CESAREO PEREZ AND MAMERTA ALCANTARA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. VICENTE EVITE, AND SUSANA MANIGBAS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Perez versus Evite

The Case

This is the case of Perez versus Evite, decided in March 1961. Cesareo Perez and Mamerta Alcantara, the plaintiffs, sued Vicente Evite and Susana Manigbas, the defendants, to quiet title over a parcel of land in Batangas. The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared the defendants the owners. The real fight, however, came later, at the stage of execution: when the defendants asked the sheriff to put them in possession, the plaintiffs cried that the judgment spoke only of ownership and never ordered delivery of possession. The case matters because it draws the boundary between a judgment's face and what the law deems necessarily included in it, a distinction every bar candidate must be able to state cold.

Procedural History

The action to quiet title was filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In a judgment dated November 9, 1955, that court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and declared the defendants the owners of the land in question. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals, on March 31, 1958, affirmed the decision in its entirety. The decision became final, and upon the defendants' application the court of origin ordered its execution. The writ of execution issued on February 25, 1959 commanded the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas to deliver ownership of the portion of land in litigation to the defendant Vicente Evite, pursuant to the terms of the decision.

The plaintiffs moved to quash the writ, arguing that the decision merely declared ownership and did not order delivery, so that a writ putting the defendants in possession was at variance with the decision and void. The court denied the motion on February 28, 1959. The plaintiffs then filed an urgent motion for clarification and to declare the sheriff's execution void, complaining that the Clerk of Court and the Provincial Sheriff had already placed the defendants in possession. After hearing, the court declared the execution valid and dismissed the motion. When the defendants then prayed that the plaintiffs be declared in contempt for resisting the lawful order to deliver possession, the court issued an order dated June 30, 1959 allowing the defendants to surround their property with a fence, warning that any act of other persons, including the plaintiffs, to intervene may be considered an act of contempt. The plaintiffs moved to set aside that order; the motion was denied on July 11, 1959. The plaintiffs then brought this appeal directly to the Supreme Court, assailing the legality of the orders of June 30 and July 11, 1959.

Facts

The land in dispute is a parcel eleven meters wide and thirty-seven meters long, with a total area of four hundred seven square meters. The plaintiffs claimed it; the defendants claimed it. The trial court believed the defendants and fixed their ownership by reference to a cacawate tree standing on the northwestern corner of the land, thirty-five and eleven hundredths meters from the edge of the land bordering the provincial road, measuring eight and ninety-two hundredths meters westward from that tree and eleven meters southward to the southwestern corner.

After the judgment became final, the defendants sought execution. The sheriff's writ commanded the delivery of ownership of the portion of land in litigation to Vicente Evite. The plaintiffs resisted, insisting that a judgment declaring ownership does not carry with it the delivery of possession. In fact, the Clerk of Court and the Provincial Sheriff placed the defendants in possession notwithstanding the plaintiffs' pending motion to quash.

In its order of June 30, 1959, the trial court made a specific finding that the plaintiffs have not given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property. That finding stands unreviewed, because the appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.

Issues

• Whether or not a final judgment declaring ownership of land necessarily includes the delivery of possession, so that a writ of execution placing the owner in possession is valid.
• Whether or not the trial court lawfully allowed the defendants to fence their property and warned that acts of the plaintiffs to intervene may be treated as contempt.

Applicable Provisions

Section 45 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Section 45. What is deemed to have been adjudged. That only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

This is the hinge of the case: the Court reads the clause on what was actually and necessarily included in the judgment as embracing the delivery of possession, even though the face of the decision speaks only of ownership.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the delivery of possession is included in the decision. The plaintiffs relied on two earlier decisions, Talens versus Garcia and Jabon versus Alo, which taught that a judgment for ownership does not necessarily include possession, because the actual possessor may have rights that must be respected, such as those of a lessee or a tenant. The Court distinguished them: in both, it had in mind a possessor with a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner. Those doctrines may not be invoked where no such right may be appreciated in favor of the possessor. Here the trial court found that the plaintiffs gave no reason for retaining possession, and that finding cannot be reviewed on a pure question of law. The plaintiffs had no claim to possession apart from the ownership already rejected. The Court reasoned that a judgment is not confined to what appears on its face but extends to what is necessarily included or necessary thereto, and it recalled that in a land registration case where ownership was adjudged, it allowed a writ of demolition as necessarily included. It added that to require the defendants to sue anew, by forcible entry or otherwise, merely to obtain possession of land already adjudged theirs would be a cumbersome process that fosters unnecessary and expensive litigation.

On the second issue, the Court affirmed the order allowing the defendants to fence their property and the order denying the motion to set it aside, since the plaintiffs had no right to remain on land adjudged to the defendants.

Doctrine

A final judgment is not confined to what appears upon its face; it extends to what was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto, under Section 45 of Rule 39. Accordingly, a judgment declaring ownership of land carries with it the delivery of possession, and a writ of execution placing the winning owner in possession is valid. The exception is a possessor who holds a right of his own, such as a lessee or a tenant, whose rights must be respected and defined; where the possessor has no claim apart from a rejected claim of ownership, no such right exists. The successful litigant need not file a separate action for possession.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders appealed from, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants; the defendants won.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a judgment includes not only what appears on its face but what is necessarily included therein, so ownership carries possession against one who has no right to remain. Examiners use this case to test execution and the extent of a final judgment, especially against the tempting answer that a declaration of ownership never includes possession.