MARIANO G. ALMEDA, SR., AND VALERIANA F. ALMEDA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JESUS Y. PEREZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, R…

This is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary
injunction, filed by petitioners, seeking to set aside and declare null and void
the orders, dated March 15, 1961 and May 8, 1961, of the respondent Judge Jesus
Y. Perez of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 44693 of
said court. The first order allowed the filing of an amended petition for
forfeiture against petitioners; the second denied a motion for the
reconsideration thereof and for the dismissal of the amended petition for
forfeiture.

In October, 1961, Epifanio T. Villegas and Jesus A. Mendoza filed a complaint
with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. with having
acquired during his incumbency as government employee, cash and properties from
unknown sources in the total amount of P121,407.98, which acquisitions,
according to the complaint, were manifestly out of proportion to the salary and
other lawful income of said Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., and, therefore, in violation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
Law. Pursuant to the provisions of said Act, a preliminary investigation was
conducted by a committee of investigators designated by the Secretary of
Justice. In a resolution of said investigators, dated November 4, 1960, it was
certified that there is reasonable ground to believe that from 1950 to 1959,
Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as Assistant Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and to his
other lawful income.

On the basis of the findings of the investigators, the Solicitor General,
representing the Republic of the Philippines as petitioner, filed on November
12, 1960, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for forfeiture
against Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 44693. It charges him
with having committed graft while engaged in the performance of his official
duties and. in consequence of said graft, had acquired properties and made cash
disbursements from 1950 to 1959 grossly-disproportionate to his lawful income.
His wife was included as a co-respondent in her capacity as wife of Mariano G.
Almeda, Sr. and as co-owner of their conjugal properties.

Petitioner herein filed their answer on December 5, 1960 and thereafter the
case was set for hearing, but on February 15, 1961, the Solicitor General filed
a “Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture”. The judge granted the
motion but rejected the inclusion of Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as party respondent.
On March 25, 1961 the Solicitor General filed the amended petition for
forfeiture, adding other counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and
disbursements thus increasing the alleged cash from unexplained sources received
by the respondents from the years 1950-59 to P208,682.45, as against
respondent’s salary and other lawful income of only P59,860.97. Respondents,
petitioners herein, objected to the amendment on the ground that the new counts
or charges had already been investigated and dismissed after investigation, and
respondents had not been given a new preliminary investigation with respect to
the new counts or charges; that the proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379
being criminal in nature, the petition may not be amended as to substance
without respondents’ consent. It is also claimed that the amendments were
presented only to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of the respondents, and
that the new counts or charges could not be included because one year nad
already elapsed aftfcr a general election in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1379. After the filing of memoranda by the parties the
respondent judge issued the order sought to be reviewed, authorizing the
presentation of the second amended petition but without including therein
Mariano F. Almeda, Jr. as a party respondent. The court ruled as follows:

“The Court finds no merit to the contention that the amended petition seeks
to include new counts which were previously dismissed by the investigating
Fiscals because no such dismissal appears in the resolution of said
investigating fiscals and moreover, the only function of the investigating
fiscals in the preliminary investigation was to determine whether or not there
is probable cause that respondents have acquired properties beyond their means.
The items of receipts and disbursements or acquisitions referred to as new
counts by the respondents are but allegations in detail respecting the main
allegation that respondents unlawfully acquired the properties described in the
amended petition. The new allegations of receipts and disbursements embodied in
the amended petition objected to by the respondents merely supplement or amplify
the facts of unlawful acquisition originally alleged in the original petition.
These amendments hence relate back to the date of the filing of the original
petition so that the prohibition contained in Rep. Act 1379 that no petition
shall be filed’ within one year before a general election cannot apply with
respect to the new items of receipts and disbursements. The Court finds no
merits in the respondents’ contention that the amended petition should net be
admitted on the allegation that his proceeding is penal in nature and no
amendment as to matters of substance can be admitted after the respondents have
filed their answer because this is a civil case and the rules respecting
amendments in civil cases and not of informations in criminal cases should
govern the admission of amendments in this case. The mere fact that a
preliminary investigation is required to be held in a proceeding of this nature
does not make the same a criminal proceeding. Hence, the rule that amendments of
pleadings are favored and should be literally allowed in the furtherance of
justice should be applied.

“With reference to the objection that no preliminary investigation was
conducted insofar as the new respondent Mariano F. Almeda is concerned, the
Court finds said objection to be well-founded because no preliminary
investigation was in fact conducted insofar as said new respondent is concerned
in violation of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act 1379.

“Wherefore, the Court hereby orders the petitioner to file, within ten days,
a second amended petition without including therein Mariano F. Almeda as party
respondent or make reference therein with respect to said person.

“SO ORDERED.”

The principal contention of the petitioners herein, respondents in the court
below, is that Republic Act No. 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence the
presentation of the amended petition without the benefit of a previous
preliminary investigation urfder the Act cannot be allowed; that the amendment
would have the effect of presenting a charge (under Republic Act No. 1379)
within one year from the date of a general election; and lastly, that the
amendment may not be made on a matter of substance after the defendants had
pleaded.

A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379 readily discloses that the
proceeding for forfeiture is civil in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the
petitioners. A test has been suggested to determine whether the proceeding for
forfeiture is civil or criminal, thus:

“* * * Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil cr criminal in nature, and
may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they
are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature
it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve
the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a
civil nature; and under statutes which sped cally so provide, where the act or
omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such
forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action.” (37 CJS,
Forfeiture, Sec. 5. pp. 15-16)

In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second
place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided
for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec.
4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required prior
to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided
expressly to be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal
case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but the
other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to
reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Had it been a criminal proceeding
there would have been, after a preliminary investigation, a reading of
information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, and a trial thereafter, with the
publication of the judgment in the presence of the defendant. But these
proceedings as above set forth, are not provided for in the law.

Section 12 of the law provides a penalty to the public officer, but said
penalty is against the employee or officer for the transfer or conveyance of any
unlawfully acquired properties. The law therefore penalizes an officer for
transferring or conveying properties unlawfully acquired, but does not to do so
for making the unlawful acquisition; it merely imposes the penalty of forfeiture
of the properties unlawfully acquired.

As the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as provided for in the
law, is not a penal proceeding but a civil one for the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired, and as the procedure outlined in the law is that
which is followed in civil actions, amendment of the charges or the petition for
forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions; i. e. the amendments
may be made before trial or in the course of trial without need of another
investigation. It also follows that amendments setting forth newly discovered
acquisitions may be inserted in the petition without obtaining the consent of
the respondent.

Wherefore, the petition should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.