PABLO S. HAMOY, PLAINTIFF, VS. PAMBAYA BATINGOLO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. MACAINDIG RANGAR, MOVANT AND APPELLANT, VS. PABLO S. HAMOY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Hamoy versus Rangar

The Case

This is the case of Hamoy versus Rangar, decided by the Supreme Court in August 1962. Pablo S. Hamoy sued Pambaya Batingolo and four other Moros to eject them from a parcel of land in Kauswagan, Lanao. Hamoy won before the trial court, and the judgment was executed pending appeal. The sheriff then ejected one Macaindig Rangar, who was actually in possession of the land and claimed it as his own, though he had never been a party to the case. Rangar asked the trial court to restore and respect his possession. The trial court refused, saying it had lost jurisdiction. The question before the Supreme Court is whether a person in actual possession, a stranger to the judgment, may be heard by the very court that issued the writ, or must he file a separate action. The case matters because it fixes the summary remedy of the stranger in possession and ties it to due process.

Procedural History

Hamoy filed the ejectment action in January 1952 before the Court of First Instance of Lanao. In a parallel administrative investigation before the Bureau of Lands, the Director of Lands decided in November 1953 that Hamoy be placed in possession, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources confirmed that decision in June 1954. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for Hamoy, ordering the defendants to vacate the land and to pay 107,100 pesos in damages.

Only Pambaya Batingolo gave notice of appeal. Hamoy therefore moved for execution pending appeal, which was granted in January 1959, and the sheriff placed Hamoy or his representative in possession. The sheriff then forcibly ejected Macaindig Rangar, who was in possession and claimed ownership. In May 1959 Rangar filed an urgent motion asking that his possession be restored and respected. Hamoy opposed, and the court set both for hearing, at which both sides presented evidence. Before the hearing could be completed, the trial court dismissed the motion on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction, the record on appeal and appeal bond having already been approved. It suggested that Rangar's remedy was a separate action. Rangar's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Supreme Court on purely questions of law.

Facts

Hamoy sued to recover a parcel of land in Kauswagan, Lanao from Pambaya Batingolo and four others. While the case was pending, the Bureau of Lands, in an administrative investigation between the same parties, ordered Hamoy placed in possession, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources confirmed that order.

The trial court ruled for Hamoy, ordered the defendants to vacate, and awarded damages of 107,100 pesos. Only Batingolo appealed. Hamoy obtained execution pending appeal, and the sheriff carried it out by placing Hamoy or his representative in possession.

Unknown to the court, the land was then in the possession of Macaindig Rangar, who claimed ownership. The sheriff forcibly ejected him. Rangar promptly filed an urgent motion complaining of the sheriff's action and praying that his possession be restored and respected. The trial court began hearing the motion and the opposition, but before the hearing was completed it dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, having already approved the record on appeal and the appeal bond, though the record had not yet been forwarded to the appellate court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court retained jurisdiction to act on Rangar's motion after approving the record on appeal and the appeal bond, although the record had not yet been forwarded to the appellate court.
• Whether or not a person in actual possession of the land, who was never a party to the case, may invoke the aid of the court that issued the writ of possession so that the character of his possession may be heard and determined, instead of being compelled to file a separate action.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as invoked in the decision, provides:

When the record on appeal has been approved and the appeal bond has been filed, the trial court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which are not involved in the matter litigated in the appeal, and to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court.

This provision is the basis for holding that approval of the record on appeal does not strip the trial court of all power over incidents not involved in the appeal.

Article 446 of the Civil Code, cited in the decision through the Omana ruling, provides:

Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.

This is the substantive right of the stranger in possession that the trial court must protect by hearing him.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in saying it had lost jurisdiction. Although the record on appeal and the appeal bond had been approved, the record of the case had not yet been forwarded to the appellate court and remained within the control of the trial court. Even if the appeal were deemed perfected, Section 9 of Rule 41 still allowed the trial court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties not involved in the matter litigated in the appeal. Rangar's claim was not involved in the appeal, for it concerned a right over the property that had never been litigated, he not having been made a party.

On the second issue, the Court held that Rangar had the right to file the motion as the most expeditious manner to protect his interest, instead of filing a separate action which is generally long, tedious and protracted. The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Omana versus Gatulayao, which it found on all fours, where it held:

Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as in the instant case, are enforcible only between the parties and their successors in interest, but not against strangers thereto.

And further:

But in the absence of any such hearing or any proceeding of similar character, every person in the actual possession of the land has a right to be respected therein (art. 446, Civil Code) and his ejectment would constitute a deprivation of a property right without due process of law.

Since the proper procedure for a person deprived of possession by a writ of execution is to invoke the aid of the court having cognizance of the case so that it may set the incident for hearing to determine the character of his possession, the trial court committed an error in annulling the proceeding started by Rangar upon the mistaken belief that a separate action was required.

Doctrine

A judgment in an action in personam binds only the parties and their successors in interest, not strangers. A stranger in actual possession of the property, ejected under a writ of execution, may invoke the aid of the very court that issued the writ by motion, so that the court may hear and determine the character of his possession. To deny him that hearing is to deprive him of property without due process of law, and violates his right under Article 446 of the Civil Code to be respected in his possession. Approval of the record on appeal does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over incidents not involved in the appeal, as Section 9 of Rule 41 allows it to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties not litigated in the appeal.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the order appealed from and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, without costs. Rangar won.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a stranger in actual possession, ejected by a writ of execution, may ask the court that issued the writ for a hearing on his possession, and to deny him that hearing is a deprivation of property without due process of law. Examiners use this case on execution pending appeal, on the jurisdiction of the trial court after approval of the record on appeal, and on the remedy of a third-party possessor against a writ of possession.