CARLOS MORAN SISON AND PRISCILA F. SISON, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

Petitioners appealed from a resolution dated January 13, 1964 of the
Court of Tax Appeals in its Case No. 337 (a) denying their petition for the
rendi­tion of a decision “on the merits” in said case, and instead,
(b) granting herein respondent’s motion for the execution of the judgment
rendered by this Court in G. R.  No. L-13739
entitled “The Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Carlos Moran Sison and Priscila F. Sison“.

In our decision of June
30, 1971, We affirmed the aforesaid
resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals, with costs.

Now before Us is petitioners’ motion for
the re­consideration of our decision, on the ground that the same is based on
certain “misapprehension of facts”. 
In the first place, they point to the statement made therein to the
effect that they refrained from present­ing evidence to prove the invalidity of
the questioned deficiency tax, claiming that they did present both oral and
documentary evidence on said matter; in the second place, they point to another
statement made in the afore­said decision to the effect that petitioners
contended that “upon the remanding of the case below, the Court of Tax
Appeals was bound to set the case anew for hearing,” claiming that they
had never advanced such contention; and lastly, petitioners’ claim that when in
our decision in G. R. No. L-13739 We said that “the Collector’s actuation
is herein sustained,” We did not thereby sustain the disputed assessment.

It must be admitted that there was inaccuracy in the first two
statements, it appearing from the record that during the hearing below held on
August 20, 1957, petitioners presented the testimony of Atty. Teodoro Dominguez and several documents as evidence, among
them being those mentioned in petitioners’ reply brief and their motion for
reconsideration now under consideration. 
It is a fact, however, that in the course of said hearing Atty.
Dominguez, while arguing on the question of prescription, said the
following:  “We prefer not to submit
evidence in the meantime while waiting for the resolution of this Honorable
Court” – obviously on the question of prescription that he had
raised.  Thereupon, Judge Nable made the observation that the Court was “trying
the whole case on the question of prescription and on the merits”, to
which Atty. Dominguez replied:  “As
I had already pointed out, your Honor, the Collector of Internal Re­venue….”,
but his statement was interrupted by an observation made by Judge Luciano to this effect: 
“It is up to you if you want to take that chance.” (t.s.n., p. 9, August 20, 1957).  The first
“misapprehension of fact” must, therefore, be considered in the
context of the foregoing.

The statement that petitioners had argued “that upon the
remanding of the case below, the Court of Tax Appeals was bound to set the case
anew for hearing” suf­fers likewise from inaccuracy.  The statement should have been, instead, that
it was petitioners’ contention that upon the remanding of the case below the
Court of Tax Appeals was called upon to render a decision “on the
merits” in view of the fact that its decision, appealed to and later
reversed by the Supreme Court, did not de­cide the question of the validity of
the assessment but merely declared that the same had prescribed.  As a matter of fact, upon the remanding of
the case below, petitioners filed on November
21, 1963 a PETITION FOR DECISION ON THE MERITS.  This petition was denied by the Court of Tax
Appeals in its resolution of January
13, 1964, which furthermore granted the motion for execution of
judgment filed by the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue.  Whatever inaccuracy there is in our statement
regarding this particular matter may be traced to the fact that the personal
recommendation made by the writer of the decision to the Court during its
deliberation on the case was precisely to have it remanded below to enable
petitioners to present whatever other evidence they had on the alleged
invalidity of the questioned deficiency tax assessment.  The recommendation, however, was disapproved
by all the other members of the Court in whose opinion judgment should be
rendered affirming the reso­lution of the Court of Tax Appeals which denied
petitioners’ petition for the rendition of a decision on the merits and,
furthermore, ordering the execution of the final judgment rendered in G. R. No.
L-13739.

Considering the questions raised by
petitioners in their brief as appellants, namely, that “The Tax Court
erred in granting appellee’s motion for execution of
the decision rendered by this Honorable Supreme Court on April 30, 1963 in G. R. No. L-13739, and denying
appellants’ petition for decision on the merits of C.T.A. Case No. 337,”
it is obvious that the “misapprehension of facts” above–referred to
do not constitute reversible errors, nor do they show that our decision is
erroneous.  In fact, they do not adversely
affect the following portion of our decision which, in reality, is the main
ground in support thereof:

“Section 14 of Rep. Act 1125 which speaks of the “Effect
of decision that tax is barred by Statute of Limitations,” pro­vides that if
the decision of the court is that the tax is barred said decision
“shall be considered as its decision that there is no deficiency in
respect of such tax.” Such being the rule the contrary must like­wise be
true, namely:  that if the decision of
the court is that the tax is not barred, such decision must be
understood in the sense that there is deficiency in respect of such tax.  In line with this, when in
G.R. No. L-13739 We overruled therein appellee’s
claim for damages, We did so “not only be­cause
they took no appeal from the decision presently under review, but also
because the collectors’ actuation is herein sustained.” (Underlines supplied; Commissioner etc. vs. Sison,
7 SCRA pp. 884, 886).  The
collectors’ contention involved in that case was pre­cisely that herein
petitioners were liable for a deficiency tax in the amount of P5,535.02.”

Petitioners contend, however, that the statement “the
Collector’s actuation is herein sustained” was only a “passing
observation” in relation to their complaint that they had been harrassed and persecuted by the Com­missioner of Internal Revenue
with persistent and repeated re-investigations of their income tax liability;
that, therefore, “The collector’s action there sustained was appellee’s actuation of causing the
re-investigation of appellants’ income tax liability for 1949 by differ­ent
teams of revenue examiners during a period of more than four (4)
years.” Petitioners will thus limit the meaning and scope of our statement
to the propriety or regularity of the repeated investigations complained
of.  This is an erroenous
view.  Our statement to the effect that
“the Collector’s actuation is herein sustained” necessarily implies
approval not only of the repeated investigations he had made of petitioners’
income tax liability, but also of the final result thereof, namely, his finding
that petitioners were liable for the deficiency tax they were required to
pay.  Moreover, peti­tioners’ defense of
prescription referred to the defi­ciency tax amounting to P5,535.02
which the respondent Commissioner was trying to collect from them.  When said defense was sustained by the Court
of Tax Appeals, the claim barred was naturally the aforesaid deficiency tax;
and when We reversed the decision of said Court, it is
likewise crystal clear that what We held to be not yet prescribed was the same
claim.  The Court of Tax Appeals
correctly understood our decision in G. R. No. L-13739 to have precisely this
meaning, for which reason it refused to render another decision “on the
merits”; and as our deci­sion aforesaid had become final and executory, it ordered its execution.

In view of the foregoing, discussion of the merits and probative
value of the oral and documentary evidence mentioned in petitioners’ reply
brief and motion for re­consideration, is deemed unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, petitioners’ motion for the reconsideration is
hereby denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take
part.