REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The present case comes by
direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila  (Case No. 44572) adjudging the
defendant-appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation,
liable in damages to the
plaintiff-appellee Republic of the
Philippines.

In the early afternoon of
August 17, 1960,
Barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down
the Pasig
river by tugboats “Bangus” and “Barbero“,^[1] also belonging to the same corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and
causing the bridge to list.  The river, at the time, was swollen
and the current swift, on account of
the heavy down­pour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15
and 16, 1960.

Sued by the Republic of
the Philippines for actual and con­sequential damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000 (Civil Case No.
44562, CFI of Manila), defendant Luzon Stevedor­ing Corporation
disclaimed liability therefor, on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were
caused by force  majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and
that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to
navigation.

After due trial, the
court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the
damage caused by its employee and ordering it to pay to plaintiff the actual
cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge
which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint.

Defendant appealed
directly to this Court assigning the fol­lowing errors allegedly committed by
the court a quo, to wit:

I – The lower court erred in not holding that the herein
defendant-appellant had exercised the diligence required of it in the selection
and supervision of its personnel to prevent damage or injury to others.

II – The lower court erred in not holding that the ramming of the Nagtahan bailey bridge by barge L-1892 was caused by force
majeure.

III – The lower court erred in not holding that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction, if not a menace,
to navigation in the Pasig
river.

IV – The lower court erred in not blaming the damage sustained by
the Nagtahan bailey bridge to the improper placement
of the dolphins.

V – The lower court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to adduce
further evidence in chief after it has rested its case.

VI – The lower court erred in finding the plain­tiff entitled to
the amount of P192,561.72 for damages which is clearly exorbitant and without
any factual basis.

However, it must be
recalled that the established rule in this jurisdiction is that when a party
appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case there for decision,
he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by
the trial Court.  The only questions that
may be raised are those of law (Savellano vs. Diaz, G.R.
No. L-17941, July 31, 1963; Aballe vs. Santiago, G.R. No. L-16307, April
30, 1963; G.S.I.S.
vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-22236, June 22,
1965).  A converso, a party
who resorts to the Court of Appeals, and submits his case for decision
there, is barred from contending later that his claim was beyond the
jurisdiction of the aforesaid Court.  The
reason is that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of
appellants’ submitting their cases for decision to either court in expectation
of favorable judg­ment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should
the decision be unfavorable (Tyson Tan et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia
de Seguros) et al., G.R. No. L-10096, Res. on Motion
to Reconsider, March 23, 1966).  Consequently, we are limited in this appeal
to the issues of law raised in the
appellant’s brief.

Taking the aforesaid
rules into account, it can be seen that only reviewable
issues in this appeal are reduced to two:

1) Whether nor not the collission of
appellant’s barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan
bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure, and

2) Whether or not it was error for the Courts to have permitted
the plaintiff-appellee to introduce additional
evidence of damages after said party had rested its case.

As to the first question
considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable
and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided
with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of
appellant’s, it is undeniable
that the unusual event that the barge,
exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a
presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the
barge or the tugs that towed it.  For in
the ordinary course of events,
such a thing does not happen if proper care is used.  In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the
inference arises by what is known as the “res
ipsa loquitur”
rule (Scott vs. London Docks Co., 2 H
& C 596; San Juan Light & Transit Co. vs. Reguena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. Ed., 680; Whitewall vs.
Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149 N. W. 299; Bryne vs. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass.
130; 168 N.E. 540; Gribsby vs. Smith, 146 S.W. 2d
719).

The appellant strongly
stresses the precautions taken by it on the day in question:  that it assigned two of its most powerful
tugboats to tow down river its barge L-1892; that it assigned to the task the
more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines,
engines and equipment double-checked and inspected; that it instructed its patrons
to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to
do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force
majeure or fortuitous event.

These very precautions,
however, completely destroy the appellant’s defense.  For caso fortuito or force majeure
(which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability)^[2] by definition, are extraordinary events not forseeable or avoidable, “events that could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable” (Art.
1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines).  It is, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been fore­seen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. 
The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility
to foresee the same:  “un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por
la sola circunstancia de que su existencia
haga mas dificil o mas onerosa
la accion diligente del presento ofensor” (Peirano
Facio, Responsabilidad
Extra-contractual, p. 465; Mazeaud, Traité de la Responsabilité Civile, Vol. 2, sec. 1569).  The very measures adopted by appellant prove
that the pos­sibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

Otherwise stated, the
appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corpora­tion, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift
current, voluntarily entered into
a situation in­volving obvious
danger; it therefore assumed the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient.  Hence, the lower Court committed no error in holding it negligent
in not suspending operations and in holding it liable for the damages
caused.

It avails the appellant naught to argue that the dolphins,
like the bridge, were improperly located. 
Even if true, these circums­tances would merely emphasize the need of even
higher degree of care on appellant’s part in the situation involved in the present case.  The
appellant, whose barges and tugs travel up and down the river everyday, could
not safely ignore the danger posed by these allegedly improper constructions
that had been erected and, in place, for years.

On the second point:  appellant charges the lower court with having
abused its discretion in the admission of plaintiff’s additional evidence after
the latter had rested its case.  There is
an insinua­tion that the delay
was deliberate to enable the manipulation of evi­dence to prejudice
defendant-appellant.

We find no merit in the
contention.  Whether or not further
evidence will be allowed after a party offering the evidence has rested his case, lies within the sound discretion of the trial
Judge, and this discretion will not be reviewed except in clear case of abuse.^[3]

In the present case, no abuse of that discretion is shown.  What was allowed to be introduced, after
plaintiff had rested its evidence in chief, were vouchers and papers to support
an item of P1,558.00 allegedly spent for the reinforcement of the panel of the
bailey bridge, and which item already appeared in Exhibit GG.  Appellant, in fact, has no reason to charge
the trial court of being unfair, because it was also able to secure, upon
written motion, a similar order dated November 24, 1962, allowing reception of
additional evidence for the said defendant-appellant.^[4]

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the lower
Court appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed.  Costs against the defendant-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., on leave, did not take part.

^[1]
The lead-tugboat “Bangus” was pulling the barge, while the tugboat “Barbero”
was holding or restraining it at the back.

^[2]
Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 661.

^[3]
Lopez vs. Liboro,
81 Phil. 429.

^[4]
p. 89, Record on Appeal.