REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOI­LA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, MARIANO PANTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS, LEONA LACHICA, ELENO M…

DISSENTING OPINION

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

The Court is called upon to pass upon the Second Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Second Motion for Reconsidera­tion – filed by Ayala
y Cia. and/or Hacienda Calatagan and Alfonso Zobel,
hereinafter referred to collectively as the respondents – of the decision in
the case at bar, promulgated on June 30, 1967, the dispositive
part of which reads:

“Wherefore, said orders dated January 18, Feb­ruary 2 and 8,
and April 13, 1966, should be, as they are hereby, annulled, and respondent
Judge is directed to order the issuance of a writ of execution for the en­forcement
of the decision in question, with costs against respondents herein, except
respondent Judge, Honorable Jaime de los
Angeles.”

The decision therein alluded to is that rendered by Judge Tengco in Civil Case No. 373 of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, as modified by this Court in G.R. No. L-20950,
on May 31, 1965.  The issue in the present action is
simply:  What is the aforesaid decision,
as thus modified?  To answer this
question, we must determine specifically: 
(1) what was the decision of the trial court in said Case No. 373; and
(2) to what extent such decision has been modified by ours in L-20950.

The Decision of
Judge Tengco

The dispositive part of said decision
consists of five (5) paragraphs. 
Paragraph (a) nullifies respondents’ TCT No. T-9550 “and other
subdivision titles” issued in their favor “over the areas outside its
private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots
360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion.” Paragraph
(b) commands the Dizons “to vacate Lot
360 in favor of x x x Tolentino.” Paragraph (c) sentences “all the
defendants to jointly and severally pay x x x Tolentino compen­satory damages
in the sum of P3,000 a year per hectare of Lot 360, from March 11, 1954, until
he is placed in x x x
possession of the said area.” Paragraph (d) restrains “all the
defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over” the four
(4) lots aforementioned.  Paragraph (e)
orders “the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.”

There is no dispute as regards the meaning of paragraphs (a), (b)
and (e).  The issue is focused on
paragraph (c) – although paragraph (d) has likewise, been brought into the
orbit of said issue – inasmuch as respondents maintain:  (1) that the phrase “all the
defendants” should be understood to refer exclusively to the Dizons, and said phrase appears, also, in paragraph (d);
and (2) that, assuming that said phrase includes respondents herein, they
should be deemed, in consequence of our decision in L-20950, exempted from the
payment of the damages mentioned in paragraph (c) and placed beyond the pale of
the injunction contained in para­graph (d).

1.  Meaning
of Paragraph (c)

At the outset, it should be noted that we are called upon, not
to decide whether or not it would be just and fair to hold respondents liable
for damages to Tolentino, but merely to interpret and
apply the aforementioned decision, which has long become final and executory; that the cardinal purpose of all rules of
interpretation and construction is to ascertain the intent of the writer or
framer of the object of interpretation; that, when the language thereof is
plain and unequivocal, there is no room, much less justification, for the
application of said rules, the clear and obvious meaning being con­trolling^[1];
and that “what is controlling” in a decision “is what
appears in the dispositive part”
thereof^[2],
“irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements” in
the body or text of the decision.^[3]

a) Writer’s Opinion

It is clear that respondents were meant to be and are included
in the phrase “all the defendants” used in paragraph (c) of the dis­positive part of Judge Tengco’s
decision, and subject to the liabi­lity therein provided, for:

(1)  
The language of said paragraph is plain, simple
and clear.  The defendants in the main
case being, not only the Dizons but, also, Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel, it follows that “all the defendants”
include Ayala and Zobel.

(2)  
The intent to embrace them within the purview of
para­graph (c) is made more apparent by paragraph (b) of said disposi­tive part which refers to the Dizons
only.^[4]
The phrase “all the defendants” in paragraph (c) – immediately after
the command in paragraph (b) addressed solely to the Dizons
– was evidently used in paragraph (c), by way of contrast, to distinguish
its coverage from that of paragraph (b) and leave no room for doubt that para­graph
(c) applies, not only to the Dizons,
but, also, to respondents herein.

(3)  
This purpose is, further, underscored by the
fact that, in their respective complaints, the Government and Tolentino merely prayed that “the defendants” be
sentenced to pay damages to them, and that the trial court understood said
phrase to encom­pass every one of the defendants, because of which it
sentenced “‘the defendants,” in paragraph (e),1 to pay the costs.  In other words, the trial court prefixed to
the phrase “the defendants” the adjective “all” – which was
not really necessary or indispensable – in order precisely to stress
in paragraph (c) – owing to its proxi­mity to paragraph (b) – the difference
between the defendants men­tioned in paragraph (b) and those alluded to in
paragraph (c).  In short, the word
“all” was purposely and deliberately inserted in paragraph (c) to
forestall any doubt about the inclusion of respon­dents in the liability
therein adjudicated.

(4)  
This intent is made even more manifest by
paragraph (d), “restraining and enjoining all the defendants from
further acts of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363
and 182 of Psd­40891.”2 The phrase “all the
defendants” in this paragraph cannot possibly refer to the Dizons only, who held no more than Lot 360 and were not
performing acts of ownership or possession over Lots 362, 363 and 182.  The injunction, in paragraph (d) insofar as
these three (3) lots are concerned, was addressed, therefore, to respondents
Ayala and Zobel. 
Besides, it is neither logical nor reasonable to assume that the same
phrase – “all the defendants” – meant one thing in paragraph (c), and
quite another thing in para­graph (d).

(5)  
Respondents, in fact, understood said paragraph
(c) as including them (Ayala and Zobel).  In their motion of January 8, 1966, to quash
the writ of execution issued against them by the trial court, respondents
alleged, inter alia, that, “while
it is true that under paragraph (c) of the dispositive
part of the decision” of said “Court ‘all the defendants (are
ordered) to jointly and sever­ally pay intervenor
Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages,’ it is x x x equally true that, under the
Decision of the Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-20950, it was held that
‘defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for
damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of
the property’ because of their good faith” and that, “since
defendants Dizons were held not liable for the
alleged damages, it follows that the joint and several char­acter of the
obligation imposed by this Honorable Court” (the trial court)
“was extinguished because the other defendants herein” –
namely, respondents herein – “will no longer be able to claim from
the defendants Dizon the share which corresponds to
the latter.” Respondents had thus conceded that, under paragraph (c) of
the dispositive part of Judge Tengco’s
decision, they shared with the Dizons the
joint and solidary liability to pay damages to Tolentino, although they (respondents) maintained that the
decision of the Supreme Court relieving the Dizons
from said obligation, had the effect of extinguishing their
(respondents’) aforementioned obliga­tion under paragraph (c).  Surely, our decision could not have extinguished
such obligation, if the same did not exist under the trial court’s decision.

b) The Majority View

The reasons adduced in support thereof may be summed up as
follows:  (1) that “the
judgment” of Judge Tengco is ambiguous; (2) that
the opinion set forth in the body of his decision – as dis­tinguished from its dispositive part – contains nothing to indicate the intent
to hold respondents jointly and severally liable, with the Dizons,
for damages to Tolentino; and (3) that Tolentino is not entitled to damages at all, as a matter of
justice and equity.  To my mind, these
reasons are untenable, inasmuch as:

(1)  
The dispositive part
of Judge Tengco’s decision,
and, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof, are clear, explicit and pre­cise.  Indeed, no attempt has been made to pinpoint
any word, phrase or passage in said dispositive part
and paragraph (c) that is or may be considered equivocal.

(2)  
The failure of the body of Judge Tengco’s decision – as distinguished from its dispositive part – to discuss explicitly res­pondents’ liability
for damages, does not render the meaning of said paragraph (c) ambiguous.  It does not affect the precision of the
language or the singleness of the meaning of said paragraph
(c).  The phrase “all the
defendants” therein includes everyone of
them, and cannot mean some of them, or “the Dizons
only,” or all of them “except Ayala and Zobel.”

(3)  
The failure of Judge Tengco
to state categorically, in the body of his decision, that respondents are
liable for damages, does not warrant the conclusion that he intended to exclude
them from the operation of paragraph (c) of the dispositive
part of the decision.  With or without
such discussion or justification, the words “all the defendants” in
said paragraph mean everyone of the defendants, and Judge Tengco is presumed to have intended this simple,
natural and normal meaning thereof, until the contrary is clearly
established.  This presumption is
buttressed by the fact that, as heretofore indicated, the term “all”
was deliberately pre­fixed by Judge Tengco to
the phrase “the defendants,” in said paragraph (c).  The question, therefore, is not
“whether said decision shows that Judge Tengco had
the aforementioned intent” but, “whe­ther it clearly appears
from said decision that he had no such in­tent.”

(4)  
Even if the body of the decision were not clear
on whether or not the intent of its writer was correctly set forth in the dispos­itive part of said decision, this would not
justify a departure from the clear and natural meaning of such dispositive part, because the same constitutes the
judgment of the court, not the opinion set forth in the text of the
decision, which, at best, sets forth the facts and/or the reasons upon which
said judgment is based.  If those
facts and/or reasons did not justify the judgment, the same would, perhaps, be
groundless or erroneous; yet, the judgment would still be what plainly
appears in the dispositive part of the
decision, which, once final and executory, should be
executed and enforced as it is, “irrespective of all
seemingly contrary statements in the body of the decision” itself.1
What is more, in the event of an open conflict between said dispositive part, on the one hand, and the body
of the decision, on the other, the former prevails, for, “the judgment
must be distinguished from the opinion x x
x.  If any
statement in the opinion preceding the decree seemingly excluded
a portion x x x it must
be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the
opinion.”2

Our adherence to this well-settled principle was emphasized, not
long ago, in a unanimous decision in Board of Liquidators vs. Ricma.3
The complaint therein having been, on motion of the defendants, dismissed, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsider­ation and a motion for the
admission of an amended complaint.  Act­ing
upon these two (2) motions, the trial court issued an order which, after
stating the reasons why both were untenable, denied the “mo­tion to
dismiss, as well as the motion for the admission of the amended
complaint.” On subsequent motion of the defendants, the dispositive part of said order was amended so as to state
that it was the “motion for reconsideration,” not the
“motion to dismiss,” that was denied thereby.  Later, the issue arose as to whether the
period to appeal should be computed from notice of the first order or from that
of the amendatory order.  Passing upon
this issue, we adopted the second alternative, upon the ground that the first
order “clearly and definitely stated that what was being denied” was
the “motion to dismiss,” and “the dispositive
part of said order made no reference at all to the motion for
reconsideration x x x” and
that:

“x x x the
fact that the motion before the court was appellee’s
motion for reconsideration, and not the defen­dant’s motion to dismiss,
and the further fact that what was discussed in the body of the
order was said motion for reconsideration and not the motion to
dismiss are of no moment, since the rule is that when the dispositive part of a final order or decision is definite,
clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without the need of
interpretation or construction, the same is con­sidered as the judgment of
the court, to the exclusion of anything said in the body thereof.  (Contreras vs. Felix 78
Phil. 570; Edwards vs. Arce, 8 Phil. 688).  x x
x.”1

If the dispositive part of a decision
prevails over the body thereof, when the latter affirmatively shows that
the Judge did not mean what he said in the dispositive
part, and that he had obviously committed therein a mistake, with more
reason should the dispos­itive part be controlling
where the body of the decision is merely silent thereon.

(5)  
Later, in this opinion, we will show that the
natural mean­ing of paragraph (c) of the dispositive
part of Judge Tengco’s deci­sion is fully and amply
justified by the established facts.

(6)  
Judge Tengco meant
what he said in the dispositive part of his
decision.  Indeed, the same merely
granted the reliefs sought in the complaints of both
the Government2 and Tolentino.  It even followed the sequence of the
remedies therein prayed for, and, almost literally, the language used in
said complaints.3 Thus,
the Government and Tolentino prayed therein:  (1) that the certificates of title in
question be annulled; (2) that they be placed in possession of the lands in
dispute; (3) that “the defendants” be ordered to pay damages
“jointly and severally”; (4) that “the defendants” be
restrained from usurping said lands or perform­ing further acts of ownership
thereon; and (5) that the Govern­ment and Tolentino be
given such other relief as may be proper. 
The dispositive part of Judge Tengco’s decision granted Tolentino
each and everyone of these reliefs in the
order prayed for, thus indicating that the different paragraphs of said dispositive part have the same meaning conveyed by their
respective counterparts, in the prayer of the aforementioned complaints.  The latter were, in turn, directed principally
against respondents herein, from whom liability for damages was mainly
sought to be exacted, they being the leading defendants in the case.

This is borne out by the fact that Judge Tengco’s
decision states, in the body thereof, that “judgment could only be
rendered in favor or against the Republic of the Philippines and Intervenor Miguel Tolentino
and/or against or in favor of Ayala y Cia., Al­fonso
Zobel and defendants Dizons”
and that “the judgment in this case should be limited therefore between
the Republic of the Phil­ippines and Intervenor
Miguel Tolentino on one side and Ayala y  Cia., Alfonso Zobel and the Dizons x x x on the other.”1

(7) The absence of any discussion, in the body of Judge Tengco’s decision, of the joint and several liability of
respon­dents herein, under paragraph (c) of the dispositive
part, becomes readily understandable when we consider two (2) circumstances,
namely:  (a) Judge Tengco
adopted the theory of the Government and Tolentino –
in their respective complaints – to the effect that respondents and the Dizons are jointly and severally liable to them (Government
and Tolentino) for damages, on account of the usurpa­tion
of Lot 360 by respondents and the occupation thereof by the Dizons,
in consequence of the sale made in their favor by the res­pondents, after they
(respondents) had illegally increased, by about 2,500 hectares, the area of
Hacienda Calatagan by causing the same to be
“resurveyed” in 1949; and (b) respondents had not  questioned in their pleadings the logic of
the conclusion thus drawn from these premises by the Government and Tolentino.

In other words, Judge Tengco did not explicitly
justify his aforementioned conclusion because respondents had limited them­selves
to assailing the factual bases thereof, and the court had found that
the facts were substantially as alleged in said complaints.  Whether such facts sufficed to justify the
joint and several liability of respondents, pursuant
to paragraph (c), is beside the point.1 The important thing is that Judge
Tengco evidently believed that they did suffice.  In fact, several members of this Court enter­tain
such belief.  After all, the intent of
the party whose writing is sought to be construed constitutes the only
objective of every rule of interpretation.

(8)  It is argued that – despite the clear language
to the con­trary in the dispositive part of Judge Tengco’s decision – the same could not have meant to
include Ayala (and Zobel) in the award for damages,
because neither said decision nor that of this Court declares or suggests that
Ayala’s possession, prior to the sale to the Dizons,
was tainted with bad faith; because Judge Tengco had
not – in discussing the matter of damages – made any reference to the previous
possession of Ayala, and because said Judge had confined his discussion
concerning damages to the issue of good or bad faith in the possession of the Dizons alone.  The
first two (2) reasons are factually inaccurate, whereas the last does not
warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom.

(a)  
The decision of Judge Tengco
did not explicitly declare respondents guilty of bad faith; but, the
Judge was inclined to doubt respondents’ good faith.  After the rendition of his said decision, the
Government and the intervenors had filed a motion for
an alias writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and a joint motion for
reconsideration, followed by an amended joint motion for reconsideration, of
the decision – insofar as it did not award damages to the Government and the intervenors, other than Tolentino
– as well as for a new trial.  Acting
upon these motions, Judge Tengco ruled, on October 5,
1962, that “although believing that the defendants” – referring to
respondents herein – “could have been in bad faith when the
subdivision of the lands were made and cor­responding titles were issued, as
stated in the findings” made in his decision, it was best to maintain the status
quo “in order to avoid serious incidents,” in view of the substantial
amount paid to respondents herein by the Dizons and
the additional amounts spent by the latter to improve the fishponds in question
and to operate the same.  In other words,
were it not for these circum­stances, the alias writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, sought by the Government and Tolentino,
would have been issued, for Judge Tengco believed
that there could have been bad faith on the part of respondents in
effecting the subdivision survey of Hacienda Calatagan
and in securing title to the subdivision. 
Inasmuch as the decision had not, as yet, become final, and Judge Tengco made foregoing statement in resolving, inter alia, motions for recon­sideration of his decision, the
aforementioned pronouncement may be considered as part and parcel thereof (of
the decision).

(b)  
Said decision declares that, by causing the
Hacienda Cala­tagan to be resurveyed and by thereby
securing subdivision titles to the area thus resurveyed, respondents herein had
managed to get subdivision titles over an area of about 1,100 hectares in
excess of that covered by the Hacienda’s TCT No. 722, including more than
400 hectares of the navigable territorial waters, which are not subject to
private ownership.  In other words, respondents
were guilty of a tort or quasi-delict, and,
hence, liable, by ope­ration of law,1 for the damages caused thereby, in
view of the “fault” or 
“culpa” entailed in the invasion of the public domain thus
committed, regardless of whether or not they had acted in good faith or in bad
faith.  This point will be further
elucidated in subsequent pages.

(c)  
The fact that, in considering Tolentino’s claim for dam­ages, shortly before concluding
his decision, Judge Tengco merely referred to the
possession of the Dizons, and made no mention of
respondents herein, was due to the circumstance that the amount of
damages awarded to Tolentino had been based
upon the fruits or income received by the Dizons.  In other words, the damages col­lectible by Tolentino were measured by the amount of the profits
made by the Dizons in the operation of the fishpond
constituting Lot 360. 
Respondents were not mentioned in said portion of Judge Tengco’s decision because their participation in the events
mate­rial to the case2 had already been taken up, rather
extensively, in the preceding pages of said decision.

(d)  
There is absolutely nothing therein to
indicate that Judge Tengco intended to exclude
respondents from any liability for dam­ages. 
Moreover, such doubt, if any, as may result from the afore­mentioned
failure to mention respondents herein in the discussion of damages, is
dispelled by the clear, positive and precise language of paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco’s
decision sentencing “all the defendants” jointly and severally to pay
the afore­mentioned damages.  Recently we
had occasion to rule:

“x x x.  It should
be remembered that while the body of a decision, order or resolution might
create some ambiguity regarding which way the court’s reason­ing preponderates,
it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets condi­tions for the exercise of those
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.”1

(9)  The theory – advanced in favor of respondents
herein – to effect that, as a matter of justice and equity, Tolentino
is not entitled to damages at all, much less from said respondents, be­cause
they were – it is claimed – completely out of the picture when he came in for
the first time, is interwoven with the effect of our decision in G.R. No. L-20950 upon that of Judge Tengco.  Hence, the latter question will be discussed
jointly with the applicable principles of justice and equity.

Effect of Our Decision in G.R. No. L-20950

Upon That of Judge Tengco

In our decision in G.R. No. L-20950, we
declared that, after going “over the evidence presented” therein, we had
“found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court”;
that “there be­ing no showing” that the “Dizons
are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention
of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the
land”; that “as such possessors in good faith,” the Dizons “cannot also be held liable for damages
allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the
property”; that, accordingly, the trial court had correctly revoked the
writ of preliminary manda­tory injunction it had previously issued and
suspended meanwhile the delivery of Lot 360 to Tolentino;
and that, “thus modified,” Judge Tengco’s
decision was “affirmed.”

It is clear, to my mind, that the said decision had been thereby
modified in two (2) respects only, to wit: 
(a) that we acknowledged the right of the Dizons
to retain Lot 360, until re­imbursed of the necessary expenses made thereon;
and (b) that, until so reimbursed, the Dizons were
not liable to pay damages to Tolentino.  In all other respects, Judge Tengco’s decision was affirmed.  Since – as demonstrated earlier in this
opinion, and impliedly admitted by respondents in their motion of January 8,
1966, to quash the writ of execution issued by the trial court, on December 27,
1965 – paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge
Tengco’s decision – “ordering all the defendants
to jointly and severally pay x x x
Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages” –
includes respondents herein, it is clear that the effect of our decision in G.R.
No. L-20950 upon that of Judge Tengco was merely to
so modify said paragraph (c) as to order “all the defendants except the Dizons”
to jointly and severally pay damages to Tolentino,
and to uphold the right of the Dizons to retain the
possession of Lot 360, until the necessary
expenses shall have been refunded to them.

Tolentino’s Right to Recover

Damages
from Respondents

It is urged that, in consequences of our decision in G.R. No. L-20950,
Tolentino had, also, lost the right to recover
any damages whatsoever, because such right springs from his right of
possession, which, in turn, is suspended by the right of retention of the Dizons, pending reimbursement of their necessary
expenses, so that, until then, Tolentino has no right
of possession and, hence, is “not enti­tled to damages at all.”

The flaw in this process of reasoning becomes apparent when we
consider that – independently of the aforesaid right of reimburse­ment and
retention of the Dizons – Tolentino
is unquestionably enti­tled to recover damages from his lessor,
the Government, owing to its failure to deliver the possession of the area
leased to him.  This goes to show that Tolentino’s claim for damages against other parties
is not suspended or affected by the right of retention of the Dizons.

And the reason is simple. 
The right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons
is not a negation, but a recognition
of Tolen­tino’s right of possession, for the former
would not exist if the latter did not. 
What is more, the former exists because of the latter.  In fact, there would be no reason for the
right of reim­bursement and retention of the Dizons
if nobody were entitled to dispossess them and they were not bound
to yield their possession.

Tolentino is entitled to the possession
of Lot 360, because, being part of the public domain, it
has been leased to him by the Government. 
Vis-a-vis the Dizons
– but, insofar only as they are concerned – said right of possession of Tolentino is subject to the qualification that the Dizons cannot be ousted unless and until their necessary
expenses shall have been reimbursed. 
That is why, despite said right of the Dizons,
and without reimbursing those expenses, Tolentino may
demand from the Government, as his lessor, the
payment of indemnity for damages, on account of its failure to deliver to him
the possession of the thing leased.  In
other words, insofar as the Government is concerned, Tolentino’s
right of possession is not subject to the qualification, limitation or
condition resulting from the right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons.  This right
belongs to the latter – and to no others – because of a circumstance
peculiar to them (the Dizons) – their good faith
resulting from justifiable reliance upon the subdivision Torrens Titles
illegally secured by respondents.

This justification is, however, absent insofar as respon­dents
are concerned, they being the very parties responsible for said illegality,
which was committed by not adhering to the tech­nical description in
their TCT No. 722, and, in effect, disregard­ing the same and the area
therein set forth.  With respect to res­pondents
herein, Tolentino’s right of possession is not
subject, therefore, to the limitation imposed by the right of reimburse­ment
and retention of the Dizons.  Neither may this right of the latter inure to
the benefit of respondents, for they do not derive their rights or
obligations from the Dizons.  On the contrary, as buyers of Lot
360, the Dizons are the ones who succeeded to what­ever
right or interest respondents had in said lot, and, hence, acquired no
right or interest whatsoever therein, because respondents had none.  The right of reimbursement and retention of
the Dizons exists, not because of the
aforementioned sale by res­pondents – who had nothing to sell –
but, despite this fact and by operation of law, which protects
the rights of possessors in good faith, regardless of their lack of a valid
title.

In short, Tolentino’s right of
possession is qualified insofar only as the Dizons
are concerned, but not vis-a-vis either the Government
or respondents herein.  As regards
both, it is not subject to any limitation.  Hence, Tolentino
may demand from respondents the corresponding indemnity for damages on account
of his failure to enjoy said right of possession because of their acts.

Respondents’ Liability to

Tolentino for Dizons‘

Possession

Respondents maintain that they cannot be held liable for damages
to Tolentino, inasmuch as his inability to take
possession of Lot 360 took place when they (respondents)
were completely out of the picture.  I am
unable to accept this premise, much less the inference drawn therefrom.

1.  Tolentino’s
interest in the disputed area was derived from one Gabino
Lachica, who – like the other intervenors
in the main case – had filed, with the Bureau of Fisheries, his applica­tion
for lease in 1949.  Respondents
then caused Lachica and other similar applicants to
be ejected from the disputed area. 
Evidently to defeat the claims of said applicants, respondents,
moreover, caused a resurvey and a composite subdivision plan, supposedly of the
Hacienda Calatagan, to be made, which plan included ille­gally
said disputed area, together with other areas, aggregating 1,091 hectares,
located outside the boundaries of the Hacienda, as set forth in its TCT No.
722.  And, based on said resurvey and
composite plan, the Hacienda, or respondents herein, unlawfully secured
transfer certificates of title to the subdivision lots outside its
perimeter.  In 1952, the Bureau of
Fisheries demanded – upon the theory that the disputed area forms part of the
public domain – that it be vacated by those who held it upon the authority of
respon­dents herein.  Moreover, that same
year of 1952, Tolentino – as assignee of Lachica’s interest, under the lease application filed by
him in 1949 – filed his own lease application, followed by ano­ther in
1954.  Meanwhile, those required by the
Bureau of Fish­eries to vacate the disputed area, including the Dizons, had ob­jected to the lease applications
aforementioned, alleging that said area is part of the Hacienda Calatagan, covered by said TCT No. 722.  Upon due investigation, conducted in
1954, this contention was found to be false, in view of which, that same
year, the Director of Fisheries officially declared
that the disputed area is part of the public domain.  This action was sustained by Us in Dizon v. Rodriguez and
Republic v. Court of Appeals,1 as well as in Republic v. Ayala.2

Thus, despite the fact that, as early as 1949, Lachica and others had claimed the right to hold the area
aforementioned, pur­suant to lease applications filed by them with the Bureau
of Fish­eries, and questioned respondents’ authority to possess that area, and
that, as Lachica’s assignee, Tolentino,
as well as others, had, in 1952, filed similar lease applications with
said Bureau, which then bade respondents’ lessees to vacate said area,
and in 1954 rejected their claim that the same is part of respondents’
property, on February 3, 1954, respondents sold Lot 360 to the Dizons.  In other
words, this illegal sale was made by respondents almost two years after
Tolentino had personally and officially entered into
the picture, and about five (5) years after his predecessor-­in-interest, Lachica, had done so.

2.  Insofar as the impediment
to Tolentino’s assumption of possession of Lot
360 is concerned, respondents were not com­pletely out of the picture,
even after the sale by them made to the Dizons.  Indeed, the latter’s possession was a necessary
legal and factual consequence of that sale. 
What is more, as the successors­-in-interest of respondents herein, the
Dizons were their alter ego.  The Dizons had
stepped into respondents’ shoes.  Accordingly,
the former represented the latter, in the sense of exercising such right of
possession as respondents illegally claimed to have, and which they must have
known they did not have, because:  (a)
Lot 360 was outside the area covered by their TCT No. 722 and, together
with other “subdivision” lots, supposedly of Hacienda Calatagan, far exceeded the area thereof; (b) they
had been advised by the Bu­reau of Fisheries to vacate it; (c) the
Department of Agriculture had declared it part of the inalienable public
domain; and (d) its being part of the shore and territorial waters manifestly
revealed that status to the whole world.

Vis-a-vis Tolentino,
respondents stood in the same condition they would have been had the Dizons merely leased Lot 360 from them, for, in that case, Tolentino would have, likewise, been pre­vented by the Dizons from taking possession of said lot.  It would then be more evident that the Dizons held the lot on behalf of respondents, in the
sense that the former would be exercising, although temporarily, an alleged possessory right of the latter.  Thus, the possession by the Dizons, under such hypothetical lease, would inure to the
benefit of respondents herein, for purposes of acquis­itive prescription of
ownership, if the lot were alienable, which it was and is not.

3.  It is true that no contractual
relation exists between res­pondents and Tolentino.  But, contract is one only of the legal
sources of obligation.  One other source
thereof is quasi-delict.1 Hence, Art. 2176 of our Civil Code
explicitly provides that “who­ever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay the damage
done.  Such fault or negligence, if there
is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.”
In the case at bar, by illegally causing Lot 360, inter alia, to be included in its subdivision title –
although not really covered by its TCT No. 722, and actually forming part of
the public domain – and by conveying said Lot 360 to the Dizons
– knowing that it was claimed by the Government and its lessee, petitioner Tolentino, apart from the fact that, being part of the
“foreshore, beach or x x x
navigable waters,” it is manifestly “not x x
x capable of registration” and its “inclusion
in a certificate of title does not convert the same into” property of
“private ownership or confer title on the registrant”2 –
respondents herein had performed acts constituting “fault” or
“culpa,” in consequence of which Tolentino,
as govern­ment lessee of said lot, had sustained damages, which respondents are
bound to indemnify under said Art. 2176.

In an attempt to show that this rationalization is legally unten­able,
it has been argued that by such process a pedestrian injured in an automobile accident
may sue the manufacturer of said car. 
Instead of accomplishing its purpose, the argument reveals its basic
flaw.  Indeed, in the absence of fault or
negligence in the manufacture of the car, its manufacturer cannot possibly be
held liable for the damages resulting from said injury.  However, if the accident took place on
account of a defect in the manufacture of the car, the injured party would
certainly be entitled to recover said damages from the manufacturer,
pursuant to the aforementioned Art. 2176. 
Such is, also, the established rule under the common law,1
which, moreover, holds the manufacturer liable even if the defective part
had been supplied by others.2

Consistently with the philosophy underlying the Common Law and
said Art. 2176 of our Civil Code, Art. 2187 thereof de­clares
that:

“Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.”

Similarly, if a building or structure collapses totally or par­tially,
owing to a defect in its plans and specifications, or in the ground, or in the
construction, or to the use of materials of in­ferior quality, the engineer or
architect who drew up the plans and specifications, or supervised the
construction, or the con­tractor who built it, may be sued directly by
the third persons who suffered damages in consequence of the said event,
pursuant to Art. 2192 of said Code.

In the case at bar, the action to exact liability from respon­dents
herein had been based upon a stronger legal and moral ground.  Indeed, in the illustrations given above,
there was merely a possi­bility or probability of somebody being
harmed accidentally.  In the case of Lot
360, its sale to the Dizons necessarily
resulted in the assumption of its possession by the latter, and, hence,
in the cer­tainty of a denial of such possession to the Government and
its lessee, Tolentino.  In other words, respondents knew
positively that, by selling the lot, they were acting in derogation of the
rights or claims of the Government and Tolentino, of
which they had pre­vious notice.

Independently of the foregoing, the fact is that respondents had
performed several unlawful acts – such as, inter alia,
ille­gally securing title to 1,091 hectares of the public domain, includ­ing
the territorial waters of the State; illegally causing said portion of the
public domain to be subdivided, and certificates of title to be issued for
the subdivision lots; and illegally selling and/or leas­ing a number of said
lots and other parts of that segment of the public domain, including Lot
360, to third persons.

In other words, they performed an unlawful invasion of the
public domain, which is a tort,1 commonly known as trespass,2
for which mistake, honest belief or professional neglect is no de­fense.3
The Common Law furnishes abundant authority to the effect that bad faith is not
necessary for liability arising from tort to attach.  In fact, good faith on the part of the tortfeasor does not exempt him from liability for his
act.  The rule is postu­lated in the
Restatement4
in the following language:

“In order to be liable for a trespass on land . . . it is
necessary only that the actor intentionally be upon any part of the land
in question.  It is not necessary
that he intend to invade the possessor’s interest in the exclusive
possession of his land and, therefore, that he know his entry to be an
intrusion.  If the actor is and intends
to be upon the particular piece of land in question, it is immaterial that he honestly
and reasonably believes that he has the consent of the lawful pos­sessor
to enter, or, indeed, that he himself is its possessor.  Unless the actor’s mistake was induced by the
conduct of the possessor, it is immaterial that the mistake is one such
as a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances which the actor knows or
could have dis­covered by the most careful of investigations would have
made.  One who enters any piece of land
takes the risk of the existence of such facts as would give him a right or
privilege to enter.  So too, the actor
cannot escape liability by showing that his mistaken belief in the valid­ity of
his title is due to the advise of the most eminent of counsel.  Indeed, even though a statute expressly
confers title upon him, he takes the risk that the stat­ute may thereafter be
declared unconstitutional.”

Other statements of the rule are set forth at the margin.1 To
illustrate, Restatement gives the following examples:

“A employs a surveyor of recognized
ability to make a survey of his land. 
The survey shows that a particular strip of land is within his
boundaries.  In consequence, A clears
this land of timber and prepares it for cultivation.  In fact, the survey is mistaken and the strip
in question is part of the tract owned by his neighbor, B.  A is subject to liability to B.”

“A, who is entitled to possession of Blackacre, reasonably mistaking Whiteacre
for Blackacre, enters Whiteacre.  A is subject to liability for
trespass.”

“A mines coal from B’s land having mistaken
the location of the boundary line. 
A is subject to liability to B although the mistake is a
reasonable one.”1

Other Factors Relevant to

the Equities of the Case.

As above indicated, Tolentino
filed, with the Bureau of Fish­eries, a Fishpond Application on May 21, 1952, and another one on September 11, 1954, covering
portions of the disputed area. 
These applications were objected to by the Dizons,
one Sy-Juco and others claiming that said portions
were private property, forming part of Hacienda Calatagan,
covered by TCT No. 722.  After due
investigation, with notice to all parties concerned, a Committee created
therefor by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, found that the disputed area was not within said
Hacienda.  Thereupon, the Dizons and their co-protestants filed, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, an action for prohibition to enjoin said official and
the Director of Fisheries from acting upon said fishpond applications, until
the ownership over the disputed area shall have been judicially settled.  Having been allowed to intervene in the case,
Miguel Tolentino and his daughter Clemencia
Tolentino, filed a motion to dismiss, which was
granted by Hon. Froilan Bayona,
as Judge of said court.1 Forthwith, Dizon,
et al. filed, with the Supreme Court, a petition for certiorari and mandamus to
annul the action taken by Judge Bayona and to compel
him to reinstate the case in the lower court. 
On April 28, 1956, the Supreme Court denied said petition,
upon the ground that the Dizons should
first prove to the Director of Fisheries that the disputed area is part of
Hacienda Calatagan, covered by TCT No. 722, adding,
however, that “even if they should succeed” in proving such claim,
if said area is “really part of the sea, beach, or foreshore, the same
cannot be regis­tered under the Registration Act x x x in the name of anyone, for they are not registrable, are non-alienable and belong to the public
domain to be administered and managed by the State for the benefit of the
people.”2

Soon thereafter, or on August 14 and 16, 1956, the Dizons and Sy-Juco, et al.,
instituted Civil Cases Nos. 135 and 136 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, against the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the Acting Director of Fish­eries, and Miguel Tolentino,
to set aside the decision of the Director of Fisheries dismissing the protests
of the Dizons and Sy-Juco,
et al., to Tolentino’s fishpond applications, with
res­pect to areas similarly situated as the one later involved in Civil
Case No. 373 of the same court and G.R. No. L-20950 of this Court, and to quiet
the title to the areas first mentioned. 
On January 30, 1958,
Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, as Judge of First Instance
of Batangas, rendered judgment dismissing the
complaints, and, inter alia, annulling
the Torrens Titles of the Dizons and Sy-Juco, et al.,
and ordering them to vacate the litigated areas.  On appeal, this decision was, on October 31, 1961, affirmed,
in CA-G. R. No. 24186-87-R of the Court of Appeals, which
further sentenced the plaintiffs therein to pay damages to Tolentino,
beginning from October 1, 1954.  By resolution of August 20, 1962, this
decision of the Court of Appeals was amended by eliminating the award
for damages and declaring that the plaintiffs (Dizons
and Sy-Juco) were entitled to reimbursement from
the Republic of the Philippines for useful expenses, with right of
retention, and to sue Jacobo Zobel
under his vendor’s warranty against eviction, he having been suffi­ciently
notified of said actions to quiet title. 
On April 30, 1965,
said decision of the Court of Appeals was “affirmed in all
respects,” in G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L-20355-56 of the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, or on September 28, 1959, the Republic of the
Philippines had instituted said Civil Case No. 373 of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, against “Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda Calatagan, Jacobo Zobel” and the Dizons, to annul the transfer certificate of title issued
to Hacienda Calatagan in consequence of the resurvey
and composite plan thereof made, by order of respon­dents in 1949, as well as
the subdivision titles thereafter issued for areas not covered by TCT No. 722,
to oust said defendants from the disputed areas, to recover damages from said
defendants, and to restrain them from exercising further acts of dominion over
the aforementioned areas, and for such other relief as may be meet and proper.  Presently, Tolentino
filed a complaint in interven­tion, and, thereafter, other applicants-awardees
of fishpond permits joined the Republic and Tolentino
in seeking the reliefs prayed for by both.  On June
2, 1962, Hon. Damaso S. Tengco, as Judge of First Instance of Batangas,
rendered the decision involved in the present case, which was affirmed
by Us in G.R. No. L-20950, on May 31, 1965, subject to the modification
already adverted to.

The points relevant to the equities of the case are:  (1) that on April 28, 1956, this Court
had declared1
that, if the disputed area is part of the beach or foreshore – as respondents
knew it was – said area could not be registered under the Torrens
System; (2) that this pronouncement was reiterated in the decision of
Judge Vasquez, dated January 30, 1958, which further declared
that said area is not and was not part of the Hacienda Calatagan
and that the subdivision titles thereto, of the Dizons
and Sy-Juco, et al., are null and void; and (3) that
said pronouncement and declaration were  affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, on October 31, 1961, rei­terated
by Judge Tengco on June 2, 1962, and affirmed
by the Supreme Court, on April 30, and May 31, 1965.

Thus, despite a final decree of the Supreme Court, as early as April
28, 1956, declaring clearly that respondents and the Dizons
cannot possibly have a valid Torrens Title to the disputed area; despite
the decision of Judge Vasquez, less than two (2) years later, declaring, in
addition thereto, that said area is not and was not part of
Hacienda Calatagan and that the Torrens titles
covering said area are null and void; despite the reiteration of these decla­rations
by Judge Tengco, and the affirmance
thereof by the Court of Appeals and by two other decisions of the Supreme
Court; and, despite, therefore, these six (6) decisions – two (2) of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, one (1) of the Court
of Appeals, and three (3) of the Supreme Court – which rendered liability for
dam­ages caused to Tolentino inescapable, respondents
did nothing – for the fifteen (15) years and a half that had elapsed, since the
rendi­tion of our decision in Dizon v. Bayona – to undo or minimize the wrong they had done, and
are still doing to Tolentino, as an awardee of fishpond permits granted by the Government.

It is next contended that, under Tolentino’s
theory, he would collect P90,000.00 a year from
respondents until he recovers the possession of Lot 360, which he cannot have
unless the Dizons are reimbursed of the necessary
expenses made thereon by them, so that, by not making such reimbursement, he
would be receiving indefinitely the aforementioned sum, at the expense of
respondents herein.  It is, however, within
respondents’ power to see to it that possession is forthwith given to Tolentino, and they could have done so, at any time,
had they been so minded, by reimbursing the neces­sary expenses due to the Dizons.  Thus, respondents
have themselves to blame for their inaction in this respect, despite the
clear message of our decision in Dizon v. Bayona,1
since April 28, 1956, to
which they have turned deaf ears.

If, using a Torrens Title he has counterfeited in his name, one
sells the land of another to a third person, who acquires it in good faith and
for value, and, as its possessor in good faith, has a right of reimbursement
and retention, can there be any doubt about the legal and equitable right of
the true owner and/or the successor-in-interest to his right of possession over
the land, to recover the resulting damages from the author of the
falsification, as the proximate cause of said damages?  Would it be just and fair to exempt him from
liability, upon the theory that the damages were sustained after the
falsification and sale made by him, when he was “completely out of the
picture,” and that he may avail – which he cannot2 –
of the rights of said buyer and possessor in good faith?

It has been argued that, since the damages suffered by Tolen­tino consist of the fruits received by the Dizons, which the former cannot recover from the latter,
because of their right of reimburse­ment and retention, there is no reason why
respondents should be held liable for such damages, considering that said
fruits were not received by them.  The
flaw in this process of reasoning has already been shown in the preceding pages
of this opinion.1
It may not be amiss to add, however, that, in consequence of the sale of Lot
360 to the Dizons, the price paid by the latter
took the place of the land, insofar as respondents are concerned, and that
the interest, profits and other benefits derived by respondents from the
posses­sion and use of said price, partook of the nature or assumed the role
of the fruits of said lot, which did not belong to them.  Al­though the Dizons
are entitled to recover said price from respon­dents, the latter are not bound
to pay interest thereon to the former, because they (the Dizons) have actually received the fruits or in­come
derived from the operation of the fishpond in Lot 360, which are the
counterpart of the benefits derived by respondents from the possession and use
of the price aforementioned.  Inasmuch
as, not being owners of Lot 360, respondents are not entitled to keep said
benefits; the same should, pursuant to the elementary prin­ciples of justice
and equity, be turned over to the party who would have received them as
possessor and operator of the fishpond, had it not been for the illegal and tortious acts of said respondents.  Apart from being implemented in Article 2176
of our Civil Code,2 those principles are incorporated, inter
alia, in Articles 20 and 21 of the same Code,
which provide:

“ART. 20.  Every person
who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

“ART. 21. 
Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compen­sate the latter for the damages.”

Effect of Dizon

v.
Rodriguez

It  is
urged that the reference made in our decision in G.R. No. L-20950, to Dizon v. Rodriguez3 – in which it was held that the Dizons had acted in good faith because they had relied on
the subdivision title of respondents herein and were entitled to continue
relying thereon until a judgment annulling said title shall have become final –
neces­sarily implied that respondents herein are, likewise, entitled to such
reliance, and, hence, to the exemption accorded to the Dizons,
because justice and equity demand that the doctrine laid down in Dizon v. Rodriguez be applied equally to those similarly
situated.

Respondents herein are not, however, so situated.  The Dizons were
entitled to rely on the aforementioned subdivision titles of respondents herein
and had no obligation to inquire about the circumstances under which said
titles had been issued.  Upon the other
hand, respondents herein were not only aware of these circumstances.  They were the ones who ordered the
resurvey and the subdivision that led to the issuance of said titles.  They knew that the area thereof exceeded, by
over 1,000 hectares, the area covered by their TCT No. 722.  As the Court of Appeals had repeatedly held
in its decision in Dizon v. Rodriguez – which
“we affirmed in all respects” – the subdivision plan of the Hacienda Calatagan “was prepared in disregard of the
technical description contained in TCT No. 722.”

Indeed, nothing was said in our decision, either in G.R. No. L-20950, or in G.R. No. L-20300-01 and L-20355-56, which may
be construed as extending to respondents herein the exemption therein declared
in favor of the Dizons, or other lessees or assignees
of said res­pondents, from the obligation to pay damages until such time as the
Dizons, lessees or assignees, shall have been
reimbursed the necessary expenses incurred by them.  On the contrary, the express mention
of the Dizons, as regards said exemption, imme­diately
followed by the declaration, in the dispositive part
of our decision in G.R. No. L-20950, to the effect that “thus modified,
the decision of the lower court x x x is hereby affirmed,” necessarily implied that
no other modification was intended and that respon­dents herein were excluded
from the benefits of said exemption, since the same was not given to
them in the decision of Judge Tengco.

Acquisition of
Something Controversial

The propriety, in equity, of awarding damages to Tolentino has been put in doubt, upon the theory that he
had “wittingly ac­quired something that is controversial,” referring,
presumably, to the fact that his interest in Lot 360 had been acquired by
assign­ment of the rights therein of Gabino Lachica – as the original appli­cant of a fishpond permit
from the Government – which were con­tested by respondents herein.

The status of said Lot 360 as a portion of
the public domain and not a part of Hacienda Calatagan
is not, however, controver­sial.  Being a
portion of the territorial navigable waters in San­tiago
Bay, it is obvious to the
whole world that said lot is not and cannot be a private property,
much less belong to the Hacienda Calatagan, whose TCT
No. 722 explicitly stated that Santiago
Bay constituted one of its southern
limits.  In other words, the Bay
was not and is not part of the Hacienda.

What is more, jurisdiction over said portion of the Bay was
asserted by the Bureau of Fisheries as early as August 2, 1952, and reiterated in 1954.  Before the close of that year, such action
was sustained by Judge Bayona, who, in turn, was, in
April 1956, upheld by the Supreme Court, which declared positively that areas
that “are really part of the sea, beach or foreshore x x
x cannot be registered x x x in the name of any one, for they are not registrable, are non-alienable and belong to
the public domain x x x.”
There could have been, therefore, no possible doubt that Lot
360 and the other lots found in the Santiago
Bay form part of the public
domain.  It should be noted, also, that
owing mainly to the initiative and resolution of Tolentino,
the State recovered more than 1,091 hectares of the public domain and the
transfer certificates of title thereto of respondents herein and their assigns
were annulled.

The question, therefore, is whether it is just and fair to deny Tolentino the right to recover damages from the party who
caused them, despite the manifest public nature of Lot 360; des­pite the fact
that it is beyond the boundaries set forth in respondents’ TCT No. 722, despite
the notices sent and demands made by the Bureau of Fisheries in 1952 and 1954;
despite the decision of Judge Bayona in December,
1954 and that of the Supreme Court in 19561; despite the decision of Judge
Vasquez in 1958 and that of the Court of Appeals in 1961,2
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1965.3

Granting, for the sake of argument, that Tolentino
had ac­quired something controversial – whether Lot 360 was or was not a part
of Hacienda Calatagan – thereby assuming the risk of
losing and sustaining damages, the fact is, however, that he was not only
right, but, also, that he thereby rendered a service to the nation,
by establishing its title to over 1,000 hectares of the public domain
appropriated by respondents herein. 
Besides, respondents had, also, performed something much
more “controversial” – to put it mildly – and assumed a greater
risk – by causing a resurvey and a composite plan to be made of the
Hacienda Calatagan, dis­regarding the boundaries set
forth in its TCT No. 722, and by claiming title and performing acts of
ownership over more than 1, 091 hectares which are beyond said boundaries – and
lost in their bid therefor.  Since both had assumed their
respective risks, is it fair and equitable, in effect, to penalize the winner,
by denying any relief for the damages sustained by him in defense of what is right,
and to reward the losers, by allowing them to keep the income and
other benefits derived by them by wrongfully defying the rulings of the proper
administrative and judicial authorities declaring their (the losers’) claim to
be devoid of merit?

Authority
to Depart from the Tenor

of a Final Decision

I would have preferred to conclude the present opinion at this
point were it not for the transcendental implications of the pronouncements
made in the majority opinion upholding the author­ity to amend decisions
long final and executory.

The case of Locsin vs. Paredes1
and the quotations from Corpus Juris, Corpus Juris Secundum and the American
Jurispru­dence relied upon, as well as the other Philippine cases cited in support
of respondents’ contention, are not in point.

Said quotations refer to “doubtful or ambiguous judgments”
or decrees2
“susceptible of two constructions.” They are inap­plicable to the
case at bar, the “judgment” or “decree” involved therein –
which is the dispositive part of Judge Tengco’s decision – being neither “doubtful” nor
“ambiguous” or “susceptible of two constructions.” Besides
– as we have shown in the preceding pages – the dispositive
part of Judge Tengco’s decision and that of ours in G.R.
No. L-20950, as well as the text and the spirit of both deci­sions, are in
harmony with our law on quasi-delicts or torts, and
with the demands of justice and equity. 
Again, the quotation – made in the majority opinion – from the American
Jurisprudence3
– to the effect that, “if a finding is inconsistent with the
judgment proper or decretal part
of the decree, the latter must control” – refutes the position taken by
the majority, and supports our view.

Locsin vs. Paredes

This case was one for the recovery of P16,417.25
“repre­senting the proceeds of a joint and several promissory
note.” Although the defendants therein “admitted the existence
of said debt in accordance with the promissory note,” the judgment
sen­tencing them to pay said amount did not declare them “jointly and
severally” liable therefor.  After the decision had become final, the
lower court – on motion of the judgment creditor, based upon the theory that
the failure of the dispositive part of the decision
to order that the debt be paid “severally” was due to an omission
committed “inadvertently” – amended said part of the decision by
specifying the “several” nature of the payment therein decreed.  A petition for certiorari filed by the
judgment debtors to annul this amendment was denied by the Supreme Court, upon
the ground that the lower court had not exceeded its jurisdiction in acting as
it did, because “it clearly appears from the allegations of the com­plaint,
the promissory note reproduced therein and made a part thereof, the prayer and
the conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision of the respondent
judge, that the obligation contracted by the petitioners is joint and
several and that the parties as well as the trial judge so understood it.”

In other words, the obligation involved therein was concededly
joint and several in nature.  It was so
stated plainly in the corres­ponding promissory note.  It was so alleged in the complaint.  De­fendants “never denied” it.  In fact, they “admitted” its
existence “in accordance with the promissory note.” They
“defended themselves merely by alleging that the action was premature.”
The “conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision”
showed “clearly” that respondent judge, like both
parties, had “understood” defendants’ obligation to be
“joint and several” in character. 
Hence, the Supreme Court concluded that his failure to so state it in
the dispositive part of the decision was due “clearly”
to an “omission” committed “inadvertently.”

None of these circumstances exists in the case at
bar.  Here we are concerned, not
with an “omission,” but with an “addition” or insertion,
which, unlike the former, cannot be and is not due to “inadvertence,” but must
have been and was intentional and deliberate.  The Republic and Tolentino
had prayed for a judgment against “the defendants,” and the trial
judge rendered judgment against “all the defendants,” thus stressing
the fact that the sen­tence encompassed everyone
of them, without exception.  What
is more, this judgment is in accordance with the theory of the Repub­lic and
Tolentino in their respective complaints, as well as
in their pleadings, briefs and memoranda. 
Thus the Locsin case does not bear out
respondents’ pretense and merely makes its infirmity more obvious.  To the same effect are –

Other Philippine cases cited

in the majority opinion

The cases therein cited are Velez vs. Martinez,1 De
Ralla vs. Director of Lands,1 Villones vs. Nable,2 and Morelos
vs. Go Chin Ling.3 In these four (4) cases, the dispositive part of the decision – unlike
that of the case at bar – was ambiguous or susceptible of several
interpretations.

In the Velez case, the question was whether the defendant,
sentenced, in the dispositive part of a decision, to
pay a certain sum to the plaintiff, was bound to do so in his personal
capacity or as administrator of the estate of a deceased person.  Said dis­positive
part did not state in what capacity the defendant had been so sentenced.

The De Ralla case involved a decision
of the Court of Ap­peals in a land registration case, the dispositive
part of which decision declared that petitioner had established a fee simple
title, not over the “entire” property applied for and covered by the
deed of purchase Exhibit D, but over a “portion” only thereof, which
could not be adjudicated, as yet, to the applicant, because the “true
boundaries” of said portion were not indicated in the plan submitted to
court, which, accordingly, remanded the case to the trial court for resurvey,
which should not include the areas covered by certain homestead and free patent
applications.  Said dispositive
part further provided that “after the amended plan shall have been duly
approved and the lower court is satisfied as to its identity” – referring
to the portion belonging to the appli­cant – “it shall be
adjudicated” to him.  This dispositive part was assailed as incongruous, in that it
denied the registration of even the portion to which the applicant had
established her title and that, by directing the exclusion of the areas covered
by homestead and free patent applications, “the applicant would be
deprived of a part of the property which has been declared to be registrable in her favor.” It was held that the
alleged incongruity in the disposi­tive part should
be resolved by considering “the decision below x x
x as a whole x x x.” No similar contradiction or incongruity exists in
the dispositive part of the decision of Judge Tengco in­volved in the case at bar.

The dispositive part of the judgment on
the pleadings ren­dered in the Villones case
sentenced the defendant therein to accept a given sum of money – payment of
which had been tendered by the plaintiffs – which, together with another
specified sum, already paid by the latter, represented “the full purchase
price of the land sold” by the defendant to the plaintiffs, and to
execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in their favor.  In the proceedings for the execution of this
decision, the issue arose as to the area of the land to be conveyed to the
plaintiffs, said area not having been given in said dispositive
part.

Similarly, the dispositive part of the
decision in the Morelos case – rendered on March 11, 1952 – ordered the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff P1,023 a month from
February 1950 “up to the pre­sent time.” This decision was, on February 8, 1957, affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.  On July 31, 1957, the trial court issued
a writ of execution directing the sheriff to cause the defendant to pay P1,023 “a month” from February 1950 to January
1957.  The defendant objected thereto,
alleging that the decision sought to be executed merely directed the payment of
said sum “from February 1950 up to the present time,” which – he
claimed – was March 11, 1952,
the date of promulgation of the lower court’s decision.  This pretense was overruled, it appearing
from the body of the decision that the issue between the parties was the term
of a lease in favor of Morelos, which was held to be
eight (8) years from January 31, 1949,
or up to January 1957.  Indeed, the
phrase “the present time” used in the dispositive
part of the trial court’s decision could mean either the date of its rendition
– which was long before the expira­tion of the term of the lease – or
the date when the decision became final – after the expiration of said
term – or the date when the lease expired, which was several months before
the decision had become final.  In other
words, the dispositive part of the decision was –
unlike that of Judge Tengco’s decision or of ours in G.R.
No. L-20950 – open to several interpretations.

Cases subsequent to

Locsin v. Paredes

1. Contreras v. Felix1

Speaking through Justice Tuason, this
Court declared that “(o)nly clerical
errors, or mistakes or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or
negligence may be corrected or supplied after the judgment has been
entered” and that “the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of
the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the
decision” itself, referring to the views expressed in the body of
the decision, as distinguished from its dispositive
part, which constitutes the judgment proper.  The Court further quoted with approval,
Freeman’s postulate2 to the effect that:

“The general power to correct clerical errors and omissions
does not authorize the court to repair its own inaction, to make
the record and judgment say what the court did not
adjudge, although it had a clear right to do so.  The court cannot under the guise of
correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment it never made or
rendered, or add something to either which was not ori­ginally
included although it might and should have so or­dered or adjudged in the
first instance.  It cannot thus repair
its own lapses and omissions to do what it could legally and properly have
done at the right time.  A court’s
mistake in leaving out of its decision something which it ought to have put in,
and something in issue of which it intended but failed to dispose, is a judicial
error, not a mere clerical misprision, and cannot be
corrected by adding to the entered judgment the omitted matter on the theory of
making the entry conform to the actual judg­ment rendered.”1

Particularly relevant to the question whether or not the Loc­sin case justifies the granting of the relief sought in
the second motion for reconsideration of respondents herein is the fact that,
like the Locsin case, that of Contreras involved the
question whe­ther the judgment debtors, under a given final and executory deci­sion, are jointly and severally liable thereunder, despite the silence thereon of its dispositive part, which was allegedly “due to inadver­tence
on the part of the court.” Commenting thereon, this Court added, in the
Contreras case:

“In truth, there is no proper and sufficient showing here that
the alleged mistake was due to inadvertence on the part of the court.  We have been through with the de­cision and
have not detected in it any clear purpose or intention to make the
defendants jointly and severally lia­ble. 
In all probability, the nature of defendants’ liability (whether
joint or joint and several) was not touched upon at all by the parties and was
not even given thought by them or by the court.  The point was involved in obscu­rity.  As the judgment of the lower court plainly
indi­cates, the case was very intricate, complicated by a multiplicity of
claims and counterclaims arising from different juridical acts and sought from
different parties who sustained diverse relationships to the plaintiffs and to
each other with reference to the separate items.  It is not to be wondered at if the finer
point of solidarity among the defendants was swallowed up and lost in the maze
of these claims and counterclaims over the valid­ity of which the
three-cornered contest was centered and bitterly waged.  x x x”2

With respect to the question whether respondents herein
may be held liable to Tolentino for damages sustained
by him after the former had conveyed Lot 360 to
the Dizons, the foregoing obser­vations are squarely
in point.  Indeed, such question was
never posed either before Judge Tengco or before the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20950. 
Hence, neither the former nor the latter could have intended the
consequences now sought to be brought by respondents’ second motion for
reconsideration.

Needless to say, to the extent that the decision in the Locsin case is inconsistent with that of the Contreras
case, the latter must necessarily prevail over the former.  In fact, the position taken
by the Supreme Court in the Contreras case was reiterated in, inter alia, Edwards vs. Arce,1 Siari
Valley Estates, Inc. vs. Lucasan,2 Manalang
vs. E. Tuason de Rickards,3 Magda­lena Estate, Inc. vs.
Caluag,4
Philippine Sugar Institute vs. Court of Industrial Relations,5 Board
of Liquidators vs. Ricma,6 and Dy
Pac vs. Dy Pac.7

2. The Edwards case

This referred to a lot of 180 square meters belonging to Mr. and
Mrs. Edwards, who delivered it, in 1931, to Mr. and Mrs. Arce
for administration.  Inasmuch as
the Arces had failed to render accounts since 1946
and had leased the property to another, the Edwards filed an action to recover
possession of the lot and for an accounting and liquidation of said
administration.

It appears that prior thereto, the Arces
had sued the Ed­wards to compel them to execute a deed of conveyance of said
lot, in compliance with a promise to sell made by them to the Arces.  In due
course, a decision was rendered declaring that the Arces
were entitled to demand fulfillment of said promise insofar only as a
portion of 137 square meters of said lot is concerned, with­out the
improvements thereon, and not with regard to the remain­ing area of said
lot, containing 43 square meters, and that, since the complaint sought the
conveyance of the whole lot, with a total area of 180 square meters, judgment
was rendered absolving the Edwards from said complaint.

After this decision had become final, the Edwards com­menced the
second action for the recovery of possession of the lot and for an
accounting.  In their answer to the
complaint there­in, the Arces invoked the decision in
the first case, acknowledging their right to demand fulfillment of the
promise of the Edwards, to sell a portion of 137 square meters of said
lot.  The Arces
prayed, accordingly, that the Edwards be sentenced to execute the deed of
conveyance thereof and to pay damages for their fail­ure to do so, despite the
decision in the first case.  The Court of
First Instance rendered, in the second case, a decision sentencing the Edwards to
execute said deed of sale in favor of the Arces
and requiring the latter to render an accounting to the former, under the terms
set forth in said decision, which was substantially affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the latter’s decision and sentenced the Arces to
return the possession of the entire lot in question to the Edwards, to
pay the latter a given sum for their use and occupation of a portion of said
lot, and to render an accounting of the rentals for the remain­ing area thereof.  Explaining its reasons therefor,
the Court used the language quoted at the footnote.1

It cannot be denied that the Arces
had a strong equity in their favor, based on the explicit recognition
made, in the body of the decision in the first case, of their right to demand
fulfillment of the promise of the Edwards to sell to them a portion of 137
square meters of the lot in dispute, and that, the dispositive
part of said decision dismissing the complaint of the Arces,
with respect to the whole lot of 180 square meters, is inconsistent with
said recog­nition.  Yet, such is the
policy of strict adherence to the principle of res
adjudicata adopted in said case,
that this Court felt con­strained therein to reverse the decision appealed
from.

Respondents herein have in their favor no judicial declara­tion,
contained in a final judgment, similar or even comparable to that
made in favor of the Arces.  In fact, the former do not have the
equities that the latter had.

3. The Siari Valley case

This case involved a decision of the Supreme Court affirm­ing
that of the Court of First Instance, the dispositive
part of which was quoted only partially in our decision.  The question was raised as to whether or not
the portion not so quoted in our confirmatory decision had, also, been
affirmed.  Holding that the answer must
be in the affirmative, we added:

“We explained in Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that ‘the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the
court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision‘,
and that the judgment must be distinguished from the opinion.  Our decree was one affirming the appealed
judgment.  If any statement in the
opinion preceding the decree seemingly excluded a portion (which we deny), it
must be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the
opinion.”1

4. Manalang v. Rickards

In several actions for ejectment of
tenants instituted in the City Court of Manila, on April 27, 1954, the
defendants filed mo­tions to dismiss based upon Rep. Act No. 1162 (approved on
June 18, 1954), pursuant to which, from the approval thereof and until the
expropriation therein provided, “no ejectment
proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against any tenant or occupant of
any landed estates or haciendas” therein authorized to be expro­priated.  On July
14, 1954, the court denied the motions and sus­pended the
proceedings for two (2) years from the approval of said Act or until further
order of the court.  However, on April 13, 1955, the municipal judge
ordered the cases set for hearing.  A
reconsideration of this order having been denied, the tenants filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
that the order of July 14, 1954,
had already disposed of the action and determined the rights of the
parties.  The CFI dismissed the petition
upon the theory that said order was merely interlocutory.  Although in the body of the order the
municipal judge declared that, “from the approval of Rep. Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceeding should be instituted or prosecuted
against any tenant,” thereby indicating apparently, that the motion to
dismiss should be granted, the dispositive part of
the order clearly and unequivocally denied the motion.  The Supreme Court affirmed the order of
dismissal appealed from, stating:

“x x x It
is argued x x x by
appellants that the body of the order recognized the prohibition laid down by
Republic Act No. 1162 against the 
institution of eject­ment proceedings after
the effectivity of said Act.  It is an elementary principle of procedure
that the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is
the investive or controll­ing factor
that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions
presented therein, notwith­standing the existence of statements or
declarations in the body of said order that may be confusing.  In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely suspended the
proceedings without touch­ing on the merits of the case or disposing of the
issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but
clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an
action for certiorari.”1

5. Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag

Paragraph (b) of a decision rendered on June 11, 1957, ordered –

“x x x the
defendant, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, to give to the plaintiff
the title to Lot 2-b-5 of Psd-33887 subject to a first mortgage in favor of the
defendant to secure payment on the unpaid balance of the price of the
land.”

The defendant having filed a motion for reconsideration, on Jan­uary 10, 1958, the court modified
said paragraph to read:

“(b) Declaring
the plaintiff to be entitled to pay for the land on cash basis within a period
of ninety (90) days from the time that the defendant shall deliver to him the
title to Lot 2-b-5 of Psd-33887, subject to a first mort­gage in favor of the
defendant to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the price of the land,
which delivery of title must be accomplished within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof.”

The defendant subsequently tried to appeal from said decision,
but the trial court dismissed the appeal upon the ground that the record on
appeal had been filed out of time, computed from the ori­ginal decision of June 11, 1957.  The Court of Appeals sustained the view taken
by the lower court, which was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court, the
amendment made on January 10, 1958,
be­ing substantial in nature, in that the original decision did not require the
plaintiff to make a payment to the defendant, which the amended decision
did.  Commenting on plaintiff’s argument
to the effect that the body of the original decision already stated that
plaintiff was under obligation to pay for the land on cash basis, we said:

“It is of no moment that the above was contained in text of
the original decision.  The quoted
finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispos­itive portion. 
It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where
there is a conflict between the dispositive part and
the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
disposi­tive portion is the final order while the
opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.  (2 Moran 194, 1963
ed.)”1

6. Phil. Sugar Institute v. CIR

In a decision rendered on August
2, 1954, the CIR sentenced the employer corporation to pay its
policemen a given additional compensation “together with all the privileges
and facilities hither­to enjoyed by them.” These policemen having
been laid off, in the meantime, and, thereafter, refused reinstatement, their Union
filed with the CIR a petition for reinstatement and for contempt.  In due course, the CIR rendered judgment on December 9, 1957, ordering the
reinstatement prayed for, with back wages, “without loss of seniority and
other privileges they have hitherto enjoyed x x x.” Still later, the Union
filed a “petition for execution of judgment re privileges,
facilities”.  It appears that these
“facili­ties” included free khaki suiting, shoes, helmets and
ponchos, which the employer did not furnish them upon reinstatement, alleg­ing
that said items were given for official use during their official tour of duty,
while rendering actual police work, which they had not rendered while laid
off.  Inasmuch, however, as the decision
sought to be executed had eliminated the “facilities” from the award
made therein, the claim of the policemen was overruled because:

“Well-settled is the rule that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof (Neri
Edwards, et al. vs. Arce, et al., 52 O.G. 2537; Govt.
of the Phil. vs. Jose Ramon y Vasquez, et al., 73 Phil. 689; Contreras, et al.
vs. Felix, et al., 78 Phil. 570; Jabon, et al. vs. Alo, et al., 91 Phil. 750; Robles, et al. vs. Timario, et al., G.R. No. L-13911, April 28, 1960; Segarra vs. Maranilla,
G.R. No. L-14428, July 26, 1960).”2

7. Board of Liquidators v. Ricma1

As we had occasion to point out earlier2,
this case involved a conflict between the dispositive
part of an order, which decreed the denial of a “motion to dismiss,”
and the body of the order, which set forth the reasons why plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration of a previous order granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, should be denied.  Although it was obvious that the court
had committed a mistake in referring, in the dispositive
part, to defendant’s “motion to dismiss,” for what was before the
court was not that motion, the same having already been granted, but the
mo­tion for reconsideration of the order granting said motion to dis­miss, we
held that the dispositive part should prevail,
for it “clearly and definitely stated that what was being denied” was
the “motion to dismiss,” regardless “of anything
said” in the body of the order in dispute.

8. Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Union v. Dy
Pac & Co.

On January 30, 1961, Dy Pac & Co.
was adjudged by the CIR guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered to pay back
wages to certain workers from the date of their unjust dismissal – by stop­ping
the work in the old carro to which they were
assigned – to the date of finality of the CIR decision, which was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.  The Union
having later moved that said backwages be computed,
the matter was referred to the chief examiner of the CIR, who subsequently
submitted his assessment of the backwages from January 20, 1957 (date of dismissal)
to December 1, 1962 (date
of finality of the decision).  This
report was, on November 9, 1966,
approved by a CIR Judge, but modified by a resolution of the CIR en banc,
on November 9, 1966,
reducing the backwages to six months.

Assailed as an attempt to modify a decision already final and executory, the validity of this resolution was sought to be
jus­tified upon the ground that “to reinstate the workers concerned when
there is no work to be done would be injustice to the com­pany, because management
would be forced to give salaries to the workers even if they have nothing to
do.” In said resolution, the CIR en banc concluded,
therefore, that whatever backwages the workers were
entitled to should not extend beyond the time when, had they been reinstated,
they would have nevertheless ceased working due to the legitimate shutting up
of the carro in which they were working.

The Supreme Court rejected this view upon the ground that while
the body of a decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity
regarding which way the Court’s reasoning prepon­derates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of these
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties and obligations.”

Public Interest and

Public
Policy

We have thus consistently adhered to the rule that the dispositive part of a decision is the judgment properly
speaking; that the same prevails over the opinion set forth in the body of the
decision; and that, in case of conflict between the former and the latter, the
former is controlling, “regardless of any possible injustice in a
particular case.” And the reason for this policy is obvious.

“x x x The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not
void is self-evident.  The interests of
society impose it.  The opposing view
might make litigation ‘more unendurable than the wrongs it is intended to
redress.’ It would create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would
constantly arise as to what the judgment or order was.  As this court has
announced, ‘public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by the law.  The
very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies.  (Layda vs. Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield &
O’Brien, 38 Phil., 521.)

“We have no cause to depart from this rule.  It is a rule that must be adhered to regardless
of any possible injustice in a particular case.  It is not a legal concept of the flexible
kind, capable of being individualized to meet the needs of varying
conditions. ‘We have to sub­ordinate the equity of a particular situation
to the over­mastering need’ of certainty and immutability of judi­cial
pronouncements.  The loss to the
litigants in par­ticular and to society in general ‘would in the long run be
greater than the gain if judges were clothed with power to revise’ their
decisions at will. ‘Perhaps, with a higher conception’ of the administration of
jus­tice and its needs, ‘the time will come when even revi­sion will be
permitted if revision is in consonance with established standards’ of court
functions, ‘but the time is not yet.'”1

This is good law and no reason has been given to depart there­from in this particular case.  Now more than ever, it is necessary to define
or state, with the greatest possible precision, the extent to which courts may
go in the interpretation or enforcement of judg­ments and decrees that are
already final and executory.  Shall we keep on upholding the restrictive
policy above set forth, or should we favor a liberal one, and allow greater
flexibility in the exercise of the ministerial duty to execute said
final judgments or decrees?

It may be trite to note that the latter policy tends to encourage
litigations, that one of the pressing needs of the Philippines is the adoption
of measures tending to minimize judicial controversies; that there are
thousands of cases pending in our inferior courts; that any increase in the
number of cases in such courts would neces­sarily connote a corresponding
increase in the number of cases brought to appellate courts, that in view of
the big number of cases now pending in our courts of justice, such cases must
necessarily consume many years before they are finally disposed of; that a fur­ther
increase in the number of court litigations would surely cause greater delays
in the disposition of cases; and that such delays inure principally to the
benefit of unscrupulous litigants, to the detriment of the people and of
their faith in the Rule of Law.

I suggest that the restrictive policy is the best, from the view­point,
not only of society, but, also, of the individual litigants; that the community
is mainly concerned with public order, the interests of which are better served
by the prompt settlement of justifiable controversies; that so is the
litigant, who needs, more than the col­lectivity, to know what his rights are,
in the simplest terms possible and as soon as it may be feasible; that, at any
rate, most of the issues raised in connection with the execution of final
judgments or decrees involve fine and hair-splitting distinctions, which it is
the bounden duty of the parties to avoid by seasonably filing motions for
reconsideration aimed at securing the necessary clarification; and that said
restrictive policy would compel the parties and their coun­sel to exercise
great care in studying said judgments and decrees before they become final
and executory.

The error of law or injustice that would allegedly result from
holding respondents herein liable for damages, is
negated by what has been said in the foregoing pages.  It should be noted, moreover, that there
would have been no such damages, had respondents not performed illegal acts,
namely, the appropriation of extensive portions of the public domain, including
the territorial waters, and the sale thereof to third persons.  They are, accordingly, the ultimate cause
of said damages.

One other factor should not be overlooked in disposing of the
issues now before the Court.  For a
number of years now, certain events or incidents here and there have led to the
belief or feeling that there must have been a good number of certificates of
title illegally issued, covering extensive areas of the public domain, includ­ing,
sometimes, lands previously decreed in favor of parties whose titles are still
subsisting.  Heretofore, such belief or
feeling had been seemingly based upon judicial controversies or administrative
investigations involving relatively small parcels of land.  Latest developments, however, indicate that
the magnitude of the irregu­larities in connection with the illegal issuance of
transfer certifi­cates of title and the consequent usurpations of portions of
the public domain may have reached considerable, if not alarming, proportions.

Apart from its adverse effect upon the stability of judicial
decisions and the condition of court dockets in the Philippines, the resolution
of the issues now pending determination before Us has a bearing on the duty of
courts of justice to afford effective relief against irregularities
jeopardizing, not only the efficacy of our Torrens System, but, also, the
defense of our national patrimony, if not of our national security.  The question, insofar as the pre­sent case is
concerned, is:  Shall we exempt the
authors of said irregularities from responsibility for damages, upon proof that
the lands thereby usurped have been conveyed to purchasers for value, who
relied on certificates of title illegally secured by their prede­cessors
in interest?  Would not the grant of such
exemption encour­age said irregularities and foster the simulation  – difficult to prove in
court – of sales to dummies or alter egos?

Favorable action on the motion for reconsideration of respon­dents
herein, would, it is believed:

(1)  
Establish a precedent – fraught with
possibilities – tend­ing to impair the stability of judicial decisions and
affording a means to prolong court proceedings or justify the institution
of new ones, despite the finality of the judgment or decree rendered in the
main case, by sanctioning a departure from the clear, plain and natural
meaning of said judgment or decree;

(2)  
Contribute to the further increase of the
steadily mount­ing number of cases pending before our courts of justice, and
thus generate greater delay in the determination of said cases, as well as
offset the effect of legislative and administrative measures taken – some
upon the suggestion or initiative of the Supreme Court – to pro­mote the
early disposal of such cases;

(3)  
Impair a normal and legitimate means to
implement the constitutional mandate for the protection and conservation of our
natural resources and the patrimony of the nation; and

(4)  
Promote usurpations of the public domain,
as well as the simulation of sales thereof by the original usurper, by
exempt­ing him from responsibility for damages – which would not have been
sustained were it not for the irregularities committed by him – so long as he
has conveyed the subject matter thereof to a purchaser for value, in good
faith.

Referring to the subject of torts, Prosser adverts to the
necessity of taking an active role in making ”a conscious effort to
direct the law along lines which will achieve a desirable social re­sult,”1
because:

“The ‘prophylactic’ factor of preventing future harm has been
quite important in the field of torts. 
The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the
victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.  When the decisions of the courts become known
and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a
strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm.  Not infrequently one reason for imposing
liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.  x x
x.” (Prosser, The Law of Torts,
3rd ed., p. 23.)

Prosser goes on to say: 
“when the interest of the public is thrown into the scale and
allowed to swing the balance for or against the plaintiff, the result is a form
of” – what Pound, in his Theory of Social Interests,2 has
characterized as “social engineering” that deliberately uses the
law as an instrument to promote that ‘greatest happiness of the greatest
number’ which by common con­sent is the object of society.  This process of ‘balancing the inter­ests’ is
by no means peculiar to the law of torts, but it has been carried to its
greatest length, and has received its most general conscious recognition
in this field.”3

WHEREFORE, I vote to deny respondents’ second motion for
reconsideration and supplemental second motion for reconsider­ation.

---

^[1] Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504; Bach­rach
v. Rural Transit, G.R. No. L-26764, July 25, 1967; People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967; City Mayor v.
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, G.R. No. L-20346,
Oct. 31,
1967; Pacific Oxygen v. Central
Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Lim Kiah v. Kaynee
Co., G.R. No. L-24802, Oct.
14, 1968.

^[2] Edwards v. Arce, 102 Phil. 390.

^[3]
Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570, 574, 575, 577.

^[4]
“(b) Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot
360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino;”

1
“(e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally
pay the costs.”

2
“(d) Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further acts of
ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd.
– 40891; x x x“

1
Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570, 574, 575, 577.

2
Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan, 102 Phil.
390, 393.

3
G.R. No. L-24318, August 29, 1969.

1 Underscoring supplied.

2 Except the Government’s claim for
damages.

3 The prayer in the complaint of the Government was:

“WHEREFORE,
it is respectfully prayed this Honora­ble Court to render judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:

Under the First
Cause of Action:

To order the
annulment of whatever title was issued in favor of the defendant Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda Calatagan for the excess of some 2,500 hectares of land
subject matter hereof and the reversion of said area to the public domain;

Under the Second
Cause of Action:

To order that
plaintiff’s lawful and bona fide permittees be placed
in possession of the corresponding parcels of land respec­tively covered by
Fishpond Permit No. F-4526-N and other Fish­pond Permits;

Under the Third
Cause of Action:

To order the
defendants to pay damages jointly and severally to the plaintiff in the sum of
at least P500,000.00;

Under the Fourth
Cause of Action:

To restrain the
defendants from exercising further acts of dominion and ownership over the land
subject matter of this litiga­tion lawfully belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, by issu­ing a writ of preliminary injunction against them during
the pendency of this case, and a writ of final
injunction to be included in the judgment as part of the relief.

Common to All
Causes of Action:

Plaintiff
finally prays for such other relief as may be deemed just, proper and equitable
in the premises.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13, in G.R. No.
L-20950.)

The PRAYER in the
complaint of Tolentino was:

“WHEREFORE,
plaintiff-intervenor respectfully prays this
Honorable Court to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor and against the defendants, as follows:

Under the First
Cause of Action:

To order the
annulment of whatever title was issued in favor of the defendants Alfonso Zobel, Ayala y Cia, or the
Hacienda Cala­tagan and the defendants Dizons for the excess of some 2,500 hec­tares of the
portions of the sea, beach or foreshore and navigable inlet, Lot 360 of Psd-40891,
subject-matter hereof, and the rever­sion of said area to the public domain.

Under the Second
Cause of Action:

To order that
plaintiff’s lawful and bona fide permittees, and more particularly the plaintiff-intervenor
be placed in possession of the said navigable inlet covered by Fishpond Permit
No. F-4526-N and Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1144.

Under the Third
Cause of Action:

To order the
defendants to pay damages jointly and severally to the plaintiff in the sum of
at least P500,000.00; and to the plain­tiff-intervenor the amounts alleged and mentioned in paragraph
16 of this complaint in intervention.

Under the Fourth
Cause of Action:

To order the defendants requiring them to refrain from usurp­ing
the said fishpond, Lot 360 of Psd-40891, lawfully belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines; and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the
aforesaid defendants restraining them, their agents and representatives from
the usurpation of the same and committing acts of dispossession against the
plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor.

Common to All
Causes of Action:

Plaintiff-intervenor finally prays for such other relief as may be
deemed just, proper and equitable in the premises.” (Record
on Appeal, pp. 30-31, in L-20950.)

1 Record on Appeal in G.R. No.
L-20950, pp. 252-253.

1 Although they were truly justified, both legally and
morally

1 Art. 2176 of our Civil Code.

2 The resurvey ordered in 1949, to meet the adverse
claims of others; the illegal inclusion in the resurvey plan of 1,091 hectares beyond
the boundaries of the area covered by respondents’ TCT No. T-722, about half of
which excess (or 403.2185 hectares) being part of the foreshore, beach or navi­gable
waters, which are not susceptible of registration, and are per se
a notice of such fact; their refusal to vacate the areas covered by said claims
or failure to cause said areas to be vacated by their assignees or
successors-in-interest, despite a demand made by the Bureau of Fisheries, as
early as 1952; the sale by them of Lot 360 to the Dizons
in 1954, or subsequently to said demand of the Bureau of Fisheries.

1 Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Union v. Dy Pac & Co., G.R. No. L-27377, March 31, 1971.  Underscoring supplied.

1 G.R. No. L-20300-01 and
L-20355-56, April 30, 1965.

2 G.R. No. L-20950, May 31, 1965.

1 Art. 1157 of our Civil Code.

2 Republic v. Ayala, et al., G.R.
No. L-20950, May 31, 1965.

1 Ford Motors v. Mathis,
C.A. Tex.,
322 F. 2d. 267; Walker v. General Motors Corp., D.C.L., 115 F. Supp.
267; Mitchell v. Millee, 214 A. 2d 694, 26 Conn.
Supp. 142; see also, 30 C.J.S. 935.

2 Comstock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W. 2d
627, 358 Mich. 163, 78 A.L.R. 2d 499; Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, C.A.
Tex. 322 F. 2d 267; Gherna v. Ford Motor Co.,
55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 246 C.A. 2d 639; Ford Motors Co. v.
Lonon, 398 S.W. 2d 240, 217 Tenn. 400; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P. 2d 168, 61 C. 2d 256; People ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bua,
226 N.E. 2d 6, 37 Ill. 2d 180; Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 210 N.E. 2d 182, 32 Ill. 2d 612.

1 Arts. 280,
281 and 308, Revised Penal Code; Arts. 429 and 1644, Civil Code of the
Philippines; Sections 499 and 1837, Revised Administrative Code; Rep. Act No.
926; Daywalt v. Corporation, 39 Phil. 587.

2 Brame v. Clark,
62 S.E. 418.

3 La Bruno v. Lawrence,
166 A. 2d 822, 825.

4 Restatement of the Law Torts, 2nd,
Secs. 1-280, p. 296.

1 “The defendant is liable for an
intentional entry although he has acted in good faith, under the
mistaken belief, however rea­sonable, that he is committing no
wrong.  Thus, he is a trespasser
although he believes that the land is his own, or that he has the consent of
the owner, or the legal privilege of entry; or although he is a child too young
to understand that what he is doing is wrong. 
The interest of the landowner is protected at the expense of those who
make innocent mistakes …” Prosser, The
Law of Torts, 3rd ed. 1964 Ed., p. 74.

“It is
also to be borne in mind that the intent, with which an act is done, is not
the test of liability of a party to an action for trespass.  A person may be ever so innocent of an
intention to cross the invisible boundary of his neighbor’s land, or he may
believe that he has a perfect right to cross it, and yet his inno­cence and
good faith will not protect him.  His
conduct may be marked by the utmost civility, and even be actuated by a desire
to benefit, or it may in fact benefit the owner.  Still, if his entry was unauthorized, he
is a trespasser and liable accordingly. 
Mere inadvertence or accident in crossing the line will not save him from
trespass, nor will plaintiff’s failure to prove that de­fendant’s act caused
substantial damage.  The law implies
dam­ages from the trespass.  Even
though the harm be so trifling, that plaintiff’s witnesses are unable to place
any estimate upon the injuries inflicted, yet, it is said, if no recovery could
be had, the trespasser, by repetition of the act and the lapse of time, might
acquire an easement in plaintiff’s land, in spite of anything that could be
done to prevent it.” Burdick’s Law of Torts, 1926 Ed., Sec. 52, pp.
408-409.

“When one
commits a trespass upon the person or pro­perty of another, whether intentional
or unintentional, there are few defenses which will excuse and relieve him
from liability.  For example, the
intent with which an act is done is not a test of liability in trespass;
therefore, a mistake of law or fact or absence of bad faith on the part
of the defendant will not excuse a trespass.  Advice of counsel, even though acted on in
good faith, will not relieve a trespasser from liability.  A trespasser cannot relieve himself from liability by showing that a third person di­rected,
ordered or authorized him to do the illegal act complained of.  As in the case of other torts, infancy is
not a defense to liabi­lity in trespass.” 52 Am. Jur., p. 864.

“Where
defendant had a right to do the act, ordinarily, his motive is immaterial.  Generally, good faith, or the fact that
defendant acted on advice of counsel is no defense, at least if full
disclosure of the facts was not made. 
Hence, a bona fide claim of right either to real or personal property
constitutes no defense to trespass although the belief was unintentionally
induced by plaintiff.” 87 C.J.S. 992,
Trespass, Sec. 33.

“Fact that
trespass results from an innocent mistake, and in that sense, is not
deliberate or willful, does not relieve the trespasser of liability therefor or for any of the results thereof; and, therefore,
even if defendant in action for trespass to land had made the most careful and
exhaustive inquiry into ownership of land before committing trespass, it
would nevertheless be liable therefor.  Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 91 A. 2d
232.” 87 C.J.S., p. 992, Footnote, 45.

1 Restatement, Torts, 2d.
Sec. 164, p. 297.

1 On Dec. 28, 1954.

2 Dizon v. Bayona, 98 Phil. 942, 948-949.

1 In Dizon
v. Bayona, supra.

1 Supra.

2 See pp. 12-13 of this opinion.

1 See pp. 13-19 hereof.

2 See p. 10 of this opinion.

3 G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 and L-20355-56, April 30, 1965.

1 Dizon v. Bayona, 98 Phil. 942.

2 CA-G. R.
No. 24186-87-R.

3 G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 and
L-20355-56.

1 63 Phil. 87.

2 In other words, dispositive part of a decision.

3 30-A Am. Jur., pp. 212-213.

1 63 Phil. 231.

1 83 Phil. 491.

2  85 Phil. 43.

3 105 Phil. 814.

1 78 Phil. 570, 574, 575, 576-577.

2 1 Freeman on Judgments, 275.

1 Underscoring ours.

2 Underscoring ours.

1 98 Phil. 688.

2 102 Phil. 390.

3 104 Phil. 254, 258.

4 G.R. No. L-16250, June 30, 1964.

5 G.R. No. L-18930, Feb. 28, 1967.

6 Supra.

7 G.R. No. L-27377, March 31, 1971.

1 “We find merit in the contention of the
petitioners much as we sympathize with the plight of respondents for,
while it is true that in the decision in civil case No. 123 the court made a
finding that respondents were entitled to demand the fulfillment of the
contract of sale regarding the portion of the lot containing an area of 137
square meters, such however is not controlling for the purpose of res judicata but what
appears in the dispositive part of the decision.  In fact, the only portion of the decision
that be­came the subject of execution is what is ordained or decreed in such dispositive part. 
Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be
considered as part of the reasons or conclu­sions of the court and while
they may serve as guide or enlighten­ment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in
the dispositive part of the decision.  Thus, in one case it was held that ‘The
presumption of res adjudicata
cannot be de­duced from the grounds of the order, but from the fallo or from the dispositive
part of the order, which is the real judgment in the case in litigation.’
(Archbishop of Manila vs.
Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 339).  In
another case it was also held that, ‘In a case decided by the court on appeal,
the true judgment of legal effect is that entered by the clerk of said court
pursuant to the dispositive part of its decision.’
(Gutierrez Hermanos vs. De la Riva, 46 Phil.
827).  And the reason why the same issue
cannot be litigated again is that, ‘Public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by the law.  The very ob­ject for which courts were
constituted was to put an end to contro­versies.’ x x
x.

“It may
be contended that the court in civil case No. 123 committed a mistake in
dismissing the case outright or in not mak­ing a partial adjudication in favor
of respondents as regards the portion of the lot containing an area of 137
square meters in line with the finding it has made in the body of the
decision, but such error, if any, cannot affect the applicability of the
principle of res judicata
for the same attaches even when the prior decision is erroneous.  Thus, it is a well-settled rule that ‘a final
judg­ment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdic­tion of
the subject-matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case
between the same parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the
same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be.’ x x x.

“On the
other hand, the plight of respondents can only be attributed to themselves or
their counsel.  Knowing well that an
omission has been committed by the court, they should have filed a motion for
reconsideration or appealed from its decision in order that the error or
omission may be corrected, but they failed to take either action and instead
allowed the decision to become final and executory.  x x
x.” (Underscoring
ours.)

1 Underscoring ours.

1 104 Phil. 254, 258.

1 L-16250, June
30, 1964.

2 G.R. No. L-18930, Feb. 28, 1967.

1 G.R. No. L-24318, August 29, 1969.

2 At page 5 of this opinion.

1 Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570, 575-576; Li
Kim Tho v. Sanchez, 82 Phil. 776; Frimm v. Atok-Big Wedge, G.R.
No. L-11887, Dec. 29, 1959; Tolentino v. Ongsiako, G.R.
No. L-17938, April 30, 1963.  See also, Dy Cay v.
Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521; Layda
v. Legazpi, 39 Phil. 83; Ebero
v. Cañizares, 79 Phil. 152, 154; Viquiera v. Baraña, 79
Phil. 486; Rili v. Chumaco,
98 Phil. 505; San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR L-18270, Nov. 28, 1962;
People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-18769, May 27, 1966; Ocampo v. Caluag,
G.R. No. L-21113, April 27,
1967.

1 The Law of Torts, by William L. Prosser, 3rd ed.,
1964, pp. 14-15.

2 4 Pub. Am. Soc. Society
(1920), p. 15.

3 Prosser, op. cit., p. 15.

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