MARITIME COMPANY OF THE   PHILIPPINES (MCP); MARINE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MOAP); AND GEN­ERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES’ UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GMSU), PETITIONE…

Because of certain labor disputes between the crew members of the
M/V “Doña Aurora” and M/V “Doña Alicia”, belonging to the Philippine Maritime
Industrial Union, hereinafter referred to as PMIU, on the one hand; and the Maritime Company of the
Philippines, hereinafter re­ferred to as
MCP, operator of the two vessels,
on the other hand, on March 16, 1965, the PMIU served notice to strike
to the MCP.  The next day, March 17, 1965, the crew members of
the “Doña Aurora”, which was then docked at
Kobe, Japan,
struck.  At that time the other vessel,
the “Doña Alicia”, was docked at Cebu City,
but the crew of this vessel did not actually go on strike as did the crew of the “Doña Aurora.” 
On March 25, 1965,
the PMIU filed charges of unfair labor practice against the MCP before the
Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as CIR.  Supplemental
charges of unfair labor practice were
subsequently filed on April 19, 1965 by the PMIU against the MCP.

On May 24, 1965,
the President of the Philippines,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act 875, certified the above-mentioned labor
dispute to the CIR, particularly the strike of the members of the crew of the
“Doña Aurora.”  This certified case was doc­keted in the CIR
as Case No. 60-IPA and was assigned to Judge Ansberto
P. Paredes, one of the respondents in the instant case
now before this Court.

Also on May 24, 1965,
an agreement
was entered into between the MCP and the PMIU denominated as “Memorandum
Agreement for the Return to Manila
of the ‘Doña Aurora.'”  This agreement, which was attested to by Secretary of
Labor Jose B. Lingad and approved by the CIR on May 31, 1965, provides as follows:

“I.  The
strike of the ‘Do164a Aurora’ crew only shall be certified to the CIR by the
President.

“II.  ‘Doña Aurora’
vessel shall be sailed back to Manila
by its striking crew.

“III.  The
return to work order issued by the CIR in the certified case of the ‘Doña Aurora’ crew shall decide the terms and condi­tions
thereof; provided that

“The strikers shall continue to serve in the ‘Doña Aurora’, without prejudice to whatever may be ordered
by the Court in its return to work order in the certification case.  No dismissal or lay-off shall be made by
management during the pendency of the aforesaid
certified case.

“The disputed cost of living al­lowance of P40.00 per month
and the claim for overtime payment from the transfer of the ‘Doña Aurora’ vessel
to the Maritime Company until the signing of this Agreement, shall be deposited upon the arrival of the ‘Doña Aurora’ in Manila with the Dept. of Labor, subject to the de­cision of the CIR on the question of
whether or not the strikers are entitled thereto.

“IV.  The
salaries of the crew of the ‘Doña Aurora’ from March
17, to the date of this Agreement shall be delivered to the R.P. Consul-General
or the Secretary of La­bor Jose Lingad in Japan, but
this shall be without prejudice to the decision of the CIR in the certified case of the
‘Doña Au­rora’ on the question of whether or not said
crew are entitled to said payment.

“V.  This Agreement shall be
without pre­judice to the raising by any interested party of any proper
question in the certified case of the ‘Doña Aurora’,
like the illegality of the strike and the unfair labor practices and any right
of other unions affected by the cer­tified case under their existing
contracts.”

On June 10, 1965, the
PMIU, in its behalf, and in representation of the crew of the “Doña Aurora”, filed a verified petition in
CIR Case No. 60-IPA, which was captioned “CREW MEMBERS, DOÑA AURORA, PHILIPPINE MARITIME INDUSTRIAL UNION
(PMIU), Petitioners, versus MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(MCP), Respondent”,
alleging, among other things, that the PMIU filed a notice to strike for the
crews of both the “Doña Aurora” and “Doña Alicia” on March 16, 1965; that on March 17,
1965, the crew mem­bers of the “Doña
Aurora” struck; and that charges of un­fair labor practice against the MCP
were filed by the PMIU on March 25, 1965 and were supplemented on April 18,
1965.  The petitioner prayed, among
others, that the strike of the members of the crew of the “Doña Aurora” be declared legal.  The MCP filed its answer alleging that the
strike staged and conducted by the members of the PMIU on board the “Doña Aurora” while it was in Kobe, Japan, was ille­gal,
malicious, tortious and unlawful.  On June 21, 1965, the Marine Officers’ Association
of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as MOAP, and the General Maritime Ste­vedore’ Union of the Philippines, hereafter referred
to as GMSU, as intervenors,
filed their respective answer to the verified petition of the PMIU, likewise
alleging that the strike staged by the members of the PMIU was illegal.

The CIR Case No. 60-IPA was set for hearing on June 10 and 11,
1965, and was assigned to a Commissioner of the Court who tried to conciliate
the differences among the parties.  In
the meantime, by reason of super­vening incidents, the PMIU filed three
motions, as fol­lows:

(1) Motion, dated June 17, 1965, entitled “Advice and
Motion”, wherein PMIU manifested to the court that the “Doña Aurora” had already arrived in Manila, was
unloading her cargo and was ready to resume her sailing schedule; that
replacement of some members of the crew was necessary; that because the
prerogative of making the necessary replacement was vested in the PMIU, it was
ad­vising the court of the proposed replacements.  The PMIU prayed that during the pendency of the case it be author­ized to effect the
proposed replacements and changes of the crew members.

(2) Motion, dated June 17, 1965 entitled “Motion to Require
Respondent to Pay Members of Petitioner Union Unpaid Salaries and Other Monies
Due Without Delay”, wherein PMIU alleged that the MCP violated the
“Memoran­dum Agreement” by not paying the 50% of the salaries of the crew of the “Doña Aurora” from March 17 to May 24, 1965; that the
crew was not paid the salary correspond­ing to March 16, 1965 although they
worked on that day; that 50% of the salaries due to the crews’ families cor­responding
to the period from May 26 to May 31, 1965 had not been paid; that the 50% due
to the families of “Doña Aurora” and “Doña Alicia” crews for the periods Feb­ruary 16 to
February 28 and March 1 to March 15, 1965 had not been paid; that the MCP was
not willing to pay the salaries due to the crew of the “Doña Aurora” from June 1, 1965 to June 15; and prayed
the Court to order the MCP to pay said monies.

As the two above-cited motions dated June 17, 1965 involved issues of fact, the
incidents were set for hear­ing before the Commissioner on June 22, 1965, but the hearing was later
suspended.

(3) Motion, dated June 22, L965,
wherein PMIU al­leged that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 21, 1965, a group of around 35 men, some armed
with pistols, boarded the “Doña Aurora” as
a “cleaning gang”; that the PMIU crew members, coming from home visits to their families,
were not allowed to board the vessel, and that the vessel left for Cebu at about 2:00 p.m. on June 22, 1965, leav­ing behind in Manila a considerable
number of the PMIU crew, and that the sailing of the “Doña Aurora” enlist­ing
a new set of crew was a
violation of the Memorandum Agreement. 
The motion prayed that the CIR orders the MCP and intervening MOAP and GMSU to bring back the “Doña Au­rora”
to Manila and to disembark the “cleaning gang”; that the MCP, MOAP and GMSU be restrained from
doing any act designed to take the vessel
without the petitioning PMIU crew, or any act forcing petitioning PMIU
crew to dis­embark against their will, or preventing them from having access to
the vessel during the pendency of the case; and that the officials of the MCP,
GMSU, and MOAP be cited for contempt of the court’s order dated May 31, 1965,
approving the Memorandum Agreement.

It is to be noted
that before the filing of the mo­tion of June 22, 1965, respondent Judge issued an order, dated June 22, 1965, enjoining the parties,
under pain of contempt, to maintain the status quo, that is,
“the crew members of the M/V Doña Aurora before
the strike, should not be disembarked without previous Court approval.”

Respondent Judge heard the motions filed by the PMIU while the MCP, MOAP and GMSU
urged the respondent Judge to proceed with the hearing of the issue of the
legality or illegality of the strike. 
While respondent Judge was hearing the motion for injunction dated June 22, 1965, the PMIU filed additional motions, as follows:

(4) Motion, dated June 29, 1965, entitled “Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings’ Re Motion to Require
Respondents to Pay Monies Due to Petitioners”, which mo­tion was denied.

(5) Motion, dated July 3,
1965, entitled “Motion to Order Respondent to Return Doña Aurora to Manila Pend­ing Injunction Incident” in
order that the crew members might withdraw their personal belongings left on
board.

(6) Motion, dated July 3,
1965, entitled “Motion to Cite for Contempt of Court” the
officials of the MCP, GMSU and MOAP for
various violations of the orders dated May
31, 1965 and June 22, 1965.

(7) Pleading, dated July 6, 1965, entitled “Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation Re Goings on Aboard Doña
Aurora at Cebu” wherein PMIU manifested to the
CIR that some regular crew members of the “Doña
Aurora” were or­dered by the Captain to disembark at Cebu;
that other crew members were under severe pressure, threat and constant fear of
harassment, and were being asked to disaffiliate
from the PMIU.  PMIU thereby
reiterated its prayer for an order enjoining the MCP and the inter­vening
unions from disembarking crew members against their will, and prayed further that the MCP, MOAP and GMSU be cited for
contempt.

(8) Motion, dated July 8, 1965, entitled “Supple­mental
Motion Requiring Respondent to
Desist from Acts of Discrimination, Acts of Vexation, Prejudice Against Petitioners,” alleging that the
MCP, MOAP and GMSU were doing acts designed
to compel the PMIU crew members to disembark from the “Doña Aurora” and to destroy the union in the two Doña vessels (Aurora and Alicia) as an exclu­sive
independent appropriate bargaining unit.

While the foregoing motions were being heard by the CIR, the MCP, MOAP and GMSU filed on
July 9, 1965 an ur­gent motion entitled “Urgent Motion to Suspend Hearings
on All Motions Filed by
Petitioners Subsequent to its ‘Petition’ Filed on June 10, 1965, and for this
Honorable Court to Proceed with the Hearing of the Legality or Il­legality of
the Strike Conducted and Staged by Members of Petitioner Squarely Presented by
the Pleadings of All the Parties in the
Case.”  The PMIU filed its
opposition to said motion, and the movants
their reply.  Respondent Judge, in his order dated July 19,
1965, denied, for rea­sons stated therein, the urgent motion, and resolved to
continue or proceed to hear and resolve the motions dated June 22, 1965 and
June 17, 1965; the pleading “Advice and Motion”, dated June 17, 1965;
the motions of June 29, 1965 and July 3, 1965 “and such other motions that
are pending before the Court where the right to return to work is not in
issue.”

Upon receipt of said order of July 19, 1965, the MCP, MOAP and GMSU filed a motion,
dated July 23, 1965,
praying the CIR that the hearing
on the motions of the PMIU be held
in abeyance because they would file a mo­tion for reconsideration of said
order.  The motion was denied and the
respondent Judge proceeded with the hear­ings of the motions as scheduled,
pursuant to a prior admonition that he would proceed with the hearing unless
restrained by a higher court.  The MCP,
MOAP and GMSU then jointly filed, on July 23,
1965, a verified motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 19, 1965 addressed to the CIR en
banc.

Without awaiting the
resolution of the CIR en banc of their motion for reconsideration
of the order of res­pondent
Judge Ansberto P. Paredes
dated July 19, 1965, the MPC, MOAP and
GMSU filed before this Court on July 31, 1965 a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, naming as respondents the
Hon. Judge Ansberto P. Paredes
of the CIR and the PMIU, and praying: 
(1) that the order of respondent Judge of July 19, 1965 in CIR Case No.
60-IPA be declared il­legal, null and void; (2) that the respondent Judge, or
any other Judge of the CIR to whom the CIR Case No. 60-IPA and its
incidents may be assigned, be ordered to im­mediately proceed to hear the issue
of legality or il­legality of the strike squarely presented by the plead­ings
of the parties in said case and to suspend further hearings on all remaining
motions filed by the respond­ent PMIU etc.; and (3) that upon the filing of
a bond to be fixed by this Court an
order issue enjoining respond­ent Judge Ansberto P. Paredes, or any Judge of the CIR to whom Case No. 60-IPA and its incidents may be assigned, from
enforcing his order of July 19, 1965 and from pro­ceeding further with the
hearing of the remaining motions of
respondent PMIU pending before the Court presided by said respondent
Judge as well as other motions that res­pondent PMIU may later file which are
not relevant to the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike.

This Court, upon the petitioners’ filing of a bond of P10,000.00, issued the preliminary injunction prayed for.

The issues raised by the parties in the present case boil down to
the following:

1.  Is the instant petition
premature?

2.  Did the respondent Judge
commit a grave abuse of discretion, or had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, in denying petition­ers’ motion to give priority to the hearing
and resolution of the issue regarding the legality or illegality of the strike
in CIR Case No. 60-IPA over the motions presented by the res­pondents in said
case?

1.  Respondents contend that
the present petition is premature because there is as yet no decision which may
be reviewed by this Court.  It is the
stand of res­pondents that what can be appealed to this Court is not the
decision of any judge of the CIR but the decision of the Court en banc
as ruled in Broce et al. v. Democratic Labor
Association, et al., G. R. No. L-12367, October 28, 1959.

Respondents further aver that the impression creat­ed by the
petitioners in their petition is that at the time of the filing of their
petition before this Court there was no quorum among the Judges of the CIR and
that there would be a long delay if the resolution of the Court en banc
had to be awaited, when the truth is that at the time of the filing of the
petition, there was already a quorum. 
The respondents point to the certification made by the Acting Clerk of
Court of the CIR to the ef­fect that “as of July 26, 1964, the court en banc has a
quorum.” (p. 96, Record)

Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that their petition is
not an appeal by certiorari but an original special
action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under the
provisions of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, hence, the
case of Broce, et al. v. Democratic Labor
Association, et al., supra, relied upon by respondents, is inapplicable.

We
find merit in the contention of respondents.  Under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court the writ of certiorari lies if the following requisites are present:  (1) that it is directed against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions; (2) that such tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of
discretion, and (3) that there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

We find that these three requisites are not present in the
instant case.  The presence of the first
requisite cannot be gainsaid – the CIR being a tribunal exercising judicial
functions.  As to the second requisite,
it is not disputed that the CIR has jurisdiction over the labor dispute in
question, the same having been certified by the President as affecting an
industry indispensable to the national interest (Section 10, Republic Act
875).  Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the res­pondent Judge committed an error in denying the motion
to give preference to the hearing and resolution of the issue of the legality
of the strike, said error is not an error of jurisdiction which may be reviewed
in cer­tiorari proceedings (Henderson v. Tan, G.R. No. L-3223, October 10, 1950).  Said error would be at most one of judgment
or of procedure.  But errors of judgment
or of procedure, not relating to the court’s jurisdiction or amounting to grave
abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certio­rari
(Bimeda v. Perez, et al., G.R. No. L-5588, August 26, 1953).  This Court has also held that where the issue
or question involved affects the wisdom or soundness of the deci­sion, not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision or its validity, the same is
beyond the pro­vince of the special civil action for certiorari (Philip­pine
Surety and Insurance Co. v. Jacala, et al., G.R. No. L-12766,
May 25, 1960).  Error of judgment can be reviewed only by
appeal (Paringit v. Masakayan,
G.R. No. L-16578, July 31, 1961;
De los Santos v. Mapa, 46 Phil., 398; Castro v. Peña, 80 Phil., 488).  As to whether the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion, the question will be discussed later.

The third requisite, i.e. the absence of appeal or any speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, cannot be said to be present in
the instant case.  Petitioners claim in
their petition that they filed be­fore the CIR on July 23, 1965 a motion for reconsidera­tion of the
questioned order of July 19, 1965.  The pre­sent petition was filed before this
Court on July 31, 1965,
although it is dated July 28, 1965.  It is during the pendency
of their motion for reconsideration before the CIR, therefore, that the instant
petition was filed.  It is an admitted
fact that the motion for reconsidera­tion was not resolved before the instant
petition was filed.  It has been held by
this Court in Mayol v. Blanco, 61 Phil., 547, that if
there is an appeal or other ade­quate remedy, like a motion for reconsideration
which is still pending in the court below, the writ shall be de­nied.  In Plaza, et al. v. Mencias, G. R. No. L-18253, October 31, 1962, this Court had occasion to state that:

“One of the grounds raised by the res­pondents against the present petition for cer­tiorari is that
it has been prematurely filed.  We find
this objection to be well taken.  The
rule is that before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all remedies
available in that court must first be exhausted.  In the case at bar the petitioners filed a
petition without waiting for a resolution of the court on the motion for
reconsidera­tion, which could have been favorable to the petitioners.  The rule also provides that actions for
certiorari may only be brought in case
there is no adequate re­medy available to the petitioner in the court below and
against which the peti­tion for certiorari is filed.  In the case at bar the adequate remedy was
the motion for reconsideration and the resolution thereon, which was expected
to be a more speedy remedy than the present petition for Certiorari.”

Petitioners’ claim that there is no speedy remedy because there
was lack of quorum of the judges of the CIR to rule on the motion for
reconsideration cannot be given credit in the face of the allegation of respond­ent
Judge, in his answer, that there was such a quorum and the certification of the
Acting Clerk of Court of the CIR that
there was such a quorum as of
July 26, 1964.

2.  Regarding the second
issue, We find that res­pondent Judge did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion, or had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, when he denied petitioners’ motion to give
priority to the hearing and resolution of the issue regarding the legal­ity or
illegality of the strike.

In proceeding to hear or investigate any matter be­fore it, the
CIR is conferred
discretion in procedural matters (Section 7, Com. Act 103, as amended).  Procedure is the means whereby the court
reaches out to restore rights and remedy wrongs, and includes every step which
may be taken from the beginning to the end of a case (72 C.J. S., p. 473).  The court may, subject to the requirement of
due process, give all such directions and orders as it may deem necessary or expedient in
the determination of the dispute before it. 
It may refrain from hearing the dispute or part thereof, or dismiss any
matter or part of any matter, where further proceedings are not neces­sary or
desirable.  Certainly, it may also defer
the hear­ing of any motion or hear one motion in preference to others, when in
its judgment such is necessary to set­tle an industrial dispute which disrupts
industrial peace and economic order of the country.  This discre­tion granted by law is not to be
interfered with unless it is gravely abused.

It cannot be said in the instant case that the res­pondent Judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion when he issued the questioned order of July 19, 1965.  Grave abuse of discretion, which is also a
requirement in or­der that the instant petition for certiorari may pros­per,
“implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 38 0.G., 830), or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbi­trary or despotic manner by reason of passion or person­al
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law” (Alafriz v. Nable, et al., 72 Phil., 278).

The respondent ‘Judge’s order is not claimed to have been
motivated by passion and personal hostility. 
It is not despotic or arbitrary. 
It was prompted by justifiable grounds. A perusal of the questioned
order is sufficient to show its
basis.  In a paragraph of the
order the respondent Judge says:

“However, there are some issues brought out of the hearings
thus far held which should be first resolved before the Court is ready for the
reception of evidence and resolution of the strike illegality issue x x x.”

And those issues were (1) the disagreement as to the im­port or interpretation
of the Memorandum Agreement, whe­ther it was only for the return of the “Doña Aurora” or a return to work agreement ending the
strike; (2) the payment of the “salaries to the crew of the Doña Aurora from March 17 to the date of this Agreement x x x” and enforcement of the items agreed upon in
the Agreement like the deposit upon arrival of the disputed cost of living
allowance of P40.00 per month, and the claim for overtime pay from the transfer
of the “Doña Aurora” to the Maritime
Company until the signing of the Agreement. 
And the order continued:

“It is clear
then that from all these facts, the strike illegality issue should first be
relegated to the background and the enforcement of the items agreed upon by the
parties in that Agreement should first be decided one way or the other,
especially where the items would appear to be clear and non-compliance
therewith would manifestly work undue hardship to labor.”

The reason given by the Court gains added weight when it is considered that the condition
provided in the agreement of the raising of the issue of legality or il­legality
of the strike did not affect the effectivity of the
other terms and conditions laid down in said Memo­randum Agreement.  This same reason explodes the con­tention of
the petitioners herein that all the issues raised in the motions of respondents
depend upon the is­sue of the
legality or illegality of the strike.

The respondent PMIU did not file those motions for delay but for
the protection of the immediate rights af­fecting the status of the employees
and their wages -matters that are vital
to their livelihood and to the livelihood of their dependents.

Neither can it be said that the respondent Judge is guilty of positive evasion of duty in not giving pre­ference to the issue of the legality of the
strike.  The case of Philippine Can Co. v. CIR, et al., G.
R. No. L-3021,
July 31, 1950, relied
upon by petitioners is not applicable to the case at bar, as can be seen in the
facts and ruling in said case.

The facts in that case are: 
On March 14, 1949, a
number of laborers belonging to the Liberal Labor Union and working in the can
factory of Philippine Can Company, staged a strike and established a picket line around the company’s
compound.  According to the company, the
strikers and picketers used threat and intimidation to prevent the other
laborers from continuing to work.  The
same morning the company posted notices at the gate of the company com­pound
notifying the strikers that those who would not ret­urn to work at one o’clock in tie afternoon would be dis­missed;
in fact those who did not return to work were de­clared dismissed and dropped
from the payroll.  Five days later, i.e.
on March 19, 1949, the Liberal Labor Union filed a petition with the CIR alleging that from February 26, 1949,
the Philippine Can Company had reduced the wages of seven laborers and that after the correspond­ing negotiations had
failed the strike was declared, and prayed the CIR to order, after due hearing,
the Philippine Can Company to restore the former rate of wages and to refund
all deductions made in their sala­ries.  In its answer,
the company denied the reduction of the wages, and alleged that the strike was illegal
and unjustified; that in spite of the notice to the strikers to report to duty,
they did not, so they were discharged; and that the company had been steadily
losing in its business and that in view of the great financial loses, the
laying-off of laborers not necessary in the operation of the can factory had
become imperative to save the
company from bankruptcy.  The company
prayed that the petition of the labor union be denied, and that the court order
the lay-off of the laborers not necessary in the operation of the factory by
confirming the discharge from the service
of the strikers who did not return to work.  On the second day of the hearing, counsel for
the labor union asked that the strikers be ordered back to work.  The attorney for the can company vigorously
objected to this request, saying that the illegality of the strike had been
raised squarely in issue before
the court and consequently, it would be highly unfair to compel the can company
to readmit the strikers without first deciding whether or not said strike was
legal and whether or not the dismissal of the strikers was proper.  The same day, April 8, 1949, Judge Jose S. Bautista of the CIR issued an
order directing the laborers of the labor union to immediately return to work
and the can company to admit them under the same conditions which prevailed
before the conflict arose.  A motion for
reconsideration filed by the can company was denied by a resolution of three
judges of the CIR.  The Philippine Can
Company filed a petition for
certiorari.  The Supreme court held:

“We hold that
where an employer claims that the strike of some of its laborers was illegal and so it has dismissed
said labor­ers for refusing to return to work, and raises such illegality
squarely in issue in a case pending before the Court of In­dustrial
Relations, and further asserts that because of the loss in its business,
it does not presently need the services of said strikers nor of substitutes to
take their places in the employer’s factory, the Court of Industrial Relations
instead of ordering the strikers back to work, should first determine
whether or not the strike was legal and whether or not the strikers had been
properly and law­fully discharged, and for this purpose the lower court should
give priority to the hearing and determination of the case, so as to avoid
committing any possible injustice to the employer.  This, espe­cially in a case where like the
present, as we understand it, only a portion of the workers had gone on strike
thereby not unduly interrupting, much less, paralyzing the work and production
of the Company, which production by the way, does not, because of its nature, involve
public interest.”  (Emphasis
supplied)

We find that between the Philippine Can Company case and the case
at bar there is only one significant similarity, and it is that the question of
the legality or illegality of the strike had been raised squarely in issue
before the Court.  There are, however,
many significant and material differences, namely:  (1) the in­stant case involves public interest; the Philippine Can case did not; (2) the
strikers here have not been for­mally dismissed, or at least it was not so
alleged in the pleadings; the strikers in the Philippine Can case were
dismissed by the employer; (3) there is a Memo­randum Agreement in this case for the strikers to con­tinue
serving in the “Doña Aurora”, and the
strikers pursuant to the agreement did return to work; in die Philippine Can
case there was no such agreement; (4) in the instant case, the PMC does not allege that it was losing and could not
afford to readmit dismissed employees, or that it did not need any more the
service of the crew four the “Doña Aurora”;
in the Philippine Can case the company complained of tremendous losses and did not need the services of the dismissed
employees back.  The incurring by the can company of business losses was the injury
that the Supreme Court sought to remedy when it decided that the issue of the legality of the strike be heard
first; and (5) the most significant difference lies in the fact that in the
Philippine Can case, the CIR
ordered the strikers to return to work before de­ciding the legality of the
strike; in the case at bar, the strikers had already returned to work by virtue
of the Memorandum Agreement executed by the parties and confirmed by the
Court.  Assuming that the crew members
had been disembarked, the hearing of the motions of respondent would not lead
to a return to work order be­fore
the legality of the strike is settled because the questioned order expressly
stated that the court will proceed to hear “such other motions where
the right to return to work is not in issue.” We, therefore, hold that
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the Philip­pine Can case is not
controlling in the present case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition should be,
as it is hereby, dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
the present case on Au­gust 5, 1965
is dissolved, with costs to the petitioners.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.