MARGARITO PILOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO, RESPONDENT.

This complaint against respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, was referred to Associate Justice
Buenaventura S. de la Fuente of the Court of Appeals for investigation.

After conducting the required investigation, Justice de la Fuente
submitted the following report and recommendation:

“This has reference to the administrative complaint filed by
Margarito Pilos against respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado, alleging that
said respondent had ‘knowingly render(ed) an unjust judgment’ against him and
‘knowingly taken such additional steps to ensure unobstructed implementation of
said judgment’.  This was reiterated in a
supplemental petition subsequently filed by petitioner, wherein he also
complained of acts done by said respondent judge ‘to deter the prosecution of
the administrative action against respondent’.

“Submitting his comment in compliance with the resolution of
the Supreme Court, respondent Judge recited the events that transpired in
connection with Criminal Case No. 10160, ‘People vs. Margarito Pilos’, and
prayed for dismissal of the complaint for being moot and academic because the
judgment in question had been vacated and set aside by the court a quo
after the Court of Appeals granted the ex parte manifestation of
respondent Judge to the effect that the appealed
case be remanded ‘to this Court of origin to give the accused (Pilos) a day in
court and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’ [Resolution in CA-G.R. No.
UDK-CFI Rizal No. 10160].

“In this inquiry into the said administrative charges, with
the conformity or agreement of both the complainant and the respondent, the
undersigned investigator required that direct testimonies be submitted by means
of affidavits setting forth the questions propounded to and the answers of
witnesses, subject to cross-examination by the other party, in addition to the
stipulation of facts on undisputed facts. 
Accordingly, the following were submitted for consideration in this
investigation:  (1) ‘Sinumpaan Salaysay’ of
complainant Margarito Pilos attached to Atty. Ventura’s letter of June 23, 1980;
(2) ‘Sinumpaan Salaysay’ of complainant Annex H of the original
petition; (3) Affidavit of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Eulalio Ventura, Annex
I of the original petition; (4) Counter-affidavit of respondent Judge
Honrado, dated August 3, 1980; (5) the Stipulation of Facts with respect to the
aforementioned sworn statements, Annexes H and I of the
complainant and his counsel; (6) Original records of Criminal Case No. 10160,
CFI Rizal; and (7) the manifestations of both the complainant and the respondent,
and other papers.

“After submitting their respective manifestations amplifying
on their respective positions (amongst others, the respondent’s manifestation
to the effect that ‘respondent will no longer examine and/or cross-examine
verbally and in writing the petitioner and/or witnesses in connection with his
petition’ [administrative charge]), this case was deemed submitted for resolution.

“The relevant facts.  –

“Most of the determinative facts in this case are not in
dispute.  Briefly stated, they are:

“1.    In Criminal Case No. 10160 (CFI Rizal),
Margarito Pilos, herein complainant, was charged with damage to property thru
reckless imprudence.  When the
prosecution had completed its presentation of evidence, the defense counsel
asked for and was granted by the court a period of 15 days from July 2, 1975,
within which to file a motion to dismiss.  This was later extended twice, the last
extention of 15 days to be counted from receipt of the transcript of
stenographic notes.  On August 11, 1975,
the accused finally filed his motion to dismiss.

“2.    It appears from the record that on August
13, 1975, the respondent, as Presiding Judge of said court, set the
promulgation of its judgment for August 26, 1975.  On that date, it also appears, that in view
of the absence of defense counsel de parte, Atty. Filomeno T. Koh
was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused.  There was then no proof of service upon Atty.
Eulalio Ventura (defense counsel of record). 
The Court proceeded with the promulgation of its judgment, sentencing
the accused to pay a ‘fine in the amount of P3,081.75 … with imprisonment in
case of insolvency at the rate of One (1) day for each P8.00 not to exceed
one-third (1/3) of thirty-one (31) days or ten (10) days;’ and to indemnify the
owner of the Mercedes Benz car ‘in the amount of P3,081.75’.

“3.    On the same day, Deputy Clerk Evangeline S.
Yuipco issued a Commitment Order addressed to the Municipal Warden,
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, as a consequence of which the accused was
detained at the municipal jail for ten days, when no bail on appeal was posted
in his behalf.

“4.    According to the sheriff’s return dated
August 22, 1975, signed by Special Sheriff Poblado, Jr., but received by the
court only on September 18, 1975, ‘Notice intended for Atty. Eulalio Ventura
was not served on the ground that the said address given cannot be located by
the undersigned despite diligent effort exerted.’

“5.    On September
9, 1975, after the accused had been released, his counsel de
parte filed a notice of appeal. 
It is admitted by said counsel, however, that he received a copy of the
decision on September 1, 1975
(paragraph 8, page 3, Atty. Ventura’s affidavit, Annex I, Original Petition).

“6.    In the Court of Appeals, where the records
were transmitted in view of the notice of appeal, a manifestation ex parte,
dated February 27, 1976, was filed by the respondent Judge praying that the
records be remanded to the court of origin ‘to give the accused a day in court
and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’ He stated therein that ‘due to plain
oversight, confusion with other cases he was preparing the decision at home,
and due to the cardiac ailment he had (been) suffering since 1972, he had
overlooked thru honest mistake that herein accused was given an extension of
fifteen (15) days to file a motion to dismiss.’ Said prayer was granted by the
Court of Appeals [Fifth Division] on April 23, 1976 (p. 110, Original Record,
Criminal Case No. 10160), after due consider­ation of the comments submitted by
the complainant as well as by the Solicitor General’s Office.

“7.    Conformably with the said resolution of the
Court of Appeals remanding the case ‘to give the accused his day in court’,
respondent Judge issued an order vacating and setting aside the decision in
question and the complainant’s motion to dismiss of August 11, 1975, was
calendared for hearing on May 17, 1976 (page 117, Ibid.).

“8.    An opposition to said motion to dismiss was
filed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Sta. Ana (page 118, Ibid.).

“9.    On May 12, 1976, the accused thru counsel
filed a manifestation (dated May 10, 1976) to the effect that the accused was
not going to participate ‘in any further proceedings’ in the case because of
his earnest belief ‘that by doing so he would be voluntarily placing himself in
double jeopardy in violation of his constitutional rights’, and also because he
had ‘already served his sentence and duly released after completion of said
service of sentence.’ It was submitted that the participation of the accused
would ‘not serve him any purpose or benefit inasmuch as any favorable outcome .
. would be moot and academic.’

 “10. On
May 31, 1976, respondent Judge rendered an Amended Decision.  Its dispositive portion reads as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, this Court finds the defendant Margarito Pilos y
Magalzo guilty be­yond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property, and imposes upon him the penalty of:

‘1.  Fine in the amount of P3,081.75 which is the
equal amount to the value of the damages, with im­prisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of one (1) day for each P8.00 not to exceed one-third
(1/3) of thirty-one (31) days or ten (10) days;

‘2.  Deducts the period the accused has served for
the period of ten (10) days which this Court considers as preventive imprisonment
based on equitable ground under Republic Act 6127; and

‘3.  To pay the costs.

‘SO ORDERED.’

“The Complainant’s Version as to what happened when the
questioned judgment was promulgated on August 26, 1975, may be recapitulated as
follows:

“Complainant received on August 23,
1975 a notice requiring his presence in court on August 26, 1975.  On that day, he appeared in court unaware
that sentence was going to be promulgated. 
He learned about this only when the case was called.  Because of the absence of counsel,
complainant asked respondent for time to contact his lawyer, but respondent
‘refused to heed your petitioner’s plea’, although
there was no proof of
service upon his counsel.  Then sentence
was promulgated, after which he was taken to the office of the clerk of
court.  Although he was ‘made to
understand that he was being detained only until he is able to post an appeal
bond’, it turned out that ‘respondent caused a commitment order to be prepared.’ He was thus committed to the municipal warden and
‘served sentence commencing on August 26, 1975’ for 10 days.  It was only upon his release at the end of
said period that he ‘realize(d) that he was not merely detained but actually
imprisoned to serve sentence’ for a crime ‘he sincerely believes he is not
guilty of’.  And such service of
sentence, it is also claimed, ‘has rendered moot and academic your petitioner’s
right to appeal’ (see pars. 14 to 18, Orig. Petition).

“Questions to be resolved in this
case.

“The complainant’s charges raise the following questions:

“1.  Is this a case of ‘knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment’ within the purview of the law.

“2.  If not, may the questioned acts or actuations
of the respondent in regard to the said promulgation of the questioned judgment
(which was later vacated and set aside by the respondent) be categorized or
considered as serious error warranting appropriate disciplinary action against
the respondent.

“Observations.  –

“1.  To
begin with, the following ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court is most
pertinent.

‘In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment
is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice…’ (In re Climaco, 5 SCRA 107).

“This was reiterated in Gil vs. Baes, 61 SCRA 476; Sta. Maria
vs. Abay, 87 SCRA 179; and Revita vs. Rimando, 98 SCRA 620.  In the last mentioned case, the Supreme Court
even added:  ‘As a matter of public
policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action, even if such acts are erroneous’ (page 624).  Disciplinary action does not neces­sarily
follow from every error of judgment committed by a judge or non-observance of
procedural rules.  It was also held in
Gahol vs. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494, that ‘only after the appellate court
holds in a final judgment [on appeal] that a trial judge’s alleged errors
were committed deliberately and in bad faith may the charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled a trial judge.’

“In Criminal Case No. 10160, the accused (herein complainant)
had refused to participate in ‘further proceedings’ after it was remanded by
the Court of Appeals to the lower court to give him his day in court, as prayed
for by respondent himself.  Complainant
gave as principal reason that he had already abandoned his appeal by
reason of his ‘service of sentence.’ Said appellate court was thereby denied
the opportunity of passing upon the merits of the questioned judgment and of
deciding whether or not the respondent committed errors in said impugned
decision which were patently ‘contrary to law’ or ‘not supported by the evidence’
adduced.  In the absence of such a
finding, the judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness.  And it becomes unnecessary to determine
whether the judgment was ‘made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice.’

“The undersigned, therefore, believes and submits that this is
not a case of ‘knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.’

“But assuming, arguendo, that it is such a case,
examination of the decision in question shows that the respondent clearly and
distinctly stated the facts upon which the court based its conclusion that the
taxicab driver’s negligence was the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident.  More specifically, it was
pointed out that the collision was due to the ‘sudden and immediate swerving to
the left to execute a U-turn by the driver of the Blue Car Taxi’, etc.

“By his motion to dismiss, complainant submitted that his
guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the lone pro­secution
witness contradicted or did not support and substantiate the prosecution’s
averment that it was ‘the vehicle driven by the accused which hit, struck and
bumped the Mercedes Benz car.’ On the other hand, in its opposition, Asst. Prov. Fiscal Sta. Ana countered
that defense counsel ‘relied solely on his cross-examination.. and overlooked
the fact that the bumping occurred because of the recklessness of his
client who was then driving a taxi by making sudden turn without
giving any signal…’ At best, the question of sufficiency of the proof of
guilt of complainant was a debatable one. 
It cannot be said, then, that complainant’s innocence is so clear and
unmistakable from the evidence of record.

“2.  In the opinion of the undersigned, the core of
the charges against the respondent Judge is that he rendered prematurely
a judgment of conviction without first resolving his motion to dismiss and
before complainant could present his evidence.

“On this score, the following facts of record appear
pertinent:

“(a)   Respondent himself admitted his ‘error’, claiming however that it
was ‘plain oversight, confusion with other similar cases I was preparing at
home, and due to cardiac ailment I had been suffering since 1972.’ He regards
it as an ‘honest mistake.;

“(b)   The comment submitted by the Office of the
Solicitor General on the respondent’s ex parte manifestation
stated inter alia:  ‘There
is no doubt that the
decision by the lower court … only three days after the court granted the
accused fifteen (15) days within which to file a Motion to Dismiss, deprived
the accused-appellant of his day in court‘ because the motion to dismiss
was not considered; and that the manifestation … filed by Judge
Honrado ‘seeks to correct this injustice done to the accused.’ To show
it was proper, said office cited ‘existing
jurisprudence.’ Sustaining this view, this court granted the prayer for
the remand of the case ‘to give the accused his day in court‘
(Res. in CA-G.R. No. UDK-CFI Rizal No. 10160).

“(c)   Respondent Judge then vacated and set aside
the decision in question.  But,
thereafter, the accused (herein
complainant) refused to cooperate and insisted in not participating in
‘further proceedings’.

“(d)   At
this juncture, it should be noted that at the hearing of July 2, 1975, defense
counsel informed the respondent Judge:

‘In case the court will deny our motion to dismiss, we will
not present our evidence.  We will submit
our case on the basis of the evidence already submitted …’ (Annex
I, Orig. Petition).

“The motion to dismiss was filed on August 11.  The questioned decision was promulgated on August
26, or 15 days afterwards.  Said
decision dated July 31 appears to have been prepared before the filing of the
motion to dismiss.

“It would seem, then, that even a judgment rendered after
the denial of the motion to dismiss would still be based wholly on the evidence
considered in the questioned decision, since defense counsel had already served
notice he would not present any evidence and the result would be no
different.  Also, that decision having
been actually promulgated 15 days after the filing of said motion, one could argue that
it was impliedly denied upon the
promulgation of the decision (Ong vs. Fonacier, 17 SCRA 617).

“Such a posture, however, would be incompatible with
respondent’s admission of his ‘error’ in rendering judgment before denying the
motion to dismiss.

“3.  In view of respondent’s admission of his error
in prematurely rendering the judgment in Crim. Case No. 10160 against the
accused (herein complainant), the question that arises is:  Would that be sufficient reason or ground to hold the respondent Judge
administratively answerable for such mistake which was allegedly due to
‘oversight, confusion with other similar cases I was preparing the decisions at
home …’ As earlier noted, Revita vs. Rimando, 98 SCRA 620, informs us –

‘As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even if
such acts are erroneous (48 C.J.S. 974).’

“The decision in question was not clearly or patently
erroneous in the sense that there was ‘no evidence of record’ to support its
factual findings or that it is plainly ‘contrary to law.’ This is quite evident
upon reading the decision, the motion to dismiss and opposition thereto.  In concluding that negligence of the accused
was the proximate cause of the accident, the respondent reasoned it out and
mentioned supporting evidence of record. 
Respondent’s mistake was in promulgating the decision ahead of his
denial of the motion to dismiss. 
Considering that defense counsel manifested to the court that, in case
of the denial of his motion, he was going to submit the case without
presenting evidence for the defense, the error did not have the
effect of depriving the accused of the right to present evidence.

“That respondent committed a mistake in good faith has to be
presumed unless the contrary is shown by indubitable proof.  Com­plainant imputes bad faith or malice upon
the reasoning that respondent judge could not have overlooked that motion he
filed 14 days before the promulgation of the decision, and that the decision
was prepared evidently 10 days earlier as indicated by its date ‘July 31,
1975.’ That would have been correct if the decision was promulgated
immediately, or before the filing of the motion to dismiss.  The stubborn fact remains that the decision
was actually promulgated on August 26, 1975 or 14 days after
receipt by the court of the motion to dismiss.

The premature rendition of the decision cannot be attributed to
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.  This is
not a case of a judgment based on non-existent or imagined evidence but made to
appear other­wise.  Neither can it be
said that the decision was hastily promulgated because of some monetary or
other valuable consideration.  The com­plaint
merely alleged and insinuated personal ill-will as the probable motivation of
respondent Judge.  To quote complainant’s
counsel, the respondent ‘was greatly peeved by my insistence to file the
Motion to Dismiss’ (par. 4, Annex H, Orig. Petition; this was denied by
respondent in the stipulation).

“4.  Complainant was of the impression, and he
insists, that he was made to serve his sentence.  It is not denied that when he was brought to
the office of the clerk of court, Deputy Clerk Yuipco prepared immediately a
commitment order (Annex G. Orig. Petition). 
It is not shown that after promulgation of the decision, respondent had
any direct or personal participation in the issuance of the said order.  It was issued under the signature of the
Deputy Clerk of Court who explained to complainant’s counsel that it was
‘routine procedure to detain the accused until a bail is posted
for the purpose of the appeal’ (par. 17, Annex I, Orig. Petition).  It is also significant that the complaint
just averred that ‘the respondent caused a commitment order to be
prepared and thereby ordered your petitioner to be imprisoned and
serve sentence …’ Such a conclusion is premised simply on the fact of
issuance of said order, unsupported by evidence that respondent himself
personally gave any specific order or instructions in regard thereto.

“Besides, it does not seem correct to say that the accused had
‘served his sentence.’ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x.  Soon after judgment was promulgated,
complainant signified his intention to appeal and he was told that for his
provisional liberty he should file his appeal bond.  His status, then, was that of an appellant
under detention.  That such continued for
10 days because of his failure to post the required bail bond does not make it
‘service of sentence.’

“Complainant also claims that, due to the premature
promulgation of judgment, he was unable to contact his counsel.  This may be true during the first day of his
detention.  It is, however, unbelievable
that, during the entire 10-day period of detention, he could not get in touch
with his lawyer.  Surely, his family
could have someone to look for him when he failed to return home that first
day.  Proper inquiry would have disclosed
that he was sentenced, was placed under detention but could be released upon filing an appeal bond.  His counsel admittedly received notice of the
decision on September 1, 1975. 
Counsel would have learned, if he tried to find out what had happened,
that his client was still under detention. 
Apparently, counsel acted only on September 9, when he filed a
notice of appeal.  At that time,
complainant had already been released.

“5.  In Mangaron vs. Bagano (85 SCRA 1), the
respondent judge likewise erred in ordering execution of an order before
its finality, resulting in the premature imprisonment of the
complainant.  Upon motion of com­plainant,
the respondent vacated and set aside the order. 
This was considered in his favor. 
Here, it would be relevant to take note also of the following:  (a) Upon realizing his ‘error’, respondent
filed an ex parte manifestation asking the Court of Appeals to
remand the case in order to give the accused his day in court and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; (b) Upon remand, he immediately vacated and set aside
the questioned judgment.

“Respondent invites attention to his 4 years service as a
Justice of the Peace and 14 years as district judge, CFI; he submits his case
with a plea for ‘compassionate consideration’. 
The complainant, too, has this prayer: 
‘…. even if respondent judge fails to adequately explain his action
… leaving no alternative but for appropriate action in the premises, it is
prayed that justice be tempered with mercy.’

“Conclusion and recommendation.
–

“It is submitted that ‘all things considered, the admitted
“error” of the respondent was committed without malice or wrongful
intention to cause an injustice.

‘Accordingly, it is recommended that an admonition (in Revita vs.
Rimando, 98 SCRA 619, the respondent Judge, who dismissed a complaint without
presentation of prosecution evidence, was merely “admonished to exercise
more prudence and circums­pection in the performance of his duties.”) of
the respondent would be sufficient disciplinary action in regard to this
administrative matter.'”

The foregoing report and
recommendation being supported by the record, is hereby approved and adopted.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT JUDGE IS HEREBY ADMONISHED TO
HENCEFORTH ACT WITH GREATER CIRCUMSPECTION.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.