CESAREO PEREZ AND MAMERTA ALCANTARA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. VICENTE EVITE, AND SUSANA MANIGBAS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

In an action to quiet title brought by the spouses Cesareo Perez and
Mamerta Alcantara against Vicente Evite and Susana Manigbas (Civil Case
No. 643), involving a parcel of land 11 meters wide and 37 meters long,
or with a total area of 407 square meters, the Court of First Instance
of Batangas rendered judgment dated November 9, 1955, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

“(1) Dismissing the complain of the plaintiffs; and

“(2)
Declaring the defendants the owners of the land in question; that is,
the are measured 8.92 meters westward from the cacawate tree standing
on the northwestern corner of the land (which cacawate tree is
35.11 meters from the edge of the land bordering the provincial road)
by 11 meters southward to the point on the southwestern corner which is
also 35.11 meters from the edge of the land bordering the provincial
road on the east.

“Without pronouncement as to costs.”

On appeal by therein plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals, on March 31, 1958, affirmed the decision in toto.

The decision having become final, the court of origin, upon application
by the defendants, ordered its execution. The writ of execution,
actually issued on February 25, 1959, commanded the Provincial Sheriff
of Batangas “to deliver the ownership of the portion of the land in
litigation to the defendant Vicente Evite, of Rosario, Batangas,
pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the above-quoted
decision.”

Plaintiffs moved to quash the aforesaid writ on
the ground that, as the decision sought to be executed merely declared
defendants owners of the property, and did not order its delivery to
said parties, the writ putting them in possession thereof was at
variance with the decision and consequently, null and void.

This motion was denied by order of the court of February 28, 1959.
Plaintiffs then filed an urgent ex-parte motion “for clarification
and/or to declare null and void the Sheriff’s execution”, complaining
that notwithstanding the filing of their motion to quash, the Clerk of
Court and the Provincial Sheriff placed defendants in possession of the
property. After hearing the motion, during which the complained
officials testified and explained their actuations, the court declared
the same with legal effect and valid, and dismissed plaintiffs’ motion.

This incident was followed by defendants’ praying the court to declare
plaintiffs in contempt for resisting its lawful order (to deliver
possession of the land), which precipitated the issuance of an order,
dated June 30, 1959, allowing defendants “to surround their property
with a fence and any act or acts by other persons or parties including
the plaintiffs to intervene may be considered as an act of contempt.”

Plaintiffs moved to set aside the above order. The same having been
denied on July 11, 1959, plaintiffs instituted the instant appeal
assailing the legality of the orders of June 30 (ordering the fencing
of the lot) and July 11, 1959 (denying their motion to set aside said
previous order).

Plaintiffs-appellants, in resisting the
trial court’s orders upon the theory that the adjudication of ownership
does not include possession of the property, rely upon two (2) cases
decided by this Court. The first is Talens vs. Garcia (87 Phil., 173), where, after quoting Section 45 of Rule 39, the Court said:

“It
may be admitted that the judgment absolving defendant Talens was in
effect a declaration that the sale to him was valid. It may also be
admitted, though with some reluctance or reservation, that it was a
declaration of ownership of the lot. But it is doubtful whether it also
included a direction to surrender it to him. Although it is true that
the owner is generally entitled to possession, it is equally true that
there may be cases where the actual possessor has some rights which
must be respected or defined. A lessee is not the owner; yet a
declaration of ownership in another person does not necessarily mean
his ouster.”

In the second case (Jabon, et al., vs. Alo, et al., 91 Phil., 750; 48 Off. Gaz., 3348), the following pronouncement is found:

“*
* *. In the absence of any other declaration, can we consider a mere
declaration of ownership as necessarily including the possession of the
property adjudicated? We do not believe so, for ownership is different
from possession. A person may be declared owner, but he may not be
entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another
either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon
of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other
valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. We, therefore, hold
that a judgment for ownership, does not necessarily include possession
as a necessary incident.”

It may be
observed that in both decisions, this Court underscored the possibility
that the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected and
defined. It is thus evident that the pronouncement was made having in
mind cases wherein the actual possessor has a valid right over
the property enforceable even against the owner thereof. As example, we
gave the cases of tenants and lessees. However, it is our view that the
above doctrines may not be invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor of the possessor.
In the instant case there appears in the appealed order of June 30,
1959, the specific finding of the trial court that “the plaintiffs have
not given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the
property”, (p. 57, Record on Appeal.) This factual finding can not be
reviewed in this instance as the appeal has been taken to us directly
only on a question of law. (p. 72, Record on Appeal.)

Under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, which reads:

“Sec. 45. What is deemed to have been adjudged.—That only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto,” (Italics supplied)

a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the
decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. Thus, in a land registration case^[1]
wherein ownership was adjudged, we allowed the issuance of a writ of
demolition (to remove the improvement existing on the land), for being
necessarily included in the judgment. Considering that herein
plaintiffs-appellants have no other claim to possession of the property
apart from their claim of ownership which was rejected by the lower
court and, consequently, has no right to remain thereon after such
ownership was adjudged to defendants-appellees, the delivery of
possession of the land should be considered included in the decision.
Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require
that for herein appellees to obtain possession of the property duly
adjudged to be theirs, from those who have no right to remain therein,
they must submit to court litigation anew. Thus, in the Mencias case, supra, we said:

“Apparently,
respondent Judge, in refusing to issue the writ of demolition to
petitioner, was of the belief that the latter has another remedy,
namely, by resorting to ordinary civil actions in the regular courts,
such as that of forcible entry and detainer, or the recovery of
possession, in which instants, said courts would then be competent to
issue said writ. Such a situation, in our opinion, could not have been
intended by the law. To require a successful litigant in a hind
registration case to institute another action for the purpose of
obtaining possession of the land adjudged to him, would be a cumbersome
process. It would foster unnecessary and expensive litigations and
result in multiplying of suits, which our judicial system abhors.

*           *           *           *           *           *           *

“* * *. Pursuant to the provision just quoted (Sec. 6, Rule 124), respondent Judge has the power to issue all auxiliary writs, including the writ of demolition sought by petitioner,
processes and other means necessary to carry into effect the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law in land registration cases to
issue a writ of possession to the successful litigant, the petitioner
herein.” (Italics supplied.)

In view of the
foregoing considerations, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Marcelo vs. Mencias, 107 Phil., 1071.