PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FELIPE ABUY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On April 1, 1959, Felipe Abuy was charged in the Municipal Court of
Zamboanga City with the crime of “trespass to dwelling” (Crim. Case No.
6751), in an information which reads:

“That on or about February 21, 1959, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter
the dwelling of Ruperto Carpio without his knowledge or consent.

“Contrary to law.”

On arraignment, the accused Abuy pleaded not guilty, and the case
was thereafter tried. When the case was called for continuation on
trial on November 5, 1959, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of
the case, on the ground that the evidence so far presented by it would,
not sustain the accused’s conviction of said crime charged. The motion
was granted by the court.

Subsequently, on November 13, 1959, the accused Abuy was charged
before the same Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the crime of
“unjust vexation” (Crim. Case No. 7201) under the following information:

“That on February 21, 1969, in the City of
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
said accused with intent to cause vexation upon Nicolasa B. de Magadia;
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously embrace, and
take hold of her wrist, thereby causing vexation upon her person; that
there being present the aggravating circumstance that it was committed
in the dwelling of said Nicolasa B. de Magadia.

“Contrary to law.”

On November 19, 1959, the accused Abuy filed a motion to quash the
above information for “unjust vexation”, on the ground that said
offense ‘”has already prescribed”. To this motion, the prosecution
filed its answer (opposition) on December 23, 1959. On May 14, 1960,
the Court granted said motion to quash, in an order which partly states:

“The record of this case show that on February 21,
1959, on the complaint of complainant Michaela B. de Magadia, the
Prosecuting Officer, Special Counsel Vicente Largo filed an
information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6751, for Trespass to
Dwelling, against the accused Felipe Abuy. This case for Trespass to
Dwelling called for trial when the accused aided by the same counsel
that appeared for him in Criminal Case No. 7201, for Unjust Vexation,
when arraigned pleaded not guilty to the crime of Trespass to Dwelling.
On the day when Criminal Case No. 6751, was called for continuation of
the trial on November 5, 1959, the Prosecuting Officer, Special Counsel
Vicente Largo, moved for the dismissal of the information charging
Felipe Abuy of Trespass to Dwelling, on the alleged ground that the
evidence so far presented by the prosecution would not sustain the
conviction of the accused of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling, which
motion was duly granted by the Court, ordering the acquital of the
accused with costs de officio, ordering further the cancellation of the bail bond filed by the accused for his provisional liberty.

“Subsequent
to the dismissal, rather the acquittal of the accused Felipe Abuy of
the crime of Trespass to Dwelling on motion of the prosecuting officer,
Special Counsel Largo, another information charging the same accused
Felipe Abuy acquitted of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling with the
crime of Unjust Vexation, the present case tc which the motion to
quash, was filed by the defense attorney, en the ground of prescription.

“The
Court, taking into consideration the above findings of facts, together
with the motion to quash filed by the defense attorney and the
opposition filed by lie Special Counsel, the arguments advanced by the
counsels on the motion and opposition to the motion to quash, and the
additional oral arguments, taken by the Court Stenographer at the time
of the formal hearing conducted by this Court on the motion and
opposition to the granting of the motion to quash, believes that the
crime of Unjust Vexation, for which the accused is presently charged
under Criminal Case No. 7201, filed after the said accused based on the
same facts complained by complainant Miehaela de Magadia, for which the
accused Felipe Abuy was charged and wherein he was acquitted on motion
of the prosecuting officer in the first case of Trespass to Dwelling
which after dismissal of the same, the accused is now again charged of
Unjust Vexation “which crime this Court believes had already prescribed
as provided for under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
paragraph 5 of Article 89 and Article 91 of the same Cede and,
therefore, the motion to quash the information filed under Criminal
Case No. 7201, for Unjust Vexation, is hereby granted, ordering the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 7201, with costs de officio.

“So Ordered.”

From this order, the prosecution appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City. On July 30, 1960, said court denied the
appeal, in an order of this tenor:

“ORDER

“The appeal in this case taken by the City
Attorney’s Office being unmeritorious and unfounded, the same is hereby
DENIED and let the records of this case be returned to the court of
origin.

So Ordered.”

Hence, this appeal.

There is no merit in the People’s appeal. There can be no question
that the crime of “unjust vexation” (Art, 287 [2], Revised Penal Code)
is a light offense (Art. 9 [3], id.) and, therefore, prescribes in 2
months (Art. 90[6], id.). Now, the information dated November 13, 1959
charging appellee Abuy with said offense, expressly alleges that he
committed it “on February 21, 1959″ on the person of Nicolasa
(Michaela) B. de Magadia”. According to Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription of an offense “shall commence to run
upon the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agents”. From February 21, 1959 to November
13, 1959 (date of filing of the information) is 6 months and 20 days,
far beyond the 2-month prescriptive period of said offense. In the
circumstances, appellee Abuy correctly moved to quash said information,
and the Municipal Court properly granted the same. The Court of First
Instance, on its part, committed no reversible error in dismissing the
prosecution’s appeal from said quashal by the Municipal Court, for
being “unmeritorious and unfounded”.

The prosecution argues, however, that the offense of “unjust
vexation” had not yet prescribed when it filed the information (Crim.
Case No. 7201) against appellee Abuy, on November 13, 1959, reasoning
thus:

“The acts complained of occurred on February 21,
1969. The information for trespass to dwelling against the accused was
filed on April 1, 1959, 39 days after (p. 1, mun. court folder). The
filing of the information for trespass to dwelling on April 1, 1959
interrupted the running of the two-month prescriptive period (Art. 91,
Rev. Penal Code).

“After the municipal court of the City of
Zamboanga dismissed the case on November 5, 1959 on motion of the
prosecution (p. 17, mun. court folder), it was only then that the
prescriptive period commenced to run again.

“The information
for unjust vexation was received by the municipal court of the City of
Zamboanga on November 18, 1959, 8 days after the dismissal of the
information for trespass to dwelling was handed down by the court.

“Adding
the 39 days which had elapsed prior to the filing of the information
for trespass to dwelling with the 8 days, prior to the filing of the
information for unjust vexation, the aggregate total of 47 days would
still be shy of the 2-month prescriptive period allowed by law for the
latter crime.”

This contention of the prosecution is not in accordance with Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that, “The period of
prescription * * * shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (accused)”.
The “complaint or information” or “such proceedings”
mentioned in the law must be the proper information or complaint
corresponding to the offense committed in order that “such proceedings”
thereunder may interrupt the prescriptive period. Here, the first
information was trespass to dwelling committed against Ruperto Carpio,
the elements of which as described in the information are, the
prosecution expressly admits (see appellant’s brief, page 8), entirely
different from the elements of the other offenses of unjust vexation
against Nicolasa B. de Magadia charged in the second information. There
is nothing in the two informations to show that the two offenses are
related to each other except that they were committed by the same
accused on the same date and within the jurisdiction of the same court.
The one, in fact, is not a bar to the other. Consequently, the filing
of the one does not interrupt the prescriptive period as to the other.

Neither is the other contention of the prosecution tenable—that the
municipal court should not have discharged the accused but should have
committed him to answer to the proper offense, as there appears to have
been a mistake in charging the correct offense. (Sec. 12, Rule 115,
Rules of Court). In the first place, the fiscal moved for the dismissal
of the case, not because of an alleged mistake, but because the
evidence so far presented by him would not sustain the accused’s
conviction of the crime charged in the information. Secondly, even if
the intention was to subsequently charge the accused with unjust
vexation, since the offense has clearly prescribed, it would not be
proper to further commit the accused to answer to the proper charge
where this is no longer available.

Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.