IN THE MATTER FOR THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, JR. AND AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, SR., AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, JR. AND AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, SR., PETITIONERS…

Del Rosario versus Del Rosario

The Case

This is a habeas corpus proceeding that reached the Supreme Court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union. Aquilino del Rosario, Senior and Aquilino del Rosario, Junior, father and son, sought the release of the younger Del Rosario from the municipal jail of Aringay, La Union, where he was held on a warrant of arrest issued on a criminal complaint for murder signed by the widow of the victim. The pivotal question is whether a widow may be considered an offended party within the meaning of the applicable provision of the Rules of Court, and thus entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her deceased husband. The Court itself calls the question novel and significant, and the case matters because it fixes the meaning of a term that appears in the very definition of a criminal complaint.

Procedural History

The widow, Juanita Olidar, subscribed and filed a criminal complaint for murder before the municipal court of Aringay, La Union, which thereupon issued a warrant of arrest against Aquilino del Rosario, Junior. The father and son then filed a petition for habeas corpus, dated the twenty-ninth of July, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of La Union, presided over by Judge Jose P. Flores. The widow filed a motion to intervene and an opposition to the petition, maintaining her right to file the complaint. On the twenty-ninth of October, 1965, the lower court rendered its decision sustaining the petition and granting the writ, on the ground that the complaint was void for not having been signed by the offended party. The widow, as appellant, brought the matter on appeal to the Supreme Court, assailing the holding that her complaint was void.

Facts

On the eleventh of July, 1965, in the afternoon, Aquilino del Rosario, Junior, a member of the municipal police force of Aringay, La Union, critically shot Orencio Mercado within the municipality, allegedly with his service pistol. That same afternoon, Del Rosario voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, as shown by entries in the municipal police blotter. On the thirteenth of July, 1965, the victim died.

No criminal complaint was ever filed before or after his death, either by the Philippine Constabulary or by the Chief of Police. On the fourteenth of July, 1965, Juanita Olidar, the surviving spouse of the victim, subscribed and filed a criminal complaint for murder before the municipal court of Aringay. On the strength of that complaint, the municipal court issued a warrant of arrest, and Del Rosario was confined in the municipal jail.

The father and son then petitioned for habeas corpus, asserting that the widow was merely the heir of the offended party and not the offended party herself, that her complaint was therefore void, and that the warrant of arrest and the confinement were consequently unlawful. The lower court agreed with them, holding that the term offended party refers to the person actually injured and whose feeling is offended, to the exclusion of the surviving spouse or other forced heirs, and that where the offended party is physically incapable of filing a complaint in person, only the prosecuting officers may present it. The lower court granted the writ, although it ordered that Del Rosario remain in the custody of the chief of police, who was directed to file the necessary criminal charges.

Issues

• Whether or not a widow may be considered an offended party within the meaning of the applicable provision of the Rules of Court, so as to be entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her deceased husband.
• Whether or not the criminal complaint filed by the widow, and the warrant of arrest issued on the strength of it, are void, such that the confinement of the accused is illegal and he is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 110, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the government or governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law violated.

The entire case turns on whether the widow falls within the phrase "the offended party" in this provision, for if she does, her complaint is valid and the warrant of arrest stands.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of the widow. Whatever qualifications may now attach to the old notion of the indivisibility of the marital union, husband and wife remain so bound that the death of either, arising from a criminal offense, vitally affects the interest of the survivor and gives her the character of an offended party. To view it otherwise, the Court said, would be an affront to reason. In this case the injury to the widow cannot be disputed: her right to consortium was put an end to, the loss of the material support to which she was entitled was equally evident, and the suffering she had to endure as the survivor of the tragedy was unavoidable. The Court refused to interpret the rule in a manner that defies both logic and common sense.

The Court added a second consideration. A contrary holding, one paying due obeisance to literalness, would be attended with deplorable consequences where, as here, the accused is a member of the police force. Reliance on the portion of the rule empowering any peace officer or government employee in charge of enforcing the law violated to file the complaint might prove futile, for a false sense of camaraderie may paralyze the hand of such officials. The conspicuous failure of the peace officers to start the prosecution in this very case could be repeated in the hundreds of municipalities where the alleged assailant is a comrade. The public interest demands that a crime should not go unpunished, and that principle fortifies the interpretation adopted.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the reliance on the earlier Guevarra decision, which dealt with whether a prosecution for falsification of public documents could be continued by the relatives of petitioners who had died in the meantime. The facts there were different, and the general statements in that opinion should be limited to the particular situation that called for them. The Court went further and declared that its present holding renders untenable the implication apparently yielded by Guevarra that a widow may not be considered an offended party.

Doctrine

A widow is an offended party within the meaning of Rule 110, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, and may subscribe and file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband. The term is not to be read with a literalness that defies logic and common sense; the death of a spouse arising from a criminal offense vitally affects the survivor's interest, ending her right to consortium and her material support, and so gives her the character of an offended party. The interpretation is reinforced by public interest, which demands that a crime should not go unpunished, especially where reliance on peace officers may prove futile because the assailant is their comrade. Any implication in the earlier Guevarra decision that a widow may not be considered an offended party is untenable.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case to the municipal court of Aringay, La Union, for further proceedings in accordance with law, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a widow is an offended party under Rule 110, Section 2, and may file the complaint for her husband's murder. Examiners use this case to test the meaning of offended party in the definition of a criminal complaint, and to test whether habeas corpus lies where the complaint was signed by the victim's surviving spouse.