FRANCISCO DUQUE IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. GAVINA CRUZ AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

In this complaint for injunction filed with the lower court, the
City of Baguio, the original plaintiff, thereafter
substituted by the then Secretary of Health Francisco Duque,
would enjoin defendant Gavina Cruz “to
discontinue and desist from further continuing her construction” in the
disputed lot and to remove what was constructed thereon as well as to vacate
the premises, with the other
defendant, the Director of Lands, being ordered to cancel her provisional
permit covered by her townsite application of October
11, 1961.  The action is based on the
claim that such a lot forms part of the site alloted
the Baguio General
Hospital.  A preliminary injunction was issued as prayed
for, but upon defendant Cruz putting up a bond of P1,000.00 it was lifted.

Defendant Cruz, in her answer, maintained that the lot, the subject matter of the
complaint, does not form part of the Baguio General
Hospital reservation, being disposable public land, to obtain which she had filed the proper sales
application.  She prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and on her counterclaim sought actual and moral
damages as well as attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff as well as defendants agreed to submit the case for
decision on the following stipulation of facts: 
“That the Philippine Commission on Tuesday, October 20, 1908, by
Res. No. 67, set aside Lot No.
84, Res. Sec. ‘A’ of Baguio Townsite
for Sanatorium Reservation, * * *; That said Lot 84, Res. Sec. ‘A’, was surveyed
in 1911 and 1912 with an area of 253,608 square meters, more or less, * * *;
That the technical description of survey plan, * * * was plotted on blue print * *; that the land covered by said plan,
* * *, was subdivided by the Bureau of Lands into Lots 84-A and 84-B in 1920
and which subdivision appears to have been approved by the Director of Lands,
Jorge Vargas, in 1928; That defendant Gavina Cruz
filed. T. S. A. No. V-7302 over a portion of 750 square meters of said Lot 84-A
to the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141); That her application for a
provisional permit to occupy the land applied for was approved by the Bureau of
Lands and she paid a fee of P151.50 therefore as evidenced by Official Receipts
Nos. C-1677683 and C-5148241, * * *; That a revocable permit to build her house
thereon was issued after paying the necessary fee to the City Engineer of Baguio who approved her plan, * * *, and certified that the
area applied for was not need by the City
of Baguio; That the house of Gavina
Cruz was on Lot 84-A * * *.”^[1]

On the above facts, the complaint was dismissed, the counter
claim being disallowed likewise.  Why the
decision should be such was made clear by the lower court. “If Lot 84-A is
a part of the disposable public
domain, there would be no question whatever over the right of Gavina Cruz to apply for a portion thereof and to build her
house thereon because the Bureau of Lands which is the sole government agency
in charge of such the position had approved her Townsite
Sales Application and issued her revocable permit to occupy the land applied
for.  Before the approval of her said
application, the Director of the Bureau of Lands or his representative must
have examined the condition of the lot to determine whether it forms part of
the public domain subject to disposition or a reservation, and the City
Engineer must have certified, after investigation, that it was not needed for
public purposes by the City of Baguio, because such
are the standard procedures that must be followed before said application could
be granted.  The Director of Lands
maintains, and there is no proof to the contrary, that Lot
84-A is not a part of the Official reservation of the Baguio General Hospital. These officials must be presumed to have acted within the
ambit of their authority and have performed their duties in accord with the
law.”^[2]

The dismissal of the case, in the opinion of the lower court was
called for, as the evidence failed “to show that plaintiff or the Baguio General Hospital has acquired a right enforceable,
in law over the portion of lad
occupied by the defendant Gavina Cruz upon due authorization of the
other defendant Director of Lands who is presumed to have acted within the scope of this authority under the Public
Land Law,  * * *.”^[3]
Hence the conclusion that there was no cause of action of plaintiff against
defendants as a court should not ”countenance the summary deprivation of
citizens of rights which they have acquired in good faith under due process of law.”^[4]

The above observation of the lower court commends itself for
approval.  As far back as 1928, the
disputed lot assumed the character of disposable public land.  There was nothing to stand in the way then of
defendant Cruz filing her application so that she could, according to law,
acquire the same.  In so acting, she did
not violate any right of the City of Baguio.  All that was required of her was to observe all the legal requirements so that her rights over the same would be fully
established.  Nor was she oblivious of
any of the law’s dictates.  Plaintiff had
no valid cause for complaint.

Nor can there be any doubt as to the power of the Director of
Lands to act as he did on the premises.  The law is clear.  The Director of Lands has “direct
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form
of concession or dis­position and management of the lands of the public domain,
and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource.”^[5]
He was possessed of such a power
even under the former law.^[6] By virtue
thereof it has been the constant holding of this Court that the determination
arrived at by the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, as thus provided, is conclusive on the courts.^[7]

It may be said, however, that in this case, there is no showing
that there was such an approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.  The absence thereof does not
detract in any way from the finality of the decision, reached as far back as
1928 by the Director of Lands and not appealed.

So it was held by us in one decision, Director of Lands v.
Manuel.^[8]
According to the petition in that case, “on October 6, 1949 Paulino Manuel filed a homestead application accompanied by
an affidavit alleging that the land subject of his application was formerly
covered by a previous application filed by him in 1931, the records of which
were destroyed during the last war, and so he asked that the same be accepted
and recorded to take the place of his former application; that this new
homestead application was approved, and on April 22, 1950, Patent No. V-5117
was issued to Paulino Manuel for which a certificate
of title was issued to him in accordance with Act 496; that upon subsequent
investigation made by the Director of Lands, it was found that Manuel had
already trans­ferred whatever rights and interests he had in the land covered
by his homestead application to
Feliciano Valeroso as shown by an affidavit executed by the former on
April 28, 1947, and on the strength of
which Valeroso also filed a homestead
application for the same land; that when
Manuel reconstituted his destroyed home­stead
application he never revealed that he had already transferred to Valeroso whatever rights and interests he had in the land
applied for, thus making the
Director of Lands believe that he was entitled to acquire the land in question; and that in the light of the
foregoing facts, the Director of
Lands issued an order on May 31, 1954, declaring
that Patent No.V-5117 had been improperly issued to Paulino
Manuel and directing that proper action be taken for the cancellation of said patent.  Said order became final and executory for lack of appeal.” Essentially, the above facts were admitted, there being
only a denial that there was a transfer of the rights and interests of defendant Manuel.

On the above facts, it was our holding:  “Considering that the question relative
to the transfer of the rights and interests of respondent to Feliciano Valeroso in the land in question has already been passed upon by the Director of Lands in
the sense that the pre­ponderance of evidence shows that the former had
previously relinquish all his rights to
the entire land now covered by the latter’s application but that in spite of said relinquishment he
employed fraudulent means to have the disputed portion patented in his name,
and this decision having become final and executory
for lack of appeal on the part of respondent,
the same cannot now be looked into. 
* * *”

The principle on which the
above decision is based suffices to show the lack of merit of the
present complaint.  For it to prosper, a
1928 decision of the Director of Lands would have to be reconsidered and set
aside.  The long period of time that had
elapsed should have cautioned plaintiff from asserting a right which, as far
back as 1928, was in effect
denied.  If, after almost four decades, a determination by the Director
of Lands could still be inquired into, there would be no stability in property
rights which, undoubtedly, is demanded by public interest.

Both on legal and equitable grounds, therefore, the appealed
decision should be sustained.  The City
of Baguio
all the while could have raised the issue after such a ruling was made by the
Director of Lands in 1928 if in reality the site intended for the Baguio General Hospital
became subject, as disposable public domain, to sales application by interested
parties.  All the while, however, it did
nothing to protest against such an alleged invasion of its rights.  It was not until 1961 that the complaint in
this case was filed.

It was much too late.  It
had slept on its rights too long, even on the assumption that there was such a
failure to respect the proper boundaries
of the site which the Philippine Commission as far back as 1908 intended for a
sanatorium reservation.  Under the
circumstances above disclosed, the complaint could not prosper, and it was
rightfully dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 77-79.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 79-80.

^[3]
Ibid, p. 82.

^[4]
Ibid, p. 82.

^[5]
Section 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 141.

^[6]
Act No, 2874, Section 4.

^[7]
Alejo v. Garchitorena,
83 Phil. 924 (1949); De Guzman v. De Guzman, 104 Phil, 24 (1958); Denopol v. Director, 106 Phil. 666 (1959); Ganitano v, Sec. of Agriculture & Natural
Resources, L-21167, March 31, 1966; Heirs of Julian Molina v. Vda. de Bacud, L-20195,  April 27, 1967; Lacson-Magallanes Co. v.
Paño, L-27811, November 17, 1967; De Los Santos v.
Rodriguez, L-23170, January 31, 1968.

^[8]
L-19799, March 31, 1964.