IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ARMANDO PUNO, RESPONDENT.

Quingwa versus Puno

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment. Flora Quingwa, a former public school teacher, charged Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. She alleged that he took her to a hotel, registered as husband and wife, and had sexual intercourse with her twice on the strength of a promise of marriage that he never kept. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: the grounds for disbarment listed in the Rules of Court are not a closed list, and a lawyer's good moral character is not a ticket punched once at admission but a continuing qualification he must keep proving whenever it is challenged.

Procedural History

The verified complaint was filed directly with the Supreme Court. The Court referred the matter to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. Hearings were held before the Solicitor, where the complainant presented oral and documentary evidence and the respondent testified and cross-examined her witnesses. After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a formal complaint charging the respondent with immorality and asking for his disbarment. The respondent answered, denying the charges. The case was set for hearing before the Supreme Court, but only the Solicitor appeared for the complainant and submitted the case for decision without oral argument; the respondent did not appear. The Court then decided the case on the evidence taken before the Solicitor General, which it held it could consider under the Rules of Court because the respondent had waived his right to present additional evidence by not saying in his answer that he intended to do so.

Facts

Flora Quingwa and Armando Puno were sweethearts. On the first of June, 1958, while they were engaged to be married, the respondent invited her to a movie. On the way he suggested they take refreshment first, and they went instead to the Silver Moon Hotel in Manila. At the restaurant on the first floor he proposed that they go up to a room, assuring her that they were getting married anyway. With reluctance, and moved by her love for him and his promise of marriage, she agreed. He registered and signed the registry book as Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno. The hotel register showed the entry arriving at three in the afternoon and departing at seven in the evening.

Inside the room, someone locked the door from outside. He undressed and pressed himself on her despite her pleas, repeating that he had promised to marry her. She submitted, and two acts of sexual intercourse took place that afternoon. They then left the hotel and went together to a birthday party. Afterwards she repeatedly asked him to make good on his promise, but he refused. She sent him a telegram in August and letters in September and October telling him she was in trouble and pregnant, and she traveled to Zamboanga City in November, where he had gone to practice law, to ask him to marry her. He admitted meeting her there and admitted the telegram and letters in his own letter to her dated the third of November, 1958. On the twentieth of February, 1959, she gave birth to a baby boy.

In his defense, the respondent denied taking her to the hotel, disclaimed the handwriting in the register, and disowned the child. He claimed they had been sweethearts only until November, 1955. The Court found, from the testimony of a witness, from his own letter, and from his own testimony, that they had reconciled and were sweethearts again in 1958. He offered no evidence of where he was on the first of June, 1958.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant through a promise of marriage he refused to fulfill, amounting to grossly immoral conduct.
• Whether or not the grounds for disbarment enumerated in the Rules of Court are exclusive, so that allegations outside the list cannot support disbarment or suspension.
• Whether or not the respondent's bare denial, without evidence of where he was on the date in question, suffices to overcome the evidence against him.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now Section 2 of Rule 138, provides:

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character.

This is the qualification the Court treats as continuing, not spent at admission, so that it may be tested during the whole of the practice of law.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as cited by the Court, makes grossly immoral conduct a ground for disbarment or suspension, which answers the respondent's claim that his acts fall under no listed ground.

The Court also invokes paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

This states the standard of morality the profession exacts from every member.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court was convinced that the facts were as stated in the complaint. The complainant was an educated woman, a public school teacher for years, and her testimony survived a lengthy cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself. The hotel register corroborated the date and the assumed names. The Court held that she submitted to his plea because of his promise of marriage, not out of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. The respondent therefore committed a grossly immoral act and disregarded the fundamental ethics of his profession.

On the second issue, the Court held that the statutory enumeration of grounds is not a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the Court over its officers cannot be restricted. An attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct showing him unfit for the office and unworthy of its privileges. In any event, grossly immoral conduct is itself now a listed ground.

On the third issue, the Court held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator, and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity expected of him. The respondent denied the hotel incident but offered no evidence of where he was on that date. Quoting Justice Moreland in United States versus Tria, the Court said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

Doctrine

First, good moral character under Section 2 of Rule 138 is a continuing qualification. It is a condition precedent to the license, and it is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.

Second, the enumeration of grounds for disbarment or suspension is not exclusive. The Supreme Court's inherent power over its officers cannot be restricted, and gross misconduct showing a lawyer unfit for the office is a removable offense. Grossly immoral conduct is now expressly listed under Section 27 of Rule 138.

Third, a lawyer faced with evidence against him cannot rest on a bare denial. He must meet the issue, overcome the evidence, and show that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity.

Fourth, sexual submission induced by a promise of marriage, and not by mutual passion, is the kind of deception that constitutes gross immorality for a member of the Bar.

Disposition

The Court disbarred Armando Puno and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Remember This

Memorize this line: good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but a continuing qualification during the entire practice of law, and the grounds for disbarment are never a closed list. Examiners use this case on the non-exclusivity of the grounds for disbarment and on the duty of a lawyer to meet the evidence against him rather than hide behind a denial.