ARSENIO REYES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. REYNALDO B. CHAVOSO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the orders of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
in its Civil Case No. Q-7050, dismissing the case as against defendants spouses
Reynaldo B. Chavoso and Manolita
C. Chavoso, and the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), on motions to dismiss separately filed by said defendants.

There is no substantial dispute about the ante­cedent facts.  It appears that on November 27, 1961, the
Sheriff of Quezon City, at the instance of the GSIS,
sold at public auction a certain subdivision lot in Diliman,
said city, with all the improvements exist­ing thereon, mortgaged to the
above-named corporation by the owners-mortgagors … the spouses Reynaldo B. Chavoso and Manolita C. Chavoso, herein defendants-appellees.  Arsenio Reyes
acquired the property at the said auction sale; and on December 2, 1961, the city sheriff referred to issued in his
favor the corresponding certi­ficate of sale, the conveying portion of which
reads as follows:

“SHERIFF’S CERTIFICATE OF SALE

“I HEREBY CERTIFY, that by virtue of the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage duly executed by the spouses REYNALDO B. CHA­VOSO MANOLITA C. CHAVOSO,
in favor of the GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, as security for the payment of the amount of ELEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS P11,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus 6% interest per annum,
plus 10% of the total amount of indebtedness as attorney’s fees, plus all the
fees and expenses in connection with the foreclosure and sale; and after giv­ing
due notice of the time and place of sale of the mortgaged property as required by law, on the 27th day of
November, 1961, I sold at public auction to MR. ARSENIO REYES, Filipino,
married to AMAN­DA SANTOS as the highest bidder for the total amount of
FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P14,500.00),
Philippine Currency, the following described pro­perty together with all
improvements thereon, to wit:

‘TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE No. 26484 REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY

‘A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 4, Block S-167 New of the consoli­dated
subdivision plan Pcs-2008, being a portion of the consoli­dated Blocks S-37,
S-167, S-168 and Lots R-149 and R-278 of plan Psd-7365-B, G. L. R. O. Record
No. 7681), situated in the dis­trict of Diliman, Quezon City.  Bounded
on the N., by Road Lot 288; on the E., by Lot 5, Block
S-167 New; on the S., by Lot 3, Block S-1679 New; and on
the W., by Road Lot 290, all of the con­solidation-subdivision plan.  x x x x containing an area of SIX
HUNDRED (600) SQUARE METERS, more or less x x
x.'”

On November 26, 1962, without the knowledge of
plaintiff-appellant … purchaser of the property at the auction sale … the
mortgagors spouses Reynaldo B. Chavoso and Manolita C. Chavoso paid the sum
of Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty Pesos (P16,240.00) to the Sheriff of Quezon City who, on the same day, issued in favor of said
spouses a “Certificate of Re­demption” of the land in question.  Said certificate was duly annotated at the
back of the corresponding original certificate of title with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. 
Likewise, the owners’ duplicate certificate of title to the property,
theretofore re­tained by the GSIS, notwithstanding the auction sale
aforementioned, was surrendered by said company to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City upon demand of the latter.

On March 12, 1963, herein appellant (auction-vendee) commenced action
for “Recovery of Property” in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the spouses Reynaldo B. Chavoso
and Manolita C. Chavoso,
the GSIS, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and
against the Sheriff of the place alleging, among others, that the defendant
Sheriff of Quezon City accepted the alleged
redemption price of P16,240.00 illegally, not only because there was no showing
that the plaintiff-appellant Arsenio Reyes had
unlawfully refused to accept said redemption price, but also because the amount
re­ceived by said official was short of the assessment fees, taxes, documentary
stamps and commission in favor of the government.  Appellant prayed for judgment order­ing the Chavoso spouses “to surrender possession of the
premises to the plaintiff”; to pay P400.00 a month for the use and
occupation of the premises starting Novem­ber 28, 1962 till they vacate the
premises, and to re­mit all rentals collected from tenants therein; and to pay
P1,000.00 for attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 for every appeal made by
defendants.  Separate answers were filed
by defendants GSIS, Register of Deeds and Sheriff of Quezon
City on April 2, 1963, May 14, 1963, and May 31, 1963,^[1]
respectively.  For their part, defendants
spouses Reynaldo B. Chavoso and Manolita
C. Chavoso filed a mo­tion to dismiss on the grounds
that:  (1) the complaint of the plaintiff
against said defendants spouses states no cause of action; and (2) the claim of
plaintiff against them in the sum of P16,240.00 redemption price has been fully
and legally paid.  This motion was
opposed by plain­tiff.

Resolving the motion to dismiss, the court, on May 24, 1963, dismissed the case as
against defendants-spouses Reynaldo B. Chavoso and Manolita C. Chavoso.  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration; while
defendant GSIS, after knowing that the case had been dismissed as against the Chavoso spouses, also moved for the dismissal of the action
against it; and the court, in an order dated July 24, 1963, denied plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal as against the Chavosos and, at the same time, dismissed the case with
respect to defend­ant GSIS.

The auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes, has
appealed from both orders.

The law question involved – whether or not the com­plaint filed
in the court below states a cause of action against therein defendants – calls
for a determination of the issue as to whether on the face of the complaint, it
appears that the Chavoso spouses had validly redeem­ed
the property, subject matter of the complaint, which would entitle them to the
possession and enjoyment of the property. 
On this point, the trial court held for appellees
as follows:

“The instant complaint prays that de­fendants be ordered to
surrender posses­sion of the premises in dispute and to order defendants to pay
P400.00 a month as monthly rental starting November 28, 1962 until they vacate the premises and
attorney’s fees.  This claim of the
plaintiff is anchored on the fact that on November 27, 1961 he acquired through a public auction
sale the property in question.  The
complaint likewise alleges however, that at the back of TCT No. 26484 there is
annotated as per entry PE-1120/T-26484 – Certificate of Re­demption by Reynaldo
B. Chavoso, ins­cribed
on November 23, 1962, and
the date of the instrument November
28, 1962.  The complaint also
alleges that the redemption money was accepted by the Sheriff on November 23, 1962, and in fact a
certificate of redemption has been issued on said date by the Sheriff.  The cause of action, there­fore, of the
plaintiff in the present complaint is based on whether redemp­tion has been
made by the defendants within the period required by law.  As alleged (in) the complaint the public
auction sale was conducted on Novem­ber
27, 1961.  Admittedly, the
redemp­tion was made by the defendants on No­vember 23, 1962, which is within the one year period
prescribed by law for redemption.  That
being the case, the complaint in this case can very well be said to have no
cause of action, for the very right of plaintiff to divest defendants of their
possession of the disputed premises, has been extin­guished by the act of
redemption made by the defendants and acknowledged by the proper
authorities.  Of course, it has been
mentioned in the complaint that the redemption money is lacking.  Suffice it to say that under the provi­sions
of Section 27, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court –

‘x x x 
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made
the sale and a duplicate filed
with the registrar of the province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by
the redemptioner, or if he has or acquires any lien
other than that upon which redemption was made, notice thereof must in like
manner be given to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such
notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments taxes, or liens.’

In this particular case, redemption has
actually been accepted by the Sheriff and, therefore, it could be gleaned that
there has been a valid redemption.  For
that matter, the complaint states no cause of action.”

Appellant contends, however, that the redemption made by the appellees spouses Reynaldo B. Chavoso
and Manolita C. Chavoso is
null and void.  It is argued that the
Sheriff of Quezon City may lawfully accept the
redemption money for the purchaser only (1) if said pur­chaser unlawfully refuses
to accept the redemption mo­ney, or (2) if said purchaser had authorized the
she­riff to accept such redemption money. 
We do not agree.  No such
conditions are imposed by the Rules.  On the
contrary, Section 31 of Rule 39 expressly provides that the payment of the
redemption money may be made to such sheriff, thus:

“Sec. 31.  Effect of
redemption by judgment debtor, and a certificate to be delivered and recorded
there upon.  To whom payments on
redemption made.  – If the judgment
debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a
redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon the effect of
the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate, and the person to whom
the pay­ment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of
redemption acknowledged or approved before a notary public or other officer
authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real property.  Such certificate must be filed and recorded
in the office of the registrar of deeds of the province in which the property
is situated, and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the
margin of the record of the certificate of sale.  The payments mentioned in this and the
last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or redemptioner
or for him to the officer who made the sale.” [Underscoring Ours]

We recall that
this same argument was hinted in Javallana vs. Mirasol and Nuñez,^[2]
where it was suggested that the redemption was rendered ineffectual by reason
of the fact that the tender of payment was
made to the officer who made the sale instead of directly to the
purchaser, and this Court held that “it was manifestly un­necessary for
the redemptioner to seek out the purchaser for the purpose
of making payment to him.”^[3]
To the same effect was the holding of this Court in Basco
vs. Gonzalez,^[4]
where, in denying a similar contention, it was explained:

“The further contention of the appel­lant that the redemption
made by Gonzalez through the provincial sheriff is not va­lid, and that
redemption could be made legally only through Primicias^[5]
x x x, is untenable.

“In the case of Papa vs. Manalo (29
Phil. 360, 364), this Court held that although the purchaser of the auction is
the only person who has a right to receive the price of the thing redeemed, the
re­demptioner may, however, deposit it in the hands
of the sheriff for its delivery to such purchaser, especially in the case where
the latter refuses to receive it, or when for any reason it may be feared that
the period for redemption may lapse with­out its being shown in the authentic
man­ner that the redemptioner has in due course of
time complied with his duty to pay the price of the sale and interest
thereon.”

It will be seen then that the manner in which the re­demption in
question in the case at bar was made is not only in accordance with the express
provision of the Rules of Court, but is likewise sanctioned by decisional
dicta.^[6]

Anent the contention that the amount accepted by the Sheriff from
the redemptioner in this case failed to in­clude the
assessments, taxes and commissions appellant claims to have paid in addition to
the purchase price of the auction sale and, for which reason, it is now con­tended
by appellant that the redemption referred to should be deemed ineffectual, the
last paragraph of Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court expressly provides
that “if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner
or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was
made, notice thereof must in like man­ner be given to the officer (who made the
sale) and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the
property may be redeemed without paying such assess­ments, taxes, or
liens.” As correctly pointed out by appellees in
their briefs, there is no allegation in the complaint filed with the lower
court that such notice was made by appellant, and there is no claim made here
by appellant that he complied with the requirement of making such notice to the
Sheriff of Quezon City before the lat­ter permitted
the redemption.  So, even on the
assumption that appellant had really paid the assessments, taxes and
commissions alluded to by him, he cannot now be heard to complain that the said
sheriff violated his duty by accepting only the purchase price at the auction
sale and the interests thereon, for without the required notice from appellant
that he had made additional payments in the form of assessments, taxes and
commissions, the sheriff concerned was in no position to know them.  Neither is appellant right in saying that he failed to make such no­tice
precisely because he was not aware of the redemption, intimating that it was
the duty of either the redemption­er or the sheriff
to notify him of the redemption.  No such
duty devolves upon them; on the contrary, the rule requiring such notice should
be taken to mean that a pur­chaser or redemptioner,
in order to protect his rights, must make such notice as soon as any additional
payments are made by him, and not only at the time the mortgagor or judgment
debtor offers to make the redemption.

We hold that the
lower court did not err in holding that on the face of the complaint filed
therewith, it appears that a valid redemption had been made by the appellees spouses, hence no cause of action is stated a­gainst them therein, and, in
dismissing, on such ground said complaint. 
The same considerations apply as regards the motion to dismiss of the
other appellee GSIS.

Order of dismissal affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on
official leave of absence.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
On May 29, 1963, plaintiff
filed a “motion to declare defendant Sheriff of Quezon
City in default”, but in an
order dated June 1, 1963,
the court denied the same – holding that the answer filed by said sheriff on May 31, 1963, “may be considered
a substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules.”

^[2]
40 Phil. 761, 770-771.

^[3]
See also Enage
vs. Vda. de Hijos de
F. Escaño, 38 Phil. 657, 662.

^[4]
59 Phil. 1, 5.

^[5]
Primicias was the purchaser or auction-vendee at the
sale questioned in said case.

^[6]
Cf. Abiguel Reyes-Gregorio,
et al. vs. Arsenio Reyes, L-24699, March 28, 1969.