MARITIME COMPANY OF THE   PHILIPPINES (MCP); MARINE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (MOAP); AND GEN­ERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES’ UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GMSU), PETITIONE…

Maritime Company of the Philippines versus Philippine Maritime Industrial Union

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a preliminary injunction, brought before the Supreme Court by the Maritime Company of the Philippines, the Marine Officers' Association of the Philippines, and the General Maritime Stevedores' Union of the Philippines against Judge Ansberto P. Paredes of the Court of Industrial Relations and the Philippine Maritime Industrial Union. The petitioners ask the Court to annul the judge's order of July 19, 1965, which declined to give priority to the hearing of the legality of the strike and instead set for hearing the union's motions touching wages and the enforcement of a memorandum agreement. The case matters because it fixes the boundaries of certiorari against the Court of Industrial Relations: it teaches when a petition is premature for failure to await the resolution of a motion for reconsideration, and it defines grave abuse of discretion in the matter of the order in which a labor tribunal hears the incidents of a certified dispute.

Procedural History

Labor disputes arose between the crew members of the vessels Doña Aurora and Doña Alicia, belonging to the Philippine Maritime Industrial Union, and the Maritime Company of the Philippines as operator. The union served notice to strike, the crew of the Doña Aurora struck while the vessel was docked in Kobe, Japan, and the union later filed charges of unfair labor practice before the Court of Industrial Relations, supplemented thereafter. The President certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations, and the case was docketed and assigned to Judge Ansberto P. Paredes. A memorandum agreement for the return of the Doña Aurora to Manila was entered into, attested to by the Secretary of Labor and approved by the Court of Industrial Relations. The union then filed a verified petition praying that the strike be declared legal, to which the company answered that the strike was illegal, and the Marine Officers' Association and the General Maritime Stevedores' Union intervened, likewise alleging illegality. While the case was pending, the union filed a series of motions concerning replacements of crew, unpaid salaries and other monies, the return of the vessel to Manila, and contempt. The company and the intervening unions moved that the hearing of the legality of the strike be given priority. The respondent judge denied that motion in his order of July 19, 1965 and resolved to proceed with the union's motions. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Industrial Relations en banc, and without awaiting its resolution filed this petition before the Supreme Court, which issued a preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond.

Facts

On March 16, 1965, the Philippine Maritime Industrial Union served notice to strike on the Maritime Company of the Philippines. The next day, March 17, 1965, the crew members of the Doña Aurora, then docked at Kobe, Japan, struck. The Doña Alicia was then docked at Cebu City, but its crew did not actually go on strike. On March 25, 1965, the union filed charges of unfair labor practice against the company before the Court of Industrial Relations, and supplemental charges followed on April 19, 1965.

On May 24, 1965, the President certified the labor dispute, particularly the strike of the crew of the Doña Aurora, to the Court of Industrial Relations. On the same day, the company and the union entered into a memorandum agreement for the return of the Doña Aurora to Manila, attested to by Secretary of Labor Jose B. Lingad and approved by the Court on May 31, 1965. The agreement provided that the vessel would be sailed back to Manila by its striking crew, that the strikers would continue to serve without prejudice to the return to work order, that no dismissal or lay-off would be made during the pendency of the certified case, that the disputed cost of living allowance of 40 pesos per month and the claim for overtime payment would be deposited with the Department of Labor subject to the decision of the Court, and that the agreement was without prejudice to the raising of any proper question, such as the illegality of the strike and the unfair labor practices.

On June 10, 1965, the union filed a verified petition in the certified case praying that the strike be declared legal. The company answered that the strike was illegal, malicious, tortious, and unlawful, and the two intervening unions likewise alleged illegality. While the case was pending, the union filed several motions, including a motion concerning proposed replacements of crew, a motion to require the company to pay unpaid salaries and other monies due, and a motion complaining that a group of men had boarded the vessel as a cleaning gang and that the vessel had sailed for Cebu leaving behind a considerable number of the union's crew. The respondent judge had earlier ordered the parties to maintain the status quo, that the crew members of the Doña Aurora before the strike should not be disembarked without previous court approval. The company and the intervening unions repeatedly urged the judge to proceed with the hearing of the issue of the legality of the strike, and when he refused, they filed this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is premature, the petitioners having filed it while their motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, in denying the motion to give priority to the hearing and resolution of the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike over the motions filed by the union.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, provides:

The writ of certiorari lies if the following requisites are present: (1) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and (3) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This governs whether the special civil action may prosper at all, and the Court finds the third requisite wanting.

Section 7 of Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, as cited in the decision, provides:

In proceeding to hear or investigate any matter before it, the Court of Industrial Relations is conferred discretion in procedural matters.

This is the source of the discretion whose exercise the petitioners ask the Court to review.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is premature. The Court found that the three requisites for certiorari were not present. The first was satisfied, the Court of Industrial Relations being a tribunal exercising judicial functions. As to the second, the Court held that even assuming the respondent judge erred in denying the motion for preference, such error was not an error of jurisdiction but at most one of judgment or procedure, and errors of judgment or procedure are reviewable only by appeal. As to the third, the Court held that the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was not present, because the petitioners filed this petition while their motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

The rule is that before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all remedies available in that court must first be exhausted.

The petitioners' claim of lack of quorum was rejected in the face of the certification of the Acting Clerk of Court that there was a quorum.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court held that in proceeding to hear or investigate any matter before it, the Court of Industrial Relations is conferred discretion in procedural matters, and that it may defer the hearing of any motion or hear one motion in preference to others when in its judgment such is necessary to settle an industrial dispute. The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The Court found the order was not motivated by passion or personal hostility, was not despotic or arbitrary, and was prompted by justifiable grounds, namely the need first to resolve the disagreement over the interpretation of the memorandum agreement and the enforcement of the items agreed upon, especially where non-compliance would work undue hardship to labor. The union's motions, the Court said, were filed not for delay but for the protection of immediate rights affecting the status of the employees and their wages.

Doctrine

First, a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the concurrence of three requisites: that it be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions; that such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Second, the petitioner must first exhaust the remedies available in the lower court; a petition filed while a motion for reconsideration is still pending is premature and must be denied. Third, an error of judgment or procedure, not relating to jurisdiction and not amounting to grave abuse of discretion, is not reviewable by certiorari but only by appeal. Fourth, grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. Fifth, the Court of Industrial Relations is conferred discretion in procedural matters, and that discretion is not to be interfered with unless gravely abused.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved, the petitioners having failed to show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Remember This

Memorize the rule that a petition for certiorari filed while a motion for reconsideration is still pending in the lower court is premature, for all remedies available in that court must first be exhausted. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of certiorari under Rule 65 and the definition of grave abuse of discretion in the procedural orders of a labor tribunal.