PABLO S. HAMOY, PLAINTIFF, VS. PAMBAYA BATINGOLO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. MACAINDIG RANGAR, MOVANT AND APPELLANT, VS. PABLO S. HAMOY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Pablo S. Hamoy filed on January 4, 1952 before the Court of First Instance of
Lanao an action against Pam-baya Batingolo and four other Moros to eject them
from a parcel of land located in Kauswagan, Lanao. This parcel of land was also
the subject of an administrative investigation between the same parties before
the Bureau of Lands wherein the director of said office on November 24, 1953
rendered decision ordering Pablo S. Hamoy to be placed in its possession. This
decision was confirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
June 14, 1954.

The court a quo, after trial, rendered judgment in favor of Pablo S.
Hamoy and against defendants ordering the latter to vacate the land since they
have no title nor right or interest of any kind over the same nor over its
improvements. Defendants were further ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of
P107,100.00 as damages.

Of the defendants only Pambaya Batingolo gave notice of his intention to
appeal the decision, and so plaintiff Hamoy asked for execution of the judgment
pending appeal which was granted on January 4, 1959. The same was carried out by
the sheriff who placed plaintiff, or his representative, in possession of the
land in litigation. It turned out that the land was then in possession of one
Macaindig Rangar who, notwithstanding his claim or ownership, was forcibly
ejected therefrom by the sheriff and so he filed an urgent motion on May 11,
1959 complain, ing to the court about the sheriff’s action and praying that his
possession be restored and respected.

Hamoy filed an opposition thereto, and thereafter the «ourt set both the
motion and opposition for hearing during which both movant and oppositor
presented evidence. But before the hearing could be completed, the court issued
an order dismissing the motion upon the ground that it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case it appearing that the record on appeal and appeal
bond had already been approved, even if the record has not yet been forwarded to
the appellate court. The court a quo has intimated that the correct
procedure for Macaindig Rangar to follow if he wanted to be restored to the
possession of the land was to bring a separate action against all interested
parties and not to intervene herein in the form of a motion as he has dona. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, Rangar took this appeal before
this Court on purely questions of law.

There is merit in the appeal. The court a quo, in reaching the
conclusion that it can no longer act on the motion of Rangar because it has
already lost jurisdiction over the case, made the following comment:

“Upon an examination of the records, it was found out that on January 26,
1959, and on previous notice to the parties, the record on appeal and appeal
bond of the defendant Pambaya Batingolo was already approved (787873; 904 of the
records). Under the circumstance the court had to give due course to the appeal
(Secs. 9, 10, 11, 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). To continue hearing the
claims of Macaindig Rangar when the Court had already approved the record on
appeal and the appeal bond as above stated thereby losing jurisdiction over the
case, is believed improper and out of the question.”

We disagree with the foregoing conclusion for the reason that although the
record on appeal and appeal bond had already been approved the fact however
remains that the record of the case has not as yet been forwarded to the
appellate court and as such it was still within the control of the court a
quo. And even if because of such approval the appeal is deemed to have
already been perfected, nevertheless, under Section 9, Rule 41, the trial court
could still issue an order for the protection and preservation of the rights of
the parties which are not involved in the matter litigated in the appeal, as
well as “to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal
of the record on appeal to the appellate court.” The issue raised in the motion
of Rangar is not involved in the appeal for it concerns a right which he claims
over the property which has not so far been litigated for the reason that he was
not made a party to the case either as plaintiff or as defendant. He only came
to know of the litigation when he was forced out of the property by the sheriff,
and so he filed the present motion to be heard and prove his title to the
property. This he has the right to do as the most expeditious manner to protect
his interest, instead of filing a separate action which generally is long,
tedious and protracted. This is the procedure laid down by this Court in Omana,
et al. vs. Gatulayao, et al., 73 Phil., 66, which is on all fours to the present
case.

Thus, the facts in the Omana case are:

“In a reivindicatory action instituted by plaintiffs Macario Omana and others
against Fidel Gatulayao, Domingo Reyos, Victorio Mejia and Mariano Cruz, said
plaintiffs were declared owners of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
Santolan, Pasig, Rizal, and the judgment to this effect was, on appeal, affirmed
by this court. On September 24, 1931, the provincial sheriff of Rizal sought to
enforce the writ of possession issued in favor of the plaintiffs but found the
land in the actual possession of the appellants here, Victorio Javier and
others, who claimed ownership thereof in common with the other inhabitants of
the barrios of Rosario and Maybuñga, Rizal.

On September 29, 1931, plaintiffs filed a petition ex parte praying
that the provincial sheriff be provided with constabulary soldiers to effect the
forcible ejectment of Javier and his companions from the land in question,
alleging, in support of this petition, that said Javier and others were merely
hired by the defendants to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining the possession of
the land. The court below granted this petition. Ejected, Javier and others
filed on October 12, 1931, a motion praying that the provincial sheriff and the
plaintiffs be ordered to return to them the possession of the land. This motion
was acceded to by the trial court, through Judge Mapa, in its order of December
15, 1931. Plaintiffs whereupon filed a motion for reconsideration of this order,
and as an alternative remedy prayed that in case of denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the parties be ordered to adduce evidence on the matter of the
possession and the identity of the land. The lower court, without setting aside
its order of December 15, 1931, directed the parties to present evidence on the
character of their possession. Movants Javier and others, pursuant to this
order, presented their evidence. Finally, on July 8, 1938, upon petition of the
movants, the then presiding Judge De la Costa set the date for the presentation
of respondents’ evidence on August 9th. On said date, the parties appeared and
the presiding judge, now Judge Leopoldo Rovira, was apprised of the antecedents
of the case. On August 4, 1938, an order was issued by the said judge quashing
the motion presented by Javier and his companions and annulling all the
proceedings, which were taken in relation thereto, with reservation to them to
file a separate independent action for the vindication of their claims. This
order is now sought to be reviewed in this appeal.”

In reversing the ruling of the Court a quo and annulling all the
proceedings already taken to give to the movants an opportunity to prove the
character of their possession and their title to the property, this Court, thru
Mr. Justice Moran, held:

“It is not disputed that movants-appellants were never made parties to the
proceeding wherein Omafia and others were adjudged owners of the land in
question nor do they sustain any relation of privity with said parties, or any
of them. They cannot, therefore, be bound by the judgment rendered therein in
favor of said plaintiffs, and the enforcement of said judgment against them is
in excess of jurisdiction. Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as in the
instant case, are enforcible only between the parties and their successors in
interest, but not against strangers thereto. (Sec. 306, par. 2, of Act No. 190,
now Rule 39, sec. 44(b), Rules of Court.) There may be cases when the actual
possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or
his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in the
instant case, that such possession has been taken in connivance with the
defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these
events, the proper procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such
possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ of possession as
the finding shall warrant. But in the absence of any such hearing or any
proceeding of similar character, every person in the actual possession of the
land has a right to be respected therein (art. 446, Civil Code) and his
ejectment would constitute a deprivation of a property right without due process
of law.”

Since, according to this Court, the proper procedure for a person deprived of
possession of his property as a result of a writ of execution is to invoke the
aid of the court who has cognizance of the case so that it may set the incident
for hearing to determine the character of his possession and that to deny
him such hearing would constitute a deprivation of his property without due
process of law, it is evident that the court a quo committed an error in
annulling the proceeding auspiciously started by movant Rangar to allow him to
present evidence to prove the character of his possession of the property in
litigation upon the mistaken belief that the proper procedure for him to follow
was to file a separate action for the vindication of his right over the
property.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.