CLEOTILDE LAT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND MARCIAL BANZUELA, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

On February 16, 1958, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
CA-G. R. No. 9490-R, entitled “In re Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Mariano M. Lat. Marcial Banzuela, administrator-appellant vs. Cleotilde
Lat, respondent-appellee”, reversing an order of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, dated October 31,1951, in Special Proceeding No.
3961 thereof and ordering said Cleotilde Lat “to deliver to
administrator-appellant the sum of P4,700, with costs of both instances
against her”, but, “without prejudice to her rights as compulsory heir”
of the deceased Mariano M. Lat.

On July 7, 1958, the administrator of said estate, Marcial Banzuela,
hereinafter referred to as the administrator, filed with the lower
court a motion for the execution of said decision, which had,
meanwhile, became final and executory. CleotILde La hereinafter
referred to as the petitioner—opposed the motion mainly upon the ground
that, before the rendition of the aforementioned decision, or on
September 29, 1957, the heirs of Mariano M. Lat had executed the deed
Elxhibit 1, whereby they agreed “to withdraw the appeal” taken by the
administrator in said case CA-G. R. No. 9490-R. This notwithstanding,
the court of first instance ordered on July 18, 1958, the writ of
execution issued On August 8, 1958, petitioner filed a motion to quash
the same. She, likewise, attached to the motion the affidavit of, among
others, five (5) of the ten (10) persons who had executed said Exhibit
1, stating that they had agreed to drop the case against the petitioner
and that the administrator had, in turn, agreed to withdraw the appeal
in CA-G. R. No. 9490-R. The administrator objected to the motion to quash, alleging that although the heirs of the deceased had met
several times with a view settling their differences, and in one of
their meetings Exhibit 1 was executed “for the purpose of showing the
willingness of everyone to settle” said differences, “no definite
settlement had been reached between the parties”. It would appear,
also, that the administrator had submitted a counter-affidavit of three
(3) of the heirs who had signed Exhibit I. On September 6, 1958, the
lower court issued an order denying said motion to quash, upon the
ground that its duty to issue the writ of execution is ministerial,
once the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and
executory.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in which the case was
docketed as CA-G. B. No. 24269-B. In due course, said appellate court
rendered its decision therein, on August 3, 1960, affirming the orders
appealed from, with costs against petitioner. Hence this appeal by
cer-iorari taken by the latter.

Exhibit 1, upon which she relies reads as follows:

“Agreement
of withdrawal of appeal in the case entitled ‘Mareial Banzuela vs.
Cleotilde Lat’ pending before the Court of Appeals.

WHEREAS,
In the municipality of Tanauan, Batangas, the undersigned heirs of the
deceased Mariano M. Lat and Fernanda Tapia, have assembled in the house
of Dr. Melchor L. Opuleneia to thresh out several causes of family
dissension;

WHEREAS, the undersigned heirs
have agreed among others to withdraw the appeal of the case involving
the recovery of a sum of money, filed by the Administrator of the
Intestate against one of the heirs, Cleotilde Lat;

WHEREAS,
his case has long been tried and decided in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, and is now pending in the Court of Appeals since
May 3, 1952;

Now, Therefore, in view of having entered into
an amicable settlement to foster and strengthen family unity and
solidarity, We, the undersigned hereby agree to withdraw the pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals of the above-mentioned ease, and in
witness whereof, we hereby affix our signatures this 29th day of
September, 1957, in the municipality of Tanauan, Batangas

Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals has erred in
sanctioning the execution of its decision in CA-G. R. No. 9490-R,
because the agreement contained in Exhibit I is a “virtual renunciation
of any interest or participation which the heirs (of Mariano M. Lat)
may have in the * * * sum of P7,400” involved in CA-G. R. No. 9490-R,
and, as a consequence, the decision therein rendered had become “moot, academic and unenforceable” ; because the administrator had made a
“verbal commitment with the heirs of the deceased that he would file in
the Court of Appeals the motion for withdrawal of the appeal in CA-G.
R. No. 9490-R, based upon” said Exhibit 1; and because, although he is
not a party to Exhibit I, the same is, in effect, a compromise
agreement between the heirs of the deceased on the one hand and said
administrator on the other hand.

We find no merit in petitioner’s pretense. Regardless of whether or
not the agreement, Exhibit I, amounts to a renunciation by the heirs
of the deceased of their respective shares in the amount of the
Judgment rendered in CA-G. R. No. 9490-R, the Court of Appeals did not
err in legalizing the execution thereof Mid decision having been
rendered in favor, not of said heirs, but of the administrator of the
estate of Mariano H. Lat, who, admittedly, is not a party to said
agreement. What is more, as such administrator, he could not have
validly renounced his rights under said decision without the approval of
the probate court, as from the fact that the heirs who signed Exhibit I
were not parties in said case, and, hence, had no authority to settle
the same. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to determine whether or
not the administrator had verbally promised to move for the withdrawal
of the appeal in CA-G. R. No. 9490-R, as contended by petitioner, for
even if he had actually made said promise, the same would not bind the
estate of the deceased. In this connection, it may not be amiss to note
the following passage of the decision appealed from:

“Without merit is appellant’s contention that
inasmuch as Mariano M. Lat’s heirs, the signers of exhibit 1, became
the owners of the amount of P7,400.00 upon Mariano’s death, with a
perfect right to renounce their participation in the same amount, their
right should be respected by appellee, who is merely their alter ego.
While it is true according to article 777 of the new Civil Code.” (657
of the old), that the right of succession is transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent, the participation of Mariano M.
3UVs heirs in the amount of P7,400.00 is purely prospective and
contingent depending upon the results of the liquidation of his estate.
The heirs may or may not receive any portion of the said sum, depending
upon the demands of the administration expenses; And appellee as
administrator is not a mere alter ego of the heirs, but is
an officer of the probate court entrusted with the management and
settlement of the estate until, with the court’s approval, he has
distributed and delivered to the heirs their respective shares of the
inheritance; which distribution and delivery should be made only
‘after, not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses
of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax is
effected (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 PhiL 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68
Phil, 228; Jimogaon vs. Belmonte, 84 Phil., 54; 47 Off. Gaz. 1119), and
after, not before, the declaration of the heirs had been made (Castillo
to Bolafios, 62 Phil 641). -Before the completion of the liquidation of
Mariano M. Lat’s estate, his heirs have no right to interfere in its
administration toy appellee.”

Indeed, the records before us do not show the status of the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano H. Lat It would
seem that the net assets available for distribution among the heirs of
the deceased have not as yet been determined. Without prejudice,
therefore, to the right of petitioner herein, if any to claim at the
proper time, the corresponding reimbursement from her co-heirs, based
upon the waiver they have allegedly made by virtue of Exhibit I, on
which we need not and do not express any opinion, we find that the
Court of Appeals did not commit the error complained of.

Wherefore, the decision of said Court is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Cleotide Lat It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur.