THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GAVINO DORADO Y ARABACA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in its Criminal Case No. 66095, finding the defendant-appellant Gavino Dorado y Arabaca guilty
of having committed the crime of arson with mul­tiple homicide and multiple
frustrated homicide and sen­tencing him to reclusion perpetua
with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

The record shows that on September
2, 1962, a 5-door apartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ildefonso Tierra and an adjacent residential house, both
located in the densely populated street of Castillejos,
Quiapo, Manila
were burn­ed, resulting in the death of 21 persons and injuries to 5 others in
varying degrees.  On September 4, 1962, the appellant, who had earlier
surrendered to the Mayor of Malabon, Rizal and who was turned over by the latter to the Manila
Police Department, gave a confession in his own handwriting which was witnessed
by several news­paper reporters,^[1]
in the following tenor:

“Noong Sabado
ng gabi ako’y
nag good-time sa Baclaran at naparami ang akin nainom na alak.  Ng mag-uumaga na, siguro
mga alas dos ng umaga, ako’y umuwi
sa Castillejos, napansin ko na
sarado ang pinto, kaya ang ginawa
ko bumalik uli ako sa
Baclaran at naginum uli.  Maalaala ko ang
pagkaapi ko sa bahay kaya
naisipan kong bumili ng gasolina
at dinala ko sa Castillejos na hindi ko
nalalaman ang akin guinagawa dala ng labis kong
pagka lasing.  Dumating ako bukas
na ang
pinto patungo sa second
floor, seguro alas 5:00
o 6:00 ng umaga noon.  Pagdating sa itaas
tinumba ko yaong lata, pagkatapos
sinindihan ko.  Tumakbo ako palabas hanggang
makarating sa
Arlegui; tumawag ako ng taxi at pumunta ako sa
Quezon City,
Cubao.  Tumuloy ako sa Marikina,
at pagka­tapos pumunta ako sa Malabon
sa bahay ng Alkalde at nagsurender
ako sa kanya.

“Sa katunayan ng
lahat ng ito ay inilagda ko ang
aking pangalan sa ibaba nito
ngayon Sept.
4, 1962, dito sa
Manila.”

Soon after the appellant had written the afore-quoted confession,
he gave a more detailed statement to the police investigator in the form of
questions and answers substantially reiterating the confession he made in his
handwriting.  On September 5, 1962, the appellant reenacted the
burning of the apartment, and on the same day, he subscribed, and swore to, his
statement before an assistant fiscal of the City of Manila.^[2]

On September
6, 1962 an information was filed by an assistant fiscal of the
City of Manila charging the ap­pellant with having
committed the crime of arson with multiple
homicide and multiple frustrated homicide, be­fore the Court of First Instance
of Manila, as follows:

“The undersigned accuses
Gavino Dorado y Arabaca of the crime of Arson with
Mul­tiple Homicide and Multiple Frustrated Homi­cide, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1962, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set fire to and burn and inhabited building and the
contents therein valued at P380,000.00,
knowing the same to be occupied at the time by many persons, located at 1039 Castillejos Street, Quiapo, in said
City, which is a populated place or vici­nity
and where houses and buildings are closely adjacent to one another, thereby
causing the death of the following persons, to wit:  Jose­phine Curato,
Rosemarie Curato, Oliver Curato,
Juliana Ravelo Curato, Braulio Curato @ Joseph Lee, Marcelina Malaluan Vda. de Silva, Eufro­cinia Silva,
Rose Silva, Rufil Silva, Erlinda
Silva, Asterio Alcantara, Simeona Cuenca, Visitacion Cuenca, Rosalina Navasa, Marcelina Orillo, Eddie Ong Orillo, Lydia Alim, Martin dela Peña, Sinforiana Wero, Baby Wero de la Peña aria Orlando
Ortanez and the said act of the said accused could have caused the death of the
following, to wit:  Rogelio Villanueva,
Helen J. Villanueva, Maria Luisa
Villanueva, Phil de Guzman and Leonardo
Baaya, as a consequence, thus performing all the acts
or execution which should have produced the crime or multiple Homicide, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes, independent of his will, that
is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Rogelio Villanueva, Helen J. Villanueva, Maria Luisa Villanueva, Phil
de Guzman and Leonardo Baaya which have
prevented their death.”

There is no dispute over the fact of the burning of
the five-door apartment located at 1039 Castillejos
Street,
Quiapo, Manila, in the early morning of September
2, 1962, and of the
death of 21 of the occupants, and of the in­jury of 5 of the occupants, of the apartments, as a
result of the burning.

The decision of the trial
court finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged in the information is
based mainly on the two extrajudicial confessions of the appellant, Exhibits A
and C.  In the present appeal, counsel
for the appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding the appellant
guilty on the basis of those confessions.

We have examined the
record very carefully, and We find that the lower
court has not committed the error pointed to by appellant.

Testifying in his own
behalf in the court below the appellant admitted that he had a grievance against
the owner of the apartment, but denied having set fire to the apartment.  He claimed
in the court below, and he insists in this appeal, that he had to make and sign
the state­ments presented against him, and he had to reenact the crime, because
of the force and violence applied on him by the police.  According to the appellant, when he was turned
over to the arson division of the Manila Police Department, the
investigators slapped and kicked him;
that due to his sickness, and afraid that he might vomit blood it subjected to
further torture, he wrote his confession, Exhibit C, as dictated to him by
Captain Giron; that with regard to his statement, Exhibit A, all that are
stated therein, except his name and
personal circumstances, were supplied by the police investigators; that when he
sub­scribed and swore to said statement before Assistant Fiscal Lino Barbosa, he affirmed the
truth of its contents because he was accompanied by one of the policemen; and
that he did not reveal the fact of his having been mal­treated to the
newspaper reporters, nor to the fiscal,
or to any one, because his idea was to expose the matter when he would testify
in court, as he would then be free from harm.

On the other hand, the
police investigators who testified for the prosecution denied having obtained
the con­fessions of the appellant through violence or intimidation.  These witnesses testified that the statements
of the appellant were given by him freely and voluntarily.  The testimonies of the police investigators
were bolstered by the testimony of Rodolfo T. Reyes, a reporter of the “Manila Times”, who was
also presented by the appellant as his own witness.  Rodolfo T. Reyes testified that he and other
newspapermen saw
the appellant write his confession (Exhibit C), without dictation from
Captain Giron; that he did not see any sign of injury
on the face, nor on any part of the body, of the appellant;^[3]
that the appellant did not complain
to him, or to any of the reporters
present, at the time when he was
writing his confession and during the reenactment of the crime, regarding
any maltreatment received by him from the police investigators; and that the appellant reenacted the
crime voluntarily and without
hesitation.^[4]

We hold that the lower
court did not err when it did not give credence to the claim of appellant that his extra-judicial confessions were
extracted from him through force or intimidation.  We find no reason to alter the findings of the lower court that the
confessions of the appellant were given by him voluntarily.  It is a settled rule that the findings of
fact by the trial court should not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked
certain facts of weight and importance, it
being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the
witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies.^[5] It is also a settled rule that a confession is admissible as evidence, and
it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is shown.^[6] Before a confession can be set aside,
both the confession and the reasons or motives given for its repudiation should
be carefully scrutinized.  It would be an
unsound practice for the court to disregard the confession of an accused simply
because the accused repudiates it during the trial.^[7]

In the case now before Us, except for
appellant’s testimony repudiating his confessions, no other evidence was
adduced to show that the statements in the confessions were obtained through
force or intimidation.  On the contrary,
appellant’s claim of torture is belied by an abun­dance or evidence showing
that his confession, Exhibit C, was written by him under circumstances which
preclude any doubt as to the voluntariness of his
act.  More so, because
he wrote and signed the confession in the presence of reporters of the
metropolitan newspapers.  The
other confession, Exhibit A, was subscribed and sworn to by the appellant
before an assistant city fiscal of Manila,
and it was not shown at all that appellant ever hesitated or refused to sign
and swear to the same, much less did he protest to the fiscal regarding the way
he was investigated.^[8]
We have noted that the statements of the appellant in answer to the questions
in Exhibit A are responsive and informative. 
The statements mention details which only the declarant
could have furnished, and could not have been concocted by the investigators.  For instance, the appellant stated details
regarding his educational attainments; regarding the demolition of his
improvised room in the apartment as a result of which he lost P70.00 in cash
and P10.00 owrth of medicine; regarding his having
filed a complaint against Mrs. Tierra, the owner or the apartment, in the fiscal’s office; regarding the fact that due to his illness
he had not been drinking wine for almost 6 months because his doctor prohibited
him from doing so; and regarding the fact that after burning the apartment he
went to Quezon City, thence to Marikina,
aria thereafter to Malabon, where he surrendered to
the Municipal Mayor.  We cannot believe
that the investigators could fabricate those particulars, and that they are so
perverted and depraved as to conspire together to falsely impute to an innocent
man the commission of a very grave offense.^[9]

We agree with the observation of the trial court that appellant’s
grievance against Mrs. Tierra must have driven him to burn the apartment, but
when overcome by remorse or conscience because those who perished in the fire
were his friends and acquaintances, he voluntarily confessed his criminal act;
and realizing later the grave implications of his confessions, it must have
occurred to him, as an afterthought, to repudiate the same and assert his
innocence.

The defense contends that the appellant could not have committed^[10]
the crime because of the alleged impossibility for the appellant to enter the
building and set it afire, and that there was no eyewitness who pointed to him
as the one who set the building on fire. 
This pretension of the defense deserves no consideration in the face of
clear evidence that the appellant had confessed voluntarily his commission of
the crime, and his confession is supported by the corpus delicti.^[11]
Well established is the rule that it is not necessary that an eyewitness should
testify on having seen the accused committing the crime, of had seen him under
circumstances indicating his having committed the crime, before the accused may be held liable under his own
confession.^[12]

We find the decision of the lower court to be in accordance with
law and the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against defendant-appellant.  No
payment of indemnity is here ordered because the offended parties, and/or the heirs at the offended parties,
reserved their right to institute separate civil actions to recover
indemnities.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Exhibit C; witnessed by newspapermen, Rodolfo T. Reyes of the Manila Times;
Roberto Cuevas of the Manila Chronicle; Young Ho Yun
of The Great China News; Teddy de los Santos of the
Manila Times; David Yap of the Chinese Commercial News; F. B. de Jesus of the
Philippines Herald and Roberto S. Enriquez of the Manila Daily Bulletin.

^[2]
Exhibit A.

^[3]
In the supplementary advance fire report submitted by Cpl. Carlos Martin, Jr.
on September 7, 1962 (Exhibit E)
there appears the following
statement:  “At about 3:10
p.m. same date, (September 5, 1962)
accused was brought to the Medical Examiner’s Office, MPD, where Dr. Luis Larion
examined him. He was found to be mentally sound
and have no visible external physical injuries on any part of the body at the time of the examination.  A
certification to that effect was issued
by Dr. Larion to the undersigned.”

^[4]
T.s.n.,
pp. 44-49, hearing of April 8, 1964.

^[5]
People vs. Narciso,
et al., L-24484, May 28,
1968; People vs. Magallanes, L-21559-60, June
29, 1968; citing People vs. Catalino,
L-25403, March 15, 1968; People vs. Alto, et al., L-18660-61, November
29, 1968; People vs. Tatlonghari, et
al., L-22094, March 28, 1969; People vs. Bautista, et al., L-23303-04, May
20, 1969.

^[6]
U. S. vs.
Zara, 42 Phil. 308; People vs. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 64; People vs. Singh, 45 Phil. 676; People vs. Pereto, 21 SCRA, 1469.

^[7]
People vs. Padua, et al.,
L-14546, April 28, 1962.

^[8]
See People vs. Racca, et al., L-15812, December 30, 1961; People vs.
Ijad, L-14456, October 31, 1961; People vs. Tondo,
et al., L-9131, July 31, 1959;
People vs. Barroso, et al., L-11923, September 18, 1959.

^[9]
People vs. Pereto, L-20894, December 29, 1967.

^[10]
People vs. Ijad, supra;
People vs. Padua, supra.

^[11]
Section 96, Rule 124, Rules of Court.

^[12]
People vs. Narciso, G. R.
No. L-24484, May 28, 1968;
23 SCRA 844.