CONSOLACION P. MANGILA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JUDGE JOSE T. LANTIN, AND THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TARLAC, TARLAC, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari
and prohibition, we are asked to strike down respondent judge’s order
sustaining his jurisdiction to hear and determine a criminal case for serious
slander in which petitioner is the accused.

The present case has its beginnings in a verified criminal
complaint filed with the Fiscal’s Office on October 8, 1963 by the spouses Naciensena Santos de Dazo and
Mariano T. Dazo, charging petitioner Consolacion P. Mangila with
serious slander.  Two days thereafter, on
October 10, 1963,
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Fer­nando M. Bartolome,
before whom the foregoing complaint was subscribed and sworn to, lodged an information signed by him for serious slander against Consolacion P. Mangila before the
Court of First instance of Tarlac.^[1]
The fiscal later registered on February
15, 1965 an amended information attaching
thereto the complaint of the offended spouses filed with the fiscal.  The defa­matory words claimed to have been
uttered by Concepcion P. Mangila
in Concepcion, Tarlac, on
or about September 30, 1963 consist of the following:  “BAYU CO MIYASAWA MAGLANDI CA PANG CANG
DAZO, PUTANG MALANDING PACARAT”, which trans­lated into English reads as
follows:  “BEFORE YOU WERE MARRIED
YOU HAD ILLICIT RELATIONS WITH DAZO.  PROSTITUTE.” Such defamatory words, it is averred, were
directed against the spouses Dazo.

On February 12, 1965,
petitioner herein, Consolacion P. Mangila,
moved in the court below to quash the information.  She claims lack of court jurisdiction
because:  (1) the crime of serious
slander falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Concepcion, Tarlac; and (2) the
defamation charged consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and yet, the
criminal action was not brought at the instance of and upon complaint expressly
filed by the offended parties. 
Respondent judge’s resolution of February
24, 1965 dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction of the
court to try the case.

However, on motion to reconsider filed by the prosecuting
attorney, respondent judge, on May 10,
1965, reconsidered its order of dismissal, denied the motion to
quash and set a date for petitioner’s arraignment.

It was petitioner’s turn to move for a reconsideration of the
judge’s May 10 order.  Respondent judge,
in his order of June 17, 1965,
resolved to deny the motion.

Petitioner then came to this Court on certiorari and prohibition. 
On August 4, 1965, we
issued a cease-and-desist order.

1.  Petitioner’s position is
that the case of grave oral defamation below falls within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Concepcion,
Tarlac.  She
cites Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts
2613 and 3828, the statute then in force. 
But we should not over­look another provision of the same Judiciary Act
of 1948, Section 44(f), which should be considered in connection with Section
87(c).  It may perhaps aid understanding
if we reproduce the two in parallel columns:

The case before us presents another occasion for reaffirm­ing
what has been elaborately discussed and repeatedly ruled upon in a number of
cases.^[2]
For, the penalty for serious oral defa­mation ranges from arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period – from four months
and one day to two years and four months.^[3]
Which, in passing, is clearly within the area of the penalty
– for jurisdictional purposes – prescribed in Sections 44(f) and 87(c)
aforementioned.

Expositor of the law is Esperat vs. Avila,
supra.  It
gives a direct answer to the question here posed.  Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court, there said:

“The fallacy in petitioner’s argument lies in his failure to
consider section 44(f) of the same Judiciary Act of 1948, in conjunction with
its section 87(c).  Note
that notwithstanding the various amendments
received by section 87, section 44(f) remained unaltered, thereby indicating the inten­tion of the legislators
to retain the original jurisdiction
of the court of first
instance in certain cases.  The fact that the jurisdiction
of the municipal or city courts was enlarged in virtue of the amendment of
section 87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the jurisdiction
conferred on the court of first
instance.  Not only is implied
repeal disfavored by the law, but also, it is a car­dinal principle that a
statute must be so construed as to harmonize all apparent conflicts, and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible.”^[4]

Indeed, we see no inconsistency between Sections 44(f) and 87(c),
both of the Judiciary Act of 1948.  The
two can stand together.  One does not
displace the other.  As we reconcile and
harmonize, we find that the two can be given a conjoint, not a discordant,
effect.  As we have said in a previous
case,^[5]
“[w]e have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole;
construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from
the whole act; consider each and every
provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute;
and endeavour to make every part effective,
harmonious, sensible.”

There is, indeed, parity of jurisdiction in the municipal court
and in the Court of First instance over criminal cases – except violations of
election laws – in which the penalty imposable is more than six months’
imprisonment or a fine of more than P200, but not exceeding three years’
imprisonment, or a fine of P3,000, or both such fine
and imprisonment.  Since Criminal Case
2923 for serious slander calls for a penalty (arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period) which is clearly
within the range just mentioned, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac may not be shorn of its juris­diction to try said
case.

2.  Petitioner decries the
fact that the criminal prosecution was not brought at the instance of and upon
the complaint expressly filed by the offended parties.  This calls into
focus the last para­graph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 1289, which reads: 
“No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation
of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed
by the offended party.”

A cursory reading of the statute just quoted will yield the
conclusion that the present defamation case is outside the res­tricted area
therein provided.  The indictment alleges
that peti­tioner uttered publicly and maliciously the defamatory words that the
Dazos had illicit relations with each other before
they were married, and that the wife, Naciensena
Santos de Dazo, was a prostitute.  This is not an imputation which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and which, by
express provision in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, would require that
the criminal action be brought “at the instance of and upon complaint
expressly filed by the offended party.” The crimes which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio are with
specificity enumerated in Title XI, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code, thus –
adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, or
acts of lasciviousness.^[6]
The slan­derous imputation here certainly is not one of those just
recited.  The reason, we must say, is
that prostitution is a crime.  But it is
a crime against public morals and can be prosecuted de oficio.  The
alleged premarital relations of the offended husband and wife could be a vice
or defect.  And again, Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply. 
Because, the law only exacts that a criminal action for defamation be
filed at the instance of or upon complaint expressly signed by the offended
party where the crime imputed cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

Having reached the conclusion that the criminal informa­tion
filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac in
Criminal Case 2923 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Consolacion P. Mangila, Accused)
heretofore mentioned does not suffer from the defects pointed out by
petitioner, the petition herein is hereby dismissed, and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court dissolved.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.

^[1]
Criminal Case 2923, entitled “People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Consolacion P. Mangila, Accused.”

^[2]
Esperat vs. Avila (1967), 20 SCRA 597, 600-602; Le Hua vs. Reyes (1968), 23 SCRA 53, 55-57; Andico vs. Roan (1968), 23 SCRA 93, 98-100; People vs.
Doriquez (1968), 24 SCRA 163, 168-169.

^[3]
Article 358, Revised
Penal Code.

^[4]
Emphasis supplied.

^[5]
Republic vs.
Reyes (1966), 17 SCRA 170, 173, citing Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, pp. 260-261.

^[6]
Article 344, Revised Penal Code.