G.R. No. L-32146. November 23, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LUIS DELMENDO Y BAL-OT AND FLORENTINO DELMENDO Y IPAC, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a case where the accused, Luis Delmendo
y Bal-ot and Florentino Delmendo y Ipac, having
volunteered to donate their blood to save the life of one, Alfredo Buccat, who had been earlier shot in his house in the
evening of February 26, 1969 and in fact, the accused Luis Delmendo
did donate 250 cc. of his blood, were later charged with the murder of said
Alfredo Buccat upon the affidavits of the widow,
Magdalena Buccat, and her son, Elpidio
Buccat, who were both present at the commission of
the crime, which affidavits were given to the police authorities on March 14,
1969 or 16 days after the shooting of Alfredo Buccat.
The information against the two accused-appellants charges ?
“That on or about the 26th day of February, 1969, at about
7:30 in the evening, in barrio Agtipal, Municipality
of Bacnotan, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
namely, LUIS DELMENDO and FLORENTINO DELMENDO, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one ALFREDO
BUCCAT inflicting upon said offended party.
Alfredo Buccat the following wounds:
‘Gunshot wound entering left anterior chest at 1st interspace, mid-clavicular line,
going thru and shattering manubrium sterni, going thru right internal mammary vessels, thru
right upper lobe of right lung including its deep vessels, out thru right axilla and thru posterior aspect of right upper arm.’
which caused the
death of the said Alfredo Buccat.
That the following aggravating circumstances were attendant in the
commission of the offense:
1.
That the crime was committed in the nighttime.
2.
That the crime is committed in the dwelling
place of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code.”
The accused-appellants pleaded not guilty,
hence, the case proceeded to trial. Upon
completion thereof, the trial court convicted the two accused in its decision
promulgated May 4, 1970, the
dispositive portion of which states:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
LUIS DELMENDO and FLORENTINO DELMENDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder as charged qualified by treachery. The court considers the mitigating
circumstance of drunkenness in favor of the accused to offset the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 plus moral damages of P5,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P3,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
plus the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.”
The two accused appealed the decision of conviction but the
records were erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals. On June
17, 1970, the same were forwarded to this Court.
In assailing the decision under review, the accused-appellants
submit the following assignment of errors:
1.
The trial court erred in finding that “at a
distance of about nine meters Luis fired at the deceased.” (p. 20,
Decision.)
2.
The trial court erred in concluding that
“the identity of Luis as the gun wielder was corroborated by the findings
of Col. Minardo Finones,
Chief of the P.C. Central Laboratory showing that Luis Delmendo
was positive for powder burns.” (p. 21, Decision.)
3.
The trial court erred in holding that “with
the positive identification of both accused, the defense of alibi interposed by
the accused, inherently weak as it is, all the more becomes even weaker and is
not worthy of credit.” (p. 22, Decision.)
4.
The trial court erred in finding that “Florentino Delmendo conspired
with Luis Delmendo to commit the offense.” (p.
23, Decision.)
5.
The trial court erred in convicting
defendants-appellants of the crime of murder qualified by treachery, in
sentencing each one of them to suffer life imprisonment, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 plus
moral damages of P5,000.00 and exempplary damages of
P3,000.00, instead of acquitting them upon the ground of reasonable doubt. (p. 25, Decision.) (Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, pp. 1-3).
The crucial issue in the case at bar is the identities of the
assailants who shot the victim, Alfredo Buccat, in his
house in Barrio Agtipal, Municipality of Bacnotan, La Union in the evening of February 26,
1969. The wife of the deceased and his
son, Magdalena Buccat and Elpidio
Buccat, respectively, point to the two
defendant-appellants as the malefactors.
Both accused, however, stoutly denied the accusation against them.
The version of the prosecution may be narrated in the following
recital, quoting the People’s Brief, pp. 2-4, to wit:
“At about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of February 26, 1969,
the appellant Florentino Delmendo
arrived at the house of the spouses Alfredo and Magdalena Buccat
in barrio Agtipal, Bacnotan,
La Union, while it was being repaired (pp. 90, 91, 104, 161, t.s.n.). After
helping in the work and drinking basi that was served
by Magdalena to the workers, at about 12:00 o’clock noon,
Florentino left only to return at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day
(pp. 105, 106, t.s.n.). Not long after Florentino
arrived, he had a quarrel with his brother Federico and they
almost boloed each other had not the proverbial
cooler heads intervened to pacify them (pp. 106, 107, 108, 109, t.s.n.). After they
had been pacified, Magdalena advised Federico to go home
to avoid further trouble (pp. l07, 108, 109, t.s.n.). Soon thereafter Florentino
left, sore at her for sending his brother home, otherwise he would have killed
him (pp. 106, 108, t.s.n.). Later on he returned with his co-appellant
Luis Delmendo (p. 106, t.s.n.).
Upon seeing the two appellants, Alfredo, who was in the yard
talking with Cipriano Delarna
and Eniong Oredena, told
his son Elpidio not to bring out basi
anymore because the ‘drunks are here again,’ referring to the appellants (pp.
83, 91, 92, 110, 148, 158, 169, 170, t.s.n.),
whereupon Cipriano and Eniong
left while father and son ascended their house for supper (pp. 82, 83, 148,
149, t.s.n.).
While Alfredo and his family were having supper, the appellants went up
to the house (pp. 83, 94, 152, t.s.n.). Luis sat on the window sill east of the
dining table where the Buccats were eating, his feet
dangling out of the window, while Florentino stood
beside him (pp. 83, 93, 152, 166, t.s.n.). A while thereafter, Florentino vomitted, causing the
spouses to complain of the appellants’ bad manners, especially at a time that
they were eating (pp. 84, 85, 152, 153, 157, t.s.n.). Luis stood up and whispered something to Florentino (pp. 84, 85, 153, 168, t.s.n.). Afterwards they left eastward following the
pathway to their houses (pp. 85, 95, t.s.n.).
Later on the appellants returned as the Buccat
family had just finished supper and while in the yard at a distance of about
nine meters, appellant Luis fired several times at Alfredo from behind (pp. 75,
76, 78, 81, 95, 117, 118, 154, 155, 170, 173, 174, t.s.n.). Alfredo slumped and fell down to the floor
(pp. 97, 119, t.s.n.). Magdalena and her son Elpidio ran to the kitchen and screamed for help as they
saw the appellants fleeing northward (pp. 81, 96, 119, 156, 174, t.s.n.).
The stricken victim was rushed to the Lorma
Hospital in San Fernando, La Union (p. 86, t.s.n.),
where he was attended to by Dr. Rufino Macagba, Jr., director of the hospital (pp. 40, 41, t.s.n.), but expired at about 11:20 o’clock in the evening
due to severe loss of blood caused by the gunshot wound sustained on the chest
(pp. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, t.s.n.; Exhs. “F” and
“G”).”
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are Magdalena Buccat, the widow, and Elpidio Buccat, son of the victim.
The testimony of the widow, lifted from the decision of the trial court,
is as follows:
“MAGDALENA BUCCAT, widow of the deceased, testified that in
the evening of February 26, 1969,
she was at home and that right after supper with her deceased husband and their
two children Elpidio and Gloria, and an aunt of her
husband, they tarried awhile on the table where they ate. That was on the cemented ground floor of
their two-storey house.
While thus lingering after supper at seven
o’clock that evening she saw the accused Luis Delmendo
with Florentino Delmendo
at their yard. Then she saw Luis fire at
her husband who, upon being hit, collapsed to the floor from the chair where he
was seated. Immediately she ran for help
towards the kitchen door where she again saw accused Luis and FLorentino running towards the north.
She did not know who finally brought her husband to the Lorma Hospital
at San Fernando, La Union, but when
she followed to the hospital at 10 o’clock
that evening her husband was already dead.
On cross-examination, she disclosed that that same night a
policeman by the name of Espejo came to
investigate. She admitted that she did
not tell anyone who the assailant of her husband was except to her son Elpidio who likewise saw the assailant. But she said it was probable that she told
policeman Espejo that night. She also admitted that she advised her son Elpidio not to tell anyone as yet who the assailant was
because, according to her, she was still afraid ‘they might come back for us!’
Asked the distance between the assailant to her husband
when shot, she disclosed that the assailant was about six meters (nine meters
by actual measurement).
That she recognized Luis fire at that distance as he was
illuminated by the kerosene lamp near the window and that it was a clear night
with the moon shining at one o’clock
high.”
The material testimony of the son Elpidio
is likewise recited in the trial court’s decision, and We
quote:
“ELPIDIO BUCCAT, l9, son of the victim, testified that x x x.
After the Buccat family had finished
their supper, the victim rested for a while on the same chair by the dining
table but had changed his original sitting position such that his back was
turned against the dining table. Witness
on the other hand remained seated by the table facing west in his original
position now tinkering with the picture frame.
He was reaching for the picture frame when he saw both accused suddenly
appear at the western window of the dining room. He saw Luis Delmendo
aim and fire at his father. At this
precise moment, Florentino was about one meter behind
Luis Delmendo.
After the gun fired, witness ran to the kitchen and out of the house to
report the shooting to a neighbor, Herminio Marquez.
Witness Elpidio Buccat
did not reveal the identities of the assailants of his father that same night
except to his mother who advised him not to reveal their identities yet to
anybody for fear of reprisal.”
Corporal Modesto Espejo of the Bacnotan Police Force was the first police authority who,
upon learning of the incident about 8:00 o’clock
that evening, proceeded immediately to the scene at Barrio Agtipal
with Patrolman Partible and two enlisted PC men
assigned to Bacnotan.
We also quote hereunder Cpl. Espejo’s
testimony as cited in the decision:
“Upon their arrival, the deceased was no longer there. He learned he was brought to the Lorma Hospital
at San Fernando by men from barrio Agtipal. He
interrogated the widow and their son and one Tinoy Delmendo (He was not sure of the surname), but did not
reduce them in writing because he turned over the investigation to Sgt. Camilo Marquez. He
gathered by his routine police investigation that same evening that the
deceased was shot in his house at barrio Agtipal. He recovered six empty shells west of the
house on the ground under the window, and a slug inside the house embedded in
a window frame east of the house.
Later he made a verbal report to the chief of police to whom he
also turned over the six empty shells (Exh. D) and
one slug (Exh. E). At the municipal building a guard
informed him that the suspects were also at the hospital. He transmitted the information to Pat. Marquez who was then at the hospital.”
The evidence for the prosecution further show that the accused
Luis Delmendo and Florentino
Delmendo were subjected to paraffin tests at the
Provincial Constabulary Headquarters in San Fernando, La Union where they were
taken by Sgt. Camilo Marquez of the Police Force at
the time said accused Luis Delmendo and Florentino Delmendo were at the Lorma Hospital in San Fernando, La Union where the two had
gone to volunteer with other barriomates to donate
blood to the wounded Alfredo Buccat. Paraffin casts of both hands of Luis Delmendo, Florentino Delmendo and Fernando Ganiola
were taken by Staff Sgt. Godoy on 27 February 1969, 0830H. The chemistry report No.
C-91-69 marked Exhibit “B” contained the following findings: “1.
Luis Delmendo – Both hands gave POSITIVE result to
the test for the presence of gunpowder residue (Nitrates); and 2. Fernando Ganiola and Florentino
Delmendo – NEGATIVE to the test for the presence of
gunpowder residue (Nitrates).”
The trial court further summarized the testimony of Sgt. Camilo Marquez, who took over the investigation of the case
from Cpl. Modesto Espejo. Sgt. Marquez admitted that the deceased
Alfredo Buccat was his second cousin and, therefore,
a close relative of the aggrieved family.
According to the decision, p. 5; Records, p. 169.
“He tried to talk to the widow and son but they could not give
him some enlightenment as they had not then recovered their composure and were
hysterical. Others he interviewed
refused to talk ‘probably because they did not have knowledge of the crime.’
Thereafter, however, he tried to find clues, and on March 17, 1969, he obtained a written statement of one Cipriano Delarna.”
It is a fact that it was only on March 14, 1969 or after 16
days from the day of the shooting incident that the widow, Magdalena, and her
son, Elpidio, both went to the office of the Chief of
Police of Bacnotan, La Union and there and then, they
gave their written statements about the shooting, identifying the accused,
Luis Delmendo and Florentino
Delmendo, as the assailants who shot Alfredo Buccat. Their
affidavits were subscribed and sworn to before Municipal Atty. and Special
Counsel Eufemio R. Molina on March 19, 1969.
We come now to defense.
The version of the defense as maintained in their Brief, pp.
10-11, is that “Between 4:30
and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, on
Feb. 26, 1969, Florentino was called by Luis to repair the latter’s
bicycle. They then proceeded to the
house of Pedro Valmonte to borrow his tools. After repairing the bicycle for more than one
hour, both proceeded to the store of Magdalena Buccat,
widow of the deceased Alfredo Buccat, where they
drank gin and coca-cola. While thus drinking,
Florentino Almodovar came
along, and Luis invited him to drink with them.
The three drank in the store for about 30 minutes. After drinking, all three proceeded east
towards the house of barrio captain Revelino Balen to fix the schedule of workers in a road construction
project in the barrio, but upon passing the house of a certain Antonio Corpuz, Florentino Almodovar stayed behind, while Florentino
and Luis went on their way to the house of said barrio captain. After having stayed in the house of the
barrio captain for about 30 minutes, he accompanied Luis to his house for the
purpose of borrowing rice. From the
house of Luis, Florentino went home. (pp. 282-303, TSN, March 4, 1970).”
Testifying for the defense, Revelino Balen, the barrio captain of Agtipal,
Bacnotan, La Union, declared that between the hours
of 7:00 and 8:00 in the evening of February 26, 1969 he was working in his flue-curing barn
in Agtipal when he heard gun reports from a northerly
direction. He proceeded northward to
investigate the cause of the gunfire when he met children who were running
southward and reporting, “Tata Pidong was shot.” He then proceeded to the house of
Alfredo Buccat, the victim, and found his bleeding
body inside the kitchen. There were many
people near the crime scene. He called
for a tricycle to bring the victim to the hospital. On the way to the Lorma Hospital,
he asked the victim who shot him, but the latter answered “I do not
know.” He saw both accused at the hospital but did not know their purpose
in going there.
Pedro Valmonte, barrio councilman of Agtipal, also testified for the defense, saying that
between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on the date of the incident, he heard gun
reports and when he heard the sound of a horn giving the alarm, he proceeded to
the house of the victim which was rumored to be the source of the gun
reports. He came upon the victim loaded
into a tricycle for the purpose of rushing him to a hospital. He also stated that he inquired from Magdalena
Buccat and her son Elpidio Buccat if they knew the assailants and they replied in the
negative. He asked Magdalena
where the assailant was at the time he fired at the victim and Magdalena
pointed to the southeastern part of her house saying, “That is the place
where the flash of light came from.” Valmonte
also declared that he searched for evidence particularly empty shells to help
authorities solve the crime but he could not find any at the place pointed to
by the widow. He, however, found six
empty shells about a meter below the window west of the house and he covered
them with a wash basin to avoid them being touched by anyone.
This witness further testified that he campaigned for
blood-donors willing to give their blood for the victim, and two caretela loads of people responded to the request for
blood, he accompanying them up to the national road where they were later on
transported to the Lorma
Hospital where the victim was
taken. He also said that both accused,
Luis Delmendo and Florentino
Delmendo, were among those who volunteered to donate
their blood to the victim.
As to the fact of the blood donation given by the accused Luis Delmendo, the records disclosed that in truth and in fact,
said accused donated 250 cc. of his blood type “B” to the victim,
Alfredo Buccat, on February 26, 1969 as shown in the certificate issued by
Nora Zafra, medical technologist of the Lorma Hospital. (Exh.
“1”).
The trial court in convicting the two accused, reached such
conclusion on the following rationale:
“That Luis Delmendo fired the gun
that killed the deceased; that Florentino Delmendo was near and in company with Luis; and that both
of them were positively identified by the witnesses Magdalena Buccat and Elpidio Buccat, the court has no valid reason to doubt. At a distance of about nine meters at night
one can easily be identified by the light of a kerosene lamp (such as that used
by the family of the deceased) especially if the party is well-known to the
identifier. Both the accused and the
witnesses are barriomates and are well known to each
other. Furthermore, the identity of Luis
as the gun wielder was corroborated by the findings of Col. Minardo
Fiñones, chief of the P.C. Central Laboratory showing
that Luis Delmendo was positive for powder burns.
The testimonies of Magdalena and Elpidio, even if they are the widow and son, respectively,
of the deceased corroborate each other in all respects. They have been shown not to be perjured and
no motive or reason was ever faintly suggested why they will perjure their
testimonies. Indeed, the accused himself
admitted that before the incident, they were in the best of terms with the
deceased. Aside from these, the testimony
of Magdalena and Elpidio of
the shooting as well as the place where Luis fired from was further
substantiated by the testimony of police Corporal Modesto Espejo
who testified that he recovered six empty shells thereat plus a slug embedded
on the frame of the eastern window of the ground floor of the victim’s
house.” (Decision, pp. 21-22; Records, pp. 185-186).
Assailing the above decision, the main thrust of the defense is
that the testimonies of the widow, Magdalena, and her
son, Elpidio, relative to the identity of the
malefactors cannot be believed and relied upon because there are compelling
reasons why their declarations cannot be given full faith and credence. And these are: (1) The three
kerosene lamps were all inside the house as testified to by Mrs. Buccat. It must have
been dark outside considering that it was already between 7:00 and 8:00
o’clock in the evening, hence, it was quite difficult for her to recognize
persons outside of her house at the time of the incident; (2) While she
testified that she saw one of the malefactors aim his gun to her husband, she
did not even warn her husband of the danger to his life; she did not shout a
warning at all. This is an unnatural
behavior of a wife witnessing the danger to her husband. Had she really seen the accused Luis Delmendo aim his gun at the deceased husband of Mrs. Buccat, the latter would have certainly shouted a warning
to him as a natural and instinctive reaction; (3) Her testimony on
cross-examination that despite the time of the night (between 7:00 to 8:00
o’clock) she was even able to recognize the color of the shirts of the
appellants, i.e., Luis was wearing light brown shirt while Florentino
was wearing a reddish shirt (p. 136, TSN, October 16, 1969), are exaggerations
in an attempt to appear credible, only to unmask her incredibility. It is unbelievable to recognize with
accuracy the color of a shirt at that time of the night especially when the
color of the shirt is dark. It is next
to impossible since any colored object on a dark night without the aid of
artificial light would appear to be black to the naked eye. And since the alleged assailants were some
nine meters away from the victim (p. 7, Decision) and therefore even further
away from Mrs. Buccat, an accurate identification
cannot be relied upon; (4) When Mrs. Buccat was
investigated by the police immediately after the shooting, she did not mention
the names of the assailants of her husband to the police investigator, her
reason being: “I did not then
mention because I was then crying.” (p. 139, TSN, Oct.
16, 1969). The defense argues
that her reason for not divulging the assailants of her husband on the night
she was investigated is flimsy for even if she was crying, it was easy for her
to mention the names of the assailants, but she did not. It would have been more natural for her to
mention the names of the assailants in the course of her investigation even if
not asked or prodded to do so. It was
only on March 14, 1969, or
more than two weeks after the incident, that she divulged the names of her
husband’s assailants allegedly because it was only then that she “had composed”
herself. Thus, she testified:
“CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTORNEY GUALBERTO:
Q – The
first time you ever gave your statement about who killed your husband was March 14, 1969, which is found on
your statement on page 34 of the record of the case?
A – Yes,
your Honor.
Q – That
was the only time when you divulged the identities of the alleged assailant of
your husband to peace officers?
A – Yes,
sir.
Q – That
was also the only time when you mentioned about the incident surrounding the
circumstances surrounding the incident?
A – Yes,
Your Honor. (p.
141, TSN, October 16, 1969)
Required to explain the rather
unreasonable delay in divulging the identities of the assailants of her husband,
Mrs. Buccat testifying on redirect examination
declared:
“REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY ATTORNEY CACANINDIN:
Q – Why
did it take you until March 14, to go to the police officers and give your
written statement?
A – At
the time of the week few days after the incident, I had not yet composed
myself. On March 14, when I had composed
myself, I went to the authorities to give my statement. (p. 142, TSN, October 16,
1969.)”
According to the defense, the other alleged eyewitness to the
incident, Elpidio Buccat,
son of the deceased Alfredo Buccat, must also suffer
the same fate. His testimony cannot be
given faith and credence for like her mother, his declarations cannot be
believed. While he allegedly witnessed
the whole incident, he refrained from divulging to the authorities the identities
of his father’s assailants alllegedly
because he was advised by her mother not to do so for fear of their lives. Thus, he declared:
“CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTORNEY CARIASO:
Q – When
you saw them (appellants), did you not go to the police authority and tell the
authorities to arrest them as they are the assailants of your father?
A – Not
yet, sir.
Q – Why?
A – I
was advised by my mother not to make a report to the authorities yet for fear
of our lives.
Q – When
were you advised by your mother?
A – The
following day, Sir, after the incident.
(pp. 181-182, TSN, October 23,
1969.)”
The defense considers the foregoing testimony as valueless for
two reasons: First, because on the night
of the incident immediately after his father was shot, the police investigators
were already in their house conducting an on-the-spot investigation. So he could have informed them of the
identities of his father’s assailants right then and there, since there was yet
no instructions from his mother not to divulge the names of the malefactors, if
it is true that it was the following day of the incident that his mother
advised him not to give the authorities the identities of the assailants. Second, because his testimony on this point
is in direct contradiction with his mother’s testimony to the effect that
immediately after the body of her husband was brought to the hospital, she told
Elpidio of the identity of the assailants at the same
time telling him “not to talk as yet about the matter,” to wit:
“CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. CARIASO
Q – Aside
from Espejo, did you ever tell any other person
especially members of your household about the identity of the assailants of
your husband?
A – None,
sir.
COURT:
You did not tell
anybody, or you do not remember having told anybody?
A – It
was to Elpidio, my son, whom I told, sir, that ‘You
will not talk as yet about the matter.’
Q – When
did you tell Elpidio?
A – When
the body of my husband was already brought to the hospital. (p. 99, TSN, October 15,
1969.)”
The testimony of Elpidio that his
mother told him not to reveal the identity of the assailants to the police
authorities is a lie because the body of the deceased was brought to the
hospital on the same night of the incident.
And since the testimony is false, the defense argues that his whole
testimony should be disregarded under the principle of falsus
in uno falsus omnibus,
false in one, false in all, under “the cardinal rule which has served in
all ages, and has been applied to all conditions of men, that a witness wilfully falsifying the truth in one particular, when upon
oath, ought never to be believed upon the strength of his own testimony,
whatever he may assert.” (U.S.
vs. Osgood, 27 Fed. Case No. 15971-a, p. 364).
The defense maintains that the trial court erred in concluding
that “the identity of Luis as the gun wielder was corroborated by the
findings of Col. Minardo Fiñones,
Chief of the P.C. Central Laboratory, showing that Luis Delmendo
was positive for powder burns.” (p. 21, Decision). It is contended that the findings of the
laboratory that both hands of Luis Delmendo were
positive for powder burns is not conclusive that he fired the gun in the light
of the admission of Col. Fiñones that there is such a
thing as “false negative,” that is if he did not fire a gun but found
positive for nitrates (p. 10, TSN, Sept. 23, 1969); that it is possible that a
person who did not fire a gun could be found positive for powder burns; that
“even a mere handling, for one occasion, of fertilizer could produce
nitrates on one’s hand” (pp. 11-12, TSN, Sept. 23, 1969). In short, Col. Fiñones
admitted that (1) one who works in a laboratory and handles nitrates will have
nitrates in his hands (p. 7, TSN, Sept. 23, 1969); (2) even smoking could
produce nitrates (p. 11, Id.); (3) even urinating also produces nitrates (p.
11, Id.); and (4) handling of fertilizer also produces nitrates. (p. 13, Id.).
The defense further contends that although Col. Fiñones testified that nitrates from gun powder is fine and
thin, whereas other nitrates give lighter color and bigger smell, he admitted
that this is not conclusive (p. 12, TSN, Sept. 23, 1969). This means that although thin and fine
nitrates were found in the hands of Luis Delmendo,
such fact is not conclusive that he fired a gun.
It is not disputed that accused Luis Delmendo
was at the time of the incident an employee of the Filipinas Magnetite
Corporation, FILMAG for short, working under Engineer Daniel P. Cafuir, Chemical Engineer, in the Assay Department of said
firm (pp. 330-331, TSN, March 5, 1970).
Luis was then a laboratory technician in said firm, assisting the firm’s
chemist in “the analysis of elements, iron concentrate and copper
ores”; that he used to handle chemicals and although he was equipped with
gloves to prevent him from contamination, he had been working without gloves,
reason for which the firm used to reprimand him. (p. 332, TSN, Id.)
Engineer Cafuir likewise declared that: “The chemicals most often used in the
laboratory are acid solvents like hydrocloric acid, sulphuric acid, nitrate acid, perphloric
acid, nitric acid, potassium dichromate, chemicals which pertain to other
analysis of different elements — ammonium nitrate, potasium
iodine, sodium thiasulphate.” (pp. 336337, TSN,
March 5, 1970).
In convicting the two accused for the murder of the victim in
this case, the conviction must be based on evidence that is clear, positive and
strong creating a moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused. The charge against them must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Since the two alleged
eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime are the widow and son of the
victim, their testimonies pointing to the accused as the perpetrators must be
subjected to a rigid test which should demonstrate beyond cavil their
truthfulness, honesty and rectitude as actual eyewitnesses to the perpetration
of the criminal act. There must never be
any shadow of doubt, any cloud of suspicion or deception to conceal the facts
and disguise the truth. The first, if
not the basic foundation upon which the prosecution builds its case against the
accused is proof beyond reasonable doubt that it is the said accused who
committed the crime charged. In other
words, the identity of the accused is the first duty of the prosecution.
As earlier indicated, the widow, Magdalena,
and her son, Elpidio, both point the accusing finger
to the two accused as the assailants.
Yet, the evidence clearly show that it took them 16 days after the
commission of the crime to lay the blame upon both accused for the first time
when on March 14, 1969, these alleged eyewitnesses went to the police
department in the townhall to make their written
statements and accuse the two defendants, although police investigators (one of
them the police sergeant who was their close relative) had gone to the house of
the victim and the witnesses to conduct an on-the-spot investigation that very
night when the shooting occurred on February 26, 1969. The credibility of their testimonies are, therefore, seriously attacked.
What is the rule in criminal law jurisprudence in similar or
analogous cases where there is delay or failure to identify the accused at the
earliest opportunity? In the following
cases, the Supreme Court has uniformly held that such an
identification is an afterthought designed to implicate the accused and
cannot be the basis of conviction. Thus
–
In People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA
451, 456-458, the Supreme Court said:
“The widow’s behavior after the incident was even more
puzzling and leads us to the conclusion that she did not at all recognize her
husband’s assassin and that her subsequent identification of the appellant was
an afterthought born of a prejudiced mind.
She related that when she reported the murder to the PC detachment at Tumauini around one o’clock
in the morning of April 30, 1959,
she told Sgt. Venturina that it was Fulgencio Baquiran who shot her
husband. But Sgt. Venturina
denied this and testified that she refused and would not talk about the
matter. Mateo Forto who, she admitted, was present when she made
the report to Sgt. Venturina, confirmed the
sergeant’s testimony and added that she said that she was not able to recognize
any of the killers. Forto
also disclosed that on the way to Tumauini, he questioned
Juanita as to the identity of her husband’s assailants and that the widow
replied that she was not able to recognize them because they had the brim of
their caps tilted downwards. Bernardo Gumatay, chief of police of Tumauini,
testified similarly. When he
investigated the widow at the scene of the crime, the latter revealed that she
could not recognize the malefactors because it was dark. Upon his return to Tumauini,
Gumatay entered the result of the evening’s
investigation in the police blotter under date of April 30, 1959 (Exh. 3). Dr. Laman, who
overheard the conversation between Gumatay and the
widow, corroborates the former’s testimony. These witnesses have not been shown by the
prosecution to have any inordinate interest in the acquittal of the
accused. No one is a relative or
barrio-mate of the appellant. They are
disinterested persons and the record does not indicate any reason for us to disbelieve
their testimonies or to suspect their motives.
The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime and
recognizes the offender is to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest
opportunity. Juanita Marilao did report the crime to the Constabulary but she
did not reveal the identity of the assailant although it was inquired into
three times or more. It taxes credulity
that Juanita made no effort to expose the appellant then. Her silence casts serious doubt on her
subsequent identification of the appellant.
Had she really recognized the appellant, as the prosecution contended,
she would have immediately and spontaneously revealed his identity upon
reporting the crime as would be expected according to the natural course of
things. The argument that she was still
in a state of shock after the incident and that she was afraid of reprisal
from the assailants who were still at learge is not
supported by the evidence on record. The
fact that she was able to seek out Ocampo and Forto to help her go to Tumauini
on the night of the murder does not show a confused and disorganized mind. If she were afraid of reprisal, wouldn’t it
be more in consonance with common experience for her to have revealed the
identity of the accused that he might safely be put behind bars? As it were, the accused was not ordered
arrested until May 3, 1959
after Sgt. Venturina filed a complaint the day
before. This is in itself significant
for it lends support to the declarations of Celedonia
and Fulgencio that the identification of the latter
as the alleged assailant took place on May
1, 1959 and not on April 30 as asserted by both Juanita and Venturina. As
previously mentioned, Juanita testified that she identified the accused as the
murderer of her husband during the first hours of the morning of April 30, 1959 when she reported her
husband’s death to the PC detachment at Tumauini. This was denied and contradicted by Sgt. Venturina who asserted that the identification was made
during the confrontation between the widow and the appellant in the morning of
April 30 around nine or ten o’clock in the morning. Celedonia, who was
investigated together with her mother as Venturina
himself admitted, testified that the investigation took place on May 1, 1959 and that the accused was
not present at all. This corroborates Baquiran’s statements to the same effect. For more than twenty-four hours then no word
was received from the widow as to the identity of her husband’s killers. This despite the fact that
after her husband’s burial on April 30, she decided to spend the rest of the
day and night in Tumauini. If Sgt. Venturina
filed the complaint only on May 2, 1959,
it could have been due to the fact that the widow made her identification only
the day before, May 1, 1959. By then, she had had more than ample time for
reflection and what was merely a suspicion deepened into a conviction. She admitted on cross-examination that she
was not able to identify her husband’s killer although she suspected somebody. Thus:
‘Q – You
want to make this Honorable Court understand that the Chief of Police, together
with his two policemen, Domingo and Taguba, went to
that place where your husband was shot and killed without interrogating or
making investigation regarding the assailant?
‘A – He
asked me, sir.
‘Q – And
there you told him that you were not able to identify the person who shot and
killed your husband, although you suspected somebody?
‘A – Yes,
sir.’ (t.s.n. 71).
She repeated her suspicions later to Chief
of Police Gumatay after the burial of her husband,
mentioning the name of Baquiran as the suspect. Needless to say, suspicion is no
identification. And the fact that she
merely had suspicions is an indication that at the time her husband was shot,
she was not able to make a positive identification of the assailant.”
In People vs. Bulawin, 29 SCRA
710, 714-715, 719-720, where the witness did not mention the incident to the
people in his own house and where an investigation was then being conducted by
the Constabulary, the Supreme Court said –
“Soon after the incident, people went to the place where
Jimenez fell. Amongst them were Governor
Ali Dimaporo, Vice-Governor Arsenio
Quibranza, Mayor Apolonio
Yap and many others. Witness Autor, however, testified that he communicated to nobody,
although ‘Mr. Quibranza, Dimaporo
and his leaders were still there,’ and left for home without even extending a
helping hand to the victim. Autor said that he did not mention the incident to the
people in his own house. These circumstances
suggest a substantial amount of improbability.
Of interest is Author’s declaration that the only person to whom he
ever mentioned what he saw was a brother of the victim. And this, he did in the morning following the
incident. It would seem odd then that
the brother of the victim did not inform the authorities about it. The record does not so indicate. No one appeared to have ever thought at that
time of taking Author’s statements, certainly very important to this case. For, he was, as already stated, allegedly
the sole eyewitness to the crime. Well
it is to remember that an investigation was then being conducted by the
Constabulary. Appellant and a number of
witnesses were in the barracks located in the same town of Salvador. (pp. 714-715)
3. There is a dearth of autoptic
or demonstrative evidence which would positively connect appellant with the
crime. Nothing in the record shows that
the officers even made any effort to locate the alleged pistol used by
appellant. Nor is there evidence that
appellant has had one. In the morning of
September 23, 1963, Sgt. Aniceto Dacalos, in the presence
of Sgt. Sarbida, pointed at appellant as the owner of
a big hat which was apparently left at the scene of the crime. Appellant denied this. Even that hat was not exhibited in
court. Or, its whereabouts accounted
for.” (p. 720)
In People vs. Cunanan, 19 SCRA
769, where the witness revealed the identity of the accused seven days after
the shooting of the victim and his reason was that every member of the family
of the deceased was very angry and he was afraid to reveal the identity of the
culprit sooner as “something also untoward would even happen,” and
“(t)he situation might be aggravated,” (p.
775) the Supreme Court, thru Justice Sanchez, held:
“7. The natural reaction of one who witnesses a
crime is to reveal it to the authorities unless, of course, he is the author
thereof. It defies credulity that not
one or two but five such witnesses made no effort to
expose Cunanan if they really knew that he was the
author thereof. This stultified silence
casts grave doubts as to their veracity.
In the end, we have here a specific case where evidence of
identification is thoroughly unreliable.
Reason: No valid explanation was
given why the People’s witnesses did not report the identity of appellant
Nicolas Cunanan to the authorities during a long
period of time.”
In People vs. Roxas, 73 SCRA
583, where the two witnesses gave their statements after the wake, or a delay
of five days from the shooting of the deceased because their deceased uncle was
a bachelor, without any family to attend to his burial, the Supreme Court,
speaking thru Justice Antonio, ruled:
“Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does
not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness, if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.” (p. 590)
In People vs. Aquino, 93 SCRA
772, where the witnesses reported 12 days after the shooting, it was therein
held with Justice Abad Santos as ponente
that:
“If, indeed, these witnesses had recognized and identified
the assailants, they would have reported the shooting and revealed the identity
of the culprits, to the police authorities, at the earliest possible opportunity,
as could ordinarily be expected of witnesses to a fatal shooting. But, not one of them did so.
The shooting was reported to the police by a certain Sulpicio Umiten, a public school
teacher in Kabacan.
When the police authorities arrived at the scene, Pacifico
and Romulo claimed that they were among those
questioned by the police. Yet none of
them singled out and named the accused.
They attempted to explain their inability to disclose the identity of
assailants, by claiming that they were afraid because it was already getting
dark, which explanation is too crude to be convincing. Romulo added a lame
excuse, that questions asked of him did not extend to the identity of the
culprits. Pacifico
and Romulo testified that two days after the shooting
they were investigated, and that they separately executed sworn statements
wherein they named the accused. But
surprisingly, their alleged sworn statements are both dated November 16, 1970,
or twelve days after the shooting.
x x x.
On the main, all that the prosecution had proved was the fact of
death of Benigno Pascua,
but it failed to prove by outright, convincing and conclusive evidence that
such death was caused by the accused.
The evidence for the prosecution does not even show that attempts were
made to recover the Garand rifle allegedly used in
the shooting, or that any of the accused was in possession of a rifle at the
time of the shooting. It does not even
appear that formal and thorough investigation was made of the accused, more
particularly of Pedro Casimina who appears to have
been hastily included in the murder charge.”
Reviewing and putting altogether what happened immediately
before, during and after the shooting incident, We
find many facts and circumstances that are not very clear nor do they logically
and naturally arise from an assumption that Magdalena
and Elpidio actually saw and identified the accused
Luis and Florentino Delmendo
shoot the deceased Alfredo Buccat at the time and
place charged. First, when the
police went to the scene of the crime in the evening of February 26, 1969 in the very house of the
victim to investigate the shooting, Magdalena Buccat
did not identify the two accused as the persons who shot her husband. Her testimony on this point is vague and
uncertain, if not vacillating, as shown in the transcript of the stenographic
notes during the trial on October 15,
1969, excerpts of which follow:
“Q – Did you ever tell anyone that night that you recognized the person
who shot your husband?
A – None,
sir.
Q – When
was the first time that you ever told anybody that you recognized the
assailants of your husband?
A – Maybe
it was to Itong Espejo whom
I told, sir.
Q – And
you told Espejo on that same night of the incident?
A – Yes,
sir.
Q – Did
you not say a while ago that you never told anyone the identity of the
assailants of your husband that night?
A – I
cannot remember if I told that to Itong Espejo, but maybe I told it, sir, because he talked to me
that night.
Q – But
did you not state a while ago that you do not even remember whether he
investigated you that time?
ATTY. CACANINDIN:
There is a lot of
difference between investigation and talking.
Q – Aside
from Espejo, did you ever tell any other person
especially members of your household about the identity of the assailants of
your husband?
A – None,
sir.
THE COURT:
You did not tell
anybody, or you do not remember having told anybody?
A – It
was to Elpidio, my son, whom I told, sir, that ‘You
will not talk as yet about the matter.’
Q – When
did you tell Elpidio?
A – When the body of my husband was already
brought to the hospital.”
(t.s.n., pp.
98-99, October 15, 1969)
In the latter part of her cross-examination, the same witness,
Magdalena Buccat, admitted that she did not tell Cpl.
Modesto Espejo of the Bacnotan
Police Force who was the first police investigator of the case who arrived soon
after the shooting incident, who killed her husband because she was then
crying, as indicated in the following excerpts of her testimony during the
trial of the case on October 16, 1969, to wit:
“Q – Madame Witness, were you not investigated immediately after the
incident?
A – I
am not sure if I was investigated. I
cannot remember. Maybe I was investigated
by Itong Espejo.
Q – You
were also investigated by the PC?
A – No,
sir.
Q – There
were no investigator, any agency, except Itong Espejo, who came to your house. Is that right?
A – Maybe
he came with a companion, but I am not sure if they asked questions from
me. I was then crying.
Q – That
is why you did not tell Itong who killed your
husband?
A – I
did not then mention because I was then crying.”
(t.s.n., pp.
138-139, October 16, 1969)
We have also the testimony of Sgt. Camilo
Marquez, a second cousin of the deceased Alfredo Buccat,
who declared that “upon going to Agtipal from
the hospital, he had occasion to talk to Magdalena Arellano, widow of the
deceased Alfredo Buccat, but he was not able to talk
to her because she was hysterical and was continuously crying.” (t.s.n., p.55, September 23, 1969). The sergeant was
also asked this question: “Q- In
other words, you tried with desperate efforts from February 26, 1969 up to
March 14, 1969, to talk with the widow and the children and yet was unable to
make them talk?” and his answer was:
“A- They were all hysterical.” (t.s.n., p. 59, Sept. 23, 1969).
This testimony of Sgt. Marquez must be believed in full because
he is a close relative of the deceased and it is but a normal and natural
reaction of the widow, shocked by the shooting of her husband, rendering her
speechless or unable to talk. But when
the police accompanied by P.C. soldiers and later followed by Sgt. Marquez, all
of whom would provide protection and security to the aggrieved family, it
became the duty of the widow to reveal the identities of the assailants, even
in confidence to the sergeant as a close relative if she really knew said
assailants. But the widow did not, and
from this omission or failure to reveal the identities of the perpetrators, We can only conclude that in truth she was not able to
identify the killers of her husband. Her
reason that she was crying and was hysterical, that she was not composed and
that she was afraid of their lives can no longer be justified in the light of
the long delay of 16 days when she finally went to the townhall
to give her statement to the police. Her
explanation is no longer valid to excuse the lateness of her accusation against
the accused after more than two weeks had passed. Indeed, “this stultified silence casts
grave doubts as to their veracity.” (People vs. Bulawin,
29 SCRA 710).
Second, the testimony of Elpidio, 19-year old son of the deceased, who claims to
have seen the two accused shoot his father, is likewise doubtful. It is even contradictory for, according to Elpidio, the first time he told anyone about the identity
of the assailants of his father was when he told his mother and that was when
she asked him if he saw Florentino and Luis Delmendo shoot his father.
His mother allegedly asked the question that same evening of the
shooting which was February 26, 1969,
after the father was already in the hospital.
(t.s.n., pp. 177-178,
Hearing of Oct.
23, 1969). Yet, according to Elpidio
himself on cross-examination, it was on the following day after the incident
that he was advised by his mother not to make a report to the authorities for
fear of their lives. (t.s.n., pp. 181-182, Hearing on Oct. 23, 1969). Contrary-wise, Magdalena
told her son Elpidio not to talk as yet about the matter
when the body of her husband was already brought to the hospital (which was in
the evening of February 26, 1969). (t.s.n.,
p. 99, Hearing of Oct. 15, 1969).
Following the testimony of Elpidio, he
declared that after the shooting of his father, he ran out of the kitchen door
and sought help in the neighboring house of Herminio
Marquez, ten meters away from their own house, telling Herminio
that his father had been shot. Herminio Marquez is the brother of Sgt. Camilo
Marquez, the second police investigator of the incident and admittedly a second
cousin of the victim, Alfredo Buccat. This Herminio,
being a close neighbor, is also a close relative of the aggrieved family. Now, when Elpidio
on the witness stand was asked: “Q
– Did Herminio Marquez ask you the identity of the
persons who shot your father when you came to him?” Elpidio’s
answer was: “A – No, sir.”
Then followed this question: “Q – And you did not volunteer to tell
him?” “A – No, sir.” (t.s.n., p. 177, October 23, 1969).
This failure of Elpidio to inform even
their neighbor Herminio Marquez, who is also a
second cousin of his father, being the brother of police investigator Sgt. Camilo Marquez, which would have been a very logical and
natural particular to disclose in Elpidio’s report or
account of what had happened to his father as stated by him to Herminio as the former sought for help, must cast grave
doubts as to the credibility of Elpidio’s testimony
that he saw and identified the two accused as the assailants of his father.
Third, the lapse of 16 days during which time Magdalena
and Elpidio did not go to the police to give their
statements or affidavits also engenders grave doubts that the two alleged
eyewitnesses actually saw the two accused in the act of shooting the victim. Claiming that they
volunteered to go to the Presidencia to be
investigated in connection with the incident and that they were not summoned. Magdalena explained
that after the incident she had not yet composed herself and it was only on March 14, 1969 that she had composed
herself.
Such explanation or reason is weak, if not sham, considering that
the usual mourning period had already elapsed.
She may be the aggrieved widow but certainly, her grief cannot be so
protracted as to be neglectful to seek immediate justice with the help of the
police. That the witnesses
procrastinated or delayed in going to the police authorities strongly indicates
the conclusion that they did not actually see the assailants or they were not
sure and positive as to their identities.
Fourth, the circumstances of time and place further
engender serious misgivings that the two eyewitnesses, Magdalena
and Elpidio, clearly saw the faces of the
assailants. The time of the shooting was
between 7:00 and 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 26, 1969. Three (3) small kerosene lamps were lighted
because it was already nighttime and supper had
already been partaken by the Buccat family. The two alleged eyewitnesses were inside the
house, on the ground floor and without any premonition whatsoever of the coming
danger. The assailants were outside the
house, some nine meters away from the place where Magdalena
was. She declared that she saw the
assailants only through the window, the dimensions being 1 meter and 33 cms. It may be true
that the moon was shining at one o’clock position and it was only a half-moon,
but considering the distance and the conditions of the night, common experience
show that it would be physically difficult to immediately accustom the eyes to
an object, more so a person, standing outside in the premises of the yard.
That Magdalena could identify the color of
the assailants’ shirts and that Elpidio could
identify the color of their pants which must have been hidden by the lower
portion of the window through which they were sighted, appears to be an
exaggeration, if not imagination to lend credence to their
identification. These and other details
which the witnesses recalled and what each did after the shooting to prove
their memory do not, however, impress Us in the face
of the indisputable fact that the witnesses delayed unreasonably in accusing
the two assailants to the police.
The records further show the lackadaisical action of the police
in apprehending and arresting the perpetrators.
When Cpl. Modesto Espejo with Patrolman Partible and 2 P.C. soldiers repaired to the scene of the
shooting right after the incident, no attempt was made to locate, search or
recover the firearm used. Cpl. Espejo said he investigated the widow and the son (t.s.n., p. 27, Hearing of Sept. 23, 1969) although Elpidio, the son, said he was not investigated by Cpl. Espejo (t.s.n., p. 180, Hearing
of Oct, 10, 1969) but Espejo did not take their
statements in writing that night, or even after several days. He did not follow up his investigation
because he rested. (t.s.n.,
p. 31, Sept. 23, 1969) and
worse, he did not even place in the police blotter the report of his
investigation as to who shot the victim.
(t.s.n., p. 34, Sept. 23, 1969).
And Sgt. Camilo Marquez, a second
cousin of the victim who took over the investigation from Cpl. Espejo, did not interview the widow allegedly because she
was crying. Yet, the police waited until
March 14, 1969, 16 days
after the shooting, to resume its investigation when the affidavits of the witnesses
were taken, only to be subscribed and sworn to 5 days thereafter, on March 19, 1969. From this indecision and hesitancy, it can be
reasonably inferred that the evidence then at hand was insufficient and
doubtful to formally charge the accused.
Now, to the motive. Generally, proof of motive is unnecessary to
pin a crime on the accused, if the evidence of identification is convincing;
however, where the proof of identification is not convincing, then proof of
motive is necessary. (People
vs. Cunanan, L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769;
People vs. Portugueza, L-22604, July 31, 1967, 20
SCRA 901; People vs. Jamero, L-19852, July 29, 1968,
24 SCRA 206; People vs. Guardo, L-23541, August 30,
1968, 24 SCRA 851).
Motive to kill assumes pertinence only when there is doubt as to
the identity of the culprit. (People vs. Sales, 44 SCRA 489; People vs. Basuel,
44 SCRA 207). Proof of motive is
important in knowing the reasons for the commission of a criminal act. (People vs. Custodio,
47 SCRA 289). Absence of motive is
important in determining the truth as between conflicting versions of the
incident object of the accusation.
(People vs. Boholst-Caballero, 61 SCRA 180;
People vs. Beltran, 61 SCRA 246)
In the case at bar, the lack of sufficient motive for the two
accused to shoot the victim is supportive of their defense of denial in the
commission of the crime. According to
the prosecution evidence, the motive to kill arose from the remarks of the
victim referring to the two accused as “drunks” and We quote the testimony of the widow:
“Q – Do you know the reason why they shot your husband?
A – There
is.
Q – What
was that?
A – When
the two accused were approaching our house, they were seen by my husband.
Q – What
about when the two were arriving at your house?
A – My
husband said, ‘Do not bring out basi anymore because
the drunks are here again.’
Q – He
was addressing who when he said that?
A – To
my son, Elpidio.
Q – And
who were the drunks referred to by your husband who were
arriving?
A – Luis
and Tino, sir.
Q – For
whom was that basi which Elpidio
was trying to bring out?
A – My
husband intended that basi for my kumpadre,
Eniong Oredena and Cipriano de Larna. (pp. 81-82, Hearing of Oct. 15, 1969)
x x x
In another portion of the widow’s testimony stating that the
accused Florentino Delmendo
was sore at her, she related that Florentino and his
brother, Federico, had a quarrel at her house about 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of February 26, 1969 wherein she interceded and pacified them,
sending home Federico to stop the fight between the brothers. We quote her testimony:
“THE COURT: (Addressing Magdalena Buccat)
After you had pacified
them, what happened?
A – Florentino got sore because I sent his brother home.
THE COURT:
Why did his brother
Federico leave?
A – Because
I pleaded to him that he would go home so that their fight would not go on.
THE COURT:
But he did not tell
anything to you that he was sore at you?
I refer to Florentino.
A – He
did not do anything, Sir, but I saw him very sore at me.” (t.s.n., pp. 107-108, Hearing, October 15, 1969)
Assuming that the deceased had referred to the accused as
“drunks”, assuming that Florentino was sore
because Magdalena pacified the fight between the two brothers, Florentino and Federico, assuming further that Magdalena
remarked about the bad manners of the two accused when Florentino
vomitted, are these sufficient motives or reasons for
the accused to murder the deceased, Alfredo Buccat? We do not believe so. We hold and rule that tested by the common
experience and observation of mankind, the said evidence falls short, far and
below that degree of probability logically and reasonably acceptable under the
circumstances. For certainly, the role
of Magdalena as a peacemaker between the fighting brothers, Florentino and Federico Delmendo,
was a good deed which normally deserves another in return, and not an act of
murder of the husband who was not even present during the quarrel. Nor does the remark uttered by Alfredo Buccat referring to the two accused as “drunks”
sufficiently prove the reason for the shooting, much less the comment on their
bad manners. Indeed, the insufficiency
of the motive, nay its improbability by normal standards, weakens the
prosecution’s identification of the accused.
In fact, it strengthens the defense claim that the accused were not the
assailants.
The last point is the defense of alibi set up by the
accused. Alibi is a weak defense that
cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses
(People vs. Estrocada, 75 SCRA 295; People vs. Roncal, 79 SCRA 509).
Alibi assumes importance where evidence for prosecution is weak and
betrays lack of concreteness on question of whether or not the accused
committed the crime charged. An accused
cannot be convicted on the basis of evidence which, independently of his
alibi, is weak, uncorroborated, and inconclusive. The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily
proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases;
otherwise, there would be the absurdity of an accused being put in a more
difficult position where the prosecution’s evidence is vague and weak than
where it is strong. (People
vs. Lim, L-46890, Nov. 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 496). The same rule is reiterated in People vs. Dilao, L-43259, Oct. 23, 1980, 100 SCRA 358, 394.
Re-stated otherwise, the weakness of the defense of alibi does
not relieve the prosecution of the required burden of proof. (People vs. Aquino, 93 SCRA 772; People vs. Salazar, 93 SCRA 796). And although alibi is the weakest defense
that an accused can avail of, it acquires commensurate strength where no
positive and proper identification has been made by the witnesses of the
offender. The prosecution has the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this
responsibility. (People
vs. Cruz, L-24424, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 181).
Applying the above jurisprudential rules to the case at bar, it
is at once discernible that the alibi of the two accused is so simple in their
candidness in admitting that each of them were in their respective houses which
are very near to the scene of the crime at the time of the shooting of the
victim. The house of the accused Luis Delmendo is about 200 meters from the house of the victim (t.s.n., p. 413, hearing on March 5, 1970) and he (the
accused) was about to eat his supper when he heard the gun volleys (t.s.n., p. 394, hearing, March 5, 1970). And with respect to the other accused Florentino Delmendo, his house is
about 50 meters away from the house of Magdalena Buccat
(t.s.n., p. 310, hearing, March 4, 1970) and said
accused was in the street north of his house when he came to know for the first
time that Alfredo Buccat was shot (t.s.n., p. 319, hearing, March 4, 1970).
The above alibi is positively corroborated by witness Florentino Almodovar who declared
that he, together with the two accused, drank gin and coca-cola in the store of
Magdalena Buccat that afternoon of February 26, 1969;
that they walked to the house of Antonio Corpuz where
Almodovar stayed behind while the two accused
proceeded to the house of Barrio Captain Revelino Balen; that after 30 minutes, he saw the two accused leave
the house, going northwards, after which he heard gun explosions, a successive
volley of fires coming from the west. (t.s.n., pp. 259-263, March 4, 1970 hearing).
While the defense of alibi frequently deserves little
consideration because it is easily fabricated, it is not always false and
without merit (People vs. Pulmones, 61 Phil. 680) as
in the case at hand, and when coupled with the improbabilities and
uncertainties of the prosecution evidence, suffice to raise reasonable doubt as
to their responsibility (People vs. Bartolay, 42 SCRA
1).
We have already ruled herein that the prosecution has not
presented clear, positive and convincing evidence identifying the two accused
as the actual assailants or perpetrators of the shooting of the victim, Alfredo
Buccat. The
basis of Our ruling have been laid down and explained and the inevitable
end-result is that We must acquit the two accused not because their defense of
alibi is weak, although such defense has acquired commensurate strength due to
failure of positive and proper identification of the offenders by the
witnesses, but on the ground that the prosecution has failed to discharge its
responsibility of proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For indeed, the duty of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond peradventure of doubt is a primary one,
and until and unless such duty has been performed, the constitutional
presumption of innocence to which the accused is entitled must be upheld,
whether his defense of alibi is weak or strong.
While the prosecution is not required to submit such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty but only
moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Sec. 2, Rules of Court), in the case at bar,
We are confronted with inculpatory facts and
circumstances which are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
their guilt. In such a situation, as
held by the Supreme Court in People vs. Abana, 76
Phil. 1; People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil, 48, 57; People
vs. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78; People vs. Parayno,
L-24804, July 5, 1968, 25 SCRA 3, the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
We have analyzed and weighed the whole proof of the case at hand,
the totality of all the facts and circumstances presented before Us, and after such careful analysis, review and
appraisal. We find inability to let the
mind rest easy upon the moral certainty of their guilt.
Thus, in People vs. Gallora,
L-21740, Oct. 30, 1969, 29
SCRA 780, 786, where the circumstances are in some respects similar to the
present case, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Makalintal,
said:
“The corroborated alibi of appellant; the fact that he did not
hesitate to go with the municipal authorities to the scene of the crime; the
failure of the two material witnesses for the prosecution to identify him when
identification would have been most timely and in accord with natural human
reaction; the absence of evidence concerning motivation; and the finding of
the telltale handkerchief in the possession of another person – all these
circumstances cannot but cast a grave doubt as to the guilt of appellant.”
Indeed, the impartial and unbiased mind is not laid to rest easy
upon the moral certainty of the accused being guilty in the light of the very
singular fact that both accused, Luis and Florentino,
immediately volunteered to be blood donors to save the life of the victim,
Alfredo. The very evidence of the
prosecution show that both accused joined and rode with other volunteers in
two caretelas to the town and then took a
Thames transportation jitney to San Fernando town at the Lorma
Hospital and there, Luis was tested as to the suitability of his blood type and
accordingly, gave 250 cc. of his life blood, type “B” to the victim,
which is attested by the certification of the Medical Technician, Nora Zafra, in Exhibit “1”. According to the accused Luis, he donated
blood because Alfredo Buccat was his uncle, the
latter being a second cousin of Luis’ father, and he had no misunderstanding
with his uncle.
The trial court’s holding that this sacrifice of blood donation
made by the accused Luis Delmendo was possibly a manifestation
of remorse on the part of the accused after their drunken state had subsided,
is clearly a distortion for a drunken person cannot be accepted for blood
transfusion or donation. Likewise, to
hold that possibly the accused went with the crowd to the hospital to hide
their responsibility for the crime is purely conjectural and speculative. The records do not disclose any reasonable
basis, not an iota of proof for such a conclusion arrived at by the court a
quo.
As to the P.C. findings in Exhibit “C” that the dorsal
portion of both hands of the accused Luis Delmendo
was found positive for gunpowder residue (nitrates), the same is, to Our mind,
satisfactorily explained by the testimony of Luis who at the time was employed
with Filipinas Magnetite Corporation (FILMAG) and his work was assisting the
chemists in assaying or analyzing iron concentrates and copper ore from the
black sands dugged out by FILMAG, using his hands,
sometimes with gloves and other times without gloves, causing yellowish discoloration
on the palm, fingers, fingertips and dorsal portion of both hands. The work involved the handling and mixing of
chemicals such as ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, sodium nitrate and other
reagents. The nature of Luis’ work as a
laboratory technician is corroborated by his immediate superior, Chemical
Engineer Daniel P. Cafuir.
That the presence of gunpowder residue
(nitrates) on both hands of the accused Luis do not conclusively prove
that he had recently fired a gun is admitted by the P.C. expert, Col. Minardo Fiñones, who testified
also for the defense. The most
significant testimony of Col. Fiñones is that there
is no difference in size between gunpowder residue and one caused by constant
handling of chemicals (t.s.n., p. 359, March 5, 1970
Hearing) and that the continued handling of chemicals containing nitrates,
potassium nitrate, sodium nitrate and ammonium nitrate will give characteristic
color of blue specks on a person handling said chemicals (t.s.n.,
p. 362, March 5, 1970 Hearing); and that one who fired a gun may give a
negative result and also one who did not actually fire a gun is negative for
paraffin test because according to him, “there is a false positive and a
false negative. False negative is when
he fired a gun and is negative for paraffin test; and false positive when he
never fired a gun but is positive for paraffin test. Why — because he has been handling some
chemicals like potassium nitrate and ammonium chloride, depending on the extent
of contamination. Naturally when tested
with dyphenyl-amin reagents, it will show characteristics
of blue specks, and this is similar to gunpowder burns.” (t.s.n., p. 354, March
5, 1970 Hearing)
In resume, where the evidence clearly and convincingly show that
(1) the material witnesses of the prosecution, the widow and son of the
deceased, failed to reveal and identify the assailants to the police and P.C.
authorities at the earliest opportunity when they arrived to investigate the
shooting soon thereafter, not even to the police sergeant, a close relative of
the aggrieved family, who followed up the investigation; (2) that the son,
reporting to and seeking help from an uncle living only 10 meters away from the
scene of the crime, did not also disclose the assailants’ identities; (3) that
both material witnesses delayed unreasonably for 16 days after the shooting to
go to the police department and make their sworn statement naming the two
accused as the perpetrators; (4) that the circumstances of time (between 7:00
and 8:00 o’clock in the evening), of place (witnesses are under the house in
the ground floor and looking through a small window out to the yard of the
house located in the barrio), and of distance (9 meters away) render accurate
identification of perpetrators in a sudden and startling occurence,
difficult and unreliable; (5) the police made no effort to locate and search
for the fatal weapon nor place in the police blotter the names of the suspects;
(6) that the motive shown was flimsy, inoffensive and trivial, hence insufficient;
and (7) both accused volunteered to donate their blood to the victim and in
fact, one gave 250 cc. of his blood, type “B” to save him, the guilt
of the two accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, thus they are
entitled to acquittal of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The two accused are hereby ACQUITTED and they are ordered released and
set free immediately, unless they are otherwise detained for some other lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., in the result.