BERNARDO LONARIA, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE PASTOR L. DE GUZMAN AND FORTUNATA SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari to review the order, dated November 26, 1962,
of the Court of Agrarian Re­lations, Judge Pastor L. de Guzman, presiding, in
CAR Case No. 60, Bulacan ‘62, ordering herein petitioned to pay additional rental of P25.00
yearly, increasing thereby the yearly rental from P200.00 to P225.00 of
petitioner’s landholding.

Petitioner Bernardo Lonaria has been an agri­cultural tenant
since 1959, on the leasehold tenancy basis, over about two hectares of
agricultural land belonging to respondent Fortunata Santiago.  Petition­er used to pay a yearly rental of P200.00
therefor, but sometime in January 1962 the owner informed peti­tioner that effective
immediately the rental was increased to P250.00, and that should tenant refuse
to pay he would be ejected.

To protect his interests, petitioner filed, on February 15, 1962,
before the Court of Agrarian Rela­tions a
petition alleging therein that the landholding had a normal average
yearly net harvest of 30.8 cavans of palay and P65.00 worth of crops, and that
pursuant to Section 46 of
Republic Act 1199, as amended, the le­gal rental should be only 7.7 cavans of palay plus P16.25 a year.  Respondent Fortunata Santiago in her an­swer,
dated March 22, 1962, claimed that “respondent’s land is a first class land and the area cultivated
by petitioner yields 60 to 65 cavans a year.” The parties entered into a
trial on November 26, 1962 wherein pe­titioner offered his evidence, while
respondent San­tiago did not submit any. 
On the same day, respondent Judge issued in open court an order, the pertinent portions of which read:

“It appearing
that the holding yields 130 cavans a year plus
mangoes and vegetables, the amount of P25.00 increase sought for by the landholder in
addition to the standing P200.00 lease
rental is considered reasonable.

“WHEREFORE, petitioner is order­ed to pay an additional amount of P25.00 or
yearly, P225.00.”

Petitioner filed a emotion for reconsideration, on November 28, 1962, upon the grounds
that (1) the affirmative and
special defenses of respondent were denied, and (2) the evidence adduced during
the trial was in direct
contravention to said defences.  This
motion for reconsideration was denied on December
26, 1962.  A second motion for reconsideration,
filled on January 22, 1963, claiming that the order of November 26, 1962 had no legal and factual bases and, hence, illegal, was Likewise
denied on February 9, 1963.

Alleging that the decision was not supported by the evidence and
that it was contrary to the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, the
instant peti­tion was filed
before this Court, praying that the decision appealed from be set aside and
that the issue be resolved on the basis of the evidence on record.

Respondent Fortunata Santiago filed April 1, 1933 a motion to dismiss upon the
principal ground that the period for the filing of the notice of ap­peal had
expired.  This Court by resolution dated
June 13, 1963 considered the motion to dismiss as respond­ent’s answer.  On July 8, 1963, however, respondents filed
their “Answer” denying petitioner’s allegation that less than
one-half of the landholding was devoted
to the cultivation of palay, and likewise justifying the decision.  Inasmuch as the requirement regarding the
perfections of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and the failure to appeal on time has the effect of
rendering final the judgment of the court, the resolu­tion of the motion to
dismiss filed by respondent on April 1, 1963 upon the ground that the appeal
was not perfected on time must be given preferential attention.

Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court pro­vides that appeals
front an order, ruling or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations shall be
brought in a period of 15 days
from notice of such ruling, or­der or decision. 
Was the instant appeal perfected within said reglementary period?

From the petitioner’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, it
appears that:

On November 26, 1962, the order appealed from was dictated in
open court;

On November 28, 1962, the first motion for re­consideration was
filed;

On January 4, 1963, petitioner’s counsel re­ceived the court’s
resolution dated December 26, 1962 denying the motion.  On this same day, counsel for peti­tioner
filed two motions, to wit: (1) motion to fur­nish petitioner with copy of the
order of November 26, 1962, and (2) motion to suspend period for finality of
the order;

On January 18, 1963, petitioner’s counsel re­ceived a copy of the
order subject of the present ap­peal;

On January 22, 1963, counsel for petitioner filed his second
motion for reconsideration;

On February 21, 1963,
counsel for petitioner received copy of the order dated February 11,
1963 denying second motion for reconsideration;

On February 22, 1963, the instant appeal was filed.  (Records, pp. 34-35)

Petitioner contends that the appeal was perfect­ed on time because only 7 or 5 days
were consumed – seven days only, even if the period be counted from November
26, 1962, because from November
26 to Novem­ber 28, there were only 2 days; from January 18 to Jan­uary 22,
there were only 4 days; and from February 21, 1963 to February 22, 1963 only
one day; hence a total of seven days.  If
the period of appeal
is to be count­ed from receipt of a copy of
the decision which in this case
was January 18, 1963, only a total of five days was consumed, because from
January 18, 1963 to January 22, 1963, only 4 days transpired; and from February
21 to February 22, only one (1) day (Records, pp. 34-35).

From what date should the
period of appeal be counted in the instant case?  When petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1962, he certainly had knowledge of the order appealed from, otherwise there was no
basis for his motion.  This s evident from the preliminary statement in his
motion for reconsideration which
cited the dispositive portion of the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
stating:

“The order sought to be reconsidered states that the petitioner is to pay a rental to respondent in the amount of P225.00 per year for the use of the land holding si­tuated
in Valenzuela, Bulacan.”

By filing said motion, he waived his right to the period of
appeal counted from receipt of order. 
The reasons for the rule requiring that the period or appeal be counted
from notice of the order or decision are, first, in order that the period may
not commence to run until the party concerned has
opportunity to take the steps he may deem proper in view of the order or decision, which steps he cannot take unless he has knowledge of the
order or decision, which knowledge he acquires usually only upon receipt
of a copy thereof; and second,
so that the commencement of the period for the appeal may not be uncertain. 
These two purposes have already
been fulfilled when petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration.  There is then no reason to say that in this
case the period of appeal should commence to run from the date he received a
copy, of the order on January 18, 1963, because settled in law is the maxim: cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex, “where the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.”

The period for appeal
should, therefore, commence from the filing of the first motion for
reconsideration, that is, on November 28, 1962. 
But this period was im­mediately suspended by the filing of the motion, notice of denial of which he
received on January 4, 1963.  His filling on the same date the motion to suspend the
finality of the order did not ipso facto suspend the running of the period from said
date, for even petitioner himself does not claim that such motion was ever
granted. Petitioner filed the second motion for reconsideration only on January
22, 1963.  From January 4 to January 22,
1963, already 18 days had lapsed, more than the 15 days allowed for appeal.  The filing of the second motion on January
22, 1963 did not suspend the running of the period, first because it was pro forma based on grounds already existing at the time
of the first motion; and second, because there was no more period to suspend,
as the period had already lapsed. 
Section 4 of Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations
provides:

“The filing of the motion for reconsidera­tion shall stay the
execution of the order or decision sought to be reconsidered and shall suspend
the running of the period within which the appeal to the Supreme Court must be
perfect­ed; Provided, however, That a pro forma motion for reconsideration which is a reiteration of
a first motion or is founded on a ground
avail­able at the time of the filing of such first motion will not interrupt
the period of appeal.”

Hence, this case must be
dismissed for having been appealed beyond the reglementary period.

Having arrived at the
foregoing conclusion, We do not consider it necessary to discuss the other points raised by
petitioner in this appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dis­missed,
and the order of respondent Court of Agrarian Relations of November 26, 1962 is
affirmed.  No pronounce­ment as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J., reserves his vote.

Bengzon, J., on leave.