A. V. H. & COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER, MARIANO B. ALUMNO, SHERIFF OF MANILA AND SHERIFF OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissing the petition for prohibition in this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.

It appears that on October 23, 1958, respondent Mariano B. Alumno
filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a notice of
injury or sickness and claim for compensation against petitioner A. V.
H. & Company of the Philippines, hereafter referred to as the
Company, for injuries sustained by him in the right hand while working
as laborer of said Company, in the performance of his duties as such.
In due course, the Administrator of said Regional Office rendered an
award, on March 12,1958, declaring Alumno entitled to P206.91 as
compensation for said injuries. On petition for reconsideration filed
by the Company, said award was, on May 27, 1959, reduced to P161.31.
Another motion filed by the Company for the reconsideration of the
amended award did not merit favorable action of said Administrator,
who, on June 25, 1959, forward the pertinent record to the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. On June 22, 1960, an Associate Commissioner
thereof rendered a decision ordering the Company to pay P849.09 to
Alumno, plus P14.00 as fees of the Commission. No appeal was taken from
this decision. On August 18, 1960, the Commission issued a writ of
execution directing the sheriff of Manila to seize personal effects of
the Company in the amount necessary to satisfy the sum adjudged in said
decision. On September 8,1960; the Commission issued another writ to
the same effect addressed to the Sheriff of Pasay City.

Thereupon, or on September 13, 1960, the Company filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila the present action for prohibition
against the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, said Mariano B.
Alumno, and the Sheriffs of Manila and Pasay City, with the prayer that
said decision of June 22, 1960 and the aforementioned writs of
execution be set aside as null and void, because Act No. 3428 is
unconstitutional, insofar as it authorizes the rendition of decisions
by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, thereby delegating judicial
powers to an administrative, agency which is part of the executive
department, and because only courts of justice may issue writs of
execution. The Company prayed, also, that pending final determination
of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction restraining said Sheriffs
from complying with the aforementioned write of execution be issued.

Thereupon, said court issued an order giving due course to the
petition for prohibition and setting a date for the hearing of the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. At said hearing
respondents filed their respective motions to dismiss the case and
prayed that said motions be also considered as motions for
reconsideration of the order of September 13, 1960 giving due course to
the petition for prohibition. Consequently, or on September 23, 1960,
said court issued tile order appealed from, holding that the petition
for prohibition is insufficient in substance and in form to warrant the
relief therein prayed for inasmuch as the Company had neither appealed
from the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, nor called
its attention to its alleged lack either of jurisdiction to render the
aforementioned decision, or of authority to issue said writs of
execution. Hence, this appeal by the Company.

In the petition filed by the Company with this Court, praying that
its “appeal by certiorari” be given due course, it, likewise, prayed
for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Sheriffs of Manila
and Pasay City from complying with the writs of execution sought to be
annulled. Upon the posting of a P2,000 bond, we issued said writ of
preliminary injunction.

The Company maintains in this Court: (1) that Act No. 3428, as
amended, is invalid insofar as it authorizes respondent Commissioner to
render an enforceable decision awarding money claims; (2) that
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, in relation to Republic Act No. 997, is
invalid; and (3) that respondent Commissioner has acted in excess of
and/or without jurisdiction in issuing the writs of execution
complained of.

Contrary to appellant’s pretense, the Workmen’s Compensation Act
does not authorize the Workmen’s-Compensation Commission to render an,
“enforceable” decision, if by “enforceable” appellant means that a writ
of execution based upon said decision may be issued. Pursuant to said
Act, if the employer adversely affected by said decision does not
comply with it, despite his failure to appeal therefrom or to seek a
review thereof , a certified copy of said decision shall be filed with
the proper court of first instance, “whereupon” the latter “shall
render a decree or judgment in accordance therewith”, which decree or
judgment shall have the same effect as though it had been rendered in a
suit duly heard and tried by the court (Sec. 51, Act No. 3428). It is,
therefore, this decree or judgment of said court of first instance, not
the decision of the Commission, that may be enforced by writ of
execution.

Upon the other hand, we have already held that so much of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A as authorizes the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission to issue writs of execution is unconstitutional (Everlasting
Pictures Inc. vs. Fuentes, L-16512, November 29, 1961; Pastoral vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 112 Phil., 742). Hence, the writs of
execution issued by the Commission in this case are null and void.

It is true that, as stated in the order appealed from, the Company
had failed to comply with the established procedural requirements for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition, but, in view of the patent
nullity of the writs of execution complained of, we cannot sanction the
enforcement thereof, although indirectly, by dismissing the case on
purely procedural grounds.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, the writs of
execution in question are declared null and void and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby made permanent,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur,