LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, PETITIONER VS. QUINCIANO VAILOCES, RESPONDENT.

This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the
Philippine bar.

It appears that as member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public,
Vailoces, on December 14, 1950 , acknowledged the execution of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus.
Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the
will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently, the
probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying
probate to the will. This decision became final. On the basis of this decision a
criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces
and the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental where, after trial, they were found guilty and convicted. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to Vailoces but
modified it with regard to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsified of public
document defined and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1
day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years 1 day of
prisión mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, fine and
costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving it in the
insular penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party instituted the
present disbarment proceedings.

In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction
rendered against him in the criminal case but contends that the same is based on
insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the charge being merely motivated by
sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein complainant, and
that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.

Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this
section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty or good
morals.^[1] Among the examples given of
crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction
and the crime of concubinage^[2]. The crime
of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public document, which is
indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and
good morals. Hence such crime involves moral turpitude. Indeed it is
well-settled that “embezzlement, forgery, robbery, swindling are crimes, which
denote moral turpitude and, as a genera] rule, all crimes of which fraud is an
element are looked on as involving moral turpitude” (53 C.J.S., 1206).

It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to
disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on
his part much as we sympathize with him to dispute now the sufficiency of his
conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a
closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with
which we are concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As this Court well said:

“The review of respondent’s conviction no longer rests upon us, The judgment
not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has
proved, himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.” (In the Matter
of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April
30, 1957)

The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime
which resulted in the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of
the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in double
jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only be availed of when he is placed
in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily
included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the
case here. The disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal
proceeding. Rather, it is intended “to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court” (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil.,
588), and its purpose is “to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable
and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence” (In re
McDougall, 3 Phil., 77).

Wherefore, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to
this effect, our Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of
attorneys.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.

^[2] In re Isada, 60 Phil.,
915.