IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ARMANDO PUNO, RESPONDENT.

On April 16, 1959,
Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified
complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar,
with gross immorality and misconduct.  In
his answer, the respondent de­nied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the
allega­tions therein do not
constitute grounds for dis­barment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of
the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation,
report and recommendation.  Hearings were
held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the com­plainant,
assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary.  The respondent, as well as his counsel,
cross-examined the com­plainant’s witnesses. 
The respondent likewise tes­tified. 
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon
Hotel on June 1, 1958,
disclaimed the handwriting “Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno” appear­ing
in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quing­wa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor general filed a complaint,
formally charging respondent with im­morality. 
The complaint recites:

“That on June 1,
1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and
respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married,
the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respond­ent told the complainant that they take re­freshment before going
to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R.
Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the res­taurant on the first floor of the said
Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complain­ant that they go to one of
the rooms upstairs assuring her that ‘anyway we are getting married;’ that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt en­gendered by love of respondent and the res­pondent’s
promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel
room respondent registered and signed the re­gistry book as ‘Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno‘; that after registering at the hotel, respondent
shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room,
someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and
undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but
respondent insisted, telling her: ‘anyway I have promised to marry you’; and
respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of
love, again assured complainant that ‘you better give up.  Anyway I promised that I will marry you’;
that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her pantie, and then placed himself on top of her and held her
hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respond­ent was already on top of
complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent’s
demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o’clock until 7:00
o’clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birth­day
party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, res­pondent
repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they
had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy
on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant
repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of mar­riage but
respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth
to a child.

“That the acts of the respondent in hav­ing carnal knowledge
with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and
has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that
respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine
Bar.”

The Solicitor General asked for the
disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962.  Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he
took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage,
succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her.  He, however, admitted that sometime in June,
1955, he and the complainant became
sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a
quarrel.  He left for Zamboanga City in July,
1958, to practice law.  Without stating
in his answer that he had the in­tention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. 
On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino
E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted
the case for decision without oral argu­ment. 
There was no appearance for the respondent.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his
intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of
the right to present such evidence (Toledo v. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April
27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Soli­citor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and
cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are
as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school
teacher for a number of years.  She tes­tified
that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as “Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno,” and succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage.  The hotel register
of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1
and Exh. B-2) shows that “Mr. & Mrs.
A. Puno” arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00
P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw res­pondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zambo­anga City. 
When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City,
she sent
him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in
trouble.  Again she wrote him a letter in
September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was
preg­nant and she requested him to come. 
Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City
in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with
his promise to marry her.

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City
in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zambo­anga City
in November, 1958.  The fact that
complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in
respondent’s letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E),
which was duly identified by
the respond­ent to be his.

Complainant gave birth
to a baby boy on February 20, 1959,
at the Maternity and Children’s Hospital. 
This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued
by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar
of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complain­ant to the Maternity and
Children’s Hospital issued by the Medical
records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and
the complainant was, the latter testi­fied that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her.  This was corroborated by the testimony
of Maria Jaca,
a witness for the complainant.  Even
respondent’s letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination
to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to
dis­credit complainant’s testimony.

In his answer to
the complaint of the Solicitor General,
the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955
only.  The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in
1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a
witness of the complaint (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.);
respondent’s letter to the complainant dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent’s own testimony (pp. 249 &
255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent’s plea for sexual intercourse
because of respondent’s promise of marriage and not because of a desire for
sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.  (Cf. Tanjanco v. Court of
Appeals, G. R. No. L-18630, December
17, 1966)

One of the requirements for all applicants for ad­mission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138) If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon
the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege.  (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No.
376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567) When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is mot enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of
him.  Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon
Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show
where he was on that date.  In the case
of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303,
Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

“An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to
the State.  If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him.  If he fails to meet the obligation which he
owes to him­self, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that
same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who
by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. 
This is particularly so when he not only de­clines to help himself but
actively conceals from the State the
very means by which it may assist him.”

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the
charges of the complain­ant that the allegations
in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a mem­ber the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of
the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds
for disbar­ment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. 
The inherent powers of the court
over its officers can not be
restricted.  Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him.  (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan., 743;
Balinon v. de Leon, Adm. Case No. 104, January 28,
1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel v. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December
28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627) As a matter of
fact, “grossly immoral con­duct” is now one of the grounds for suspension
or disbarment.  (Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court)

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has
committed a grossly immoral act and has
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his
profession.  Indeed, it is important that
members of this ancient and learned profession of law must con­form themselves
in accordance with the highest standards of morality.  As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics:

“x
x x The lawyer
should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education.  He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of
the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of
justice.”

WHEREFORE, respondent Armando Puno
is hereby dis­barred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.