follows: “We sympa­thize with the predicament of the widow and other heirs
of the deceased Pelagio Cagro,
but the law is clear on the matter.  The
indemnities adjudged by the Court in their favor may only be charged against
the exclusive properties of the accused if he has any, or against his share in
the partnership assets after liquidation thereof if any still remains after the
payment of all the items’ enumerated in article 161 of the said Civil Code.
“^[3]

Hence this appeal, the heirs of Pelagio
Cagro assigning as sole error the quashing and
annulling of the writs of attachment and execution aforesaid.  As stated at the outset, we find the appeal
meritorious.

The applicable Civil Code provision^[4]
is not lacking in explicitness.  Fines
and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife “may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enume­rated in
article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; * * *.  ” It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a
liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still
existing.  The law speaks of
“partnership assets”.  It
contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in Article 161,
chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first.  It is thus obvious that the termination of
the conjugal partnership is not contemplated as a prerequisite.  Whatever doubt may still remain should be
erased by the concluding portion of this article which, provides that “at
the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.”

What other conclusion can there be than that the interpretation
placed upon this provision in the challenged order is at war with the plain
terms thereof? It cannot elicit our acceptance. 
Nor is the reason for such a codal provision
difficult to discern.  It is a funda­mental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for felony is also
civilly liable.^[5]
The accused, Froilan Lagrimas,
was, as noted, found guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to pay the indemnification
to satisfy the civil liability incumbent upon him.  If the appealed order were to be upheld, he
would be in effect exempt therefrom, the heirs of the
offended party being made to suffer still further.

It would follow therefore that the Civil Code provision, as thus
worded, precisely minimizes the possibility that such additional liability of
an accused would be rendered nugatory. 
In doing justice to the heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice is
committed against the family of the offender. 
It is made a condition under this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 covering primarily the maintenance of the family and
the education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one
of them as well as other obligations of a preferential character are first
satisfied.  It is thus apparent that the
legal scheme cannot be suscepti­ble to the charge that for a transgression of
the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear
burdens of an extremely onerous character

The next question is how practical effect would be given this
particular liability of the conjugal partnership for the payment of fines and
indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife?  In the brief for appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro, they seek the
opportunity to present evidence as to how the partnership assets could be made
to respond, this on the assumption that the property levied upon does not
belong exclusively to the convicted spouse.

In Lacson v. Diaz,^[6]
which deals with the satisfaction of the debt contracted by husband or wife
before marriage by the conjugal partner­ship, likewise included in this
particular article, it was held: “Consider­ing that the enforceability of
the personal obligations of the husband or wife, against the conjugal assets,
forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who
invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its
applicability are obtaining.”

Without departing from the principle thus announced, we make this
further observation.  Considering that
the obligations mentioned in Article 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof
required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most
exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. 
Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the
conjugal partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its obligation
irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the offended
party.  That result is to be
avoided.  The lower court should be on
the alert therefore in the appraisal of whatever evidence may be offered to
assure compliance with this codal provision.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set aside
and the case remanded to the court of origin for the reception of evidence in
accordance with this opinion.  With costs
against appellee Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes and Zaldivar, JJ., are on
official leave.

^[1]
According to Article 163 of the Civil Code: “The payment of debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership.  Neither
shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partner­ship.  However, the payment of
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered,
if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partner­ship such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the pur­poses
above-mentioned.” Article 161 in turn provides: “The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations con­tracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also
for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3)
Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of
the children of both husband and wife, and of legiti­mate children of one of
the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional,
vocational or other course.”

^[2]
Record on Appeal, pp. 72-73.

^[3]  Ibid, pp. 73-74.

^[4]
Article 163, Civil Code.

^[5]
Article 100, Revised Penal Code.

^[6]
G.R. No. L-19346, May 31, 1965.