G.R. No. L-24273. April 30, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PEDRO FIGUEROA, BOY AHIJAL, CELEDONIO CARINGAL, KARIM JAUKAL, RAJAH MAHAMMAD, MUSTALI GAJALI, ALI MAHAMMAD, STAJI BADTANG…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal by the State from the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Palawan sustaining the motion to quash the
information on the ground, that in the Court’s opinion, the accused were not
given ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation
conducted by the investigating fiscal.
The accused were apprehended on December 13, 1964 by officers and
crew of the Philippine Navy RPS “Antique” off the island of Tara within
the province of Palawan, having in their possession
and custody, aboard the kumpit M/L “Pershia” three hundred eighty-eight cases (of 50
cartons per case) of “Old Gold” blue seal cigarettes, without first
having paid the Government the, specific taxes due thereon in the amount of
P102,432.00. The accused with their
cargo were brought to Philippine Navy Headquarters at Manila,
where they were investigated on December
14, 1964 by investigating officers of the Naval Judge Advocate
General and before whom they individually executed affidavits in question and
answer form. All nine accused admitted
the fact of their having been apprehended off Tara Island aboard the kumpit loaded with the untaxed cigarettes, which
they had gotten from Jolo, Sulu
and which, according to the patron of the vessel, Pedro Figueroa he was taking
to Hulugan, Tanza, Cavite to sell there.[1] Provincial Fiscal Zoilo
Alviar of Palawan later on
the sane day showed up at the Navy Headquarters and conducted a preliminary
investigation, taking the sworn written statements of the arresting officers,
among them Servicemen Rodolfo Baltazar and Esteban Sumil[2]
as well as of the accused. The accused
jointly executed, a statement stating that they knew they would have to face
criminal charges before the Court as a result of their apprehension, that they
were agreeable to Fiscal Alviar conducting the
preliminary investigation of their case in Manila
and that they were waiving the provision of Section 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:
”SA SINUMANG KINAUUKULAN:
“Kaming nakalagda
sa ibaba ay nagsasabing kami ay nahuli ng sasakyang
dagat ng Philippine Navy sa dagat na
pumapaligid sa isla ng Tara;
malapit sa Busuanga, Palawan sa umaga ng
December 13, 1964;
Na hinuli kami dahil sa ang
aming sasakyang dagat (Unnamed) ay kinapapalagyan
ng mga sigarilyong
blue seal nangangahulugang walang
bayad ng tax sa BIR;
Nanalalaman naming dahil
sa pagkakahuli so amin ay mapapaharap kami sa husgado
upang harapin sakdal laban sa
amin;
Nang dahil dito, kami ay sumasangayon
na humarap sa Provincial Fiscal ng Palawan, si Fiscal
ZOILO Q. ALVIAR, dito rin
so Maynila at nakunan ng karapatang ‘preliminary
investigation’ sangayon sa batas ng korte
suprema (Rules of Court);
Upang mabigyan ng kaukulang panahon
ang nasabing Fiscal, ay pumapayag kaming itatwa ang aming
karapatang
sangayon sa Sec. 125 ng kodigo penal na naguutos sa sinumang
opisyal ng gobierno na dalhin
ang sinumang tao, na nahuli
hinggil sa isang paglabag sa batas sa
opisyal ng husgado (judicial authorities) sa
loob ng anim
na oras.
Maynila, December 14, 1964.”
Fiscal Alviar then interrogated the
accused individually, confronted them with their affidavits in the presence of
the arresting officers Servicemen Baltazar and Sumil, and had the accused identify their respective
affidavits and signatures thereon; the accused testified further that the
contents of their affidavits were explained to them and that the facts stated
therein were true; the fiscal further asked them whether they had any questions
to ask from Sirvicemen Baltazar
and Sumil, to which they replied in the negative.[3]
On the next day, December
15, 1964, Fiscal Alviar sent from Manila
a telegram to his assistant at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, stating that he had conducted a
preliminary investigation in Manila
and instructing his assistant to file the corresponding information for
illegal possession of the untaxed 388 cases of cigarettes against the accused.[4]
On the following day, December
16, 1964, Fiscal Alviar wrote a letter to
Assistant Fiscal R. Abaca, stating that the accused would be brought by the
Philippine Navy to Puerto Princesa by the same
arresting officers, Servicemen Baltazar and Sumil. He suggested
to his assistant that while he had already conducted a preliminary
investigation in Manila, the latter should conduct still another investigation
in Puerto Princesa, by asking all of the respondents
and the arresting officers to identify and affirm the truth and correctness of
their previous sworn statements given before Fiscal Alviar
in Manila, “to obviate any technical defect of the preliminary
investigation that I conducted.”[5] This was what Assistant Fiscal Abaca did upon
the arrival of the accused and the arresting officers at Puerto Princesa on December
19, 1964, at 8:15 A. M.[6] He advised the accused that they were
entitled to counsel,[7]
but they declined and readily reaffirmed their previous sworn statements before
Fiscal Alviar in Manila.[8] Their sworn statements to this effect were
again taken down in writing before Assistant Fiscal Abaca, who thereafter filed
on the same day, December 19, 1964,
the corresponding information for violation of Section 174 in relation to
Section 183 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4097.[9]
The information bore the earlier date of December 16, 1964 but was subscribed and sworn and filed
in court on December 19, 1964
by Fiscal Abaca. Fiscal Abaca later
stated under oath at the hearing that he prepared the information on December 19, 1964 and that the date
of December 76, appearing on the information was but a clerical error.[10] The accused Pedro Figueroa and Celedonio Caringal posted bail,
while their co-accused remained
under detention, and the case was scheduled
for arraignment on January 19,
1965.
On January 11, 1965, counsel for the accused filed a Motion to
Quash, alleging that in violation of Section
14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court,
the information against the
accused was “filed by the Provincial Fiscal without conducting a preliminary investigation
or if there was any, it was conducted
in Manila and not in Palawan, the province where the
alleged crime was committed.”[11] The
motion was heard on the next day and
Fiscal Alviar filed a written opposition where he
informed the Court that “According
to the records of this case 2nd
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca conducted a preliminary investigation on
December 19, 1964, in which investigation he interrogated the witnesses
for the prosecution as well as the accused under oath and recorded their
testimonies. x x
x In their
statements, both the prosecution witnesses and those of the accused, all
admitted and affirmed the truth and correctness of their statements which were
shown to them and were read to them by the investigating Fiscal, Fiscal
Abaca. Although these statements that
were referred to in the investigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Abaca, were taken by Provincial Fiscal Alviar in the
City of Manila, this fact makes no difference in the validity of the
preliminary investigation conducted by 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca,
because the witnesses were only reiterating before him what they have already
testified to before Fiscal Alviar. There can be no irregularity in the
investigation conducted by 2nd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca, by the mere
fact that instead of retaking their statements, he showed and read to them
their previous statements and asked each and every one of them whether, these
were their statements and whether they affirm the truth and correctness of the
fact stated, in which case, they all acknowledged that those were their
statements and each affirmed the truth thereof In said investigation, the
accused did not raise any defense nor adduce any fact to exculpate them. Under these circumstances, there is no
ground to say that accused were not given a chance to be heard or any
opportunity to interpose their defenses in the preliminary investigation.”[12]
Fiscal Alviar further presented to the
Court the records of the investigation of the accused.[13] Notwithstanding all these, the lower court
took the extraordinary step of placing Assistant Fiscal Abaca on the stand,
questioned him extensively[14]
and likewise had him cross-examined extensively by defense counsel[15]
at the end of which he announced the granting of the motion to quash, denied
summarily the fiscal’s motion for reconsideration,
and thereafter dictated in open court his order, dismissing the information,
and ordering the Fiscal “to conduct a new preliminary investigation in
this case in order to afford the accused all the chances to be heard in the
preliminary investigation.” The
pertinent portions of his Order read:
“It appears that a preliminary investigation of this case was
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal in Manila. Then the accused were brought to Puerto Princesa, Palawan
by the apprehending officers on December
19, 1964. The Provincial
Fiscal sent a telegram to First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Miclat,
Exh. ‘A’, requesting him to file a rush case of
illegal Possession of Smuggled Goods against the herein accused, which telegram
was received by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Abaca who was then incharge of office in the absence of First Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Miclat. The accused and the prosecution witnesses saw
Fiscal Abaca on December 19, 1964. Lt. Hernandez of the Philippine Navy
delivered to Fiscal Abaca a letter from Fiscal Alviar
dated December 16, 1964, Exh. ‘1’ which is self-explanatory. Right then on December 19, 1964, when the prosecution witnesses went
to the office of the Provincial Fiscal, Fiscal Abaca supposedly conducted a
preliminary investigation. The first
questions appearing in the statement of the prosecution witnesses were the very
questions which were suggested by Fiscal Alviar to
Fiscal Abaca in his letter to
him Exh. ‘1’.
After the investigation of the
prosecution witnesses, the accused were investigated also. The investigation was made hurriedly on the understanding of the
investigating Fiscal that they were
under custody. There is no
showing at all whether they waived their rights to Section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code or not to warrant an immediate preliminary investigation without
giving the accused the chance to
prepare. Besides, the Fiscal, in
the opinion of the Court, Was of the notion that the investigation made in Manila
was sufficient as could be gleaned from the telegram Exh.
‘A’.”
x x x x
x x
“From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court is of the
opinion, and so hoIds, that the accused in this case
were not given ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation which is against the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Honestly speaking, the Court
believes that Sec. 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court has not been
substantially complied with by the investigating Fiscal.”[16]
We hold the lower court’s order quashing the information for lack
of substantial compliance with Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court to
be patently erroneous and set it aside.
1. Assuming that the trial
court felt that the accused should have
been given more “ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the
preliminary investigation”, then what it could properly have done, since in its own Order it recognized that Fiscal Abaca had conducted a
preliminary investigation although “hurriedly” in its opinion, was not to
dismiss the information but to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation
or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. This Court, speaking through now Mr. Chief
Justice Concepcion in People vs. Casiano,[17]
had stressed this as the proper procedure, pointing out that “the absence
of such investigation did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective. Much less did it
affect the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance over the present case.”
2. The record amply shows,
however, that in compliance with the requirements of Rule 112, section 14 on preliminary investigations by provincial or city
fiscals or state attorneys, the assistant fiscal of Palawan
conducted the investigation in the presence of the arresting officers and the
accused[18]
and afforded them “the right to be heard, to cross-examine the complainant
and his witnesses, and to adduce evidence in (their) favor.” The fiscal duly advised respondents of their
right to counsel but the accused chose merely to reiterate their sworn
statements previously given
before Fiscal Alviar in Manila,
and their affirmation thereof
under oath was duly taken down in writing before the fiscal. The accused chose not to raise any defense
nor adduce any evidence to exculpate themselves. The fact that the questions asked by the
fiscal of the prosecution witnesses and the accused “were the very
questions which were suggested by Fiscal Alviar to
Fiscal Abaca, in his letter to him, Exh. ‘1’”, i.e. to affirm the truth
and correctness of their previous statements, did not affect the validity and
regularity of the investigation proceedings.
Where a witness or accused has previously given a statement, it is a perfectly
valid procedure often availed of to avoid needless waste of time to just ask
him whether he affirms the same statement and the truth and correctness of the
contents thereof. To require the
investigating fiscal to repeat the same questions asked of, and answered by,
the complaining witnesses and the accused in their previous testimonies before
Fiscal Alviar, as the lower court would apparently
indicate as the appropriate procedure would have served no useful purpose nor added a whit of evidence as to the
reasonable probability of the guilt of the accused, for purposes of the filing
of the information, in the
light of their statements admitting their apprehension in flagrante delicto for
possession of the untaxed cigarettes,
which statements remain unrepudiated by them. There was no basis, therefore, for the lower
court’s finding that the investigating fiscal had failed to
substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 112, section 14 of the
Rules of Court.
3. The lower Court’s
finding that “there is no showing at all whether (the accused) waived
their rights to Section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code or not to warrant an immediate preliminary investigation without
giving the accused the chance to
prepare” is not borne out by the
record. The joint waiver executed by the
accused is reproduced hereinabove,[19] and the investigating fiscal had
precisely informed the Court that
“(N)otwithstanding such waiver the investigation
must be terminated within seven days from its inception, so that in this
case there is that element of expediency. If we will
have the investigation later, the
accused have to be released”[20] pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 112, which provides:
“SEC. 15. Investigation of persons in custody.
— Where the accused is detained without a warrant for his arrest,
he may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with the preceding sections, but
he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Notwithstanding such
waiver the investigation must be terminated within seven (7) days from its
inception.
If the case has already been filed in court and no preliminary
investigation has been conducted by the fiscal because the accused has not made
the waiver referred to in the preceding paragraph, the accused may, within a
period of five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a reinvestigation thereof with the same right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him and adduce evidence in his favor.”
The immediate and “hurried” investigation conducted on
December 19, 1964 by the investigation fiscal in Puerto Princesa,
considering that the accused were under detention by virtue of their lawful
arrest on December 13, 1964 was but in compliance with the requirements of the
above-quoted rule.[21]
4. But assuming that the
lower Court had correctly found that there was no waiver by the accused of the
provisions of Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, neither would it have
been justified in dismissing the information.
For Rule 112, section 15 expressly authorizes the fiscal to immediately
file the case in court against a detained person arrested without a warrant,
without conducting a preliminary investigation, where the accused has not made
such waiver. The right granted by the
Rule to the accused in such cases is “within a period of five (5) days
from the time he learns of the filing of the information, (to) ask for a
reinvestigation thereof with the same right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him and adduce evidence in his favor.” This, the accused failed to do, for the
information against them was filed
on December 19, 1964
and they did not ask for such reinvestigation
within a 5-day period thereafter. Their
Motion to Quash was filed much later only on January 11, 1965.
5. The lower Court erred in choosing to believe against the uncontradicted sworn testimony of the investigating fiscal
that the information was prepared on December 16, 1964, three days before it was actually
subscribed and filed with the Court. It
refused to believe the fiscal’s explanation that the
date “16” appearing on the information was a typographical error
x x x because if it was
really so the subscribing fiscal should have corrected it.” But such overlooked typographical errors do
occur frequently. At any rate, this was a mere triviality
which was of no relevance to the
issues. The Information was not complete
until it was subscribed together with the fiscal’s sworn certification on December 19, 1964, the date when the preliminary investigation
was conducted”, as held by the Court itself in its Order.
6. This Court finds also
that the procedure adopted by the lower court of placing the investigating
fiscal on the witness stand and subjecting him to cross-examination by defense
counsel was highly improper. Aside from
the sworn certification in the information by the investigating fiscal that he
had duly conducted a preliminary investigation, the entire record of the investigation with the sworn
statements of the complaining witnesses
and the accused had been presented to the Court. The lower Court may have
had its reasons for directing questions to the fiscal to satisfy itself that
the accused’s rights had been duly safeguarded, such
as giving them a chance to cross-examining the complaining witnesses. But to have the fiscal placed on the witness
stand and have the defense counsel cross-examine and argue with him on points
of law, as to whether the affirmation by the arresting officers and the
accused of their previous testimonies without retaking them was sufficient
compliance with the Rules of Court and impertinent questions as to whether
“the statement of the Philippine Navy as complainant” was
taken, was uncalled for. The lower Court disregarded the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed[22] and the well-settled rule that when nothing
appears affirmatively on the record that a preliminary investigation was not
in fact held, an objection on the ground of denial or deprivation thereof deserves scant consideration
by virtue of the presumption that both the court as well as the prosecution
proceeded in accordance with law.[23] Certainly, defense counsel must first
overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and present strong prima facie evidence
of irregularity or falsification of the investigating fiscal’s certification and record of the investigation for the Court to deny them the
faith and credence properly due them.
7. A final word on the
summary nature of preliminary investigation proceedings seems appropriate, in
order to obviate the recurrence of these cases, where the State’s efforts at great expense and zeal to thwart
traffickers in smuggled goods who undermine the national economy are frustrated
by a distorted view of the nature and purpose of preliminary
investigations. The late Mr. Justice
Jose P. Laurel, speaking for this Court in
1941, placed the role and object of preliminary investigations in proper
perspective, thus: “x x x Its oft-repeated purpose is
to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions,
and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial and also to protect the State from
useless and expensive prosecutions. The
new Rules were drafted in the light of the Court’s experience with cases where
preliminary investigations had dragged on for weeks and even months. The Court had intended to remove this clog
upon the judicial machinery and to make a preliminary investigation as simple
and as speedy as is consistent with the substantial rights of the accused. The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, to be followed by the trial proper. The investigating judge or prosecuting
officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The occasion is
not for the full exhaustive display of the Parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. When all this is fulfilled, the accused
will not be permitted to cast about for fancied reasons to delay the proceedings;
the time to ask for more is at the trial.
x x x“[24]
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby set aside
and the lower Court is directed to proceed with the arraignment and trial of
the accused upon the information filed in the case. With costs in solidum
against defendants-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., voted for the setting aside of the order appealed from and the
remanding of the case to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with the decision.
Capistrano, J., did not take
part.
[1]
Record, pp. 13-20.
[2]
Record, pp. 21-25.
[3]
Record, pp. 3-10.
[4]
Exhibit “A”.
[5]
Exhibit “1”.
[6]
Record, pp. 47-51; T.S.N., p. 36.
[7] T.S.N.,
p. 13.
[8] T.S.N.,
p. 14.
[9]
Record, page 1, Criminal Case 3252.
[10]
T.S.N., p. 15.
[11]
Record, p. 38.
[12]
Record, p. 41.
[13]
T.S.N., pp. 8-9.
[14]
T.S.N., pp. 11-16.
[15]
T.S.N., pp. 16-31; 37-44.
[16]
Record, pp. 52-54.
[17]
People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478, 483.
[18]
T.S.N, pp. 12-13.
[19]
See page 2.
[20]
T.S.N., pp. 41-42.
[21]
We do not here rule upon the validity of the preliminary investigation
conducted by Provincial Fiscal Alviar at Manila
pursuant to the accused’s conformity thereto with
their waiver, as the parties appear by common consent to have foregone it as an
issue both in the lower court and here.
[22]
Rule 131, section 5(m).
[23]
People vs. Selfaison, 1 SCRA, 235 and cases
cited.
[24] Hashim vs. Boncan, 71
Phil. 216, 225, emphasis ours. Cited in Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 18
SCRA 1115 (1966).