G.R. No. L-24402. April 30, 1969
PEDRO V. C. ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, PASAY CITY ASSESSOR AND PASAY CITY TREASURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This action for declaratory relief poses the question of whether
the Secretary of Finance has been deprived by Republic Act No. 1125, which
created the Court of Tax Appeals, of his authority to review the decisions of
the Board of Tax Appeals of Pasay City on the listing
and assessment of real estate therein under Section 42 of RepÂublic Act No.
183, the City Charter, as amended by Republic Act No. 3275.
Petitioner is the owner of Lot No. 2236, Block No. 5 at the
corner of Dominga and A. Flores Streets, Pasay City,
which was assessed for taxation purposes by the City Assessor for P13,340.00 effective the year 1960. Not satisfied with the assessment, he filed
an appeal with the City Board of Tax Appeals,[1]
pursuant to Section 42 of the City Charter, and the said Board in its resoluÂtion
of November 18, 1963, reduced the assessment of the properÂty from P13,340.00
to P9,695.00, effective 1960.
Subsequently, on December 5, 1963, the City Assessor served petitioner
with a Notice of Adjustment of the assessed value of the lot increasing the
assessment from P13,340.00 to P16,350.00 effective the year 1964, “in
strict compliance with the new appraisal manual (1963) of the Department of
Finance” and citing the reason that “Dominga
St. is now concrete.”[2]
On February 10, 1964, the
Secretary of Finance reopened for review the said resolution of the City Board
of Tax Appeals as well as its resolutions in some 207 other cases of city real
estate owners, pursuant to Section 42 of the City Charter.
Contending that respondent Secretary has been deprived of his
authority to review resolutions of the City Board of Tax Appeals by virtue of
the creation of the Court of Tax Appeals under Republic Act No. 1125 which
vested said Tax Court with “exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal”, inter alia,
“decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising
under the Assessment Law including rules and regulations relative
thereto,”[3]
petitioner-appellant brought this action for declaratory relief in the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City. The lower court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit, and the case is before us on appeal.
We hold that the lower court correctly rejected petitioner’s
contention that the creation of the Court of Tax Appeals through Republic Act
No. 1125 divested the Secretary of Finance of his authority to review the
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals of Pasay City
on the listing and assessment of real estate for realty tax purposes, on the
principal ground that Congress expressed its intent to retain the power of the
Secretary to review adminisÂtratively the decisions of the City Board of Tax
Appeals in its later enactment of Republic Act No. 3275.
Republic Act No. 3275, which amended certain sections of the Pasay City Charter[4]
took effect on June 17, 1961,
which was a much later date than the approval on June 16, 1954 of Republic Act No. 1125. The sections of the City Charter amended by
Republic Act No. 3275 were the vital sections concerning the listing and
assessment of real estate in the city, the functions of the Board of Tax
Appeals, whose composition was radically changed, and proceedings before the
Board of Tax Appeals and the Department Head.
Thus, section 36 of the City Charter was amended so as to restrict the
authority of the City Assessor to reduce or increase existing assessments to
“once every three years” instead of annually.[5]
The amendment of Section 40 of the City Charter drastically changed the
composition and tenure of the 5-member Board of Tax Appeals from “three
members of the Board … selected from among government officials in the city
other than those in charge of assessment … and two other members … selected
from among property owners in the city” holding office for a term of two
years, to three owners’ of real estate in the city and two others representing
the tenant-lessee interest in the city “upon the recommendation of the Pasay HomeÂowners Association, Inc.,” holding office
for a term of four years.[6]
Lastly, Section 42 of the City Charter was amended, to provide as follows:
“SEC. 3. Section forty-two of the same Act is hereby
amended to read as follows:
”Sec. 42.
The Board of Tax Appeals shall hold sessions beginning from the month of
February to hear all appeals duly transmitted to it, and shall decide the same
forthwith. It shall have the authority
to cause to be amended the listing and valuation of the property in respect to
which any appeal has been perfected by order signed by the Board or a majority
thereof, and transÂmit it to the city assessor who shall amend the tax in
conformity with said Order. Such
reassessment and revaluation shall be made on due notice to the individual
concerned who shall be entitled to be heard by the Board of Tax Appeals before
any reassessment or revaÂluation is made.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals shall be final unless the Department
Head declares the decision reopened for review, by him, in which case he may make
such revision or revaluation as in his opinion the circumstances justify. Such revision when approved by the President
of the Philippines
shall be final.” (R. A. 3265)[7]
The principal amendments thus made in Section 42 of the City
Charter were the granting of authorization to the Board of Tax Appeals to hold
sessions beginning from the month of FebÂruary to hear all appeals transmitted
to it, unlike previously, where its sessions had to be authorized by the
Secretary of Finance; and the deletion of the clause in the old provision
whereby its power to revise and correct erroneous or unjust assessments had to
be exercised “with the approval of the Department first had.” But the
above-underlined provision grantÂing the Secretary of Finance as Department
Head the authority to declare the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals
reopened for review by him, was expressly
retained. The legislative intent to
retain the Secretary’s power of administrative review over the City Board of
Tax Appeals in the face of these deliberate changes and amendments of the City
Charter dealing with the assessment of real estate cannot, therefore, be
seriously questioned. The conflicting
insinuations of appellant in his brief that the retenÂtion of the provision was
a legislative oversight or that said provision might have been “smuggled”
into law[8]
are too bereft of any basis in the record to warrant any further
attention. On the contrary, as indicated
by the City Assessor, the drastic change in the composition of the membership
of the City Board of Tax Appeals whereby it is now entirely composed of
property-owners and representatives of tenants-lessees with the elimination of
the previous majority of three city officials appears to have motiÂvated
Congress to retain the Secretary of Finance’s power of administrative review
over the said board’s decisions.[9]
It should further be noted that there is no irreconcilable
conflict between the two statutes in question.
The power of the Secretary of Finance under Section 42 of the City
Charter, as amended by Republic Act No. 3275 refers to administrative review
of the decisions of the City Board of Tax Appeals, to be exercised by him motu propio or upon
petition of either the City Assessor or the real estate owner, whereas under
Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, the power of the Court of Tax
Appeals refers to judicial review by appeal. The administrative review by the Secretary of
Finance may conceivably satisfy the taxpayer, thus doing away with the need of
his going to the Court of Tax Appeals, while the City Assessor has been held to
have no personaÂlity to resort to the said Court.[10]
On the other hand, should the result of such administrative review not be
acceptable to the taxpayer, he still retains his right to seek judicial review
by apÂpeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Appellant finally contends that Section 42 of the City Charter of
Pasay City granting the Secretary of Finance the
authority to reopen for review the decisions of the City Board of Tax Appeals
is “class legislation” and should therefore be held unconstitutional
because the charters of other cities in the Philippines
allegedly do not carry a similar provision.
Assuming that the same power of administrative review is not found in
the charters of all other cities in the country as granted by Congress,
nevertheless the provision cannot be assailed on constitutional grounds. The difference would consist merely in a
question of procedure but the taxpayers of Pasay City
cannot be said to be placed in a more advantageous or disadvantageous position
than taxpayers in other cities, simply because the City Charter grants the
Secretary of Finance the power to review administratively the decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals of Pasay City. More importantly, as pointed out by this
Court in Unson vs. Hon. A.H. Lacson
et al.,[11]
“municipal corporations in the Philippines are mere creatures of Congress;
that, as such, said corporations possess, and may exercise, only such
power as Congress may deem fit to grant thereto; that charters of municipal
corporations should not be construed in the same manner as constitutions.”
The equal protection clause may not be validly invoked by a municipal
corporation to complain against a lesser grant of jurisdiction and functions in
its charter as against a larger grant of powers and autonomy by Congress in the
charters of other municipal corporations.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., on leave, voted for the affirmance
of the decision appealed from.
Castro, J., on leave.
Capistrano, J., did not take
part.
[1]
PBTA Case No. 214, Annex “A” Petition, Rec. on App., p. 10.
[2]
Annex “B”, Petition, Rec. on App. p. 13.
[3] Section 7, Rep. Act No. 1125.
[4] Republic
Act No. 183, approved June 21, 1947.
[5]
Sec. 1, Republic Act 3275.
[6]
Sec. 2, Republic Act 3275.
[7]
Emphasis supplied.
[8]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 11.
[9]
Petition, Annex “E”, Rec. on App., pp. 21-24.
[10] Ursal vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 101 Phil. 209.
[11] 100 Phil. 695, 700.