SPOUSES MOISES P. PALISOC AND BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES AND TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, OWNER AND PRESIDENT, RESPECTIVELY, OF A SCHOOL OF ARTS…

An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student
in automotive mech­anics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon
Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for dam­ages
arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow
student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon,
at the laboratory room of the said Institute.

Defendants, per the trial court’s decision, are:  “(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise
to this action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the
institute:^[1]
the defendant Teodosio Valenton,
the president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue,
instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow
student of the deceased.  At the
beginning the Manila Techanical Ins­titute was a
single proprietorship, but lately on August
2, 1962, it was duly incorporated.”

The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs’ son were
thus narrated by the trial court: 
“(T)he deceased Domina­dor Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio
L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of
March 10, 1966, between two and three o’clock, they, together with another
classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room
located on the ground floor.  At that
time the classes were in recess.  Desiderio Cruz and Vir­gilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador
Palisoc was merely looking on at them.  Daffon made a
remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman.  Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon
on the face.  Daffon,
in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on
the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.  Palisoc re­treated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward.  Palisoc became pale
and fainted.  First aid was administered
to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospi­tal.  He never regained consciousness; finally he
died.  The fore­going is the substance of
the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to
the incident.”

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the
incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio
Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who
“has no motive or reason to testify one way or ano­ther in favor of any
party” and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows an the
deceased.

With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian
of the Manila Police Department who performed the autopsy re “Cause of
death: shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs (6th and 7th, left),^[2]
contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain”, and his
testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased were caused ‘probably by
strong fist blows”, the trial court found defendant Daffon
liable for the quasi­delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.^[3]
It held that “(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon
in giving the dec­eased strong fist blows in the stomach which ruptured his
inter­nal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article
of the Code.”^[4]

The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
defendants-officials of the Manila Techanical
Institute, in this wise:

“x x x
Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code which reads:

‘Art. 2180.  x x x x

‘Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.’

“In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not
applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control
or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the
conduct and actions of the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

‘CIVIL LAW:  DAMAGES. ART.
2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED:  – The
clause ‘so long as they remain in their custody’ contained in Article 2180 of
the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents.  In those
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father
and mother to the teachers.  (Ciriaco L. Mercado, Peti­tioner, vs. the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al., respondents, G. R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960).’^[5]

“There is no evidence that the accused Daffon
lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the
school.  These defendants can­not
therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.”

Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:

“1.  Sentencing the defendant Virgilio
L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the de­ceased
Dominador Palisoc (a)
P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning
power, considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and seventeen
years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attor­ney’s fee,
plus the costs of this action.

“2.  Absolving the other defendants.

“3.  Dismissing the defendants’ counter­claim for
lack of merit.”

Plaintiffs’ appeal raises the principal legal question that under
the factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial
court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding
them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors,
with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them
as a result of their son’s death.  The
Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious.

1.  The lower court absolved
defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180,
Civil Code, which expressly hold “teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades … liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody”, are not applicable
to the case at bar, since “there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fist blows^[6]
lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the
school.  These defendants cannot
therefore be made respon­sible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.”

The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the
Court’s dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals,^[7]
that “(I)t would seem that the clause ‘so long as they remain in their cus­tody,’
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents.  In these circums­tances the
control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from
the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the
torts of the pupil.  Such a sit­uation
does not appear in the case at bar: the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is
over.” This dictum had been made in rejecting therein petitioner-father’s
contention that his minor son’s school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which
was not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than him
as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the
physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate.  [A cut on the right cheek with a piece
of razor which cost only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure,
since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set
aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in
Article 2279, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been established,
petitioner’s son being only nine years old and not having been shown to have
“acted with discernment” in inflicting the injuries on his classmate.

The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum
in the earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno,^[8]
where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the decision, was whether
the therein defendant father could be held civilly liable for damages resulting
from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly
and negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved adversely against
the father).  ‘Nevertheless, the dictum
in such earlier case that “(I)t is true that under the law above-quoted,
‘teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody’, but this
provision only applies to an insti­tution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution. ” was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado.

2.  The case at bar was
instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue
of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code,
for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the
school premises.  Here, the parents of
the stu­dent at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time
of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved
is a non-academic school,^[9]
the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and
industrial school.

The Court holds that under the cited codal
article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute
(defendants Valenton and Quibulue,
respectively) are liable jointly and sever­ally for damages to
plaintiffs-parents for the death of the latter’s minor son at the hands of
defendant Daffon at the school’s labor­atory
room.  No liability attaches to defendant
Brillantes as a mere member of the school’s board of
directors.  The school itself can­not be
held similarly liable, since it has not been properly im­pleaded
as party defendant.  While plaintiffs
sought to so implead it, by impleading
improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single
proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorpor­ated since August
2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have
been brought in as party defendant. 
Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes
and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs’ request for admission had
expressly manifested and made of record that “defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the ‘Manila
Technical Institute’ which is now a corporation and is not owned by any
individual person.”^[10]

3.  The rationale of such liability
of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to “exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child.”^[11]
This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.^[12]
In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of
the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students’ activities during the whole time that they are at attend­ance in the
school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may
inflict will­fully or through negligence on their fellow students.

4.  As tersely summarized by
Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde,
“the basis of the presump­tion of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180]
is some culpa in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority”^[13]
and ‘where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the
torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is
not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction.” The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.^[14]

5.  The lower court therefore
erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who
inflicted the fatal fist blows on his classmate and victim “lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school.”
As stated above, the phrase used in the cited art­icle — “so long as (the
students) remain in their custody” means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time.  There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits
the tortious act must live and board in the school,
as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the pre­sent decision.

6.  Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as
president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly
and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their
co-defendant Daffon in the latter’s having caused the
death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc.  The
unfortunate death result­ing from the fight between the protagonists-students
could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of
providing adequate supervision over the activities of the stu­dents in the
school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of
fellow students or other parties.  At any
rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Art­icle 2180, Civil Code,
by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of
the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability.

7.  Plaintiffs-appellees‘ contention that the award of P6,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set
by the Court in People vs. Pantoja,^[15]
and observed in all death indemnity cases there­after is well taken. The Court,
in Pantoja, after noting the de­cline in the
purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its “considered
opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00.”
The Court thereby adjusted the minimum amount of “compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict”
as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to
P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded “even though there may have been
mitigating cir­cumstances” pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article.

8.  Plaintiffs-appellees‘ other claims on appeal that the lower court
should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total
damages awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney’s fees all concern
matters that are left by law to the discretion of the trial court and the Court
has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such discre­tion on
the part of the trial court.^[16]
Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that ‘In
quasi­-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.” No gross negligence on
the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposi­tion
of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and increased attorney’s fees, and
the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb
such finding.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as
to provide as follows:

1.  Sentencing the defendants
Virgilio L. Daffon, Teodosio V. Valenton
and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to
pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00
for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P 2,000.00 for attorney’s fee,
plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2.  absolving def­endant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.  dismissing defendants’ counterclaims.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor
,and Makasiar,
J., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.

Zaldivar, Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur with J. Makalintal’s dissent.

Barredo, J., concurs in this opinion and judgment and the concurring opinion of J.
Reyes.

^[1]
Per allegations of the complaint and as indicated in the title of the
case.  Brillantes
was made def­endant as “registered owner/head under Act No. 3883” of
the Manila Technical Institute.

^[2]
Notes in parentheses supplied from other portions of autopsy report.

^[3]
‘ART. 2176.  Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done.  Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contract­ual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi­delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. 
(1902a).”

^[4]
Per the decision also, defendant Daffon had been
charged for homicide for the death in Criminal Case No. 82419 and was
“acquitted on reasonable doubt.”

^[5]
Reported in 108 Phil. 414.

^[6]
Note in brackets supplied.

^[7]
108 Phil. 414 (May 30, 1960).

^[8]
101 Phil. 843 (June 29, 1957), a six-to-three decision.

^[9]
The writer concurs with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Exconde [concurred
in by Justices Padilla and A. Reyes] that “(I) can see no sound reason for
limit­ing Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and
not to academic ones.  What substan­tial
difference is there between them in so far as con­cerns the proper supervision
and vigilance over their pupils?  It
cannot be seriously contended that an aca­demic teacher is exempt from the duty
of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third
persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and
supervision over the pupil.” However, since the school involved at bar is
a non­academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institu­tions will have to
await another case wherein it may properly be raised.

^[10] Rollo, page, 47.

^[11]
Art. 350, Civil Code.

^[12]
Art. 349, Civil Code enumerates: 
“(2) Teachers and professors” and “(4) directors of trade
establishments, with regard to apprentices” among those who “shall
exercise substitute parental authority.” Art. 352, Civil Code provides
that “The relation between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are
fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution.  x x x“

^[13] Tolentino expresses a similar opinion:  “Teachers:  – In order to be within this provision, a
teacher must not only be charged with teaching but also vigilance over their
students or pupils.  They include
teachers in educational institutions of all kinds, whether for the intellect,
the spirit, or the body; teachers who give instruction in classes or by
individuals, even in their own homes; teachers in institutions for deficient or
abandoned children, and those in cor­rectional institutions.”

^[14]
“ART. 2180.  The obligation imposed
by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.  x x x

“Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

“x x
x x .”

^[15]
25 SCRA, 468, (Oct. 11, 1968).

^[16] See
Arts. 2231, 2211 and 2208, Civil Code.

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