G.R. No. L-25481. October 31, 1969
GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT, FABIAN CAGUIAT, AND APOLONIA CAGUIAT, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES AND FRANCISCO CAGUIAT, R…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari
from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35429-R, Geronimo Caguiat et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Guillermo E. Torres
and Francisco Caguiat, Respondents, which
“denied and dismissed” the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners-appellants for the purpose
of annulling and setting aside the order of above-mentioned judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 8050 of said court
between said appellants and private appellee – respondent
herein, Francisco Caguiat granting the latter’s
motion to enjoin the taking of said appellee’s
deposition, by way of discovery, after issues had already been joined by the
filing of said appellee’s answer as defendant in
said civil case.
The controlling facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
“Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8050 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VIII, presided over by respondent
Judge, while respondent Francisco Caguiat is the
defendant therein.
On August 18, 1964, after defendant had filed his answer with
counterclaim, and the plaintiffs, their reply to defendant’s answer (See
Annexes A, B, C, D), the herein petitioners served on respondent Caguiat a notice to take his deposition (Annex E). On August
26, 1964 respondent Caguiat filed with
the lower court an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to
restrict its scope (Annex F), which urgent motion the
petitioners opposed (Annex G). On the
29th of the same month the respondent Judge issued an order (Annex F) to hold
in abeyance the resolution of his co-respondent’s urgent motion until after
the pre-trial set for September 3, 1963 which was, however, reset for October
2, 1964 to give the parties time to consider an amicable settlement. The parties however failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement.
On October 3, 1964 herein petitioners again served on respondent Caguiat a second notice for the taking of his deposition
upon oral examination (Annexes K and L), to prevent which, the latter filed an
urgent motion on the 14th of the same month (Annex M). Petitioners opposed respondent Caguiat’s urgent motion (Annex N). Resolving the urgent motion and the
opposition thereto, the respondent Judge, on the 17th, granted his co-respondent’s
urgent motion and ordered the petitioners to refrain from taking the
contemplated deposition (Annex O).
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Annex P) was denied after its
hearing on December 12, 1964
(Annex S).
x x x x x x x
The petitioners’ avowed purpose in securing the deposition of
respondent Caguiat is to get the latter to lay his
cards on the table and/or to simplify or abbreviate the proceedings. Respondent Caguiat,
on the other hand, affirms that he has already revealed practically his entire
defense, even to the extent of naming his witnesses, during the pre-trial, so
that the necessity of a deposition has been obviated. In fact, according to respondent Caguiat, he had expressed
willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, but apparently the
petitioners did not want to. We note
that the petitioners have not denied
respondent Caguiat’s assertion that he had already
disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial, neither have they belied that
personal animosities between them and the same respondent which went
unfettered during the pre-trial, might endanger the peaceful and objective
conduct of the deposition upon oral examination.
It is significant that
the respondent Judge deferred the resolution of his co-respondent’s first
motion to prevent the taking of his deposition or to restrict its scope, until
after the pre-trial (See Annex H).
Likewise, the second urgent motion of the same tenor (Annex M) and the
petitioners’ opposition thereto (Annex N) were resolved only after the
completion of the pre-trial and in fact after the parties’ joint petition for hearing on
the merits had been granted (Annex J). The fact that the controverted
orders were issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent Caguiat’s affirmation that he had revealed his defense
during the trial, and that the respondent judge had satisfied himself that
after such revelation there was no more need to take the former’s
deposition upon oral examination.
Indubitably this view must have been shared by the petitioners,
otherwise they would not have filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits
even before the orders in question were issued.” (Decision of Court of
Appeals, pp. 1-2 & 4-5)
Appellants assign the
following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
“I
“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECISION DEPEND ON
THE UNSUPPORTED CONCLUSION THAT ‘SINCE THE RESPONDENT FRANCISCO CAGUIAT HAD
PRACTICALLY DISCLOSED ALL HIS EVIDENCE
DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE’ THE NECESSITY OF A DEPOSITION THROUGH ORAL
EXAMINATION BY THE PETITIONERS WAS OBVIATED.
“II
“ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS A DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY
THE RESPONDENT CAGUIAT DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND THAT THE PERSONAL
ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES MIGHT BE HEIGHTENED, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN MAKING SAID ‘FINDINGS’ AS GROUNDS TO COMPLETELY PREVENT AND BAR DISCOVERY
THROUGH DEPOSITION ON EXAMINATION.
“III
“THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING PETITIONERS’ MODE OF
DISCOVERY TO OTHER MEANS THAN ORAL EXAMINATION IGNORING THEREBY THE SPIRIT
BEHIND THE RULES OF DISCOVERY.
(Appellants’ brief)”
Anent the first alleged
error, it is readily to be noted that the conclusions of fact of the Court of
Appeals being assailed are binding upon the parties and this Court. Indeed, the finding of that appellate court
to the effect that appellee has already disclosed all
his evidence during the pre-trial and that personal
animosities between the parties “might endanger the peaceful and
objective conduct of the deposition upon oral examination” proposed
appears well substantiated in the records before Us. As aptly stated in the appealed decision:
“It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the
resolution of his
co-respondent’s first motion to prevent the taking of his deposition or
to restrict its scope, until after the pre-trial (see Annex H). Likewise, the second urgent motion of the
same tenor (Annex M) and the petitioners’ opposition thereto (Annex N) were
resolved only after the completion of the pre-trial and in fact after the
parties’ joint petition for hearing on the merits had been granted (Annex
J). The fact that the controverted orders were issued only after the pre-trial
supports respondent Caguiat’s affirmation that he had
revealed his defense during the trial, and that the respondent Judge had
satisfied himself that after such revelation there was no more need to take
the former’s deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view must have been shared
by the petitioners, otherwise they would not have
filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even before the orders in
question were issued.” (P. 5, CA’s decision)
In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the
disclosure by appellee of practically all his
evidence at the pre-trial and the danger of heightening the animosities between
the parties during the proposed taking of the deposition of appellee
are not enough to warrant the trial court’s order preventing completely the
taking of said deposition. Such
contention is untenable.
There can be no question that the trial court has jurisdiction to
direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are
valid reasons for so ruling. (Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-7952, July
30, 1955, unreported) That the right of a party to take depositions as means of
discovery is not exactly absolute is implicit in the provisions of the Rules
of Court cited by appellants themselves, sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24, which
are precisely designed to protect parties and their witnesses, whenever in the
opinion of the trial court, the move to take their depositions under the guise
of discovery is actually intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress
them. In such instances, these
provisions expressly authorize the court to either prevent the taking of a deposition
or stop one that is already being taken.
In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all
his evidence at the pre-trial, appellee expressed
willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer, appellants
rejected. Moreover, according to Court
of Appeals, the parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits
even before the orders in question were issued.
Under these circumstances, it is inevitable to conclude that there was
indeed no further need for the deposition desired by appellants. It could have served no useful purpose, for
there was nothing anymore to discover.
Appellants have not shown any real concrete reason for such deposition.
Appellants’ inference in their third assignment of error that the
Court of Appeals has limited their modes of discovery only to other means than
a deposition is entirely baseless. All
that has been done here is to hold, and rightly, that appellants have failed to
show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in holding that, under
the circumstances proven in the records, there existed good reasons to prevent them
from taking the deposition of appellee.
It is Our conclusion that this appeal is
absolutely without merit. Instead of
availing themselves of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules in the
manner that would accomplish one of the basic purposes for which they have been
designed, namely, to cut down trivial discussion about issues of fact which are
better agreed upon rather than formally tried, appellants have chosen to unduly
delay this case by taking the simple incident herein involved to the Court of
Appeals and later to this Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Treble costs against appellants in this
instance.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.