LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, PETITIONER VS. QUINCIANO VAILOCES, RESPONDENT.

Ledesma de Jesus-Paras versus Vailoces

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the offended party, asks the Supreme Court to remove Quinciano Vailoces from the roll of attorneys. Vailoces is a lawyer and a notary public who was convicted, by final judgment, of falsifying a public document — the supposed last will and testament of the complainant's deceased relative. The case matters because it fixes the rule that a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is, by itself, a ground for disbarment, and that the disbarment proceeding cannot be used to reopen the conviction or to raise double jeopardy.

Procedural History

The forged will was offered for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. The probate court found the will a forgery and denied probate; that decision became final. On the strength of that ruling, a criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses before the same Court of First Instance. After trial, they were found guilty and convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to Vailoces but modified the judgment as to his co-accused. Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsifying a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, with accessories, fine, and costs. That sentence became final and he began serving it in the insular penitentiary. The offended party then instituted this disbarment proceeding before the Supreme Court, an original administrative action.

Facts

On December 14, 1950, Vailoces, as a member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus.

The will was presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. The probate court found the will a forgery and denied probate. That decision became final.

On the basis of that decision, a criminal action for falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses. After trial they were convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to Vailoces but modified the judgment as to his co-accused. His conviction became final and he began serving sentence in the insular penitentiary. The offended party then brought this disbarment proceeding. In his answer, Vailoces disputed the sufficiency of the evidence against him, claimed the charge was motivated by vindictiveness, malice, and spite, and pleaded double jeopardy.

Issues

• Whether or not falsification of a public document is a crime involving moral turpitude, so as to warrant disbarment.
• Whether or not the respondent may still dispute, in the disbarment proceeding, the sufficiency of the evidence behind his final conviction.
• Whether or not disbarment after his criminal conviction places the respondent in double jeopardy.

Applicable Provisions

Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court provides:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This is the ground relied upon: conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court provides:

When a defendant has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

This defines double jeopardy, which the respondent invoked but which the Court held inapplicable to disbarment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that falsification of a public document is a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. The Court quoted with approval the settled rule that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, swindling are crimes, which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude." Since the respondent was convicted of such a crime, he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127.

On the second issue, the Court refused to look into the sufficiency of the conviction. That is a closed chapter. The only issue is that he was found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

On the third issue, the Court held the plea of double jeopardy untenable. Double jeopardy under Section 9, Rule 113, applies only when one is prosecuted anew for the same offense, an attempt or frustration of it, or an offense necessarily included in it. Disbarment is not a criminal proceeding. Its purpose is to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function be competent, honorable, and reliable.

Doctrine

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended upon a final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude means any act contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals; forgery and all crimes of which fraud is an element involve moral turpitude. Once the conviction is final and executed, the disbarment court will not re-examine the evidence; the fact of final conviction is conclusive for purposes of the administrative case. Disbarment is not a criminal prosecution, so double jeopardy does not lie against it; its object is to protect the courts, the public, and the administration of justice.

Disposition

The Supreme Court removed Quinciano Vailoces from his office as attorney and ordered the Clerk of Court to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is itself the ground for disbarment, and the administrative proceeding cannot reopen it. Examiners use this case on moral turpitude, on the conclusiveness of a final criminal judgment in disbarment, and on why disbarment is not double jeopardy.