ASELA P. TACTAQUIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE B. PALILEO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On September 7, 1962 appellant filed the present action against appellee
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to recover damages in the total sum of
P37,686.35 for the death of her daughter, Norma
Tactaquin, and serious physical injuries inflicted on her on June 16, 1961 when
a car recklessly driven by appellee hit them at Marulas, Valenzuela, Bulacan.

After being served with summons appellee filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the demands set forth therein were
barred by the final judg­ment
rendered in Criminal Case No. 4736 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
finding him guilty of the of­fense of homicide, with serious physical injuries,
thru reckless imprudence, arising from the same accident alleged in the
complaint, and awarding appellant damages in the sum of P4,000.00, aside from
imposing upon him (ap­pellee) the corresponding penalty of imprisonment.

Sustaining said motion, the lower court dismissed the case.  Hence the present appeal.

Grounds for reversal relied upon by appellant are that the trial
court erred (a) in holding that the claims set forth in her complaint are
already barred by a prior judgment, and (b) in holding that appellant had not
re­served her right to file a separate civil action for damages when Criminal
Case No. 4736 of the Court of Fist Instance of Bulacan was instituted.

In connection with the first question – which is obviously
decisive of this appeal – it is admitted that because of the accident that took
place on June 19, 1961 in Valenzuela, Bulacan, appellant suffered bodily
injuries and her daughter Norma died; that, as a result, appellee was prosecuted
in Criminal Case No. 4736 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan where he
was found guilty of the offenses charged and was sentenced to the corresponding
penalty of imprisonment and to pay damages o the offended party in the sum of
P4,000.00.

It is also a fact that the accident just referred to is the same
accident alleged as cause of action in appel­lant’s complaint dismissed by the
trial court.  There can therefore, be no
doubt at all that the claim for damages alleged in said complaint is already
barred.

But appellant contends that the cause of action set forth in her
complaint is not predicated upon the same criminal act charged against appellee
in the criminal case where he had been convicted, and that appel­lee’s
negligence which caused damages to her and death to her daughter is a tortious
act which “in itself can be the basis of recovery for damages
independently of criminal
action”.  In other words,
appellant distinguishes the civil liability of appellee under the Civil Code
from his liability arising from the crime committed under the facts set forth
above, invoking in support of her stand the provisions of Article 2177 of the New
Civil Code to the effect that responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding articles (quasi-delict) is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the penal code.

Appellants contention is without merit,
because according to the very legal provision she relies upon, “the
plaintiff can not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant”
(Underlines supplied).  In the case at
bar, it is crystal clear that any civil liability contracted by appellee –
whether based on quasi-delict or
otherwise – arouse from exactly the same act or omission, namely, his reckless
manner of driving which resulted in
serious physical injuries to appellant, in the death of ho daughter.  For this same act or
omis­sion appellant can not recover twice.

On the question of whether or not appellant made of record in the criminal case already referred
to her right to institute a
separate civil action for damages, the record tends to show that the
reservation was made after appellee had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had
entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of
the criminal pro­ceedings.  Consequently,
such reservation must be deemed, as in fact the lower court deemed it, legally ineffective.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment being in accordance with law, the same is hereby armed,
with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.